


Social and Cultural Interferences in the
Black Sea Region

EUBSR 2013 International Conference, Volume 3

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Social and Cultural Interferences in the Black Sea Region

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Black Sea Region**
EUBSR 2013 International Conference, Volume 3

Edited by:
Mihai ȘERBAN
Gabriel LEAHU

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Cultural Integration of Foreign Students by Means of Romanian Culture and Civilization Classes

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Abstract: Within the new educational framework study programs for foreign students who attend the preparatory year in order to learn Romanian have undergone lots of changes to meet the requirements imposed by reform of the educational system and to fulfill the objectives of the globalization policy. As a result the number of Romanian classes in the curriculum of the preparatory year was reduced from 28 hours/week to 24 hours/week, but in addition classes of Romanian Culture and Civilization came to supplement them.

The paper presents the results of an investigation carried out within the Romanian Culture and Civilization classes, whose main aim was not only to familiarize the students with the Romanian culture, but also to help them better interact and function as a homogeneous group in spite of their cultural diversity.

Keywords: cultural integration, Romanian culture and civilization, foreign students.

1. Introduction

Due to its unique specializations (petroleum and gas engineering in particular), Petroleum-Gas University of Ploiesti has been developing a real tradition in Romanian teaching for foreign students. The fact that in the last decade the number of the foreign students has progressively increased resulted in the necessity of coagulating a teaching team able to respond not only to the new requirements of the CEFR, but also to have additional competences which allow them to deal with the students' needs of adapting and integrating themselves in a new/unknown social – economic and, more important, cultural environment.

We have to specify that students do not benefit from the support and guidance of a tutor designated to help them in their individual and collective efforts to socially and culturally integrate in their host country. Being the first ones to get into a permanent contact with them (besides the ones responsible for their accommodation and administrative problems), the Romanian language teachers were instinctively chosen by the students to share the difficulties they encountered during their first months of staying here.

Initially, the teachers tried to help the students in solving their daily problems as they occurred, without having in mind a defined strategy, but taking into account the existence of various factors which might influence their adaptation process. Some of the factors could be predicted from the very beginning being easily identified from the direct contact with the students, the confirmation of a scientific study not being necessary.

It is well known that factors which are not directly connected with the academic life can influence students' academic success and achievements. Such predictable factors, defined as factual knowledge (CEFR, 2000, p. 102) that affected the extent to which they adapted to the new social and cultural environment are: geographical, linguistic, social and cultural ones. "Careful consideration has to be given to the representation of the target culture" (CEFR, 2000, p.148) and a course on Romanian Culture and Civilization is more than necessary to make students become aware of the differences between the Romanian culture and their own cultures.

Individual and collective factors affect in a different manner the adaptation process, depending on each student's nationality. It is worth mentioning that within their socio-cultural knowledge a first stage is represented by adaptation, followed by their capacity to integrate. Moreover, we should take into account the following aspect: all these factors influence students' adaptation and integration in a different manner, depending not only on their common characteristics as a group (for example the Albanian group dealt in a different manner with the Romanian social and cultural realities, compared to the Turkmen or North Korean group), but also on their

individual abilities (“selfhood factors connected with their individual personalities, characterized by the attitudes, motivations, values, beliefs, cognitive styles and personality types”, CEFR, 2000, p. 105) to face the new environment.

We have also noticed that, besides these factors, their intercultural awareness has led them to a better understanding “of the relation (similarities and distinctive differences) between the world of origin and the world of the target community.” (CEFR, 2000, p. 103)

As a consequence of the direct interaction of our teaching team with several generations of students in the preparatory year, we have observed that the Romanian language acquisition process was simultaneously taking place with their individual and collective process of adapting and integrating themselves in the university community and in the Romanian society; moreover, these two processes influenced each other. That is why in the last two years we tried to better understand this complex phenomenon in order to be prepared to offer them the appropriate guidance and support. In this respect we initiated a study which aimed to identify the main stages in the cultural integration process and to find better ways of approaching the teaching activities. Based on the initial results of the study, we considered necessary to double the Romanian language course with Romanian Culture and Civilization classes meant to provide proper and oriented information about the cultural characteristics of our country.

2. Methodology

2.1. Research Objectives

The main objective of our research was to establish students’ capacity to obtain standard skills and competences, such as: initial adaptation capacity (interpersonal flexibility, open-mindedness, sociability and motivation), language competence, communication skills, social integration (ability to become part of a social network – university community, for example) and knowledge of host culture (at least insights into the host cultural pattern).

2.2. Participants

We worked with a group of 45 students coming from Albania (7 students), Turkmenistan (20 students), North Korea (5 students) and Angola (13 students) between the ages of 17 and 24 years.

2.3. Research Instrument

By means of direct observation, discussions with the students, the answers to a questionnaire, creative writing activities and group projects we managed to get a broad image of the adaptation and integration process.

The questionnaire consisted in 11 open and closed items, which are listed below:

- Q1. What did you know about Romania before coming here and where did you get the information from?
- Q2. What impressed you most when you first arrived in Romania? (that was more different than your country)
 - a. Architecture
 - b. Language
 - c. Food
 - d. People
 - e. Other aspects (please mention)
- Q3. What are the similarities between your country and Romania?
- Q4. What places did you visit in Romania? Which one did you like and why?
- Q5. What places in Romania would you like to visit?
- Q6. What Romanian celebrations do you know?
- Q7. Are there any similar celebrations in your country? If yes, which ones?
- Q8. What Romanian personalities do you know?
- Q9. How do you spend your spare time in Romania?
- Q10. Do you have any Romanian or foreign friends here?
- Q11. Who helped you more to adapt to the Romanian way of life?
 - a. Romanian friends

- b. Colleagues from other countries
- c. Teachers
- d. Other people (please, mention).

2.4. Data Interpretation and Analysis

During the entire academic year we were able to observe and identify three stages of the foreign students' adaptation and integration process in the Romanian social and cultural environment: initial stage, intermediate stage and guided stage.

2.4.1. Initial Stage

The first impact factor mentioned by the students when discussing with them was the surrounding space observed mainly by visual contact. Aspects such as the architecture of the buildings, the layout of the town, public signs and notices, traffic and living conditions impressed them as they were completely different from their country, especially in the case of Asian and African students. This new environment somehow forced them to activate their preliminary information on our country which they already had before coming here. The information they had came from various sources: the Korean students were guided by the embassy, while the others got the information in an unofficial manner, namely from the Internet which provided an objective perspective and from friends or relatives who had already had a direct contact with our culture, the general impressions being in this case not very well structured, limited and moreover subjective.

Another aspect the foreign students had to face was their need to adapt to the Romanian cuisine, the lack of the communication instrument being a major difficulty in buying supplies. In addition to that some of them had medical problems due to the particularities of the Romanian food.

Another factor that delayed their adaptation was the isolation of the African and Asian groups of students who were not accommodated with Romanian students, as different from Albanians who, even if they came later, managed to adapt easier and make up for the missed classes by means of their direct contact with Romanian roommates. Specificities connected

with language and culture mark “those who live purely local lives and therefore correlate with social class, occupation and educational level.” (CEFR, 2000, p.121).

Trying to step out from their isolation, in communicating among themselves and with Romanian students, they had to use the support language, namely English, which, unfortunately, is not very well known by all of them. That is why, for some of them the socializing process was more intense than for the others: the students who spoke English better were able to extend their social network from their classmates to different other students from the university campus or acquaintances, while for the ones who had poor English knowledge the socializing context was limited to their classmates. What should be also taken into account is that students who had a similar cultural background (Albanians) found some linking elements and benchmarks in their path towards the adaptation.

Not being equipped with the basic communication skills slowed down their correct perception of the Romanian mentalities, since “each language is a gate opening new cultures and it is important to be acquainted with other cultures in the relations between the civilizations.” (Ömer, 2011, p. 257)

In order to support them in their adaptation process, we tried to provide by means of free discussions guidance and to offer hints for real life situations in their host country as, in our opinion, the teachers are expected “to find ways of recognizing, analyzing and overcoming their learning progress as well as developing their individual learning abilities” (CEFR, 2000, p.141) and their individual integration capacities.

2.4.2. Intermediate Stage

In this stage we observed the passage from adaptation to an incipient integration. This was the result of the fact that they gained the Romanian communication instrument that offered them more opportunities of getting in contact with Romanian students and among the heterogeneous groups that constituted the preparatory year. As a result, they became more mobile, being directly exposed to the community, and they started getting familiar with the Romanian environment and culture in an empirical way.

We consider as empirical their contact because this was done in an unorganized manner, with the help of friends, mates or acquaintances.

Their access to the Romanian culture was also facilitated by activities specific to their age: listening to Romanian music, watching Romanian movies, reading Romanian newspapers and magazines, going to clubs and organizing short trips around the city which improved their language skills since “language itself gains a more broader meaning by means of its relation with culture and also when the language is the reflection of that culture, on the other hand, culture can be taught as a key or an instrument for all languages.” (Ömer, 2011, p. 258).

Other activities that aided their access to the Romanian language and culture took place during the classes when they had to take part in authentic communicative interactions, specially designed to make them face a native speaker of Romanian and role-plays where they actively interpreted certain Romanian characters. These activities captured their imagination and proved to be very motivating for them.

As their level of understanding Romanian increased, they were able to read and comprehend short texts from their textbooks or provided by the teachers, presenting parts of the Romanian culture: texts about historical cities, monuments, about important museums in our country, about Romanian personalities, about Romanian way of life etc.

2.4.3. Guided Stage

The first two stages discussed above were characteristic to the first semester of the preparatory year when the access to the Romanian culture was possible only by means of the Romanian language classes. During the last stage we were able to offer them a guided approach assisted by the Romanian Culture and Civilization classes, as a passive way of learning about the Romanian environment and to involve them in group projects, as an active way of understanding our culture and civilization compared with their own culture.

We also believe that a culture and civilization course will help them improve their Romanian language as “the specialists have an agreement on

the issue that foreign language instruction should be carried out by the means of target language's history, literature, geography and also its social characteristics" (Ömer, 2011, p. 257).

As a result, the topics covered by the course included Romanian celebrations, traditions and customs and ethnographic aspects (popular costumes, traditional alimentation, traditional architecture). During the course, the students had the chance of getting visual and audio support, by means of short movies, Power Point presentations, photographs etc.

"Many studies on cultural adaptation stress the importance of the ability to communicate with others in a culturally appropriate way and underline concepts such as empathy, perspective taking, cultural sensitivity, listening and non-ethnocentrism." (Colier, 1989). Given that, our purpose was to show to the foreign students from the preparatory year some aspects within the Romanian cultural pattern in a manner that aimed at making them capable of distinguishing between similarities and differences between the Romanian culture and their own culture and the other foreign students' culture.

In order to improve the foreign students' integration skills we made use of various student-centred teaching activities such as creative writing exercises which required self-study, gathering and selecting suitable materials and organizing the structure. Students were asked to make projects about their native culture following the pattern offered by the Romanian culture and civilization course. The purpose of these projects was to check their ability to make a description in Romanian, but also their capacity of emphasising their own cultural identity marks. The students' involvement in this task proved their availability in sharing with their mates the cultural values of their countries and their ability to select the most representative aspects of their culture. For example, they presented the popular costumes taking into account regional differences, the balance between the traditional and modern architecture, unique monuments and their significance, traditional food and elements of popular art.

This experiment was very successful from a didactic point of view, being beneficial not only for the presenters, but also for the audience who actively participated by asking questions and making comparisons and positive comments.

We diversified the formal activities with many other informal ones, consisting in visits to museums, architectural traditional monuments and exhibitions of Romanian art. In this way, students had the chance to get a clear image starting from the information received during the courses.

To study and to evaluate their level of integration we also considered useful to administer the questionnaire shown above, the findings being the following:

One of the items (Q1) within the questionnaire aimed to identify the impact factors related to their first contact with the host country. In order to obtain more detailed answers we suggested a comparison with the environment of their country. All the students indicated the language as the most significant aspect connected with their arrival here as it also represented their main concern. Their option proved that they individually were aware of the necessity to be able to interact competently in all life situations as part of their adaptation attempts. This awareness constituted a precious starting point for all their formal and non-formal activities in Romania.

Besides the linguistic matter, the foreign students indicated the social interaction experience as a defining element for their behavioural adjustment with the Romanian society. Apart from the natural differentiations (look, appearance, character features, even clothing) noticed between Romanians and their own people, students paid attention to the human dimension already having in mind the fact that the human factor would have great importance in their integration as “successful adaptation not only depends on communication, but also in learning and using appropriate behaviours” (Lewthwaite, 1997, p.169). Their answers were accompanied by additional comments on the Romanians’ hospitality, politeness and their availability to help them in daily situations, which

really impressed them in a positive way and made them overcome their shyness and refrains.

When designing the questionnaire, we also thought to evaluate the impact of the Romanian cultural model on the foreign students. Items 3 and 7 focused on this matter and the respondents proved to have the capacity to find similarities and differences between their cultures and our culture and showed great interest in understanding and correctly perceiving the intercultural context. For the Albanian students the understanding process was easier as their cultural background provided them with some links with the Romanian culture. The same thing can be mentioned with regard to the Angolan students, but in their case especially their religious beliefs (most of them are Catholics) facilitated the understanding.

As far as the Korean and Turkmen students are concerned, even if they did not indicate too many similarities, they were curious to find out details about the Romanian celebrations and treated them with respect. All the students, no matter their nationality, showed interest in enlarging their cultural horizon by visiting different places in Romania. It is worth mentioning that they not only had in mind touristic locations, but also cultural sights, especially after having contact with them during the Romanian culture and civilization course. (Q4 and Q5).

Another point of interest in our study was to determine the socializing process the students took part in. That is why Q9, Q10 and Q11 aimed at evaluating the manner in which they involved themselves in social interactions; Q11 was designed having in mind the intrinsic affective factor (sense of loneliness, homesickness) and how this factor functioned as a motivating resort in their adaptation and integration.

The answers provided by the students were various: while most of the students indicated the Romanian teachers as the people who helped them a lot, others mentioned older colleagues from their own countries, Romanian friends and acquaintances. This proved that their social network during the preparatory year is not very developed being limited to persons who can either offer them support or to companions of entertainment. This

can be also explained by the fact that spare time options (Q9) are also limited (sports activities, walks in the city, listening to music, watching movies, shopping, short trips etc.).

3. Conclusions

The aim of our study was to investigate the manner in which the Romanian language and the Romanian culture and civilization classes could help foreign students in a faster adaptation and integration to the Romanian context. We started from the assumption that learning about the culture of the target country and language increases students' interest in learning the language. We considered that teaching about cultural features brings advantages not only for the learning of the foreign language, but also in the general education process of students coming with different backgrounds.

The foreign students' empirical and intuitive adaptation and integration strategies can be supported by those of the teachers who offered them guidance and orientation in dealing with cultural matters. As the adaptation process is cyclical and recursive implies using a step by step strategy in solving their various issues. Even if the social, cultural and economic patterns are different or, in some cases, there is a mismatch between them, we did not notice negative responses to our efforts such as a continuous anxiety and frustration which might be regarded as something normal at the beginning.

We appreciate that applying this type of study was a real benefit not only for improving the teaching strategies, but also for approaching our relation with foreign students. From the perspective of the relationship between teacher and students, we also managed to take into account more subtle aspects regarding the students' integration process.

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Harmony of Civilizations in Mircea Eliade's Vision

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Abstract: My paper highlights the openings of Mircea Eliade's comparativism with regard to the interpretation of the religious significance and also to the political significance of historical facts. Phenomenology of religions in unity with the original method of Mircea Eliade's creative hermeneutics underlying participatory morphology program submit a "new humanism" which helps modern man to understand himself. In addition, this method gives an important place to the cultural alterity. In other words, from the comparative religion point the religious diversity appears as a common problem of different civilizations, in their deepest, most sensitive, most explosive potential sizes. Besides theoretical purposes, the finality of eliadean comparativism is commissioning into "dialogue" different religions and regions. By affirming the religious sense of the creative possibilities of historical facts in different geopolitical areas, but in a secret unit of the spiritual, by the importance given to the relationship between unity and diversity, Eliade cultivates a policy of cultural pluralism. Given Eliade's pleading for the hermeneutics of trust and the respect for diversity, the religious scholar can be considered a predecessor of the ideas of multiculturalism, tolerance, plural habitation cultivated in European space. Thus, starting from religious comparativism, we can prefigure a model of reconciliation between Black Sea area's civilizations - finally unified spiritually, but politically disjointed - to those regions at west, north or south of the European continent.

Keywords: civilization, comparativism, religion, hermeneutics, morphology.

1. Chapter I

1.1. Hypothesis

My study seeks to highlight the actuality of theoretical and practical openings of Mircea Eliade comparativism, which addresses both the interpretation question of the religious significance and the problem of political significance. The title, obviously, wants to be a "reply" to the title of the famous Samuel Huntington's work, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

The meaning of such a topic initially submitted to the *Second International Conference on EU and Black Sea Regions. Challenges and opportunities for a multilateral cooperation* lies in the fact that no matter how “pragmatic” would be the world we are living – and the EU as well as Black Sea Region are included in this current at least by the proposed cooperation projects, such that of the implementation of the Black Sea Synergy [1] - valuing of individuals and societies is obtained by full fulfillment of all human forces, including science, the social and transcendent, as stated Joseph Basile. According to him, social progress would be impossible without “an inner effort with the character of a religion”, without a high moral purpose, as in “the respect for of prayer” [2], not alien even to “rationalists”. And this ideal is achieved through qualitative change of mentality that allows becoming beneficial technological advances through a synthesis of knowledge, action and soul whose roots are nourished by Greek rationality, by the Roman organizational spirit and by the Christian mysticism. European thought is marked by the balance and the consistency of this humanism that “evolves and grows with time” [3].

By placing Mircea Eliade’s conception of religious harmony in a wider thinking frame, I want to show that its historical-philosophical work proposed, in fact, in the 60s - 80s of last century, a model of reconciliation and cooperation between different cultures and geographic areas which nowadays finds a full validity.

1.2. The Object and the Method: A Single Corpus

Comprehensive and meaningful to a wide cultural context, Eliade’s conception of humanism and harmony of civilizations can not be separated from its hermeneutic scope and method involving both systematic, “holistic, organic and dialectical” approach as pointed out by an interpreter as Douglas Allen: „The whole is more than the sum of its parts. No element can be understood in isolation but only in terms of its dynamic, mutually interacting relations with other key elements. New structures and meanings emerge through dynamic relations that cannot be found in any separate component part” [4].

The phenomenological problem of the religious significance interpretation involves, among other, the question of the final politics and geopolitics significances, in terms of the dialectic alternation of the sacred and profane, or in terms of the manifestation of "universal spirit" in particular historical phenomena, which can be recognized in local or regional symbolisms: "Eliade is not simply a brilliant, unsystematic, intuitiv genius, as extolled by some supporters, or a methodologically uncritical, unsystematic, hopelessly unscientific charlatan, as attacked by some critics. I formulated Eliade's foundational system primarily in terms of two key interacting concepts: the dialectic of the sacred and the profane, the universal structure in terms of which Eliade distinguishes religious phenomena, and religious symbolism, the coherent structural systems of religious symbols in terms of which Eliade interprets the meaning of religious phenomena. I maintain that it is the essential universal systems of symbolic structures, when integrated with the essential universal structure of the dialectic of the sacred, that primarily constitute Eliade's hermeneutical framework and serve as the foundation for his phenomenological approach"[5].

Also, the first assumption of Mircea Eliade's method is that of unity in Carl Olson's vision. The interpreter bases this assertion on the well known eliadian axiom concerning the sacred as structural element of human consciousness. And the fundamental unity of religions is based, he reminds, on the "indivisible unity of the history of human conscience" [6]. Using the arguments from *A History of Religious Ideas, Patterns in Comparative Religion, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*, Carl Olson emphasizes the connection between the discovery of religious experience's continuity and the determining of research method. In other words, "the dialectic of the sacred" remains the same by completely and spontaneous rediscovering of the old religious values, regardless of the historical period and geographical location.

One implication of the dialectic of the sacred unity consists in the fact that it tends to recur indefinitely in a number of archetypes, so that a hierophany (i.e. a sacred manifestation) which is achieved at a certain "historical moment" is structurally equivalent to an earlier or a later one. In

conclusion, according to Olson, Eliade develops hypotheses of a historical unity of human consciousness, which will have important implications for other aspects of his hermeneutics [7] and should have implications for the peaceful relations between nations and areas of civilization.

According to another interpreter, David Cave, the main points of both eliadean "hermeneutic program" and eliadean comparativism based on religions morphology are the following: "By resorting to a morphology, instead of aligning symbols along a chronological, evolutionary line, Eliade could compare religious facts across space and time even when the cultures involved had had no known historical or geographical contact. Thus, for instance, Eliade interpreted the regenerative meanings attached to lunar symbolism by comparing fertility myths among the Eskimos, Australians, Indians, Greeks, Romans, Persians, Algerians, French, Germans, and Portuguese - in only three paragraphs! Symbols universalize. They cohere. They express the unity of humankind. And all local-provincial phenomena find their true and more complete meaning in the larger, global meaning of symbols"[8].

Mircea Eliade's hermeneutics originality is achieved at the same time as the unity between experience and method: "However implicitly or explicitly he articulated a methodology, Eliade lived out the full implications of his hermenutical discoveries. He lived in a constant dialogue between experience and method. The importance of this relationship between experience and method is understood when placed within the context of the hermeneutical tradition" [9]. The unity between experience and method underlies the "hermeneutic program" of what David Cave called "participatory morphology" and the "new humanism" which Eliade himself has proclaimed.

2. Chapter II

2.1. The Dialectic of the Sacred and the Revelation of World Religious Unity

In comparative practice, as opposed to the ethnographic or evolutionary models – the morphological model summarizes a large number of data, it maintains the plurality and proffers an interpretive scheme in kind to that proposed sometime by Wolfgang von Goethe. As shown by Cave, "The Goethean Morphology postulates a once 'existent' primordial plant (Urpflanze) that orders in an integrating fashion all variant plants spawned throughout time. The primordial plant itself is an archetypal, metaphorical, symbolic concept having no historical actuality, except as it is manifested through the wide diversity of its variants in and throughout history. The primordial plant is beyond the vicissitudes of time and so, however much the variations on the plant might be and become, the structure of the primordial plant stays true within each variant"[10]. Moreover, Eliade reopens the Goethian theoretical concerning the symbol: "For Goethe, the symbol was a 'living, instantaneous (*lebendig- Augenblickliche*) revelation of the inscrutable'. The Goethean symbol as revelation itself was then shared by Corbin, Scholem, and Eliade. Corbin used both of Eliade's perennial terms for revelation, 'hierophany' and 'theophany'. He explicitly cited Eliade on this usage" [11].

Thus morphology preserving the irreducible quality of a phenomenon prefers structural connections (synchronicity) between traditions. Finally, the morphology is governed by the concept of paradigm that defines the structure (and its change is equivalent, in the history of culture and civilization, with a historical mutation). But on the other hand, the necessity of shaping a new humanism arises from the existence of historical diversity, as a "participatory morphology", axis of eliadean hermeneutics (David Cave).

Furthermore, in Joseph M. Kitagawa and Gregory D. Alles's analysis, eliadean method can be located in the tradition of dialectic discourse addressing the parties and the whole dialectic [12].

Further it should be noted that David Cave outlines the relationship between the eliadean method leading to the idea of world religious unity with the anthropological concept of *homo religiosus*: "Similar to Dilthey's hermeneutics, Eliade's opens the interpreter to universal culture. In the broad comparative line of Max Müller and George Dumézil, Eliade seeks a common religious heritage among humans based on the universal presence of symbols. But to have a universal hermenutics a theory of human nature is needed to draw the different cultures together. This unity of the human spirit Eliade found in the anthropological concept of *homo religiosus*, an irreducible construct wherein the person encounters the sacred through symbols" [13].

Already in the 60s and 70s decades, as noted Guilford Dudley, Mircea Eliade becomes the leading spokesman for a new discipline began to become autonomous, "Religionswissenschaft", newer than the history of religions. According to Dudley, the future of the history of religions depends on the general acceptance of the methodology proposed by Mircea Eliade. Moreover, this is a model for other areas, because Eliade has shown the right way between conflictual methodologies, through the ability of its method to satisfy the demands of "hard" ways of religions science and those of "soft" ways of the same discipline. By "hard approach" G. Dudley understands empirical information, direct primary thought, while the "soft approach" means the "intuition of religious phenomena essences" [14]. History of Religions methodology helps the modern human being "to understand himself" (Gerald C. Braar), and the non-academic reason for this prediction related to the observation that, for example, Americans need increasingly more understanding of Asian peoples and for this they need to understand their religions [15]. It is what Mircea Eliade observed in connection with the entry of new nations in history, a situation which requires a "new humanism". That is to say that the eliadean method is

related to the specification of otherness non-European and non-American cultures place in a global world.

The fact that the human being is studying himself in comparative religion, that religious diversity is a common human problem is also emphasized by Wilfred C. Smith. He shows that in the history and philosophy of religions the man is studied in some of the deepest, most complicated, “potentially the most explosive“ aspects of its modern situation [16].

Also, in order to extend the possibility of reconciliation and understanding in the frame of human community the proposed method is the dialogue. European public space provides, in principle, this possibility, especially since in recent years it has opened to the Black Sea, by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU. Besides theoretical achievements, the comparative method might actually consist of the dialogue implementation between different religious, different areas, different authors, different individuals or citizens. Looking at United Europe as a symbol, we even discover the etymological definition of the symbol that tells us that the original symbol establishes relationship between equal partners. For in the frame of this definition, each of the holders of a e significant equal “half“ is equal with any other holder. In other words, every human being, in principle, when contemplates his proper sacred symbol is found in the position of a model, which approximates the model of European citizenship ideal.

2.2. To the Harmony of Civilizations: An Opened Scientific Work

Referral to these openings to historical actuality that allows the work of Mircea Eliade as a unity between the object and method could pass as a possible response to allegations of “anti-historicism”, of inadequacy to reality and to the practical problems of human being. Mircea Eliade's methodology, notes Wendell Charles Beane is not an anti-historical one, but rather his sense of historiography reflects a creative dialectic of the romantic and of history, if by “romantic“ is understood human desire — within the meaning of human search — to achieve the ideal understanding of the religious phenomenon: “and thus we are being summoned by

Eliade's thought to acknowledge that, to the extent that we are willing to confess that we are in search of such 'ideal understanding', we need not assume a vehemently antithetical posture before him, the man (though posthumously), and/or his *œuvres*. The quest for the ideal understanding of anything or any number of things, therefore, constitutes the prime archetypal motivation in all of us both as human beings and as scholars" [17].

On the other hand, beyond the assertion of unity, to support pluralism, Mircea Eliade says at one point that "What is striking in the history of religions is not the almost universal presence of some important rituals, myths and symbols, but the fact that their significance is never *exactly* the same" [18]. Thus, for example, " Christianity has utilized, amplified and revalorized the symbolism of the Cosmic Tree. A Homily of pseudo-Chrysostom speaks of the Cross as a tree which 'rises from the earth to heaven. A plant immortal, it stands at the centre of heaven and earth; strong pillar of the universe, bond of things, support of all the inhabited earth', etc. The Byzantin liturgy sings even now, in the day of the exaltation of the Holy Cross, of the 'tree of life planted in Calvary' (...). Many texts compare the Cross to a ladder, a column or a mountain - and these are universally attested images of the 'Center of the World', the *axis mundi*.(...) But, of course, for Christians the cross was sanctified through the agony and death of Jesus: it became the instrument of salvation. (...) Idea of salvation prolongs and completes the notion of perpetual renovation and cosmic regeneration, of universal fecundity and sanctity, of absolute reality and, in the final reckoning, of immortalitya" [19].

In addition, N.J. Girardot was fascinated and inspired by "the magnanimity of his vision (what he would have called his 'bird-view' of religious experience), his open-ended methodology, his respect for the contributions of other disciplines, his emphasis on the hard work of historical research (including adequate language skills) while also stressing the importance of a serious generalist approach to interpretation as opposed to the hyperspecialization of most disciplines, and his sense of irony about the

strangeness of the total human enterprise. His mystocentric genius was to affirm the creative possibility of finding religious meaning in absolutely anything. These themes, I should say, are expressive of the culturally eclectic and transitional tenor of the late 1960s in the United States, an association that, perhaps like the association of some intellectual movements in the late 1930s in Europe, alludes both to the artistic and cultural vitality and to the romantically self-deceptive and totalitarian danger of periods of rapid historical change" [20].

Returning, relationship between unity and diversity plays an important role in the method of Mircea Eliade and it has consequences related to a profound personal history: "If Eliade ends up with any political philosophy, it is in offering the ideal of a way to do this, by means of a politics of radical sacred-in-the-secular pluralism, where nothing is touched that would disturb the sacred's fragile and fascinating diversity, since it is only from a hierophany here, and a lost parable there, the real humanism is learned. Here is where the radical polarity of Eliadean religious universalism from fascist totalitarianism becomes clear. The capacity for the sacred to take new shapes needs to be preserved. But it can only exhibit its wonderful diversity and take new shapes in the matrix of a world which contains at least the *apparent* nonsacred, even the terror of history, against which the sacred stands in bold relief and above which it shines like haeavens" [21]. Now, the terror of history is manifested in everyday life, but during Eliade launched this concept (in the book *The Myth of Eternal Return*), this was manifested in the lack of sense of the Cold War and of the East-West blocks separation.

The "Gnostic", the orientalist or the ethnographer Eliade are found in the the philosopher and historian of religions which communicates in an original language the fact that between differnt cultures and areas, such as, for example, on the one hand, bordering states Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Georgia, and, on the other hand, western, northern or southern European countries, the cooperation is possible, at least on common foundation of conscience on the sacred, before it reaches the actual concepts such as "Black Sea Synergy".

Although religion does not appear as a problem in defining European identity, however the premise of pluralism and democracy includes it. In European history, transmission and appropriation of elements of civilization and culture from the Mediterranean area to the Greek and Byzantine spaces, in Roman, Celtic, Germanic, Balkan, Scandinavian, Slavic and Baltic spaces stands as a proof of a "european integration" which has a strong impact on the evolution of peoples and states on the continent.

3. Conclusions

Phenomenology of religions in unity with the original method of Mircea Eliade's creative hermeneutics underlying participatory morphology program submit a "new humanism" which helps modern man to understand himself. In addition, this method gives an important place to the cultural alterity. In other words, from the comparative religion point the religious diversity appears as a common problem of different civilizations, in their deepest, most sensitive, most explosive potential sizes. Besides theoretical purposes, the finality of eliadean comparativism is commissioning into "dialogue" different religions and regions. By affirming the religious sense of the creative possibilities of historical facts in different geopolitical areas, but in a secret unit of the spiritual, by the importance given to the relationship between unity and diversity, Eliade cultivates a policy of cultural pluralism. Given Eliade's pleading for the hermeneutics of trust and the respect for diversity, the religious scholar can be considered a predecessor of the ideas of multiculturalism, tolerance, plural habitation cultivated in European space. Thus, starting from religious comparativism, we can prefigure a model of reconciliation between Black Sea area's civilizations - finally unified spiritually, but politically disjointed - to those regions at west, north or south of the European continent.

Treating this aspect which starting from the work of Mircea Eliade suggests a pacifist model, is not only a "challenge", but it suggests also the spiritual "opportunities", the profound premises of a "multilateral cooperation".

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Socio-cultural and Ecological Characteristics of Sustainable Development

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Abstract: Sustainable development is a long-term development of economic activity characterized by satisfying the needs of present generations without diminishing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

Sustainable development is a fundamental objective of the European Union, aimed at continuously improving the quality of life and well-being for present and future generations by creating a link between economic development, environmental protection and social justice.

Sustainable development involves fulfilling certain objectives, such as:

- Maintaining the capacity of natural systems to provide raw materials and energy and to absorb the waste resulted in producing economic goods;
- Enhancing the environment supportability;
- Increasing the quantity and quality of usable natural resources;
- Reducing the impact of technology on the environment;
- Increasing the efficiency of natural resource use;
- Rising living standards.

Due to sustainable development, the positive effects of scientific and technical progress manifest on a long term.

Keywords: sustainable development, natural resources, biodiversity, poverty, wages, environment.

1. Introduction

A key objective of the EU Strategy for Sustainable Development is to promote a democratic, secure and fair society, taking into account social inclusion and healthy living principles, regarding fundamental rights and cultural diversity that creates equalization of opportunities and to combat discrimination in all its forms.

2. The Social Dimension of Sustainable Development

In the center of EU policy is the man, by promotion of fundamental rights, combating all forms of discrimination and contributing to poverty reduction and the elimination of social exclusion worldwide.

Poverty is a state of an individual or family, characterized by a lack of intellectual ability and economic resources necessary to meet minimum basic needs and survival in a society. It means that the individual does not have sufficient financial resources to enable a minimal participation in social life.

Currently, poverty means lack of financial resources that would allow human individual a standard of living adequate to collectivity standards [1].

Poverty can be understood as an absolute phenomenon or a relative phenomenon [2].

Absolute poverty means no minimum living conditions that would allow survival of individual and his family under the context of that society.

Relative poverty means no minimum resources required for the normal person (families) in a given socio-cultural context.

Expanding of poverty represents a limiting factor for economic growth, and recovery of social and economic development [3].

Preventing expansion of poverty and reduction its proportion ratios are priority objectives of social policy.

A serious phenomenon faced by Romanian society is now amplifying poverty.

Reducing poverty is a fundamental objective of social policy. In our country, social policy aims at currently, especially, protecting the public from the adverse effects of the economic crisis.

In the ensemble means of social protection, social security has an important role [4]. In a modern economy, social security contributes to mitigating the effects of poverty by providing income (social benefits) to individuals who

cannot obtain income from employment, as they face social risks (old age, sickness, unemployment), and to families with many children, that are eligible for social support.

A foundation of social policy is Pareto's Principle, according to which any change is good, as long as, at least one individual, do to be better located, without making anyone else worse situated.

A change that increases personal income, situated below average, which does not mean a decrease in other income, meets Pareto condition: it allows some individuals to have a better standard of living, but this does not mean a worsening of living standards for others. Such a change can be seen, therefore, that a good thing, even if it leads to increasing inequality of income distribution.

In Romania, the average wage earning is low compared to that existing in the vast majority of European countries.

Country	2000	2008	2009	2010
Romania	1732	5777,0	5221,0	5426,0
Bulgaria	1393,3	3368,0	3767,0	4008,0
Czech Republic	4577,5	10937,0	10673,0	11364,0
Holland	29600,0	39440,0	40615,0	41135,0
Poland	6004,6	10050,	8604,0	9683,0
Slovenia	11146,6	16711,0	17286,0	17956,0
Sweden	–	34620,0	32164,0	36797,0

Source: Romania in figures, 2012 Statistical Summary, p. 78

Table 1. Average gross annual earnings (Euro) in some European countries

From the presented table, results significant disparities between the economies of European countries in terms of average gross annual earning, in euro currency. The lowest levels of this indicator are in Bulgaria and Romania, reflecting low levels of productivity and welfare. In principle, the size of earning in a country is positively correlated with the level of economic development, expressed by developments in total and per capita gross national product. Awarding of wages according to productivity of workers contribute to raising efficiency of economic activity [5]. If workers

are well paid, they will submit most of the time, more effort, and costs of job losses are high. If wages are so low that the workers do not care if they stay or lose their job, their productivity will be lower.

Higher wages can improve worker productivity, because they allow a healthy alimentary diet and an improvement in general worker state of health. Increased wages are an incentive for individuals to invest [6] in their own education and to qualify to increase their employability.

Negative aspects for sustainable development are highlighted by some demographic indicators. Thus Romania in 2011, registered a negative natural growth and infant mortality per 1000 live births high, resulting in a detrimental imbalance in structure per age of the population.

Country	2000	2008	2009	2010
Romania	9,2	11,8	-2,6	9,4
Austria	9,1	9,3	-0,2	3,8
Bulgaria	10,7	14,2	-3,5	9,0
Czech Republic ¹	10,4	10,2	0,2	2,7
Denmark	10,6	9,4	1,2	3,5
Germany ¹	8,1	10,4	-2,3	3,5
Greece ¹	9,2	9,6	-0,4	3,8
Poland ¹	10,2	9,8	0,4	4,7
Portugalia ¹	9,2	9,7	-0,5	3,1
Hungary ¹	8,8	12,9	-4,1	4,9

¹ Provisional data

Table 2. Natural movement of population, statistics in 2011, in some European countries (per 1,000 inhabitants)

3. The Environmental Dimension of Sustainable Development

The environment has an important contribution to economic activity, which is manifested in at least three ways:

Constitute the sole source of energy and raw materials which are transformed into economic goods;

Provides storage for emissions and waste generated by economic activity and consumption necessary to develop human life;

Provides indispensable conditions for maintaining life.

Capacity of the natural environment to support economic activity and development of life is diminished by the occurrence of adverse and unwanted processes.

EU Sustainable Development Strategy (EU SDS) include targets for conservation and management of natural resources, such as [7]:

Improving efficiency in using resources, aiming to reduce the overall use of unrennewable natural resources and the use of renewable natural resources at a rate that does not exceed their regeneration capacity.

Achieve and maintain a competitive advantage by improving resource usage efficiency, through the promotion of eco-efficient innovations.

Improving management and avoiding overexploitation of renewable natural resources and restoring degraded marine ecosystems;

Halting the loss of biodiversity;

Avoiding waste production and encourage efficient use of natural resources through the application life cycle concept and promoting reuse and recycling.

Achieving objectives requires a range of actions, among which are: the introduction of rural development programs, adoption of necessary legislation in favor of sustainable development, and the protection of forests.

Ecological dimension of sustainable development can be assessed by indicators such as forest area, the number of species threatened with extinction, average annual deforestation, and surface of protected areas to

maintain biodiversity, and environmental quality and protection indicators.

Country	2000	2008	2009	2010
Romania	27,3	-0.22	37	19,9
Austria	46,5	-0.13	30	22,9
Germany	31,1	-	47	42,4
Denmark	11,6	-1.14	20	4,9
Switzerland	29,1	-0,38	14	24,9
France	29,1	-0,39	88	16,5
Italy	30,2	-0,90	122	15,1
Poland	29,7	-0,37	26	22,4

¹ Negative values show an increase in areas under forests

² Calculated based on Romanian Statistical Yearbook 2012, pag.635, 636, 637, 696

Table 3. Indicators of biodiversity in some European countries

Analysis of indicators reveals lower weight ratios of forests in total area in Romania in relation to many European countries and also, a large number of species threatened with extinction, a feature common to all European countries.

Interest in sustainable development, and attention that is given to environmental threats, have spurred governments to re-examine the ability of monitoring and evaluation of environmental quality.

Various human activities have a clear impact on the environment, impact can be seen at local, regional or global.

According to Larousse dictionary, the environment is an "ensemble" different at some point, by physical agents, chemical, biological and social factors likely to have a direct or indirect, immediate or delayed effect, on living organisms and human activity.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) - like other international organizations - in line with the purpose of promoting economic development in member countries, is concerned with

quantitative and qualitative aspects of economic growth and sustainable development. In this respect, protection and environmental quality statistics provide useful data and information necessary to substantiate and promote sustainable development decisions.

The concept of "sustainable development" was promoted as a guide for policy makers in the political plan, in order to shape policies that adequately address social and economic needs of a growing global population, while maintaining environmental quality and natural resources. It becomes therefore extremely important to place clear and coherent environmental information in a context of sustainable development.

The experience of recent decades shows that there are important relationships between environmental quality and protection issues (global and local) and other topics, such as economic development, human development, population growth, poverty, changes in political structures. In fact, many environmental problems occurred mainly due to economic and social problems cannot be solved by isolated measures relating to technology and law.

Access to natural resources, is growing as a major cause of poverty and social disparities in developing countries. Also, access to adequate food and clean water is a key factor for improving population health.

Another major environmental health problem is air pollution (as reported by the World Health Organization, is responsible for more than 6% of annually causes of death recorded in the world). Due to the increasing use of liquid and solid fuel (both traffic and industrial processes), air pollution will probably become even more important, especially in developing countries and transition.

Environmental indicators include aspects of land use, especially by conversion to agricultural use, which can lead to major losses of natural capital. In addition, factors such as erosion, salinization, pollution, climate change may severely damage the ecosystem quality and all these aspects are strongly connected, both in terms of causes and effects.

In practice, the list of global environmental issues is very dynamic, as far as old problems are not completely solve and new ones appear or increase weight gain. Therefore, environmental indicators should be treated as a system, and the analysis process should be made on evaluation layers.

Traditionally, analyzes and reports on the state of the environment are focused on the quality of water, air, soil. Monitoring programs are built, thus, in particular for measuring concentrations of pollutants. Once the issues are identified, the challenge is to find out the causes of environmental change, to be able to outline the actions and measures to be taken. Major issues affecting the environment, and that can be solved relatively quickly and inexpensively, will receive the highest priority. Actions will be formulated to remove the causes of environmental degradation and, therefore, will be chosen appropriate tools. These factors should not be applied only by government but also by individuals, private companies, and non-governmental organizations.

The main topics of interest to characterize environmental issues are (in the opinion of the OECD Council): climate change, ozone depletion, eutrophication, acidification of waters with toxic contamination, urban environmental quality, biodiversity of waste, natural resources of the waters; forest resources, soil and subsoil resources, soil degradation.

Natural resources, especially renewable ones, are of major importance, both environmentally and economically, because they constitute the basic support for human life and ecosystems. Although the qualitative aspects of a strong link, indicators aimed primarily at quantitative aspects of natural resources and focuses on finding the answer to the question of sustainable development: natural resources extracted and used beyond renewal stocks (reserves) in the long term.

Sustainability of natural resources has been an important theme of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, Rio de Janeiro, 1992).

Agenda 21, adopted by the Conference, explicitly addresses several points, such as the protection and conservation of fresh water resources, biodiversity conservation and sustainable management of soil to prevent overfishing of the oceans degradation coastlines and coral reefs. In addition, there are several international conventions and agreements on natural resource management, such as those concerning the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Sustainable management of forest resources will take into account the fact that excessive use of forests leads to a decrease in long-term productivity and regenerative capacity of the soil. At the same time, small sampling rates (in particular, where classes are imbalanced age) may also reduce productive capacity of forests and act against the production of wood. For sustainability, forest management should aim an optimal sampling rate.

OECD Council recommended indicators of general socio-economic activity, population and environmental costs - factors that impact on the environment. Economic activity is a key factor in quality and environmental protection. On the one hand, economic growth pressure on the environment through pollution and natural resource use. This pressure gives rise to concerns about the quality of natural resources reserves (also called natural capital). On the other hand, growth offers opportunities on public expenditure for environmental protection and to fund research necessary for the introduction of clean technologies and consume less natural resources.

Changes in consumption patterns and protection are key preoccupations to achieve sustainable development for performance on quality and environmental protection.

Transport is a key factor, determinant for economic activity and has environmental impacts.

For transport to be sustainable it must meet the needs of economic, social and environmental needs of society, reducing the undesirable impacts.

4. Conclusions

Poverty alleviation involves objectives, actions, and strategies of social policy analysis at EU level and in each state.

Extending unemployment and declining purchasing power lowers living standards. Decisively to restrict expansion of poverty is economic recovery and increasing revenues. Otherwise, the Romanian economy will have the characteristics of poor countries, with a standard of living of most people, near the poverty line.

A less discussed topic, in comparison to the economic dimensions of the formation of the single market, liberalization of capital movement, and the formation of the monetary union, is the social dimension of the EU.

One explanation may be that in the first three decades of the postwar period was a high and growing economic prosperity of the citizens of the Member States forming the belief that economic progress generates social progress. But positive economic results do not automatically solve social problems facing the citizens of the Member States. Among the social problems faced by the population of EU member countries are:

- Increasing the number of unemployed and low rate of employment;
- High share of long-term structural unemployment;
- High unemployment disparities across countries;
- The need to reform the social security system, especially in the area of pensions, unemployment benefits, family allowances.

Social policy includes measures to increase employment and social services to support people in vulnerable situations. Their number is high, given that Romania is facing a high unemployment rate, the poverty extended to regional disparities in terms of economic and social development, with an aging population.

Among the problems facing our country, is the active inclusion, in the labor market, of people with disabilities and adequate social services in order to facilitate labor market inclusion of all persons with disabilities who can, and

want to work. To this end it seeks to train people with disabilities and assist the establishment of workshops employing persons concerned.

Natural resources, especially renewable ones, are of major importance because they constitute the basic support for human life and ecosystems. A basic principle of the economic activity must be that natural resources extracted and used does not exceed renewal stocks (reserves) in the long term.

Typically, analyzes and reports on the state of the environment are focused on the quality of water, air, soil. Monitoring programs must measure concentrations of pollutants and after identifying environmental issues appropriate measures should be applied.

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The Security of the Human Individual in the Social Environment

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Abstract: It is clear that national security systems, zonal, regional or global can not build environments in which the individual does not feel protected. Ignoring this reality, the systems are not only ineffective, but sooner or later collapse under its own weight contrasts. If an individual is threatened, then both of which the group security and other related communities is threatened. If all groups want to achieve and preserve state security, they must be based on individual security on the basis of humanity's intrinsic connection. However, the institutions and national, regional, regional or global, there may be discrepancies between the interests of individuals and those of the institution / organization to which they belong. Institutions, whatever the level to which we refer, is the sum of rules of influence and social control of individual behavior, specific and stable patterns of organization and development of social interactions between individuals and groups focused on meeting basic needs, values and interests paramount, strategic maintaining social collectivity. Since achieving security aims to achieve a state in which the perception of risks, dangers and threats to existence, values and interests of human individuals (in any form of constitution) by the existence of divergent interests and values, they will feel a deep discomfort and insecurity. But most times, the vision of institutions / organizations on the process of achieving security is much broader than that of the human, whose action is the main theme personal safety or, at most, the group to which it belongs, excluding the one of the higher forms of social organization. Also, different interests and values are manifested in the relations between individuals and institutional, not only between individuals and institutions, therefore achieving total security state representing a process can not be completed. All meanings of human existence are constructed by definition results from perceptual experience of individuals. Overall security status involves achieving a perceived lack the risks, dangers and threats to be absolute, unquestionable, or this is hampered by the huge variety of values and interests, which often conflicts, creating fears of individual security, group, national, state, supra. Simultaneously with the progress of the human spirit and society progresses and what we consider risk, danger and threat.

Keywords: security, the human, social, threats, risks.

Security at any level, is the man topic that transcends all boundaries. In this case, what should be emphasized in security studies is precisely the

individual security or, as some experts call¹, human security. This includes a number of rights and freedoms set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: individual rights (right to life; recognition before the law, protection from cruel or degrading forms of punishment, protection against racial, ethnic, sexual or religious etc..), legal rights (access to legal means to prevent the violation of fundamental rights, protection against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile), civil liberties (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), subsistence rights (the right to food and basic standards of health and welfare), economic rights (the right to work, rest and recreation, social security) and political rights (right to take part in elections and participate in government). Moreover, depending on the nature of the rights and freedoms can be systematized and types of threats to human security: individual (physical violence, murder, accidents) Community (oppression, decay, discrimination), political (repression, torture, violation of rights fundamental), economic (poverty, hunger, lack of housing and living conditions in general), health (diseases, unsanitary conditions of living) and ecological (environmental degradation, pollution, natural disasters). In his understanding Ole Waever, human society is an entity resulting from a process of coexistence and association between people and groups bearing a number of common attributes (race, ethnicity, language, history, geography), which give expression to the common feelings (identity, symbols, values).

The most important aspect of human security is the quality of life, what a concept is evaluative and reporting resultant living conditions and activity that make up human life, needs, values and human aspirations². It is noted that this concept refers both to the objective conditions in which human

¹.View Weissberg, Matthew, conceptualizing Human Security in "Swords and Ploughshares. A Journal of International Affairs" - online version <http://www.american.edu>, Spring 2003, Volume XIII, No. 1, pp. 3-11 and Hampson, Fen Olsen, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder*, Ontario, Oxford University Press, 2002

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life is and how each individual subjectively evaluate their own life. The most important social and sociological indicators and which measures the objective conditions are: - social and sociological indicators and indices of housing: housing stock (number of dwellings per thousand inhabitants incumbent, incumbent number of rooms per thousand, the average living area that belongs to a³ person), the development of the housing sector (public sector involvement in housing, infrastructure costs accruing to a person within one year in urban areas), housing (urban population rate, the rate of population living in the areas affected by pollution, environmental pollution mortality rate housing with potable water)⁴, social and sociological indicators and of poverty: the poverty, the minimum subsistence poverty rate, poverty gap, Sen index (percentage of total income of the population that should be transferred to the poor, so that their revenues are brought to the poverty threshold), Fishlow index (poverty gap expressed as a percentage of revenues of nonsăraci the idea of eliminating poverty through direct transfers of income from them), the Gini coefficient (a measure of income inequality) and so on⁵; Health indicators: rates of morbidity, morbidity quotas, access to health services, providing people with doctors, pharmacists providing the population with indicator insurance human resources, etc.⁶, Freedom and human development indicators: indicator human freedom, human development indicators - indicators characterizing the education system: school enrollment, internal efficiency of the education system, the quality of educational services and resources etc.⁷ Regarding the subjective conditions of quality of life, basic indicators are: perceived quality of life

³. xxx, *Sociology and Social Indicators in Vlăsceanu* Catalin Zamfir and Lazarus (eds.), op. cit., 1998, pp. 699-738.

⁴. Ibid

⁵.Ibid

⁶. Ibid

⁷.Ibid

indicators, indicators of satisfaction with life, happiness indicator, indicator etc alienation.

If an individual is threatened, then both of which the group security and other related communities is threatened. If all groups want to achieve and preserve state security, they must be based on individual security on the basis of humanity's intrinsic connection. Human development can not be achieved without ensuring human security. Human security usually involves a condition in which people can exercise their choices safely and freely, without fear that the opportunities they enjoy today will be lost or withdrawn tomorrow. Security means that the benefits they have reached people in expanding their opportunities and capabilities improve current arrangements are protected by social, economic, political. Security is based on a broad social acceptance - based on sustainable institutions - the rights and obligations of people. The debate over security components and ways how to achieve security have become increasingly complex and specialized. Integral element of wider issues through materialize their way to the stage of international relations were considered particularly in its efforts to move beyond concepts and definitions priori which sometimes exclude important aspects that become visible as their concrete manifestation. Unwilling to develop a comprehensive security aporia which only multiply existing number, we will from the outset a clear delineation of the issues on which we shall consider in our study further aspects which issue was raised recently on stage studies security, namely issues related to ethnicity and religion. These issues were often integrated social dimension of security⁸, today, we believe it is necessary to support the initiative to examine the configuration, security cultural profile, covering any gaps between its different approaches through a careful examination of their interrelation, at interdisciplinary macro and micro. In this regard, such as political science, international relations, anthropology, economics, law and linguistics, can provide useful tools. As is well known, most security concepts conveyed today in political and academic from the field of security

⁸ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, Ed Cartier, Chisinau, 2000, pp. 130-131

studies. An important factor of life and security of the human individual is the environment in which he lives, or the environment. Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 known as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) has addressed the issue of environmental security and economic development, generally seen as being in conflict with each other. As a result of industrialization and increased production of goods increased more materials affect the environment. Increasingly, some of the raw materials or final, highly complex products can be found in air, water and soil. Waste issue has taken on alarming human activities, by their accumulation causing impaired quality of the environment. These alterations are due to imbalances in flora and fauna and the good year of health and human collectivity congested areas. By accelerating the pace of development, based on energy consumption of non-renewable resources, it was in some industrialized countries, a high degree of prosperity, finding practical as occurs with an increasingly negative human action on the environment's pollution level globally. The environment is an essential element of human existence and is the result of interference of natural elements -, soil, air, water, climate, biosphere -, with elements created by human activity. All they interact and influence the existential conditions and possibilities for future development of the company. Any human activity and thus individual existence is inconceivable outside environment. Therefore, its overall quality as well as each of its components separately, put their stamp on the existing level and evolution of individuals. The conclusion is obvious human individual security is a complex interdependent factors between them, just as through collaboration and compliance legislation can ensure the safety of the human individual in the social environment.

A Comparative Analysis of the Regional Influence of Different Administrative Systems in the Black Sea Area

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Abstract: One cannot fully understand the history of the Black Sea Regions without analysing the differences and similarities between the administrative systems of the neighbouring countries – this way we will be offered an interesting perspective on the reasons why some countries have proved themselves more influent than others throughout history and why and how a well-organized interior administration gives to the respective state not only more chances to fully developed economically, but also more and better chances to influence its neighbours.

Keywords: Black Sea Regions, history, administration, authoritarian state, state influence.

1. Introduction

1.1. Black Sea Region – Geographical and Geopolitical Limits

When referring to the Black Sea region (*BSR*), we have to define this area and to distinguish between two different meanings – the first one is the narrow sense of the *BSR*, highlighting the geographical limits of the littoral countries to the Black Sea, and the second one is the extended sense, highlighting the geopolitics, the international relations and influence of the countries in the area.

Thus, in the narrow sense, in the *BSR* we will include the states that actually neighbour the Black Sea, namely Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, and in the extended sense we will define the region including, apart from the above mentioned states, the following countries: Republic of Moldova, the Caucasian countries and even the Danubian¹ ones.

Unfortunately, as it was brilliantly stated by Charles King, the head of the Romanian studies Department from Georgetown University, “history and social sciences seem to suffer from seasickness”² when it comes to understanding the social, cultural and administrative history of this region. Too little attention was offered by the contemporary historians to the BSR, and this can be explained partially by the fact that almost all the states from this area were part of or under the influence of the former USSR – Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, Romania and Republic of Moldova. Only recently the region was paid the deserved attention for such a strategic area where different administrative, political and cultural systems confluence and where different former Empires exercised or are still trying to exercise their influence.

1.2. Short Contemporary History of the BSR and European Perspectives

Currently, the region passes through a long process of geopolitical and strategic reshaping generated by the dissolution of the former USSR, modern empire that dominated most of this region. The states that were part of it proclaimed their independence and have tried to find out their own way to build a better future, both from the economical and from the social point of view³.

Russia, which saw its former empire falling apart after the demand of the former USSR states to get back their independence, has been trying to keep its influence in the area in every way: political, administrative, military and economic, and one of their key goals in the region is gaining back their former Black Sea influence. In other words, not only that Russia is a main player at the Black Sea, but it also oppose as much as it can to the influence of the pro-European states.

Turkey is somehow a kind of exception for this region, as it did not belong to the communist bloc. We also have to mention that Turkey is a NATO

member since 1952 and it constitutes the second military force within the organization. Turkey played, by its geo-strategic position, an important role during the Cold War, acting as a neutral state, but also it was one of the first countries to become a member of the Council of Europe in 1949; on top of that, Turkey was a founding member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961 and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1973.

At the moment, it seems that E.U. – Turkey relationships are back on the political track in order for this country to join the E.U. in the foreseeable future, even if no deadline for accomplishing this task has yet been announced by Brussels; moreover, last year, during the Republic of Cyprus' rotating presidency of the E.U., Turkey decided to frozen the relationships with the Union, a decision that brought to a halt any other European initiatives regarding the joining process.

Romania and Bulgaria, countries that belonged to the communist bloc for half a century, have succeeded to join the European Union in 2007, after in 2004 both of them succeeded to join NATO. After a short period of enthusiasm, which in Romania lasted only until the end of 2008 and accompanied the economic boom that placed the country on top of the European GDP growth ranks with an incredible 7.3%⁴, the Euro-skepticism settled step by step in the minds of the Romanians and Bulgarians. This is partially because the two people saw that joining the E.U. brought little real benefits, such as visa - free travelling within the borders of the E.U., and no economic ones, except from the possibility of accessing European funds, but even this opportunity has been failed to fully benefit from by the two member states which “succeeded” in absorbing no more than 10% of the total structural funds allotted to them. Besides that, another aspect that we have to take into consideration when referring to the Romanian and Bulgarian Euro-skepticism is the failure of the European institutions to give a reasonable explanation for subjectively denying the right of Romania and Bulgaria to be accepted in the Schengen space.

Ukraine, once the Europe's favourite of the region because it moved away from the Russian influence with its famous *orange revolution* which brought to power new pro-European politicians, is now seen as the single country from the Eastern Europe which seems to back off from the European democratic values, first of all because of the way the last elections were conducted and second of all because of the selective judicial trials which involve only former political leaders (Yulia Tymoshenko is the best example). As stated in the European progression report concerning Ukraine, "these (progression) steps were largely overshadowed by instances of selective justice and the conduct of the October 2012 parliamentary elections, which showed deterioration in some areas compared to standards previously achieved"⁵.

Republic of Moldova is now involved in a long and difficult process of accepting and adapting socially and economically the European Union values in order to be invited to adhere to the E.U. as soon as possible. In spite of all this struggle, my opinion is that this country will still have to wait for this invitation, not because it is not ready to fulfill the terms which would be imposed by Brussels, but because of the E.U. internal problems at the moment. The Union is not ready to accept or at least to invite another country right now, especially one that will afterwards become the new European Eastern border.

Also, it is a fact that the Moldavian pro-European political coalition is not so strong at the moment and the euro-skepticism rate among population is growing. Though, the last report on the progression of this state in adhering to the E.U. values praises the reforms conducted by the Moldavian Government, stating that "reform of the public administration continued, in particular with the adoption of a decentralization strategy, as well as reforms in the fields of health and education"⁶but in the same time invites Moldova to "step up the reform of the public administration and start implementing the decentralization strategy, with a view to strengthening institutional capacity, efficient use of public resources and optimization of local administration"⁷.

Georgia was involved in a short military conflict with Russia, started on the 7th of August 2008, and that was a political decision which, in my opinion, will influence on a long term the possibility of this state to join the E.U. or even NATO, in spite of their results regarding internal administrative or economic reforms. Besides, the last E.U. progression report, though it praises the way Georgian Government held the 2012 elections and accomplished the transfer of the political power, it clearly stipulates that Georgia is still long way behind with their reforms concerning the electoral, the judicial or the administrative systems and even on matters concerning the freedom of speech or media pluralism.⁸ Anyway, apart from the official statements, the major obstacle in the country's goal of joining the E.U. seems to be its own political agenda and priorities, as the new Georgian ruling coalition has declared its preoccupation to strengthen the relationships with Russia, weakening at the moment any other Georgian pro-European initiative.

Serbia, a Danubian country included by some authors⁹ in the extended sense of the Black Sea Region, has just become on the 1st of March an official candidate to join the E.U. after having signed an agreement with Kosovo on matters regarding the diplomatic cooperation between the two former Yugoslav states.

2. Administrative Systems in the Black Sea Region

2.1. The Situation before the Dissolution of the Soviet Union

Before 1989 the Black Sea Region was administratively conducted or influenced by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), a giant empire formed by 15 states, many of each are now independent, including the BSR ones: Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia; here we didn't include the former Socialist Federative Republic of Russia, though it was also part of the former USSR, because Russia is considered the continuator state and the heir to the former communist empire. Apart from that, the former USSR imposed its political regime and leaders in all the Eastern Bloc European countries; thus, we can say that all the other countries in the area,

except from Turkey, were under the influence of the USSR, politically and economically but also administrative – Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria.

a) Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia

These states were, before 1991, members of the Soviet Union and they were exercising the soviet administrative power in the Black Sea Region from all points of view – military, economically and on matters regarding the external affairs policies. Anyway, the internal and external political agenda was established only in Moscow so we can't differentiate between these three countries when talking about their influence in the Black Sea Region – they were practically one: USSR.

b) Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria

These states were, before 1989, under the influence of Moscow and all three had communist regimes, a form of governance initiated and supported by the Russian Communist Party all over the world. The political leader in each of these states was supported by Moscow and the economic, military and political ties between their countries were very strong. Having considered that, one can easily understand why all the ex-communist states in the Black Sea Region were in a way or another promoting the Soviet Union interests in the area. Besides, the rest of Europe was then seen as “imperialist” and practically enemy during the Cold War. This is the reason why, as we cited in the introductory chapter, the historians and other social sciences specialists seemed to have forgot about this region – Black Sea was practically a USSR internal lake and there was nothing special about the geography of the former Soviet Union Empire to write about for the historians.

Anyway, comparing Bulgaria to Romania in terms of Moscow influence upon them, we should say that while Bulgaria proved from the beginning to the end to be a reliable ally of the Soviet Union, Romania, especially after 1968 when Red Army troops invaded Czechoslovakia, proved itself to be quite independent. The Romanian communist leader was visited and also visited himself Western leaders from the “capitalist” Europe and

established connection with many of the Cold War enemies of the Soviet Union.

c) Turkey

This state was the only exception to the communist Moscow influence in the Black Sea area. Its role in the BSR was a strong one and it was due to the 1936 Montreaux convention which empowered Turkey to ensure free passage of merchant ships and to regulate the transit of the war ships through the Turkish straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles). Since then, throughout history, Turkey has been playing a significant role in the Black Sea area, regardless of the type of the political regime of its neighbours. It also allowed Turkey to maintain diplomatic relations both with the communist neighbours of the Black Sea and with its Western allies from the rest of Europe or with the United States.

This short history of the Black Sea Region during the Cold War was only meant to underline that the countries in this area shared the same political and administrative principles before 1991 and thus we cannot really talk about an influence of a system or another: Black Sea was at that time, except from Turkey's shores, a communist lake.

2.2. The Situation after the Dissolution of the Soviet Union

After the fall of the Soviet Empire and the dissolution of the USSR, the former soviet states gained back their independence and started establishing their own political, administrative and economical systems according to their own principles. Also, the other communist states from the Eastern Bloc and neighbours to the Black Sea, namely Romania and Bulgaria, stepped for the first time after half a century on the road of democracy and along with this they have been embracing the Western democratic values and have been trying to let behind everything related to the communism. This meant that after a very long time when Black Sea Region was a communist one, now the countries neighbouring it adopted a wide range of administrative systems; but, as we will see in the following, despite the differences between them, all the BSR states except from Russia, have adopted or are on the way to adopt the European Union set of

democratic principles regarding the public administration; this is why I dare to name the Black Sea as the future internal lake of the European Union, paraphrasing its former nick-name as “the USSR internal lake”.

a) Russia

The continuator of the USSR, Russia is a federative state according to its Constitution: “The Russian Federation - Russia is a democratic federal law-bound State with a republican form of government.”¹⁰ The fundamental Russian law says also that “The Russian Federation consists of Republics, territories, regions, cities of federal importance, an autonomous region and autonomous areas - equal subjects of the Russian Federation”¹¹; thus, Russia has 89 federal subjects of the kind.

A characteristic of the former empires, the federative form of Governance allows Russia to keep together in the same state different republics and territories, in spite of the historical and cultural differences between them. In the same time, for Russia, being a federation proved itself a real issue in the recent past, as many of its territories are seeking for independence and many of these intentions gave birth to radical and separatists movements. This is why Russia, along with other European states, hasn't yet recognized Kosovo as an independent state for fear that some of its own republics would seek for independence in the same way.

Another characteristic of the Russian administrative system is that this is by excellence a presidential state – the president, elected directly by the people, has got extended powers, a six year mandate and the right to appoint the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation or even to dissolve the State Duma in certain conditions stipulated by the Constitutional Court of Russia.

These characteristics allow Russia to continue to exert a “natural” influence in the Black Sea Region – a state of its size, used to conquer territories and which also was deprived of some of its states, a former communist Union which exerted so much influence over its neighbours over the last half a century is in a certain way “entitled” to try to influence its neighbours including the Black Sea Region; as we will see, even its territorial

administrative organization is identical with that from other two BSR countries.

b) Turkey

A former empire, as well as Russia, Turkey is not at all a federative state, even if it does have some domestic issues regarding the territories where the Kurds are a majority. Turkey is a presidential republic (before 2001 it used to be parliamentary) with a very important cleric influence (Turkey is a secular republic according to its Constitution) and his president is voted directly by the people (before 2001 it used to be voted with two thirds of the Turkish Great National Assembly members) for a five year mandate (it used to be seven); Turkey's Constitution dates back from November 1982, but it was fundamentally revised in 2001 when new articles were added regarding administrative measures in order to support the process of joining the E.U..

The Turkish territory is divided into eighty-one provinces, divided in their turn into eight districts, in average. The provinces are led by a governor, appointed by the central Government, but the cities and districts are led by mayors elected by population.

Turkey has always sought after being recognized as the initiator and the leader of all the Black Sea initiatives – Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) or the military Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR). In this respect, Romania's initiative of holding in 2005 in Bucharest the Black Sea Forum upset Ankara who saw its role in the region diminished.

A member of NATO since 1952 (even before Federative Germany, which joined the Organization in 1955), Turkey's only drawback as the most influential country in the BSR is the failure of obtaining a deadline for joining the E.U., an achievement which will definitely and substantially increase their influence in the region. Nonetheless, also E.U. will take an important advantage from Turkey becoming a Union member, as Turkey's economy is continually getting surprising results when it comes to GDP

rates (9.2% in 2010 and 8.5% in 2011)¹², but it seems that at the moment it is not the right time for Turkey to join in.

Now, Turkey is asking for a definitive answer from E.U. and they even show their good will and advanced a generous deadline of their own, saying that if Turkey is not an E.U. member until 2023 then they will no longer consider it a priority. Meanwhile, Turkey is more and more becoming a developed country with steady principles and with a will to become a regional power at the Black Sea and a global influent trader.

c) Romania and Bulgaria

In terms of studying their influence in the Black Sea Region, it is not a mistake for these two countries to be taken together. First of all because they share identical principles of development, both being members of the European Union since 2007, and second of all because they both have almost the same administrative system, with a president elected directly by the people and who appoints with the approval of the Parliament the Prime-Minister who exercises in his turn the executive power. The difference is that in Bulgaria there is a pure parliamentary system while in Romania the president claims for his country to have a semi-presidential administrative system, an artifice which allows the Romanian president to take part to the European Union meetings or to request the members of the Executive to accomplish a certain task or another; in this respect, the governing coalition from Bucharest is preparing the necessary annotations to the Romanian Constitution in order for the Prime-Minister to have the main role in setting up the internal and external political agenda, like in the majority of the European countries, except from France.

As for the form of territorial division of each of the two countries, we have to specify that while Bulgaria accomplished its regionalization process in 1999, along with the decentralization of the economical and administrative power; at that time Bulgaria changed its territorial organization from 9 provinces into 27. Romania is still behind with the regionalization process – only this year the Romanian Government decided to start it, a political and administrative decision which will make possible for Romania to have

NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 units, similar to Poland's voivodships, and thus to be able to access much more European funds dedicated to local and regional development.

Both countries are candidates to accession to the Schengen Space and in my opinion the Black Sea is both the drawback and the answer for this issue: this year the two candidates were rejected again from being accepted, this time even though both of them had accomplished their tasks demanded by all the other members. Officially only Netherlands, Finland and Germany opposed to Bulgaria and Romania accession, but rumours said that many Schengen members did not support the idea as well. What will happen if these two are finally accepted as members of the Schengen zone? The first thing which everybody is taking into consideration is that the Black Sea will become an immense entrance into Schengen space and that can indeed constitute an issue for the Union.

Black Sea neighbours at the moment only Romania and Bulgaria as members of the E.U., the rest of the littoral states being ex-soviet countries (Russia, Georgia, Ukraine) or potential candidates for E.U. accession (Turkey) – this is not very reassuring for Brussels at all; it means that, before anything else, both countries have to secure the Black Sea frontier and only after that they will definitely be accepted as members in Schengen Space.

In conclusion, Bulgaria and Romania's influence at the Black Sea is strong because they both represent European Union's interests in the region, but their influence and also responsibility could become much more visible if they both are admitted into the Schengen Space. In the same time, beyond any doubt, Romania is one of the countries which started and fully contributes to the process of putting the Black Sea Region again on the EU political agenda, as Romania is one of the initiators of the Black Sea Synergy, with its two main components – the Black Sea NGO Forum and the Black Sea Partnership for Environment. Also, Romania is part of many other Black Sea initiatives such as Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) or the International Club of the Black Sea (which establishes cooperation between cities which have a harbour at the Black

Sea) and also the initiator of the Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership, though the last one is seen not to have now the dimension and agenda intended at the beginning in 2005.

d) Ukraine

An ex-soviet state, Ukraine is a semi-presidential republic, run by a president elected by the direct vote of its people for a five year mandate. Its Parliament has only one room and it is responsible for appointing the Government.

Ukraine has a territorial-administrative organization system which very much resembles the Russian one: in its structure there is a Republic (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea), 24 regions and two special status cities - Kiev and Sevastopol, exactly like the special status awarded in Russia to Moscow and St. Petersburg. The Autonomous Republic of Crimea has its own Parliament and Government, though incomplete, and the Ukrainian regions, cities and districts are governed by representatives of the state appointed by the president.

Even if the Ukrainian Government leader recently issued a statement in which he reaffirmed the Ukrainian determination in continuing the pre-joining negotiations with E.U., the new political majority in Kiev seems to have changed the Western and natural course of the country and now it directs it to the East, re-establishing the old ties with the Russian Federation, both politically and economically. For the Black Sea Region it cannot mean but one thing: Ukraine will hence support the Russian interests in the BSR and will act accordingly, whether it will be an economic matter or a geo-strategic one.

Ukraine is also a member of GUUAM, a regional initiative from 1997 of five member states – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, meant to improve cooperation between member states in strategic fields such as energy, transport, economy and commerce, telecommunications, tourism, counter-terrorism and so on. GUUAM is an important organization in the Black Sea Region because it includes three

countries from this area and also because it enjoys the support of the most influential littoral state at the Black Sea – Turkey.

e) Moldova

Moldova is not a littoral state to the Black Sea but it's landlocked between two littoral states – Romania and Ukraine; it also has a maritime transport opportunity by using the potential of their Danube harbour Giurgiulesti. This is why Moldova is included in the extended sense of the Black Sea Region.

An ex-soviet state, like Russia and Ukraine, Moldova is a Parliamentary Republic, run by a president elected by the Parliament with three-fifths of the votes for a four year mandate. The executive power is exercised by the Prime-Minister, also approved by the Parliament. The Moldavian Parliament has one room and 101 seats; the simple majority is 52 seats, according to their Constitutional Court.

Moldova adopted in 2006 a new law in order to ensure the regional development and to stimulate the absorption of European funds. The country is divided into 32 rayons (a form of territorial unit inherited from the former USSR), five municipalities and two special status regions.

As we presented in the first Chapter, Republic of Moldova step on the road of adhering to the European Union long time ago and E.U. has always been praising its achievements regarding this goal. In 2004 the European Commission approved the Moldova-European Union Action Plan, which determines strategic cooperation directions for the following years. The latest political developments in Moldova are not so encouraging though, since the pro-European political coalition lost majority in the Parliament and there is a strong fear from Brussels' officials that the communist party will try and form a majority in Chisinau once again.

Moldova does not exercise a visible influence in the Black Sea Region, partly because it is not a littoral state and partly because its size and economic development. However, Moldova's aspirations to join the E.U. have been changing the country constantly and along with it its administrative system. By adhering to the E.U. principles and due to its close historical and

national ties with Romania, Moldova can play a role in the Black Sea Region, supporting the E.U.'s interests in the area.

Also, a member of GUUAM, Moldova can also play an important role in this regional initiative and in the Black Sea Region. In conclusion, though not a littoral state, by being a member of GUUAM and by its intentions to join the E.U. in the future, Moldova is an important Black Sea Region country in the extended sense of it, and a bridge between different regional interests in the area.

f) Georgia

Its administrative organization of the territory is specific to the ex-soviet states: Georgia is divided into two autonomous republics (Abkhazia and Adjara), nine regions and the Capital, Tbilisi. Georgia has a presidential democratic system, also specific to most of the ex-soviet countries, with the head of the state elected directly by the people for a four year mandate.

Not even a NATO member, because Georgia failed to be invited in April 2008 at the NATO Summit held in Bucharest, when Russia strongly opposed this idea, and also implied in a short war with Russia in August the same year, Georgia seems to be the most underprivileged country at the moment in the Black Sea Region. Though praised for the results achieved so far in their determination to join the E.U., Georgia is now trying to close the old connections with Moscow.

The future and the role of this country in the Black Sea Region depends on the political decisions taken in Tbilisi – if the Georgian administration wants to increase its influence in the BSR, then it must take into consideration that no less than two other territorial states, namely Turkey and Ukraine, plus Republic of Moldova, are trying to reach E.U. standards of democracy and economic development in order to join the Union in the foreseeable future.

3. Conclusions

The Black Sea Region is in a constant transformation and the littoral states are constantly trying to increase their influence in the region in various ways, starting from improving their administrative systems and to adopt the European democratic values in order to join the Union along with other BSR states and ending up with trying to cast their influence in the region using their dominant geographical position or former economic and administrative ties.

At the moment Black Sea Region seems to be again in a political turmoil – if last year all the countries in the area were strongly determined to let behind their communist past and to adopt the European Union democratic values, now at least two of the countries affirmed their intentions of re-establishing strong political ties with the Russian Federation: Georgia and Ukraine. Moreover, in Moldova the pro-European coalition has lost majority in the Parliament and in the country there is still a strong Euro-skeptical feeling, while Turkey is about to lose its patience because of the European Union’s failure to advance a deadline for this country to become a member.

The only countries that are fully supporting and promoting European Union’s interests to the Black Sea are Bulgaria and Romania; even though, I reaffirm my opinion that the Black Sea is now on a no-turning road of becoming an E.U. “internal lake” because sooner or later all the countries which affirmed their intentions to join the Union will be accepted: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Turkey.

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Roma: Cultural Interferences in the Romanian Area

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Abstract: Traditions (characterizing how a people lives and thinks) almost unchanged for thousands of years, allowed Roma – a people without a state or a government – to survive over time. The almost 619,000 Roma living today in Romania represent a distinct ethnic group. The numerous subdivisions of the Roma bring as many traditions to the cultural heritage of Romania. There are groups that give up their old customs and start, indeed very slowly, to align to the majority, adopting a life style like theirs, and there are also conservative families who want to maintain their ancestral traditions. This paper presents a brief analysis of Roma's culture in Romania and the interference, in the Romanian space, of the Roma cultural heritage – stories, songs, legends, sayings and proverbs, riddles, folk poetry – with fundamental values, and the role of some prominent Roma personalities in Romanian culture (Anton Pann, Barbu Lăutaru, Grigoraș Dinicu, etc.).

Keywords: Roma, cultural heritage, interference.

1. Roma Ethnicity in European and Romanian Context

At the beginning of XXI century, in the 27 EU Member States, Roma was the largest ethnic minority (10-12 million persons). Characteristic to this ethnic group is that the Roma are young: 36% are younger than 15 years, compared to 16% for the majority population. Average age for Roma population is 25 years while for the majority of the population is 40 years. Also, Roma do not define themselves as a national minority, they do not have a territory marked by boundaries, although they constitute an ethnic group with distinct physical, demographic and socio-cultural characteristics and with rights and freedoms common to all people and ethnic groups.

Today, Roma's ethnic and cultural identity has been preserved and it developed due both to human rights (Roma should enjoy the same rights as all citizens of the country they live in) and to creating a favorable climate for interethnic and intercultural understanding and for the assertion of identity for all ethnic groups in contact with the majority or with other ethnic groups in a wider Europe.

Roma are an ethnic group with a distinct culture, recognized in music, dance, trade, with special skills in woodworking, metal, gold and silver, features that enrich the national, European and world cultural landscape.


To earn their living, Roma communities are migrants; this characteristic has made and makes this ethnic group to spread all over Europe and especially in the developed countries. The human and moral dimension of the new Europe requires as a prerequisite the concern for Roma, a disadvantaged minority in the past, both in terms of rights and freedoms the state undertakes to give, but also in terms of their obligations and responsibilities as individuals and human groups to themselves and to the other members of society [1].

In Romania are also valid the constitutional rights and freedoms for citizens in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the signed covenants and treaties [5], [8].

2. General Characteristics of the Roma in Romania

According to the 2011 census, Romania, with a stable population of 19,042,936 people (preliminary results of the National Institute for Statistics), is a country where a significant number (approximately 11.4% of the population) of nationalities / ethnic groups coexist and are officially recognized. Preliminary data of the 2011 census ([6], [7]) shows 619,000 people for the Roma population, accounting for 3.2% of the population of the country. Preliminary data for the stable population by mother tongue in the 2011 census included 247,058 Roma people representing 1.3% of the total resident population, who are relatively evenly distributed in the

territory, with weights ranging from 0.1% in Covasna County to 9.32% in Mures County (figure 1).



Source: Press release on the preliminary results of the Census of Population and Housing, 2011, August 24, 2012, the National Institute of Statistics

Figure 1. Stable Roma population by native language, the census of 2011 – preliminary results

Roma people are relatively evenly distributed in the territory, with weights ranging between 1.1% in Botosani County and 8.8% in Mures County. Roma are in a relatively greater percentage, over 6.0% of the resident population, also in Calarasi (8.1%), Salaj (6.9%) and Bihor (6.1%) counties.

However, the discussion over the real number of this population continues, some researchers ([4]) claiming that approximately 4.3% of the population would self-identify as Roma, while on the basis of hetero-identification, a number of 1,515,626 people (6.7%) would be Roma ethnics.


Comparative analysis of 2011, 2002 and 1992 census data, regarding the Roma population in Romania, shows a significant increase after 1992 (figure 2).

With respect to the territorial distribution of the Roma, as the provisional results of the Population and Housing Census – 2011 show, most Roma are found in the developing regions Muntenia South, Central and North West [10]-[11].

Ranked according to the share of Roma minority population in total population, Central Region—which includes Mures County where is the highest percentage of minority Roma population relative to the total county population (8.78%)—holds the first position, followed by North West—including Bihor and Salaj counties where the share of the Roma population in county's total population exceeds 6% (6.13% in Bihor and 6.95% in Salaj County). At the opposite end we find the North-East Region that includes Botosani County with the lowest percentage of Roma among all counties (1.06%).

Roma population has a very young demographic structure, determined by their higher mortality and fertility rates compared to the general population.

At the 2002 census, 36.33% of the Roma population was represented by children (0-14 years), and the share of the elderly was about 3.33%.




* Provisional data

Source: Press release regarding the provisional results of the Population and Housing Census, 2011, February 2, 2012, INS

Figure 2. Evolving dynamics of Roma population in Romania

Compared to Romanian population, age distribution at different moments shows the Roma population much younger than the majority and the Roma

population pyramid unlike the normal one with an extremely wide base which becomes much “sharper” after the age of 55 (figure 3).



Data source: Statistics National Agency for Roma

Figure 3. Age pyramid for Romanian and Roma Populations in 2002

Gender distribution for the 15-64 years segment of the population was almost identical: men 60.55%, women: 60.11%.

Gender analysis of the data for age distribution shows that, in 2002, for the age groups 45-49 years and 50-54 years the number of men was very close to that of women in these groups (a difference of 28, respectively 11 people). Before this age there is a dominance of males: accentuated for the age group 0-29 years (on average, Roma males were 1,700 people more than Roma females) and weaker for the age group 30-44 years, the difference being reduced, on average, to 780 people. Starting with the age group 55-59 years, women are dominant (figure 3).

Although it is difficult to assess with great accuracy the differences between the considered censuses with respect to residence and regions, however, the share of the Roma population in rural areas increased only by 2% between the last two censuses. No region-wide significant increases are for this period, the maximum difference being of 1.19% between South Muntenia and South-East [10].

From a demographic point of view, the Roma population is also characterized by:

- Age at first marriage for Roma women is very low and many couples begin their family life when younger than 16 years;
- The share of undocumented marriages is higher for younger age groups. Undocumented marriage is more common for those living in rural areas, for those who have only Roma families as neighbors or have fewer years of schooling;
- In the Roma community there are two dominant models of family and household: mononuclear families and Roma households which include persons other than the nuclear family.
- The number of children born throughout their life by Roma women is decreasing;
- The number of live births per 1,000 women of Roma follows an increasing curve to the age group 45-49 years and then decreases slightly.
- The largest number of women who gave birth to dead children is in the age group 15-19 years (22,312 Roma women).

3. Cultural Characteristics of the Roma in Romania

Analysis of Roma communities throughout the history highlights a number of elements that differentiate them from the rest of the population. Thus, since the medieval period one of the most striking differences between the two ways of life, Roma and non-Roma, relates to Roma's nomadic life. The memory and the tradition of this life influenced for a long time Roma's way of living, including that of the sedentary Roma.

The gap between the living conditions of Roma and other ethnic groups was deepened by several factors, among which may be mentioned: the low importance given by Roma to their house (by tradition), the emphasis on movement, the marginalization, contempt and discrimination to which Roma have been subjected over the past centuries, the lack of access to

community resources (given their permanent “newcomer” status), the difficulty or inability to become landowner etc.

More than for other communities, it is difficult for Romanian Roma to present some “characteristic elements of their communities’ traditions” [2]. This is due to the fact that:

Roma communities differ widely among them due to: socio-economic differences, different basic occupations, standard of living and community organizing, differences in the degree of preservation of their distinctive cultural elements and the degree of assimilation of elements from other cultural communities;

The loss of many traditions due to assimilation for some communities, and to the general process of society modernization;

Not enough pieces of written culture exist that could have kept significant information and the lack of a consistent interest of the majority population for these Roma specific cultural aspects;

Roma have lived in small communities, their activities having other ethnic communities as beneficiaries;

It is difficult to separate the specific elements of Roma culture from that of the majority population, the Roma being, in many cases, those maintaining Romanian folk traditions as outstanding transmitters, traditions to whose development they undoubtedly contributed.

Although, there is a large number of local traditions preserved in various Roma communities, such as those relating to important moments in life: birth, baptism, acceptance among adults, marriage, death, how to cope with difficult situations, or maintaining the social structures of the group.

Roma art is above all an art of living. It is not only the reflection of a way of living; it is a way to live the life, lived more than thought and elaborated. It is an everyday art, an art in all respects and about everything, that can not be dissociated from its social, economic and cultural contents. It is the art of negotiation, the art of leadership, the art of singing or dancing, word art, the art of social relations, the art to celebrate.

This art has been recognized and appreciated for a long time. One of the first texts referring to the Roma and their migration, written by the Persian poet Firdusi, mentions “ten thousand Lourié men and women playing the lute experts” requested from a king of India by the King of Persia to entertain his subjects. Later on and until today, the Roma were protected by nobles and the most powerful to serve as entertainment or to stimulate daydreaming, often disregarding the laws forbidding anyone to live in proximity.

Professional Roma art is in the same time special and trivial, making it extremely ambiguous. Roma and travellers’ art, because of their travels, is an art of travel which produced mainly incorporeal elements: songs, dances, stories, music, poems, often ephemeral, forgotten improvisations.

Language has played an important role in the continuity of Roma culture. Experts in the field emphasize that Romani is poetic: for example, in some areas, in Romani for “earthquake” is used the phrase “dancing ground”. George Sarău, who teaches Romani at the University of Bucharest shows that “Romani is an intact structure that keeps well in many dialects. And do not judge a language by vocabulary, but by structure. Romani had this structure that it miraculously kept, unlike other nations who had writing, institutions, but who have lost their language. Romani never had institutions, for a long time it did not have writing yet it has been preserved miraculously. In addition, breaking away from the Indian context before 1000, it is much closer to the Sanskrit language, for example, it maintains the eight cases” [3].

This degree of sophistication may appear as a surprise in the eyes of many Eastern Europeans not inclined to see in Romani a language, but “slang”. A limited appreciation with multiple causes; one of them is their closure and keeping their secrets, practiced in many Roma communities, who felt that was the only way to survive. In addition, Roma communities seem to put much value on the differences between them [9].

Roma are perhaps best known for their music. There are numerous historical sources mentioning that throughout Eastern Europe, Roma have

always been preferred for events like weddings or holidays. In this way, Roma have played a crucial role in preserving the traditions of others. The status of valued musicians allowed Roma to obtain, during the hard times of their existence, privileges otherwise very difficult to get.

Traditional music, mourning songs and long ballads reached today a global fame. The growing interest for world traditional music brought everywhere Roma to public attention. They do make music for themselves and for others, but the story is told mostly within the community fostering cultural pride and a sense of belonging.

Because Roma have lived and played in so many different countries, it is difficult or even impossible to identify an authentic Roma music in Europe. Roma music varies greatly depending on the country.

In Romania, Roma musicians can be heard playing everywhere, at festivals and outdoor events, folk festivals, in concert halls, on terraces and restaurants. Some musicians have such a diverse knowledge that they can play with symphonic orchestras. Fiddlers have to be able to sing a variety of songs as they sing in different regions, in different places and for different audiences. Their music is creative, rich, intense, full of feelings but extremely varied and hard to define.

Finding authentic Roma music in Romania it would be very difficult. If a Roma band releases an album we often hear Bulgarian, Serbian, Turkish and Greek influences, perhaps because such a combination is more successful with the public. Therefore, it is hard to tell where ends Romanian music and where begins Roma music. The Roma music is based largely on traditional Romanian music and Romanian music was largely preserved, sung and brought to perfection by Roma.

Studies by experts in the field indicate that Roma had a very important role in the development of Romanian popular music. The base of Romanian traditional music is the lamentation of the Roma violin. Cymbal virtuosity and the impressive voice of the Roma singer astonishes any Romanian. Almost any major orchestra has at least a few Roma musicians and in villages, Roma are the most sought after musicians for various events.

Although, in Romania Roma do not sing only Romanian popular music. To earn money, the Roma had to play for their hosts – and the hosts were not only Romanians – the music of their liking and with which they were used.

Roma music from the Balkans and Romania blends in Turkish influences. For example, the word “taraf” seems to come from Turkish. There are historical sources mentioning that Roma were musicians in the Ottoman armies (playing music during the battle to boost soldiers’ morale and to cover the battle noise).

But when it comes to the music that Roma play for themselves, things are different. Nomadic Roma borrowed, from the people around them in a country or region, a music genre, then in the next country another kind of music. So many genres, from different regions were assimilated and combined, converted to please Roma, creating a new style of music that can rightfully be called Roma. The music Roma play for Roma in Romani, can be considered, in general, really Roma. Authentic Roma music and dancing synthesize their lifestyle and represents Roma history and culture. This is truly an art form that expresses independence and spiritual freedom, and it was for a long time the only means of expression for an oppressed people.

What Roma have in common is not only what they sing, but how they sing. In music, the composers who have been seduced (Liszt, Brahms, Dvorak, de Falla, Granados etc.) were aware of this fact. Roma pay more attention and grant prestige to creative interpretation rather than to the raw composition and to the origin of the elements that were used.

Roma ursari are particularly talented in music, they “have the rhythm in their blood.” Most of ursari musicians learned to play an instrument without school. Very often the expressions “learning to play by ear” or “does not play by note” are used to describe it.

Clejani, a dusty village in the Romanian Plain, hosted by centuries an informal academy for musicians. Here, Roma communities have passed to

their children, from generation to generation, the techniques, knowledge and crafts.

For the past four-five decades, Roma children are educated at special schools and an increasingly higher number of them study at the Conservatory. Some graduates will embrace the musician career for a symphonic orchestra or for professional entertainment orchestras. But most of them will play music as freelance musicians. They will sing in restaurants or at parties.

Ursari musicians interpret, usually, slow *sârba*, slow *hore*, or depending on the region, Romanian folk songs that prevail there. For example, in Moldova they are dancing “Russian” and “on the beat”, in Valachia “*geamparaua*” and “the *Breaza*”.

For parties, Roma ursari get dressed with their cleanest clothes, with tie, vest, hat and polished shoes. Women dress alike, with the cleanest and most elegant clothes they have. Even today, at parties, ursari women wear headscarves usually tied in the back. They wear earrings, beads and rings. Their dresses are long and not overly colorful. They wear well polished boots or shoes with a low heel.

4. Roma – Promoters of Romanian Culture

Roma musicians have an important role in advertising abroad Romanian popular music, not just Roma music, and thereby they contribute to promoting Romanian culture and Romania in general.

After 1989, many Western artists came to Romania and discovered with astonishment the mastery of Roma musicians. Some even helped them record albums or give concerts around the world, where they were often greeted with great enthusiasm.

Tom Pridgen, a successful musician and connoisseur of many styles of music, came to Romania to study Roma music and founded a band of Roma musicians. Today, he plays traditional Romanian and Roma music at Boston festivals in USA. Pridgen considers that “preserving and promoting

traditional music is very important nowadays when the music industry produces and promotes on an assembly line the same type of non-artists like Britney Spears and other non-talents”. He also said that “singing gypsy style is to sing with skill, with an innate understanding of the laws of harmony and music variation and mesmerize audiences with an energy that transports them into another world. If my abilities allow me to occasionally reach this condition, I am honored and grateful.”

Among the best known Roma in Romanian culture could be considered:

- Barbu Lautaru (Vasile Barbu on his real name), who was one of the most acclaimed musicians and cobzari. He combined elements of traditional Romanian music with elements of oriental music, Russian and Western;
- Anton Pann (Anthony Pantoleon Petroveanu), poet, religious music composer, folklorist, he composed the national anthem of Romania;
- Zavaidoc (Marin Teodorescu) - musician in the interwar period;
- Grigoraş Dinicu violinist and composer, who is known for his 1906 composition entitled Hora Staccato;
- Fănică Luca (Luca Stefan Iordache), panpipe player and musician, was considered one of the most talented performers of all time;
- Ionel Budişteanu (Nae Ion Voicu), violinist and conductor.

5. Conclusions

The great diversity and complexity of the cultural elements currently charactering Roma communities in Romania, as well as the importance of preserving this diversity, can be a source of cultural enrichment for the whole society.

More than for other communities, for Roma it is difficult to describe some “characteristic elements of Roma traditions in Romanian communities”.

Through the game of migrations, certain holidays “exported” by Roma families outside their home countries were thus preserved and considered, in some cases, in their environment as typical Roma festivities.

In recent decades artistic works were developed in various, even not very common, fields (painting, sculpture, literature, cinema, etc.) and without any doubt in all countries Roma artistic careers became famous in the traditional fields of music, sing or dance.

It is vital, for example, that an art as powerful as storytelling, which is based on the power of oral traditions and which is about to mutate, can be recovered through a special function in the school universe and in the television or show universe before the it does risk to be lost because current conditions lead it to oblivion.

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The Advanced European Integration, or What Should Be Expected From?

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Abstract: In 1961, in the earlier stage of the European integration, Bela Balassa proposed a five successive phase model about it as a foresight. Today, the half century experience on integration and corresponding literature issued just lets us see rather two big phases (instead of five). The one would be the incipient integration, that came to enlarge the economic openness and internationalization and shaped on: (i) free trade area (FTA) and (ii) customs union; the other would be the advanced integration, in which internationalization would be replaced by the unique-common market and other two commandments would replace or just reshape the older FTA and customs union into: (iii) economic convergence and (iv) optimal currency area. Or, the last two will be emphasized by our paper, as for their current description-analysis in the literature.

Keywords: Integration, European type integration, economic convergence, monetary union, fiscal union, optimum currency area.

1. Introduction

We would like this paper to continue the previous one (Andrei 2012), for the preoccupation for the European integration outline, as considered update. In *résumé*, polemics were with the integration model of Balassa (1961) through here criticizing at least all: (i) the *economic and monetary union* that had been assumed to have ended the integration process; (ii) integration, as not only successive, but also *distinct* phases from one-another; (iii) limiting integration to its 'liberal' part of development (i.e. through *common-unique* market, competition, economic union and common currency – whereas today the 'other European economics', the

non-liberal one of budgets, policies, structural funds and policy, cohesion, sustained and regional development and others has become as obvious as the liberal component of the European integration.

Also in *résumé*, our retort to the Balassa's model – more precisely, to the 'liberal' component of the economic integration – comprises only two big (development) phases, meaning the (a) *incipient* and (b) *advanced* integrations, as in the following Table 1.

INTEGRATION	INCIPIENT	ADVANCED
Basic structure	International	Unique-common market
Commandments	Free trade area	Convergence*
	Customs union	Optimum currency area

* See several types of convergence considered in the literature: economic, political and institutional.

Table 1. Outline of The (European) Integration Process

Just mentioning that 'our' phases proposed are no longer assumed as distinct from one-another, as in the previous model – i.e. even the primary *free trade area* phase might contain germs of the *optimum currency area* (OCA), as it will be read below, in this paper.

Our previous paper did conclude on a presumable 'end of integration' for a moment in which specific contradictory aspects would end, when the EU (or just the 'Euro') area would work like all States federations and when the institutional inventory will become complete, as it is in individual federations or just States. As for this paper, a certain 'drawing-back' is preferred in the sense that details of such a time-development will dominate. *Convergence* and *optimum currency area* (OCA) will be debated – more precisely, we'll let the literature talk about – as similarly specific to the advanced phase of integration, as free trade area and customs union stay specific to both the early phase of the EU and to all the other than EU integration options world-wide. There is not only similarity between the two phases of integration, as for their conceptual links to proper-specific commandments – i.e. convergence and OCA are different issues than the free trade area and customs union, as described below in our text.

Just one more mention for this paper. Space limits impose to our approach to stay close to conceptual developments in the literature, meaning distant from either details on the EU-Euro-Zone, or debate on current crisis. These last will be for a future contribution.

2. The Economic Convergence Concept in the Literature

2.1. Definition and Perception

There are three definitions of the economic convergence in the literature (Frankel 2004): (i) *synchronization* of business cycles – against *asymmetry shock*¹; (ii) *similarity of economic structures* – e.g. weight of agriculture and industry in total GDP; (iii) *similarity of productivity and non-tradable weight* in the total economy. Iancu (2006, p.6) completes such portraying through considering the internal distinction among: *real*, *nominal* and *institutional* types of convergence – of which the *economic* convergence stops to the first two of these.

Equally through its conceptual approaching, convergence equalizes a *structural similarity* between national economies (Dinga 2008², pp. 17-19), assumes a list of *quantifying indicators*³ (ibidem, p. 19) and lays in the proximity of other (economic) terms like: similitude, harmonizing, complementarity and even redundancy (ibidem, p. 21).

The same literature indicates three *perceptions* of the economic convergence. The one points on the ‘market forces’ and stays related to the neoclassical theory of economic growth – that will be approached below. The second one in line considers rather a ‘non-convergence’ finding of the contemporary era – and the last chapter of this paper will also detail about

¹ This is a term rather strongly used for the other concept approached in this paper -- i.e. the *optimum currency area* --, but this remark is for once more illustrating the proximity between these two concepts in the today understanding.

² And on-line: http://www.edinga.ro/files/studii/7_ro.pdf

³ See also below for details.

it. Thirdly and finally, convergence is seen as possible on the competition market, but the difference from the neoclassic view here consists in the presence of *policies* instrumented (developed) for convergence implementing and presumably appropriate (Iancu 2006, p. 7).

2.2. Classification

The α type convergence sees what is meant by *structural similarity* between economies. This type of convergence is considered able to absorb the *asymmetric shocks*⁴, but equally insufficiently clarified as in theory – i.e. what kind of structural similarity is about? – and in methodology – e.g. what about economies of different dimensions? Are regional non-similarities also able to induce convergence (Dinga 2008, p. 26 and the following)?

The β type convergence is pretty different story. It focuses on the link between the ‘classical’ and qualitative view on the convergence dynamic, on the one hand, and ‘catching-up’ type processes – that display different dynamics on shorter terms in favour of less developed and developing countries – on the other. As in its larger sense, the β convergence regards all about economic ‘speeds’, meaning that it even starts from the dynamic *of a national economy towards its own equilibrium*, as the primary definition of convergence.

The same type of convergence reaches its own regression equation and coefficient (Sala-i-Martin (1997, pp. 58) and breaks down into: β -*absolute* -- *higher growth for developing economies, as compared to the developed ones*; β - *group* -- β absolute, plus considering countries’ grouping on criteria of similarity in industrial technologies, institutions and economic policies applied; β -*conditioned* -- the previous, plus additionally considering the vector of determinant factors of growth.

Criticism for this zone of convergence classifying comes from other several analyses. Quah (1993) here accuses the ‘Galton type error’ related to self-

⁴ As once more related to the optimum currency area (OCA).

correlation statistics. Boyle & McCarthy (1997) pretend that even the β type convergence, in its literal definition might see itself wrongly reflected by its found coefficient and Friedman (1992) argues that it can be well replaced by the *variation coefficient of per capita GDP* within the region. Boyle & McCarthy (1997, pp. 57-58) suggest that this above three (sub)types of the β convergence would actually base on the need created for such an internal distinction, as directly, and notice, as the basic truth, that the β convergence doesn't prove able to replace another type, the σ type convergence – that is the similarity regarding per capita GDP and directly related economic indicators, the 'catching-up' process equally considered (Dinga 2008, pag. 27-28).

As concretely, the σ type convergence calculates through the per capita GDP *coefficient of variation*⁵ (Friedman 1992) or *standard deviation* (Dalgaard & Vastrup 2001, pp. 283-287) and includes two series of indicators for value dispersion (from average values): the (a) *simple* ones -- basic dispersion and amplitude – and (b) *synthetic* ones – linear and squared average dispersions, variation coefficient (Pecican 2006, pp. 1-4). Note that such negative assessment that all the σ coefficients basically develop clears the way for assessing 'catching-up' as '*the higher the dispersion, the higher its speed, the more positive evolving throughout de facto conversion*' (i.e. the β -type conversion, actually the per capita GDP/ Iancu 2006, p. 14 and 27).

The other two types of convergence in debate are δ and γ types (Dinga 2008, pp. 27-28). The previous regards the similarity of *real convergence* factors (Frankel 2004, p. 4). These factors do group into third levels. The basic one sees just the common currency that countries trade in-between (Glick & Rose 2001). The second one comprises "common language(s), colonial history, remaining political links". The "third category of factors" mean what Frankel (2004, p. 4) calls "accidents of history" ... "that influences both currency choices and trade links".

⁵ *Transversal*, but also *chronological* data series are here used (Iancu 2006, pp. 21-22).

Finally, the latter γ type convergence regards the business cycles synchronizing. Dinga (2008, p. 28) generally agrees the literature's arguing about its essential role in 'turning the asymmetric into symmetric shocks', but slightly doubts its long-life in practical terms.

2.3. The Real Convergence Criteria

The description regarding the nominal convergence and its Maastricht (1992) criteria won't be here repeated⁶. And unlike Dinga (2008), I find the EU's (actually, ECB's) absence from any debate about real convergence criteria enough consistent with the Organization's general attitude on this topic. I here remind the *nominal* convergence criteria and so the basic distinction between these and the *real convergence criteria* for the reason of mentioning Dinga (2008, pp. 36-39)'s contribution to drawing a list of what the author calls *inter-conditioning* criteria between the *nominal* and *real* groups of them. This is what the author calls 'nominal-real transmission channels' and three such general indicators are here enumerated.

The *real interest rate* (Ibidem, pp. 36-37) deals with components of both the aggregate demand (consumption, government expenditure) and supply (investments⁷). Secondly, the *inflation rate* is the way of affecting (reducing, when inflation rises) the money purchasing power, so the aggregate demand, but indirectly the aggregate supply, as well. And thirdly, the *exchange rate* takes a behaviour similar to the one of wages – as nominal and real, similarly to the exchange rate --, the difference made consisting in the proximity of the exchange rate to the openness degree of the economy (ibidem, p. 37).

Lastly, Table 2 enumerates the *real convergence criteria* by individual and groups (ibidem, pp. 45-47), then the author organizes them into three

⁶ See my opinion about in Andrei (2010) that these Criteria didn't arise from any scientific debate that the European Monetary Institute (EMI), its following European Central Bank (ECB) or other EU forum would ever largely or publicly propose.

⁷ I see investments on the aggregate supply side as arguable.

'classes' of criteria (ibidem, pp. 48-49), but these classes do not match the previous list of individual criteria.

GROUP	ITEM	OF WHICH:	NOTATION
(a)	general indicators		
		population	P
		active population	Pa
		people employed	EMP
		average number of employees	EMPav
		on regions and activities	
		GDP- domestic supply	GDPs
		GDP- sources	GDPk
		GDP-distribution	GDPq
		exports	X
		imports	M
		government	G
(b)	revenues & expenditures		
		households' revenue	HR
		gross nominal wages	Wagn
		net nominal wages	Wann
		gross nominal labour costs	LCgn
		households' expenditure	HE
(c)	others		
		net savings	Sn
		domestic demand	Dd
		domestic absorption	Ad
		direct fiscal pressure	DFP

Source: Dinga (2008, pp. 45-47)

Table 2. Real Convergence Criteria

The class of (i) 'catching-up' criteria includes items like average domestic supply, openness degree of the economy and average gross wage. The class

of (ii) *sustaining* criteria includes: the net savings rate, labour productivity in commercial sectors, GDP-distribution and the sold of the current account of the external balance of payments. Lastly, the (iii) *resilience* class of criteria contains items like national revenue on activities, domestic absorption, employment rate and government.

2.4. Criticism, Controversies and Other Aspects

As the above title suggests, this paragraph belongs to debatable aspects, as update. So, there will be about three directions of studies drawn on the economic convergence concept so far in the same literature.

2.4.1. Neoclassic, Solow and the “Anti-Convergence”

This aspect might well have had its place as introduction of all the above descriptions, due to its historical and bibliographical dimensions. Roughly, studies of convergence did start in the mid 1950s in the neoclassical zone of thinking. Solow (1956) has his own (famous) theory that bases the today convergence description, as both economic equilibrium reached and ‘catching-up’ processes: *the same saving-investment rate help growth and development at different degrees – i.e. it is converse to the capital stock that this rate relates to*. In other words, the capital stock agglomeration lowers the returns to investment, as much as less developed economies or those destructed by wars and other external causes, on the opposite, are, conversely, able to acquire higher returns on the same investment made. The Solow’s model’s restrictions are those of: (a) equal saving-investment rates for all countries and (b) general decreasing returns on capital stock. Plus, a ‘steady state’ to be reached by all economies – when zero growth rate of capital stock related to the unit of labor – is also concluded.

Mankiew (2003) illustrates the Solow’s theory of growth at least by the extreme post-war cases of Germany and Japan, with their ‘catching-up’ developed economies, but many other authors share a fully different position than that. Thirlwall (2001) founds that empirics never confirmed this neoclassic theory and others point to the *enlarging development gaps*, as a contrary world-wide trend, as enough obvious. The poor countries of the Third World see themselves forced to internationally specialize in basic

product(ion)s, the international factors' mobility closed stops convergence trends as well and the revenue multiplier plays for reach countries and equally against the poor and developing areas (Myrdal 1957; Thirlwall 2001; Kornai 1974), all of these as a true 'anti-convergence' phenomenon of the contemporary era (Iancu 2006, pp. 7-15). New and newly-based models point to the 'out of use' for the neoclassic thinking on growth-convergence in diverse ways – e.g. associating to the physical capital or to β - σ parameters like 'convergence speed' for the negative value of parameters, or 'convergence-divergence' for value dispersion (Arrow 1962; Lucas 1988/pp. 2-42; Romer 1986).

The current literature in the area sees itself splitting into pros and cons, but not only. On the pros side, the ones reconsider growth motors like savings and growth of population (Mankiw, Romer, Weil 1992; Islam 1995), others play the same for capital and labour mobility (Barro, Sala-i-Martin, Blanchard, Hall 1992). On the opposite side, authors rather see divergence between large groups of countries, versus some existing 'clubs of convergence' (Baumol 1986; Durlauf 1995;1996; Quah 1996). A rather third position belongs to authors like Galor (1996): convergence might be real in practice, but for countries that prove some similarities 'ab initio' – or, this is what there has already been called above the *conditioned* convergence, but also might be called 'multi-polar' convergence.

2.4.2. The Balassa-Samuelson Effect

This is a controversy face to the convergence issue made by a theory actually shared by a longer series of authors⁸. The *Balassa-Samuelson effect* predicts that *countries experiencing productivity increases would meet price increases* meanwhile (Frankel 2004, p. 14). The purchasing power parity (PPP) proves productivity-based and this effect is double-based: first, the so-called "Penn-effect" sees the (same) goods' price higher in the richer, than in poorer countries; second, the so-called "Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis" sees all economies producing both tradable and non-tradable

⁸ See the Ricardo-Viner-Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson-Penn-Bhagwati effect (Kravis and Lipsey 1983; Samuelson 1994, p. 201).

goods and the productivity level and rates stay more variable for tradable zone all over. In such an order, immediate causes of this effect do easily multiply: variation of productivity among countries for both tradable and non-tradable sectors; variation of differences in the same productivity between tradable and non-tradable goods within the same country; persistence and weight of the non-tradable sector in the home economy; the direct productivity-incomes correlation; even high transportation costs wherever the good is cheaper. The “Penn-effect” finalized sees the PPP deviations as: *the higher the income, the higher the price level* (David 1972 and Officer 1976).

2.4.3. Specific Developments in the European Union

The EU appeared aware of the about realities from the very beginning – that was why its basic Treaties did associate convergence with *cohesion* (Myrdal 1957). The attractiveness of the area has also presumed as associated to the pressure on labour resources, especially the one from less developed areas. The Maastricht Treaty and moment (1992) took a new and advanced step onto deepening cohesion in a context linked to convergence and growth-sustained development (Iancu 2006, pp. 12-13).

Despite these facts, Iancu (2006, pp. 22-23) concludes some contradictory situation regarding the issues here above debated. The per capita GDP proves rather divergent (i.e. rising σ coefficient) within EU15 during the 1995-2005 interval. On the contrary, a slight convergence trend was proven by EU25 between 2004 and 2005 around EU10. However, the EU25 and EU15 groups display significantly different variation coefficients from each-other. Finally, all three mentioned groups of the EU member countries play on distinct numbers the way that the highest trend to convergence belongs to the less developed countries⁹.

⁹ Here including Romania. Despite the author has a not too optimistic conclusion, i.e. for a presumed 4% a year growth for this country, as against 1.8% a year growth for EU25, a common per capita GDP level will get as high as EUR 63,200 in about 57 years from the moment of this study (Iancu 2005, pp. 18-21).

3. The Optimum Currency Area (OCA) Theory in the Literature

In 2002 the OCA theory had its own 40th anniversary, for a period during which four phases were claimed to have succeeded and marked this subject: 1/ *“pioneering”* phase – with the basic OCA theory and properties revealed; 2/ *“reconciliation”* phase -- combining diverse facets of the theory; 3/ *“reassessment”* phase -- that leads to the “new OCA theory”; 4/ *“empirical”* phase – in which the theory was subject to due empirical scrutiny (Mongelli 2002, p.4).

3.1. The “Pioneering” Phase¹⁰

It was developed between 1960s and early 1970s. Actually, debate started and the OCA properties were drawn on appropriate issues -- mobility of factors of production within the area; price and wage flexibility; economic openness; diversified production and consumption; similarity in inflation rates; fiscal and political integration; financial integration. The similarity of shocks and income correlation “were added later” (ibidem, the same page). This first phase of the OCA theory developing was started by Mundell (1961) – who is recognised as the parent of the concept --, then McKinnon (1963), Kennen (1969), and Ingram (1969) joint the debate not much later on, whilst Freedman (1953) and Meade (1957) expressed earlier than Mundell and the others, the previous on a principial price flexibility and the latter about the balance of payments of the region in way to become the later EU.

3.1.1. Basic Definition of OCA

Once more, Mundell drawn the common OCA definition:

(i) a *‘domain within which the exchange rates are fixed’* (Mundell 1961, pp. 657);

¹⁰ Ibidem, pp. 4 and 8-11.

(ii) the region (not the nation) with a high degree of internal production factors mobility (i.e. capital and labour), versus external immobility (ibidem, pp. 661);

(iii) finally, Mundell sees a world of currency regions, rather than nations with their own monies¹¹.

In reality, the first and third components of the Mundell's definition of OCA relate to money and currencies, so OCA, on the one hand, retorts the older theory of *international monetary systems* (IMS/Triffin 1973) and on the other will come to be completed by McKinnon (1993a) – actually by the last's theory of the *nominal anchor*. This is the order in which Mongelli (2002, p.8) notices the concomitance of this phase with either the IMS shaping in the Bretton Woods Agreement (1944)'s way and process, with its specific *capital control*, or the beginning (incipience) of the European integration. In other words, the OCA theory came up directly into the *debate about fixed, versus flexible exchange rates*.

Pelkmans (2003) believes that the (above) OCA's definition might actually be simplified or adjusted as: "the region in / for which the cost of giving up floating exchange rates– i.e. the alignment of the national currencies' rates within the region -- is overwhelmed by benefits of the unique-common currency in use'.

The second component of the OCA's definition prolongates the above one related to the intra-region currency-exchange rate regime, but then more aspects here attach to these two and come to be mentioned here below.

3.1.2. Properties of OCA

3.1.2.1. Mobility of Factors

Mundell (1961) was ending his analysis by reiterating for OCA the picture of the "region with perfect (production) factors' mobility". As for this component, *mobility of factors of production* counteracts price variability (see the next sub-paragraph) *within the region* (Mundell 1961). Labour

¹¹ See also Fűruter (2012, pp. 3-4).

could be less mobile on the short periods, but the aspect might change in the long run (Corden 1972).

Kennen (1969) notices that the Mundell's "region" is portrayed as neither geographical, nor political, and for the "factors" mobility", Mundell had insisted more on labour, than on capital (Ingram 1969). And this labour *mobility* needs a prior *employment* mobility and labour *homogeneity* in a formula that rather conducts to mono-industrial type regions. Grubel (1970) explains that the Mundell's description reclaims "*perfect internal labour mobility*, versus *perfect external labour immobility*", whereas in reality there is to debate about a real graduality (different levels) of labour mobility. Giersch (1973) here wonders, in context, about whether an irreversible by definition process that *migration* is would be able to imbalance the external equilibria on the long term. Corden (1972) here answers that mobility of labour might prove a rather lower capacity of fighting *asymmetrical shocks*.

3.1.2.2. Price Flexibility

As continuing the introductory idea of the precedent sub-paragraph, when flexible prices and wages – says the "last neoclassic" that Milton Friedman was, as together with all his "classics" and neoclassic predecessors -- it is less likely for unemployment in one country and inflation in another, plus exchange rate adjustments between (Friedman 1953).

3.1.2.3. Financial Market Integration

And since the incomplete Mundell's discourse about factors' mobility, Ingram (1973) argues that this part of integration cannot substitute the capital's mobility, but just smoothen it – i.e. fighting its shock aspects. In other words, *financial market integration* cushions temporary adverse disturbances through capital inflows. Later on, McKinnon (2001) reinforces the role of financial integration, in context.

3.1.2.4. Degree of Economic Openness

McKinnon (1963) says that the more open the economy, the easier the *transmission mechanism* of exchange rate mobility into prices' and wages' movements; plus similarity between economic activity structures.

3.1.2.5. Diversification in Production and Consumption

According to Kenen (1969), this OCA item also smoothens the exchange rate changes shocks; the same for impacts of individual sectors' mutations, and for settling "jobs portfolios" within the region.

3.1.2.6. Similarities of Inflation Rates

Fleming (1971) observes that inflation might be caused by diverse disequilibria of sectors, their developments, policies promoted etc.¹² Similarity in inflation rates equally might reduce inter-country shocks and their impacts. Eichengreen (1990) indicates the need for narrowing fluctuations between countries and the "*Balassa-Samuelson*" effect¹³ could allow the "catching-up" part of integration processes.

3.1.2.7. Fiscal Integration

This aspect is for the *union of countries* to be able to redistribute resources among -- i.e. to countries that need them, when the case, in order to free the exchange rate from such a task, once more (Kenen 1969).

3.1.2.8. Political Integration

This is, finally, the will of the countries involved to join commitments, to share costs of processes amongst and to encourage institutional linkages and cooperation on some activities etc. (Mintz 1970).

Synthetically, these above properties would make the money exchange rate less adjustable (usable) within the region to adjust (temper) presumable shocks (Mongelli 2002, p.5).

3.1.3. Criticism on the "Pioneering" Phase

Mongelli (2002, pp.5; 11) indicates what the author calls the "pioneering phase's drawbacks", meaning there were not yet for OCA: (i) a "comprehensive framework" defined, so some properties were yet contradicting one-another; (ii) an empirical content for most of its properties. There also were for Robson (1987) difficulties for measuring properties; ambiguity of characteristics and of differences amongst. As for

¹² See the 'Mundell-Fleming model'.

¹³ See the above Part I of this paper.

Tavlas (1994), “OCA points to different directions”, meaning a “problem of inconclusiveness” – e.g. small economies are more likely to be open, but less capable of production diversification, so more likely to accept the unique currency, but with more propensity to flexible (than to stable) exchange rates. McKinnon (1993) here adds that more differentiated economies have less trade. Then, how can the OCA above requirements be ranked amongst?

3.2. The “Reconciliation” Phase

That was during the 1970s. There was both a deepening of some properties (i.e. “meta-properties”) of OCA and an adding of more ones (i.e. *similarity* of shocks/ Mongelli 2002, p. 5). There is to be understood for this phase the above “pioneering” points of view reuniting, but equally what a presumable OCA brings for countries joining it. Concretely, McKinnon (1963) views that country A might be supposed as interested in a currency union with a price and cost stable country B, in order to ensure its own stability, but some shocks are always expected. Or, this is the same with Ishyama (1975), for whom OCA is limited by the interest of each country to join or stay out of the union, and Corden (1972), who imagines joining a currency union by any presumable country as basing on a prior *cost-benefit analysis*. And actually, the exchange rate flexibility would be in place on both alternatives, together with the one of prices and wages -- the exchange rate would be able to insulate a country from asymmetric shocks in any way; the question which remains is whether that would be outside or inside the union.

And as for the *cost-benefit analysis* of the monetary integration of individual countries, see the rectangular graph in Figure 1.

This is illustrated by Artis (2002, p. 16) for “a country facing option of joining with a partner or group of countries in a currency union”.(ibidem, pp. 2). *Benefits* here mean loss of: (i) transaction costs and (ii) currency risk – the (B) curve is upward sloping: the higher the economic integration degree, the higher the benefits from the monetary integration. *Costs*, as correspondingly, mean: (i) loss of the country’s (independent) monetary

policy; (ii) loss of the shock absorbing of exchange rate movements... – the (C) curve is downward sloping: both monetary and exchange rate policies decline, as values, in the open and interacted economies of such an area.

There are 3 cost curves (C, C' and C''), of which's meaning gets related to different economists' view on approaching integration – see also the corresponding intersectional points. The intersectional costs-benefits points express economic states in which a country starts taking advantages of joining a currency area.




Figure 1.

In such an order, it is the *monetarist* view (C'') – for which integration costs are assumed to be low and even a reduced integration degree is enough for attending the crossed cost-benefit point of joining integration; versus the *Keynesian* view (C') – for a significantly higher cost level of assuming integration. Cerna (2006) has, in this context, a two columns list of possible costs-benefits of OCA. And apart from these, two ways of efficiency increase in the OCA context are outcoming from this view: (1) rising the economic integration (i.e. convergence) degree between countries in the area; (2) reducing rigidity of the integration costs – i.e. flexible production factors' movement around.

Despite all these above developments, this new “reconciliation” phase proves the same drawback as its previous “pioneering” one: still no empirical content (Mongelli 2002, p. 5).

3.3. The “Reassessment” Phase

Then, in early 1980s, there came a kind of “stagnation” for the OCA theory’s developments or a “*lost momentum*” in the aftermath of the second phase. Despite that, then there were: (a) some advancing on empirical approaches; (b) conceptually reconsidering the monetary (currency) union; (c) reinterpretations of some properties, as previously formulated – and this was the “*reassessment*” phase: between 1980s and early 1990s (Mongelli 2002, p. 5). Not to be equally here omitted for the late 1980s, parallel preoccupations for building the EMU on the “*one market-one money*” principle, that did push approaches through the “new OCA theory”. Or, “the... EMU question is, possibly, more complex than the OCA question” (ibidem, p. 14). Tavlas (2003) remarks that the “new” OCA theory here started emerging vis-a-vis the “old” OCA theory after revisions have been made (Tavlas 1993).

Then, see *empirical studies* that did start in context since the 1980s: low wage flexibility behind low price flexibility (Calmfors & Driffil 1988); real wages are still low flexibility across European countries and employment does some adjustment to wage flexibility (OECD 1994); some significant asymmetries of the European labour markets (Cadiou, Guichard and Maurel 2001); the relationship between centralization of wage bargaining and labour market outcome is not linear – countries with differences in labour market institutions make find it costly to form a monetary union (DeGrauwe 2000). Besides, it is for this phase that Alesina, Barro, Tenreiro (2002) conclude that countries with large co-movements of outputs and prices have lost costs from abandoning monetary independence vis-a-vis their partners, but Calvo & Reinhart (2002) appreciate the lost of monetary independence as “not a substantial cost”. Last, but not least, Emerson and al (1992) argue that in the long run, high inflation does not yield any macroeconomic benefit in terms of growth and unemployment.

3.4. The “Empirical” Phase

This final phase started in 1987, as complex approaches and analyses (Mongelli 2002, p. 5), of which’s sizes overpassed the previous studdies drawn in early 1980s. Issues that came one by one under study in this time interval were: price and wage flexibility (ibidem, p. 18), labour market integration (p. 19)¹⁴, factors market integration (i.e. foreign direct investments/p. 20), financial market integration (pp. 20-21), the degree of economic openness (p..21), diversification in production and consumption (p. 21-22), similarities in inflation rates (p. 22), fiscal integration (p. 22-23) and political integration (p. 23-25).

The general critical remark that can be made on this final and intellectually productive phase is that all these studdies look backwards by definition (ibidem, p. 26), whereas the opposite “*looking ahead*” stays a more delicate issue – it is supposed to answer some questions raised. The one is the *question-paradigm* between the old and classic *country specialisation* in the inter-member countries’ trade contest and *endogeneity of OCA*, that is the real integration (ibidem, pp. 27-31).

As for the previous (*country specialisation*), the “*Krugman specilisation hypothesis*” (Krugman 1993, with the so called “*lesson of Messachussets*”) relates to a US development-experience over the last century: the single currency removes barriers of increasing returns to scale and even in integration fostering conditions the comparative advantage will work as classically and countries will specialize (see also Rauch 1994, Eichengreen and Bayoumi 1996, Bertola 1993). But so member countries of a currency area will reduce production diversification and become vulnerable to asymetric shocks. Frankel (1999) so opinates that the solution will be enlarging the OCA’s area – i.e. the *Frankel’s paradox*. Otherwise, the former OCA will turn into a small grup of countries with proper currencies floating

¹⁴ Here to be exemplified about labour market integration in Europe Eighengreen (1990) concluding that variation of unemployment was twice in Europe than in the US. and Thomas (1993) for different responses in Europe and US of the unemployment rate to unemployment shocks.

among each other: “the OCA’s dissolution” (Mongelli 2002, p. 28). Finally, on the one hand, the European integration is a process of evidence, but on the other specialisation among the EU member countries plays its (other) role: destruct(ur)ing production diversity, as required by OCA (ibidem, p. 32).

As for the latter (*endogeneity of OCA*), a preliminary answer comes from Frankel (1999): member States will be more attracted by sharing a common currency when the trade-off and/or corelation between *incomes* and *economic openness* towards the(other) member States. The question whether income correlation rises or falls following the monetary integration doesn’t make unanimous answer (Mongelli 2002, pp. 27-28).

In which conditions, Frankel (1999) also adds that “*OCA varies over time*”.

The hypothesis of positive correlation between income and inter-member countries trade rising consists in that increasing integration would so be assumed to lower transaction costs and eliminate currency risks. McCallum (1995) specifies that the common currency is supposed to be a “serious commitment”; no competitive devaluations, incentive for FDI and future political integration encouraged.

But *what does the empirical evidence tell us...?* Eighengreen (1996) and EU Commission (1999) conclude on results like: (i) increasing specialisation and (ii) lowering industrial concentration for both Europe and US. Another important response comes from Rose (2000): countries trade on the same currency (with other countries) three times more than with countries with other currencies¹⁵.

The other relevant *question-paradigm* of the last and current phase is: “do countries form currency unions because they tread a lot, or start trading more because they form a currency union?” Or, do the two position reconcile? (Mongelli 2002, pp.6; 31).

¹⁵ 186 countries were taken in this model.

4. Concluding Remarks

Mongelli (2002, p. 31-32) finds as the appropriate question raised for the 40th anniversary of the OCA theory that: “was that made simpler?” And the author answers “yes and no.”

For the “better position”: studies are much deeper and OCA can be viewed in many more positions and situations. For the opposite “harder position”: it is still hard to reconcile all the OCA’s properties and to assess the agents’ reactions.

4.1. Concluding for Convergence and OCA

As already mentioned in the introductory paragraph, space limits stay present for this paper and also require abstention from too much details on the two concepts above analyzed. So, we’ll limit to just one aspect, seen as comprehensive enough vis-à-vis all of the above.

Just let us suppose the impossible alternative in which both convergence and OCA debates wouldn’t limit to regions, as *multi-country-regions* defined as above. Then, what would our approach become? The answer is simple: (a) the debate on *convergence* would go back to its primary neoclassical approach of growth-development, with its double aspect, (i) trend towards self-balancing and (ii) “*catching-up*” developed economies by the less developed ones in the international context; (b) the debate on OCA would search for inter-country trade and all the other flows equilibrium able to fight real and even presumable asymmetric shocks.

So, actually, such an extremely simplifying hypothesis is enough for re-positioning research onto basic *growth-development* and general *equilibrium*. Also note that the two concepts keep in common issues like: equilibrium growth, international economics, symmetry-asymmetry of shocks, common currencies – i.e. common value references for the common market –, but equally regionalization, as areas-zones for OCA and countries “clubs” for convergence. Despite these, the two defined concepts on the advanced integration are obviously distinct from each other.

Last, but not least, recall that the *convergence-OCA* couple of concepts look different issue than the *free trade area-customs union* corresponding association. The last are just phases of an earlier moment of the integration and the report between is defined clearly and simply by specific differences. Convergence and OCA stay different from free trade area and customs union meaning a paradox of more knowledge of the past for what was developing at that time, than it is the case of an *advanced integration* on which theoretical debate sees itself forced to recall primary economic theories and analyses and/or to adapt them to a reality that is... just Europe.

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Managing Irregular Migratory Flows at the EU's Black Sea Border.

Case Study: The Romanian Coast

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Abstract: Set at the confluence of various commercial and transportation routes, characterized by an outstanding cultural mosaic in its surroundings, the Black Sea itself can represent both a border of and a gate to the European Union. The main purpose of this article is to synthesize aspects related to the management of irregular migratory flows at the EU's Black Sea Border. Within this nexus of transnational migration and security issues, special attention is laid on the Romanian coast.

Keywords: Black Sea, cultural mosaic, irregular migration, Romanian coast.

1. Migration Worldwide – Preliminary Remarks

In this global age of trans- and interconnectivity, the sole perception of migration as a 'one-way journey'- as it used to be considered almost up to the turn of the millennium- proves insufficient. The global revolution, together with the existence of multipolar centers of power, leads to the creation of round or even spiral migration patterns.

1.1. General Migration Trends

The existence of new migration patterns requires the implementation of further measures, able to meet these accelerated dynamics. In one of his speeches, Franco Frattini, European Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security, emphasized this necessity for change: “we have to shift - even if not completely - our traditional way of thinking of migration as a world of loss and sorrow. [...] Let us try to use, a new expression: *EU mobility*. We have to look at immigration as an enrichment and as an inescapable phenomenon of today's world not as a threat.” Still, the same

person goes on mentioning that the rather negative aspects of migration cannot be ignored, since “[i]mmigration is and will remain a far too (negatively) loaded term, in part because the dark side of the phenomenon is still alive.” [1]

Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller also underline the changing patterns of migration in their *Age of Migration*, stating that “the old dichotomy between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries is being eroded” [2], since countries subject to the so-called brain-drain exodus, for instance, may be in need of receiving other immigrants, as well. The researchers mentioned above identify several general tendencies of migration worldwide, out of which one can notice the acceleration of migration- following the pattern of the high-speed globalized world-, the differentiation of migration into various categories, emphasizing, once more, the idea that immigrants can under no circumstances be perceived as a homogenous group and the growing politicization on migration- reiterated in the 2011 Report of the International Organization for Migration, as well; last, but not least, there is an overall tendency of proliferation of migration transition [3] in a sense that emigration countries become transit countries. The extent to which this last feature can be applied upon Romania will be analyzed throughout this paper.

1.2. The European Legislative Framework

Migration to and from the EU is legally framed within the Regulation (EC) No. 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No. 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers. In Article 2 (b) and (c) it is mentioned that “(b) ‘immigration’ means the action by which a person establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another Member State or a third country”, whereas “(c) ‘emigration’ means the action by which a person, having previously been usually resident in the territory of a Member State, ceases to have his or her

usual residence in that Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months.” [4]

1.3. Irregular Migration

According to the 2008 Report of the project *Clandestino. Undocumented migration. Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends Across Europe*, “the term “*illegal migration*” reflects, in its broadest sense, an act of migration that is “not legal”, or an act of migration that is carried out against legal provisions of entry and residence” [5]. Still, as is has been noticed, various researchers and advocacy groups for human rights protested against the use of the lexem “illegal”, since the “adverb ‘illegal’ associates this type of migration with criminal or otherwise ‘illicit’ behaviour and should therefore be avoided” [6]. This argument, together with the idea that “no human being is illegal” led to the introduction of a more neutral term to characterize the same phenomenon, and this is irregular migration, which should be understood as a type of migration that is not regular, not according to the rules. Irregular migration can hardly be quantified. Moreover, there are various taxonomies that appear under this generic concept. For instance, as *Clandestino* underlines, one can further distinguish between irregular foreign workers and irregular foreign residents, two main categories that only interfere up to a certain point. The intragroup classification varies further on, but this is part of another research subject.

Regarding the situation in the EU, opinions vary from “it is estimated that 1.9 million to 3.8 million unauthorized immigrants resided in the European Union in 2008” [7] to rather far-fetched numbers of “round seven to eight million irregular immigrants” [8].

2. Complexity in the Black Sea Region. The Migration-Security Nexus

“We must free ourselves of the hope that the sea will ever rest. We must learn to sail in high winds.” [9]

2.1. Analyzing the Black Sea Region: A Multi-sectorial Sketch

Located at crossroads of diverse cultures and civilizations, the Black Sea Region (BSR) is an example of a multi-faceted and rather turbulent environment, be it at religious, political, societal, economic, national and transnational level, where various risks, vulnerabilities and threats have been identified so far. Or, as George Cristian Maior put it, “there is not a sole Achilles tendon [in the region], but a complex image of hot spots, associate weaknesses and rising instabilities” [10].

Seen from a geopolitical perspective, the Black Sea lies at the junction of the European Union (EU), NATO and Russia, further linking these to the Middle East and Central Asia. Hence, complex interests in expanding power appear, both convergent and divergent, especially in terms of transport and trade routes and natural resources such as oil and gas.

Furthermore, the existence of a cultural mosaic in the area under discussion is highly relevant. This is definitely not a new issue, since this can be traced back to Antiquity. Still, as Samuel Huntington stated in his *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, there is a certain tendency of countries “to bandwagon with countries of similar culture and to balance against countries with which they lack cultural commonality [...] For security reasons core states may attempt to incorporate or to dominate some peoples of other civilizations who, in turn, attempt to resist the influence of their core state.” [11] This is why this confluence of identities existent in the BSR should not only be identified as such, but also managed properly, especially since it is an area where “[t]he democratic construction of the states has yet to be over” and that “enmity factors are higher than those of friendship” [12]. And this aspect is highly relevant in an age when “[c]ultural communities are replacing Cold War blocs and the fault lines between civilizations are becoming the central lines of conflict in global politics.” [13]

2.2. Managing Migration and Security on the Romanian Black Sea Coast

In order to better manage this cultural confluence, to support development, to promote peace and regional stability, partnerships and cooperation initiatives have been established. Among these, well-known is the Black Sea Synergy- A New Regional Cooperation Initiative, created immediately after the admission of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU. With regard to the main cooperation areas enumerated in this document, the second one is of particular interest for the present paper, namely “[m]anaging movement and improving security” [14]. In order to achieve this aims, “the Commission has also been encouraging the countries in the region to develop further practical co-operation on countering cross-border crime in general, by *channelling experience from other similar initiatives in South-Eastern Europe and the Baltic area*. Further intensified regional cooperation will *enhance the performance of national law enforcement*, in particular in the fight against corruption and organised crime.” [15] Still, worth mentioning is that “[t]he challenge of international cooperation in the field of migration remains considerable”. [16]

Statistics show that in the first semester of 2012 more than half of the total number of applications for a Romanian visa came from two neighbouring countries, namely Moldova (36.31%) and Ukraine (15.25%). The third country of origin of applicants was Turkey (13.63%), followed by the Russian Federation (6.96%). Out of them, 96.35% were approved. The reasons for applications varied from tourism (29.67%) to transit (5.76%). [17] As it can be noticed, the greatest numbers of immigrants to Romania come from countries of the Black Sea Region.

In the first semester of 2012, out of a total number of 1617 illegal immigrants apprehended, 15.28% came from Moldova and 11.75% from Turkey. As expected, they lived in the capital city, Bucharest, in Cluj or close to the external border, in counties such as Arad, Timiș, Iași and Constanța [18].

In 2011 FRONTEX identified 990 illegal crossings via the Eastern Border Route, a relatively small number, as compared to the number of illegal crossings of the Central Mediterranean Route, 64 261 [19]. Of course, the latter number can be traced back to the events of the Arab spring. In contrast to that, “[t]he year 2012 saw a 50% decrease in the number of illegal border crossings detected at EU level compared to the year before. Moreover, at around 73 000, it was the first year since systematic data collection started in 2008 that the total figure for the year stood at less than 100 000.” [20]

With regard to the Romanian border, in June 2011¹, 10 Afghan migrants were caught trying to illegally cross the Bulgarian-Romanian border at Ostrov in order to further arrive to Germany, led by four Bulgarians. [21]

In April 2013 a 10-member-family from Syria was caught willing to pay 40,000 Euros to illegally cross the border to the EU, more exactly to Germany. Syrians were introduced into Romania via Ostrov by Bulgarian traffickers. They were caught as a result of a joint action of the Romanian and Bulgarian Border Police. [22]

It is not only irregular migration that should be taken into account, but also drug trafficking.

A 2012 FRONTEX Report revealed that “increasing ammounts of cocaine arrive at ports of Southeastern Europe and along the Black Sea coast”[23]. The strategic position of Romania as transit point for drug trafficking has also been underlined in the 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of the US Department of State, where it is mentioned that, even if Romania is “not a major source of illicit narcotics”, it “continues to be a significant transit country for narcotics and lies along the well-established Northern Balkan Route for opium, morphine base, heroin, and chemical precursors moving to and from Afghanistan, Central and Western Europe.

¹ Access to information regarding irregular border crossings is primarily limited to newspapers, since the information gathered in this respect by the Coast Guard, territorial structure of the Romanian Border Police is not available to the public, being classified.

The largest cocaine seizure in all of Europe in 2009 (over 2 metric tons) took place in Constanta, its largest port city.”[24] Furthermore, in 2012 a transborder criminal group composed of Colombian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Italian citizens, directly connected to the terrorist organization Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia, was caught introducing to the European Union round 50 kilograms cocaine through Constanta harbour. During this action, the Romanian Directorate for Investigating Infractions of Organized Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) collaborated with the Romanian Intelligence Service, as well as American officers from Drug Enforcement Administration and with partner institutions from Greece, Bulgaria and Italy [25]. This action represents a positive example of transborder cooperation against organized crime.

3. Conclusions

In the context of the worldwide proliferation of the migration transition, as stated by Castles and Miller, the Romanian Coast of the Black Sea, both border of and gate to the European Union, has become one of those hot transit points not only for an outstanding mosaic of peoples, cultures and religions, but also for various risks, vulnerabilities and threats. This is why the acceleration of migration implies a further need for its securitization. The examples identified throughout the paper reveal good practices in terms of transborder cooperation. Still, much remains to be done. Situated at the Eastern border of the EU, Romania and Bulgaria have yet to receive permission to enter the Schengen Area. Moreover, beside the examples of good practices presented above –and many other, of course- the ‘untold’ cases of organized crime existent in the region should not be neglected and the existing actors should further cooperate on further identifying potential risks and on finding workable solutions to diminish the already existing ones in the region.

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Romania's Contribution, as a NATO and EU Member, to Prevent and Combat the Organized Crime in the Wider Black Sea

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Abstract: The security and defense are both national objectives as well as European goals. The peace and security are goals "that can be attained only through complementary means which reinforce each other."

In this sense, the XXI century requires a common European policy on security and defense, of which Romania can't be removed, being an important supplier of security and stability in the area. Through the geopolitical and geostrategic position, Romania is proving a necessary partner for both Europe and America, wishing at the same time, to have its own identity on security and defense.

Through the contributions to the achievement and maintenance of European and global security, Romania affirms its potential to promote the regional and global stability and security, proving that it is an "element of balance and continuity in its strategic zone, an area of political, social and military stability".

Keywords: involvements, strategies, combating organized crime, security.

1. Introduction

Black Sea has always been a challenge for researchers and security analysts, given its geographical position - in the ancient on the "Silk Road", but currently on the Eurasian energy routes - and more its geopolitical relevance, determined by the role as a bridge to Asia or the role as a border for Europe.

In Romania, reference is made, especially those from the military system, on the Black Sea using the concepts of "Wider Black Sea Area" or "Wider Black Sea Region" but in this paper it is assessed the first concept. In this regard it is considered not only the Black Sea littoral states, but this space

is integrated in a wider area: from Central Asia to the Balkans, from Moscow to the Middle East, because all these areas are interconnected and can not be separated.

A serious concern about this area here again it is recalled that the Black Sea is an extremely important area that is in the attention of many international actors with responsibilities for ensuring and maintaining regional and international security comes from the fact that in the area of Black Sea, more specifically, Wider Region of the Black Seas manifested the organized crime and terrorism phenomena against which we can fight firstly by adopting preventive measures, and the EU as an example has already set targets in this area.

2. Romania's Role in Achieving Regional Security

The European and global security relies on both politic stability and on the military one. European security Model is strengthened on the two components: security policy and abandoning any idea of imposing stability by means of confrontation. The security interests and objectives of European countries converge towards a united Europe, there is no reasons to generates conflicts. In this framework, "Romania's return to the big family of European democracies is an enormous moral and political benefit"[1].

The security and defense are both national objectives as well as European targets. The peace and security are targets *"that can only be achieved through complementary means which reinforce each other"*[3].

In this sense, the XXI century requires a common European security and defense, of which Romania can not be removed, being a leading provider of security and stability in the area. Through the geopolitical and geostrategic position, Romania is proving to be a necessary partner both for the Europe but also America, wishing at the same time, to have its own identity in security and defense. The contributions of each state, and, in particularly the Romanian ones to achieving these objectives, are commendable.

A significant Romanian contribution to achieving the European security is the Romanian-Austrian initiative that was launched in Vienna on 27 May 2002, the Danube Cooperation Process, the first political process of cooperation in the Danube region (involving 14 states basin Danube: Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), which provides a framework for coordination and implementation of a tangible projects for cooperation among the Danube. The trial is designed as a forum for regional cooperation structured on several sectorial dimensions (economy and sustainable development, environment, culture, navigation, tourism, sub-regional cooperation), subsumed to a political dimension which is designed to establish the guidelines of an upcoming cooperation and to identify the priority projects that are to be done within the sector size. For Romania it is a chance to capitalize the existing potential for the river ports and bring back to life the shipyards, not to mention the privileged situation by the holders of Danube. The Danube Cooperation Process is proving to be a useful tool for regional security and increasing of regional cooperation as well as to strengthen links of the Danube Region with the European Union [4].

During the period when it was not a full member, Romania has decided to participate with other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on a series of joint actions: exercises in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) operations for peacekeeping; actions to support the fight against terrorism and organized crime.

Through the contributions to the achievement and maintenance of European and global security, Romania declares its potential to promote the regional and global stability and security, proving that it is an "*element of balance and continuity to the strategic area (...) an area of political, social and military stability*"[5].

3. Romania's Implications in the European Union's Strategic Objectives in the Wider Black Sea Region

In Romania's view, the Black Sea region it is a paramount connector for Euro-Atlantic community (as a provider of security and energy consumption) in the strategic area Middle East - Caspian - Central Asia (as energy supplier and security consumer) [6].

In the fight against cross-border at regional level, the Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime (SECI Center) in Bucharest, have a vital input place the Black Sea region, being an important contributor to the security of the countries of South Eastern Europe and being considered instrumentally appropriate for the transfer of experience and good practices in the region., In this regard it is appropriate be mentioned that the SECI Center has provided assistance and expertise for setting up the GUAM Virtual Center for combating terrorism, organized crime drug trafficking and other forms of serious crime.

To strengthen the impact of the SECI Centre in the Wider Black Sea and its cooperation requires permanent connection with the Information and Coordination Centre of the Black Sea Border, in Burgas, Bulgaria. Into the permanent monitoring plan for systematic studying and the adequate understanding of highly dynamic geopolitical developments in the wider Black Sea the area that provides the expertise necessary for the grounding foreign and security policy decisions, it was considered useful the creation of a specialized research structures Conceived as an academic structure, but with a strong pragmatic orientation and with an interdisciplinary regional subsumed to European and Euro-Atlantic priorities in the Wider Black Sea region.

Romania also encourages the exchange of experience concerning the emergence cooperation between the EU dimension of the Black Sea and the other regional initiatives aimed at EU neighborhood - Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) and the Northern Dimension - to identify the lessons that can be

learned and giving source of inspiration for the projects that will be undertaken within it.

Romania, as a member of EU, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe and the UN, a neighbor of Black Sea and having good traditional relations with all other nations in the Black Sea region, has to played an important role in increasing the effectiveness of BSEC and EU initiatives promoting this part of Europe. Moreover, the responsible factors of European Union have highlighted on countless occasions that it expected from our country substance contributions to the building of a trust and good neighborly relations between all the countries of the Black Sea region and also at the enhancing cooperation between them and the EU. In this regard, our country, which together with Bulgaria and Greece played an important role in launching the Black Sea Synergy can act now in the area and at Brussels for developing of this initiative into a European Union strategy with objectives and precise priorities for the Black Sea region after the model of EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea also for The Danube Cooperation Process.

Is a need for effective coordination of Romania, Moldova and Ukraine in combating various forms of organized crime, which could be achieved within the BSEC, taking as a basis the Additional Protocol for cooperation in the field signed by the interior ministers of the Member States of the organization.

4. Conclusions

Looking ahead, it is evident that the Wider Black Sea region has a considerable potential for further development, of regional cooperation, in the major advantage of the states in this part of Europe and of entire continent. The European Union, through the member countries of the region - Bulgaria, Greece and Romania - and its initiatives in the Black Sea may also contribute in a substantial degree at the entry of all states from this space on the trajectory of political, economic, democratic values and of european security [2].

We agree, instead of conclusions, with a view of the Baconschi politician in one of its communications that: "(...) *Firstly Romania needs a strong domestic position: without it, we can not have strong allies in Europe or in the world. Secondly, Romania needs for other countries in the region to build. We do not want anyone to impose our own values or standards, or to change the rules relating to navigation, (...) Finally, the people around the Black Sea represents the best resource that we have. If they meet, move and communicate, the region can become a vivid pole of development, a link between Europe and Asia, between the experience of the West and East potential [7]*".

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Perspectives on the Challenges and Opportunities for a New Type of Governance

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Abstract: The hypothesis: for all the progress in the construction of the new identity of European Union, the European Civil Society (resistance against the coercive European Political Society) cannot accept “the embedded neo-liberalism” (the EU’s actual hegemonic Project) without finding real solutions for so-called “social fracture” of globalisation and this represents a big threat to the soft security model of Europe. This research is based on the neo-Gramscian integrative theoretical perspective. The question is: could Civil Society from CEEC, as social power participate in the potential anti-hegemonic Project of European Civil Society (in neo-Gramscian terms), able to face the hegemonic project of European Political Society, “embedded neo-liberalism”? After examining CEEC case study the answer is negative because this Civil Society is not yet well organised, even it is ripe to understand their social situation and the possibilities to change it in alliance with other transnational forces of Social and Christian Democracy from Europe. This study of the CEEC’s EU integration was made from two perspectives: as a challenge, but also as an opportunity for the Western European and Eastern European winners and losers: European Round Table of Industrialists, European Civil Society, European Union and CEE Governments and Civil Society, by examining the connections between power in production including social power, power in the state, and power in international relations and proposing a new project by shifting from a paternalistic policy paradigm of “embedded neo-liberalism” towards a new and more enlightened policy paradigm towards integration, in the frame of a comprehensive humane security concept in Europe and humane governance, from a feminine perspective, by adapting the emergent geo-governance to the realization of human rights.

Keywords: European Civil Society, social power, power, international relations, human rights.

1. Introduction

1.1. Method of the Research

While a full analysis of this process of enlargement is not feasible in the limited space of our study, the application of a neo-Gramscian feminin perspective is a preferable method of investigation such cases of accession and the concepts used by Gramsci can be transferred: like *social forces of globalisation, political society, civil society, hegemony, power of ideas for change*. This is the instrument with which our thesis will look at the EU's enlargement towards CEEC by assessing, which project is currently hegemonic and which are the social forces supporting it, by identifying the winners of this hegemonic project and especially, which can be the alternative project and which are the social forces supporting it, starting from the identification of the present and future losers of three macro-processes, which are under way. The research will be limited on time and space, starting with the analysis of the history of strategy for EU enlargement initiated by his engeen, ERT and their actual reports referring to the unemployment, analyzing the social policy available at present, presenting the perspective of enlargement with its main challenge, unemployment., of both political society and civil society, in gramscian terms. We will continue with the analyses of the concept of European civil society available on the documents of ESC and CIVICUS in contrast with Gramsci's concept of civil society. In comparison with the European political society perspective on challenges and opportunities for EU enlargement we will present CEEC's political society perspective by looking at the governmental documents available dealing with cost-benefits of European Integration and the present threats for security from their perspective. Civil society perspective from these countries will be examined with the aim of finding the loser's challenges and opportunities in this context of integration. For this aim we will use primary and secondary sources available for the author, which are limited but relevant for our aim of presenting new model of humane governance, which has the potentiality

to change the losers in winners of these three macroprocesses. The method used will be qualitative analysis of the literature, reviews and articles.

1.2. The Aim of the Research

At the surface structure it is challenging and consists on explaining to the public opinion the real threat for individual security, on one side and to find the principal common denominators of challenges and opportunities of the actors involved on the European affairs, on the other side, by presenting a prospect of Humane governance for sustainable development. First task is to reveal that an appeal to solidarity, to the European ideal and to the institutional links with CEEC might not be sufficient to sway public opinion¹, in other words, a successful enlargement will not be possible until Western politicians and civil society are convinced that enlargement will not lead to negative economic consequences and huge budgetary costs. Any calculation of costs should also include those gains to the EU and the costs of prolonging the process of the CEEC's accession to the EU. In order to be successful, enlargement must be with the approval of the citizens of the Union based on cost and benefits to the EU and his member states and correcting the over-optimism of CEEC concerning the benefits of enlargement of the EU.

1.3. The Aim of the Research at the Deeper Structure

This is to argue that established theories of integration - neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism - are unable to explain the elements of structural change, because they are deterministic and take existing power structures as given and to reveal that trans-national social forces of capital and labour, supported by institutions linked to the global economy such as finance ministries, were behind the drive to membership of the EU, making an important contribution to understanding of European integration and

¹ D.J Van Den Berg, Opening Address by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Report of the Conference Enlargement of the European Union with Central European Countries; Challenges and Constraints, The Hague, 17-18 March, 1995, p.2

globalisation by using a critical alternative, neo-Gramscian, feminist theory.

1.4. Importance of Choosing the Issue

This consists in two aspects: the question of membership has not been linked to Globalisation and the related restructuring processes, which applicant countries have undergone since the end of the Cold War in many studies and articles and our approach will help the better understanding of it, equally the perception that enlargement is in general advantageous to all potential new members has to be proved. It is particularly in these two respects that a neo-Gramscian analysis can contribute to the debate. The future enlargement to CEE has generated a large number of academic studies (e.g. Avery and Cameron, 1998; Curzon Price, 1999; Grabbe and Hughes, 2000; Henderson, 1999; Maresceau, 1997; Mayhew, 1998; Preston, 1997). They are mostly state-centric and empiricist. They presume that enlargement is in general advantageous to all potential new members, and concentrate on the issues between the applicants and the EU and among EU members themselves. Modest research has been carried out in relation to the potential conflicts between the losers and winners of EU membership among the applicants and the losers and winners inside the EU member states. Automatically, the potential opponents and their substitute approaches have been neglected and the potentiality for a cooperative paradigm of humane governance for sustainable development of both winners and losers.

Another motivation steams from my personal experience and formation. As a political analyst, professor of linguistics and European Affaires, researcher on International Relations, I spent a lot of time researching about the economy and social issues and transition from Communist to market economy, being a strong advocate of the gradualist policies adopted by the Chinese, policies that have proven wise over the past two decades, based on principle of balance. Therefore to avoid this conflict between losers and winners would be better to create bridges between them and enable them to communicate in a perspective of balance and wisdom,

inspired from the Chinese and oriental philosophy, avoiding the gap between the winners and losers agendas. The red tread could be the Balance between the power of the economic interest and the wisdom of the creative feminine forces of the “organic intellectuals”, aiming to avoid the polarization of social forces, not the polarity.

1.5. Structure, Theoretical Approach and the Principal Question of the Research

This is motivated by the aim of this research which is double: surface structures on the one side and deeper structures on the other side, which were presented after raising the awareness on the issue of the European Humane Security in the context of the EU enlargement towards CEEC. The integrative theoretical approach, neo-Gramscian, is the instrument for understanding at the deeper structure the European Integration. The explanations, from the second annex of the conflicts of globalisation with the regional version European Integration, versus Unity opens the windows for a deeper understanding of the process of globalisation and European integration, which are the engine of the actual “social fracture” and to formulate the principal question; Can Civil Society from CEEC participate on the potential anti-hegemonic project of European Civil Society against the actual “embedded neo-liberalism”, the hegemonic project of European Political Society? (EU as an “integral state” in a neo-Gramscian perspective.) An overview of the article is necessary for the readers. The EU accession raises economic, social and political issues. Economic dimension, Social dimension and Security dimension are the three issues analysed. These three dimensions are interrelated because *«people use to organize themselves to make demands on the political and economic system, but when more orthodox avenues are blocked, they will opt for extreme strategies that entail riots, strikes, demonstrations, rebellions, or even civil war to express their grievances»*² and this represents a big threat for internal

² C.O.Lerche, Economic Influence on Popular Disturbance in Nigeria, Journal of Asian and African Studies XV, 3-4, 1980, p.193

security. EU integration will have different effects on social groups and will create losers and winners. The analyses of winners and losers perspective is necessary to cover the social dimension. A theoretical introductory approach, framework for understanding the European integration and Globalisation processes with three sections; the evaluation of the impact of change on the security concept and the relationship between Globalisation and European Integration, the introduction of the common challenges and opportunities for the design of a common agenda of all types of powers (political power, economic power and social power). The hegemonic project of embedded neo-liberalism, the powerful child of ERT, which is a big opportunity for a market strategy, from their perspective. The big challenge of Europe is unemployment and the answer is ERT's vision for job creation. Important is the commitment of the EU for economical interest, despite the urgent need for a social policy, which is a common concern for both political elites and civil society from Western Europe. Is is urgent to make a comparison between the actual European civil society mission and institutionalisation of it and the old concept of civil society of Gramsci. This comparison demonstrate the impotence of the actual reality of civil society to realise his noble mission of creating a conter-hegemonic project of humane governance, concurrent of the present geo-governance, because it is asymmetrical and even copies the same model of geo-governance, for lack of imagination, independence and material capabilities. We need new ideas, material capabilities and institutions for the creation of a hegemonic project able to challenge the actual hegemonic project of embedded neo-liberalism. The CEEC's political elite perspective on EU integration in term of challenges and opportunities is different from the civil society perspective taking into account the report cost-benefit of European Integration. The next chapter proposes a prospect of Humane governance for sustainable development based on the core value of sustainable development and humane security. A set of chapter's conclusions and concluding remarks help to identify the common challenges and opportunities in order to establish the common denominators of the common agenda of all actors involved on the Enlargement project in a common effort of survival. This is the structure of

the research and the arguments, the case study and the conclusions are useful instruments for the aims of the research, which is made from different perspectives: enlargement as a challenge and opportunity for European Political Society, to expand the “embedded neo-liberalism” towards CEEC, the actual hegemonic project of the European Political Society and governments of CEEC (the present winners of integration) and as a challenge and opportunity for the European Civil Society (the present losers of integration) new potential paradigm of a counter-hegemonic project of “embedded neo-liberalism”. These perspectives it would like to show the intensifying resistance against the social forces of globalisation across Europe within the enlargement towards CEE, including identification of the potential losers of the European integration. These two perspectives have in common the socio- economic concerns of the elites and civil society and form the big threat for the new concept of security in Europe, Humane security. The last chapter presents the prospect for a global security humane governance regime in Europe different of the present European governance struggle, based on the collaborative experience of the EU.

In sum this study analyzes the challenges of the potential polarisation of different interests in Europe, especially in the post-Wall Europe and to see if exists any possibility for aggregating interests of the old and evolving actors in Europe. In this logic we have to rethink security from a feminist vision and imagine new policies and strategies at European and national level. In the context of the latter, the analysis in the next chapter and in the following chapter is directed towards the examination of (not only) EU institutional response and adaptation to the new structural elements, but also to assessing the development of strategies, both for state actors (EC as an intergovernmental organisation) and non-state actors (as ERT and trade Union and NGO’s) from Eastern and Western Europe, and in the last chapter the opportunity of formulation of effective policies dealing with humane security in the frame of Humane global governance, the anti-hegemonic potential approach of the European Civil Society, divergent in a neo-Gramscian perspective but convergent approaches of Global

governance from the Commission on Global Governance image³. (*Though the Commission gives the image that global governance is somehow a sum of the actions of all this participants, the process has actually emerged as a conflict between the “top down” elite agenda and the “bottom up” popular agenda*).

2. Challenges and Opportunities for a New European Humane Security Order

This chapter has three sections: first deals with ignored types of threat showing the economic influences on popular disturbance and the link between Globalisation and European integration, the second introduces the common opportunities and challenges of EU enlargement towards CEE space and the third one, proposes the paradigm of cooperation, starting point for a new Model of Global Humane Governance. All three sections present the issues from a feminine perspective: new paradigm of Humane Security taking into account the ignored types of threats, the opportunity of Cooperative relationship instead of Competitive relationship for overcoming the main common challenges of all actors involved on European, humane governance for sustainable development.

This first section of the chapter evaluates how structural change in the international system level, such as Globalisation and the end of the Cold War, have impact on the Security agenda, by looking at those ignored types of threats⁴ related to security in post-Cold War Europe, from a feminist point of view; hunger, disease, illiteracy, person abuse and exploitation, pollution of the air and water and especially unemployment.

³ Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.2-3

⁴ the complexities involved in trying to understand the ignored security challenges have been and continue to be discussed, for example by N.Dimitris. Chrysochoou, M. J. Tsinisizelis, Stelios Stavridis and Kostas Ifantis, *Europe in Change, Geopolitical imperatives of system change order and security in post-Cold War Europe, Theory and reform in the European Union*, Manchester University Press, 1999, New York, pp.83-104

Comprehensive security concept is a big challenge for state and other existing institutions. This type of challenge consists on new linkages between political, security and economic threats, which have challenged the capacity of the state to perceive and to respond to new challenges and needs for action in one side and on institutional challenge relating to the competence of existing institutions for international action in the other side and finally to the potential for co-ordination between state and other non-state (transnational and subnational) forces.

This first section also explains the relationship between Integration and Globalisation, by warning on the present and future impact of integration on the poor of the most of the CEEC. An analysis of challenges and opportunities of European Enlargement is not an end in itself; it is a useful way of understanding the social and political world in order to change it, in a neo-Gramscian, feminist perception, producing a more “feminine” society and a new model of governance, by adapting the emergent geo-governance to the realization of human rights.

We continue trying to answer what is the relationship between these three simultaneous processes in the most of the CEEC: multilevel and multidimensional process of transformation, the process of integration into the EU and both of these processes are occurring in the larger context of the Globalisation process. All these three macro-processes are strongly interrelated and it is difficult or even impossible to distinguish clearly the transformation, integration and global processes and their impact on the economies and societies of the transition countries because we don't have a theoretical approach able to explain this simultaneity and existent theory of integration are limited.

We assume that if we would like to find solution in the real life we have to find solution also at the theoretical level, taking into account the power of ideas for change. We need a new theory of integration as a useful instrument for generating alternative models of governance adequate to the reality of European Integration. We need new theory because the old ones are limited and are not able to explain the reality.

Despite the continuing domination of states, multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, intergovernmental organisations and supranational institutions such as the EU share the stage of global politics affected by economic and political development combined with technological changes. The inability for governments to manage problems arising from trans-border transactions requires co-operation even at the cost of losing autonomy. The first section of the second chapter will demonstrate the impotence of state - the Romanian case study - to guarantee humane security and sustainable development and consequently their priorities of foreign policy to fill this vacuum of security, by the CFPS regime of EU and by integration, potentiality for a win-win game instead of zero-sum game scenarios. We will also demonstrate that state sovereignty and personal sovereignty are myths only, because in reality, multi-national corporations are not subordinated to states and International organisations, such EU and law have superior authority and for this reason states can't determine their own policies. These actors have different interests and power politics is made less important because they are operating within the societal domain and beyond direct state control. We are summing, in this section, the existent theories of integration pointing out their limits.

Neo-functionalism explains European Integration through an emphasis on the internal dynamics of European Politics, of spill - over, from different sectors of economy to political sector. The wider structure, within European Integration is situated, is completely ignored. It is impossible to take into account structural change such Globalisation and the end of the Cold War.

In contrast to neo-functionalism, which emphasizes the importance of non-governmental interest groups in the process of European integration, inter-governmentalism considers the international structure to be an anarchic system in which states are the only important actors. This approach argues that states pursue rationalist policies of power maximisation and security in order to ensure their survival in the absence of a central power at the International level.

Liberal inter-governmentalism put the predominant emphasis on state as the main actors in international relations neglecting the power of ideas and transnational actors as independent forces behind integration. The behavior of TNCs, after 1980s in the EU, is interpreted as rational adaptation of intergovernmental commitment, while policy involvement and ideas of TNCs are view as the result of intergovernmental demands, but not as independent force.⁵

Neo-Gramscian alternative gives another answer to this behavior, showing the role and power of influence and control of this transnational capital and financier actors at the European level, being a critical theory which tries to explain the change and treating the human nature and all structures, including the international system, as product of history and consequently subject of change.

The revival of European integration since the mid-1980s has reconciled regional integration with Globalisation. How it was possible? The answer is obviously simple, the same transnational fractions of capital that are behind the current drive of European integration are components of a wider transnational historical bloc, working within high profile fora such as the G-7 meetings (now G8) and including also private organisations such as the Trilateral Commission and the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT). It is this bloc which has generated the ideas, institutions and material capabilities for a global shift towards more neo-liberal forms of state and which influenced the development of European integration making it compatible with Globalisation, not opposed to it. It is correct to agree with Cox, that the task to change World Order begins with the long laborious effort to build new historical blocs and our thesis will try to analyze the potentiality of such occurrence in the post Cold Europe.

⁵ A.Bieler, *Globalisation and the Enlargement of the European Union*, Austrian and Swedish Social forces in the struggle over membership, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, pp.1-18

Change of the polarity of the international system after the Cold War, reflects the development of new structural variables, as results of trends aiming to revise institutional entities as European Union and state policies. Not all elements of change are causes of conflicts, because it is not polarity but polarisation that can lead to conflicting situations. There is no evidence that such a process will occur in the European subsystem yet, but the coming situations are not predictable, thus this thesis will try to analyze the potential polarisation in Europe, as a product of willingness for change of the losers representing the social power of the European integration process with its both aspects deepening and enlargement, process which is driven by the transnational forces of globalisation, which are the real winners.

What is important to notice is that the states become “a transmission belt” from the global level to the national economy level, “undermining the sovereignty and autonomy in all aspects of security”. This phenomenon “can be called internationalizing of the state”, according to Robert Cox.⁶ This phenomenon created the so-called “social fracture”, engine of the conflicts of globalisation. (see annex 1, Conflicts of globalisation, first neo-Gramscian analysis of the author of this thesis).

Linked with this social fracture of Globalisation and European enlargement towards CEEC, we have to start our analysis by looking to the ongoing hegemonic project of “embedded-neo-liberalism” synthesis aimed to unify the transnational capitalist actors (TNCs) and first subchapter of the first chapter elaborates on it. This includes the social purpose supporting the emergent European Order. The Maastricht compromise reflects the gradual rise of what can be called an ”embedded neo-liberalism”. This is neo-liberal view as it emphasizes the primacy of global market forces and the freedom of the movement of the transnational capital. So, as a result of such processes, markets become increasingly disconnected from their post-

⁶ R. Cox, *Global Restructuring: Making Sense of the Changing International Political Economy*, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, London: Macmillan, 1994, p. 49.

war national social institutions and we risk a shift from a “national dictatorship” to an “international dictatorship” in these so called transition countries. In one side, one may read “embedded neo-liberalism” as the outcome of the transnational struggle between the three projects of neo-liberalism, neo-mercantilism and supranational social democracy. This was a struggle in which the neo-liberal became dominant but still had to accommodate the concern both of the former neo-mercantilist and of the social democrats. The neo-liberal project incorporated these rival concerns in such a manner that they were subordinated to the interests of globalising capital (neglecting the social democratic concerns in this compromise). In the other side, “embedded neo-liberalism” can also be interpreted as the emerging hegemonic project of Europe’s transnational capitalist class. This class has become dominated by- the leadership of a globalist fraction both in terms of financial firms and global industrial TNCs.⁷

This process of assimilation is an extremely attractive and powerful project, which became the basis for expansion towards Central and Eastern Europe. Our thesis would like to argue that European Integration is not a win-win scenario yet, as it is considered on the theory of integration⁸; even the removal of barriers to free trade and closer integration of national economies, they have the potentiality to enrich every one, especially the poor. What is the reason for this failure? The neglect of the social protection and the denying of the existence of genuine unemployment by the standard model that economists had used for generations could be one explanation; the only reason that unemployment existed was the wages were too high, suggesting the simple remedy: lower wages. They argued that markets worked perfectly and outworn presumption that markets, by themselves lead to efficient outcomes and this failed to allow the desirable intervention of the government in the market for the guidance of economic growth and

⁷ Van Apeldoorn, B., Transnationalism and the restructuring of Europe’s Socio-Economic Order, in *International Journal of Political Economy*, pp.12-35 1998

⁸ see the ERT Position Paper and Analysis of The Economic Costs and Benefits of EU Enlargement, 2001, http://www.ert.be/pf/enf_frame.htm, 24 January 2003

make everyone better off. Therefore, the second section of the first chapter deals with the existing social cohesion policy and unemployment policy at the EU level, which is not yet prepared to answer to the social challenges. Some hope for the future exists, taking into account the recent proposal of social working group, to include on the draft of the constitution, as objectives on the Art. 3: promotion of full employment and quality of work, together with social justice and sustainable development.

In sum, “embedded neo-liberalism” is here interpreted as a potentially hegemonic project unifying Europe’s “transnational capitalist class” and expressing its collective interests and identities. The discourse and strategy of the ERT continued to play an important role in the evolving regime of European socio-economic governance into the 1990s. The question is who will articulate and defend the public interest against the global reach of private financial and commercial interests, when the latter will go too far? The third subchapter of the both first chapter and second chapter will introduce the Gramsci’s concept of Civil Society in contrast with the actual concept of civil society at the European level. Gramsci’s concept of civil society has the potentiality to advocate the losers of integration, “organic intellectuals” having the noble mission of imagining a counter-hegemonic project - basis for a new building bloc.

It is possible to analyze the history of European integration revival project, as well as we shall discuss future possible scenarios and developments including the opportunities for resistance against the dominant hegemonic projects. The method of understanding historical processes put forward by neo-Gramscian perspectives open the door for alternatives for European Integration.

The second section of the chapter introduces the common challenges and opportunities for a new European security order in the “post-Wall” period, from the winners and losers of EU integration perspective in an aggregated effort of finding the common denominators in a cooperative paradigm and discusses the need for redefinition of security, in a feminist perspective (related to it, the definition of a threat and its perception also it is

necessary). A big challenge at the theoretical level is to find an alternative approach of the theories of integration, which could explain the actual reality of European integration and from this theoretical position to find the mechanism of global governance, which could manage the global structural change in a more humane nature. The biggest challenge for the development of human being in our contemporaneous world is unemployment victim of so-called “fragnegration” process. The biggest disruptive force appears to be at first glance, economic in nature. Widespread large-scale unemployment in modern industrial economies, resulting in reduced levels of income, consumption and actual tax revenues needed to pay the generous unemployment that benefit the unemployed demand, have imposed painful fiscal sacrifices, such as a higher level of taxation, that have become increasingly accepted as inescapable features of modern societies. Years of unmitigated unemployment have sapped the pride and self-respect of whole generations and have left workers, business and governments in a state of despair and suspicious about the real costs of integration. Paying for the newly eligible recipients of unemployment benefits, who have not contributed anything in the past and cannot, if unemployed, be expected to contribute anything in the future, has come to be regarded, by some of the richer partner, as too high a price to pay for the luxury of integration. In conclusion disruptive forces like unemployment will challenge the meaning of security and the definition of threat. Any discussion about the common denominators has to start with the opportunity of a new system of collective security in Europe - as they have been expressed through the decisions taken in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Berlin, Madrid and Saint. Malo - and also should take account of the constituent elements of change that produced the “new order”⁹. The elements of Change usually create conflicting relationships; the wisdom and challenge will be to deal creatively with them, transforming these

⁹ By the term “order” we mean a formal or informal sum of relations which produces regular and expected patterns of behaviour and in which commonly accepted views on issues of hierarchy, legitimacy and normative interaction prevail. See R. Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, especially Chapter 6.

challenges in opportunities for new policy and strategies in an aggregated effort of all European actors involved in building a new Humane Security Order, based on common denominators. This can be an opportunity for the regime-building process, which should draw from states their common interests in redefining the terms of an interstate security community in Europe, recognising non-state actors as “critical supporters” for this process, in a feminist theoretical perspective of cooperation.

The condition for successful security regime building, as an opportunity is the identification and definition of the threat. NATO experience in Kosovo has shown that there is a linear relationship between the internal cohesion of an alliance and the way in which members perceive external threats and challenges. The nature of interstate relations in post-Cold War Europe has changed to such an extent that the definition of a specific threat is very difficult by replacing “the Soviet threat” with a complex of secondary threats or collective risks. (see annex 2).

The failure of EU states to define the nature and character of post-Cold War threats could not only undermine the attempts to transform the CFSP into “defense policy”, but could endanger the integration process in other fields. By linking threats to internal security of the EU to the enlargement project by some politicians, the public opinion would be against enlargement project.

Related to this aspect starts the question: “Is it the real threat for the internal Security of the EU, the enlargement towards CEEC or “social fracture” of Globalisation?”

The answer is not so simple. The more politicians from Western Europe point to international competitive pressures, the EMU, and so to legitimate and push through changes in structures of social policy, the more they run the risk that potential and real losers of such policies will turn against Globalisation and European Integration and demand more control over foreign economic policy, in short protectionism.

The challenge is to explain to the public opinion the real threat for individual security, on one side and to find the principal common

denominators of the actors involved on the European affairs, on the other side. Therefore we will try to elaborate on these issues during the journey of our thesis, as an opportunity and challenge at the same time, by looking at the emerging social forces, from Western and Eastern Europe, which potentially have the interest to convert the losers of integration in winners contributing to the emerging project of Humane governance, based on new core values as Humane security and Sustainable development. It is important to challenge the neo-liberal wisdom, which has acquired a status of natural truth during the processes of Globalisation.

The third section of this introductory chapter deals with another question: Can EU neutralise the negative impact of the anarchical international environment by the long-term experience of co-operational and institutional frameworks of normative interaction?

We will argue that the nature of the new systemic reality, contrary to realist and neo-realist predictions, can converge with the efforts of the EU member states to formulate norms and rules which can promote co-operative state and non-state behaviour and advance the integration process, in a feminist perspective, as a positive compromise for a model of humane governance.

The European model represents a fusion between “liberal” and “realist” visions of the international system, states are basic units of analyses, in the view of realist, but contains the security dilemma within a non-violent conflicting - cooperative - relationship, or even culture of cooperation.

The shift from state, as a unit of analysis, to relationship, as unit of analysis of International Politics, it is the important change in International Relations. Building constructive relationships between all the European powers and actors has been a challenge amplified by the existence of military and economic competition. It was a wise paradox and good example, at the same time.

New type of relationship between western great powers and transnational capitalist actors is called geo-governance. In this case geopolitical axis will

certainly shift from *statist field, balance of power, stability, self-defense, spheres of influence and alliances* to *global market concerns with competitiveness, financial flows, capital sources, trade expansion, coordinating mechanism of labour market.*

The challenge will be to build a common agenda for all actors by a cooperative relationship in short between soft and hard power. The common denominator of all this powers is the struggle for survival and we assume that in a long term only humanistic values like humane security and humane governance for sustainable development can assure the survival for all. The question is could be this struggle transformed in cooperation for survival of the Human being and preservation of the Earth?

In the regulation of power relations, the European system puts constraints on the state behavior and the stability becomes a special vested interest of dominant powers, in the management of the status quo. Despite the continuing domination of states, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organization, intergovernmental organizations and supranational institutions such as European Union share the stage of global politics affected by economic and political development, but on the other hand, non-adversarial problem solving mechanism would not be promoted in a hierarchical order controlled by elitist decision- making. This is the biggest dilemma.

Our hopes must continue to rest on the democratic energies of the peoples of the world, acting in all their diversity, yet conscious both of the threats that confront them and of the historic necessity to adapt the emergent geo-governance to the realization of human rights, transforming it in humane governance for human security and human sustainable development.

2.1. Global Humane Sustainable Governance as a Counter Hegemonic Project, from European Civil Society Perspective

The third subchapter deals with another question: Can EU neutralise the negative impact of the anarchical international environment by the long-

term experience of co-operational and institutional frameworks of normative interaction?

We will argue that the nature of the new systemic reality, contrary to realist and neo-realist predictions, can converge with the efforts of the EU member states to formulate norms and rules which can promote co-operative state and non-state behaviour and advance the integration process, in a feminist perspective, as a positive compromise for a model of humane governance. The European model represents a fusion between “liberal” and “realist” visions of the international system, states are basic units of analyses, in the view of realist, but contains the security dilemma within a non-violent conflicting - cooperative - relationship, or even culture of cooperation. The shift from state, as a unit of analysis, to relationship, as unit of analysis of International Politics, it is the important change in International Relations. Building constructive relationships between all the European powers and actors has been a challenge amplified by the existence of military and economic competition. It was a wise paradox and good example, at the same time. New type of relationship between old and transnational actors is called geo-governance. In this case geopolitical axis will certainly shift from *statist field, balance of power, stability, self-defense, spheres of influence and alliances* to global market concerns with *competitiveness, financial flows, capital sources, trade expansion, coordinating mechanism of labor market*.

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Global humane governance will be the subject of discussion of this subchapter. First section makes in evidence the necessity of creating such a system in order to avoid the blaming and also the prescriptive top-down approach of global governance after analyzing the world order present models. Second section discourses the conflict between long-term interest and short interest common values of the actual actors involved on international politics. Human sustainable security can transform the global geo-governance concept in Humane geo-governance and the third section will try to explain the prospect for Humane governance.

Our paper will only present general ideas because the discussion needs more space. We give more space to the prospect for human sustainable security, which eventually will be part of the new security identity of Europe, civilian approach.(see the non-violent peace force network-making the bridge between USA and Europe)

In order to find a global humane governance system, we need first a constitution developed around the following functions: disarmament, involving the protection of human rights; social justice, environmental protection; economic and social development; and the regulation of international processes such as trade, transportation and communication.

What the new world-order models have in common is a commitment to the basic human values as fundamental criteria of world order. They begin with common problems and then formulate functional institutions to cope with those problems. In today's nation-state competition, those values that conflict with national security goals have little chance to become operative on any significant scale.

The starting point of each Model or governance is the necessity to have as a common denominator but the problem is which one? Sustainable development and Humane security for all actors of international system and the Right to development can be the key words, as integrative concepts of all human needs for the humanity as a whole, shortly sustainable human security. In public policy debates, few argue openly in terms of their own self-interest. Everything is couched in terms of general interest.

Third section deals with *humane governance* opposite concept of *geo-governance*. *Humane geo-governance* is the preferred variant of *geo-governance*. *Humane geo-governance* is not a structure to be blueprinted, but a process of engagement that is guided by a principle of non-violence. *Humane governance* is a preferred form of *governance* being a process and a goal, which emphasizes the achievement of comprehensive rights for all peoples on earth. We have to warn that our passivity will ensure the triumph of the G-8 view of the human future. The prospect for human governance is urgency.

In sum, Humane governance emphasizes people-centred criteria of success, as measured by declines in poverty, violence and pollution and by increasing adherence to human rights and constitutional practices, especially in relation to vulnerable segments of society, as well as by axiological shifts away from materialist/consumerist and patriarchal conceptions of human fulfillment. The perspectives of humane governance stress the accountability of elites and the participation by the peoples of the world and their directly elected representatives. It is necessary to explore the meaning of humane governance in a series of conceptual and policy settings, as well as some implications of counter-projects to shape geo-

governance in more beneficial ways than those resulting from global market forces. The political imaginations of the rich and powerful are still caught up in greed and by efforts to retain short-run advantage. As a consequence, the historical opening at the end of the Cold War has been largely squandered, being treated as one more opportunity to consolidate power and wealth.

If Globalization brought negative aspects, the positive aspect of Globalization is that it has brought an active civil society, fighting for more democracy and greater social justice.

2.2. Conclusions and Perspectives on the Future Project of the European Civil Society

The principal question was if the civil society is ready to form a counter-hegemonic bloc at the European level in alliance with CEE governments, able to face the actual hegemonic bloc driven by embedded neo-liberalism. The answer is negative from two reasons: the actual European Civil society is manipulated by the EU by institutionalization of the civic dialog via the ESC, for the preservation of the status-quo and the other reason is the lack of financier independence, logistic and internal problem of democratization of these civic society entities from both sides Western and Eastern Europe. The creation of counter hegemonic bloc would be possible at the International level and we can't make any prediction yet. The actual tendency at the European level is for polarisation not for polarity and this represents a big threat for the soft security model of Europe. Therefore a marriage between Social Europe and neo-liberalism has to be a priority for the new identity of Europe, to curb the eventual polarization of social forces of all Europe. Europe could be a model of global humane sustainable governance. This hegemonic project should be developed around issues of a humane sustainable security system via a new entity and a regional strategy, which considers good environmental and social standards and full employment to be more important than efficiency, competition and high levels of economic growth, because the society is not a company. In this respect, it is important to challenge the neo-liberal wisdom, which has

acquired a status of natural truth during the processes of globalization. This will not be easy and requires a long *war of position*. Institutions should be set up, which could provide the platform for organic intellectuals and for the development and promotion of an alternative to neo-liberalism. Ministers and representatives stressed the crucial role of NGOs as key non-state actors partners in developing, advocating, building and implementing humane sustainable security¹⁰. The question is if these social forces are prepared to face the actual hegemonic ongoing process of *embedded neo-liberalism*. Let's sum these potential forces of Europe and their input to this coalition already in formation:

- Pressure groups - Redistribution of benefits and losses resulting from lobby activities and these influential pressure groups both in the CEEC and Black- See Region and the EU itself can affect the position of losers and winners.
- Trade union- Intensified co-operation between trade unions within Europe, including the sector level: on co-ordination in respect of wages, working conditions and social regulation complemented by much closer co-ordination of national economic and social policies, going beyond neo-liberal solutions.
- Nation-states - particularly decision-making elites could be ready to participate on this coalition with new ideas able to re-legitimize their authority because even the most powerful nation-states - are no longer able to fulfill the purpose for which they were created (elected) consequently not longer legitimate.

The question is how to make all these actors work together taking into account heir divergent interests. The solution is to find the values, which are commons for all actors, as sustainable human development including humane markets and humane security and cooperative behavior and culture. Our continent has tradition in Christian message and this

¹⁰ *Civil society's vital role in pursuing humane security objectives was recognized at the second Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network in Lucerne, Switzerland, May 11-12, 2000.*

represents an important value, which will transform integration into a real win - win scenarios, as peaceful conflict resolution soft model.

We need a new autonomous civil society representative entity, in neogramscian terms, able to face embedded neo-liberalism and its financial and political institutions in order to participate on decision making process of Global governance mechanism. This entity needs proper material, financial, information and human resources capabilities. New forms of direct democracy are needed too.

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Aspects Regarding the Coordinates of Cooperation in the Black Sea Region

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Abstract: International cooperation, as a source of security, must take in account all domains where there are identified risks, dangers or threats to the security at any of its levels. Through various forms of cooperation there can be solved some of the problems that in recent decades have increased in intensity. It has been identified thus the need for expansion and intensification of cooperation in this region, whereas the six riparian countries and their neighbouring ones have different concepts of security and stability.

Keywords: international security, mechanisms, stability, regional cooperation, regional policy.

1. Introduction

Although it has always had a major strategic importance for the geostrategic area configuration, the Black Sea has never fully played out, with the exception of the Crimean War, the role of space in which could trigger and materialize the policies and strategies of confluence. There are several prerequisites for the geopolitics of the Black Sea to develop and harmonize so complicated tension and mentality that manifests itself in adjacent spaces. [1]

In this context, the Black Sea can be considered a “*strategic country bordering binder with synergistic effect in maintaining a stable security environment, conducive to economic and social development and regional cooperation*” [2]. The establishment of organizations of economic cooperation and security in the region or adjacent to the region is the expression of peace, cooperation, security and stability of nations and to international bodies.

2. Issues Regarding International Cooperation and Safety

Starting from the classic definition, *international cooperation* has positive connotations, it representing the deliberate adjustment policies by countries that are trying to solve a common problem or to achieve mutual gains [3]. The complexity of developments in the South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus region and Central Asian region has established regional actors to redouble efforts on cooperation in the area.

The new features of the security environment have demonstrated that not only States can be actors involved in these processes, and goals may also have negative effects. Thus, in the last decade, the theories relating to international cooperation [4] were centered on three elements:

1. *Non-state actors*, who, increasingly, are playing important roles in all forms of international cooperation (from international organizations to private companies). This trend signifies the erosion of the nation states, as the primary unit of analysis at the international level.
2. *The rules and ideas shared at a transnational level*, which constitutes a source of lasting cooperation. By introducing this element of analysis it is recognized that explanatory model, based on economic factors and the military is no longer enough to determine the nature and scope of international cooperation.
3. *Effectiveness of cooperation* as a topic of interest, which is concerned that the manner in which they apply the arrangements and measures taken jointly, and the extent to which the agreements resolve issues which they are made.

There have been initiated a number of significant initiatives, with multiple dimensions – economic, cultural, environmental, military, etc., in order to strengthen stability and security in the wider Black Sea region. Taking into account all forms of cooperation in the region, it can be seen that NATO, the EU, and each power with regional or global implications, in partnership with Russia, Central Asian countries, Turkey and the Caucasus countries are engaged in building a durable peace and security in the wider Black Sea region.

An analysis [5] of cooperation processes that take place in the Black Sea area, showed the *two main forms of international cooperation*:

1. international cooperation that has the effect of enhancing stability and security in the area, and called *international cooperation as a source of security*;
2. *other forms of cooperation* at the international level which have the effect of eroding stability and security in the area, which are *the sources of insecurity*. This regards terrorist groups or organized crime [6], which operates in the Black Sea region or that use it as a bridge for expanding their business into other areas of the globe.

The theme of this paper is aimed at *the issue of international cooperation as a source of security*. In this regard, international cooperation must address all areas where there are risks, dangers and threats to security at any of the levels of its manifestation. Among the factors affecting the process of international cooperation in the Black Sea are:

- the remains of the rivalry - Russia, Turkey and Greece;
- unresolved ethnic and political conflicts in the Balkans, Moldova and the Caucasus;
- political and economic problems that have prompted most countries riparian to turn their attention to the domestic agenda, and not regional cooperation;
- divergent interests of States in the region, which led to the building of strategic and security ties with various global and regional powers, whose agendas on the Black Sea are based on conflicting goals, etc.

The security and stability of a region is closely correlated with the affirmation of an identity and the strengthening of regional cooperation. Living in the Black Sea area has numerous regional cooperation bodies that operate under the auspices of solid landmarks is the basis of which it can develop initiatives in the field of security and defense [7].

The Black Sea was an essential factor of the regional policy of the post 1989, generating a *"geopolitical explosion"* [8]. In the break-up of the USSR context and the process of enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance –

starting from the partnership for peace and ending with the NATO enlargement which recognizes the importance of its southern flank - appeared as indispensable to achieve cooperation structures of the states bordering the Black Sea.

The need for expansion and intensification of cooperation in this region can be explained by a few assertions as resulting from the debates held between the specialists in the field [9]:

- the threats grow in scale, especially cross-border crime, and can be controlled only through forms of regional cooperation;
- the possibilities for economic development in many of the countries in the region could benefit from certain cooperative efforts, such as, for example, transport infrastructure or flight connections;
- such forms of cooperation creates identities, build mutual trust between the actors of the region and contribute to the achievement and preservation of peace, in particular, between former enemies;
- the EU, whose borders are increasingly closer to stability in the region, that is driving the creation of new initiatives for regional cooperation;
- the actors in the region - be they governments, opposition parties, whether it be civil society - who fights for the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, are interested in, in particular, cooperation with other actors, in other areas of the world, with a view to promoting their regional interests.

The cooperation in the Black Sea region, more precisely in the area of the Black Sea, is required, on the one hand, the external pressures of NATO enlargement and the European Union, the exploitation of energy resources in the Caspian Sea area and transporting them to the West, international control of trafficking in drugs, arms and humans, combating organized crime, etc., and, on the other hand, numerous internal pressures, those two levels: state - modernization of the economies of every State in the area, the democratization of access to energy resources, etc. - and the regional transformation of the region from an area of confrontation to an area of confluence.

The dynamic entity expansion of economic, political, military and security already is one of the most effective ways of achieving, extensive areas of stability and security. Thus, at the regional level, there are a number of mechanisms and international cooperation organizations.

The **Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)** is an international organization composed of 56 participating states from Europe, the Mediterranean, Caucasus, Central Asia and North America, covering the northern hemisphere area "from Vancouver to Vladivostok" [10]. Thanks to the mechanism of adopting decisions by consensus, all OSCE participating States have equal status. The OSCE has its origins in the early 1970s, when it was initiated by the Conference for security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as for dialogue and multilateral negotiation between East and West. The OSCE is the only institution or security organization in Europe, considered as a regional security arrangement within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and, consequently, the first early warning instrument in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction in the region. All-encompassing approach to security is reflected in the justification of the activity of the Organization in three dimensions: politico-military; economic and environmental issues; human being.

Setting up an initiative of the Black Sea economic cooperation once belonged to the former Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Sukru Elekdag, and was immediately embraced by Bulgaria, Romania and the former USSR, still left disrupted at that time. On 25 June 1992 by the Istanbul Declaration, launched the idea of creating the **Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)**, at a time when particularly favorably on European cooperation, shortly after the demise of the cold war and the abolition of economic and military blocs. The BSEC was founded by eleven countries: 5 Balkan countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey), 3 countries which have become independent riparian (Moldova, Russia, Ukraine) and 3 countries Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia). The signing of the Charter for the Black Sea

Economic Cooperation, on 5 June 1998, at Yalta, marks the time of processing this cooperation structures within an international organization, which, with effect from 8 October 1999 had acquired observer status at the UN. BSEC operates with "The European neighborhood and partnership instrument" and "the document on measures to increase the size and security of the Black Sea".

The **Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE)** is an initiative to implement a strategy of conflict prevention, with a focus on political development, economic recovery and social stability. It was released in 1999 in Cologne and is intended to encourage the cooperation of the States of South-Eastern Europe, and to support the efforts of these countries ' economic and political integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Politically the most important Instrumental of the SPSEE is "regional table", which plays the role of the supervisory body. SPSEE activities: economic development, local democracy and cross-border cooperation, cooperation in security, human capital development, the parliamentary cooperation. [11]

The **Regional Council of Cooperation (RCC)** is the form present in the stability pact for South-Eastern Europe, following the regional table transformed in Belgrade (30 May 2006), when States have decided to redefine the Stability Pact through its transformation in RCC [12].

The **Central European Initiative (CEI)** is a flexible form of regional cooperation, created in 1989, bringing together 17 countries: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Italy, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, and Ukraine. CEI decisions are reflected in the final documents, statements and policy recommendations, adopted by consensus at its meetings (Summit meetings of Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs).

The **Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)**, established on 6 December 1996 in Geneva, aimed at encouraging co-operation among participating States in order to facilitate their integration into European

structures, including the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovenia, Turkey, Hungary.

Border Defense Initiative (BDI) is an initiative launched in 2004, at Bucharest, with support from the United States, in order to improve the export control regime, cooperation in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova.

The Black Sea Naval Cooperation (BLACKSEAFOR) was initiated by Turkey in 1998 and comprises: Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Its main purpose is to develop cooperation and interoperability between the naval forces of the countries bordering the Black Sea.

South East European Brigade (SEEBRIG) was established at the initiative of Turkey, in September 1999, and comprises: Albania, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Italy, Romania, Turkey. Croatia, Slovenia and the United States have observer status. The objectives aimed at strengthening the SEEBRIG stability and regional security, political and military confidence, developing military cooperation in the area of good neighborly relations between the countries of South-Eastern Europe.

Organization for democracy and economic development GU(U)AM, established in 1996 at Vienna, is an Alliance of political, economic and strategic for the strengthening of the independence and sovereignty of the former Soviet republics, including Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (retired in 2005), Azerbaijan and Republic of Moldova.

Black Sea Regional Energy Centre, established in May 1994 at the ministerial meeting, is aimed at the implementation of the EU acquis and harmonization of energy policies of the States in the region with those of the EU. [13] Energy Center includes: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro.

The South-East Cooperation Process (SEECP), a regional structure unregistered, established in 1996 at the initiative of Bulgaria, it was desirable to establish a new form of cooperation through the transformation of the region into a space of peace, security, stability and the integration of the States of the region into European structures and euro-Atlantic. In this structure are: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, Turkey (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia have observer status).

The **Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial Process (SEDM)** is a regional initiative which works under the auspices of the Multinational Force of Peace in South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), as well as the following projects:

- the Working Group for the proliferation of mass destruction, border security and the fight against terrorism (CBSC);
- "Female Leaders in Security and defense" (FLSD);
- Building integrity Initiative (BII);
- Strategic assessment process to SEDM (FLSD).

The states from the Black Sea region have initiated, in addition to the cooperation of institutions and organizations, a series of bi-and trilateral agreements aimed at countering the dangers and threats specific to our century and risks associated with them. **Trilateral** is a flexible form of sub-regional cooperation, which operates in accordance with the principles laid down by common agreement between the participating countries, whose objectives, areas of cooperation, mechanisms, legal framework and the degree of institutionalization differ depending on their interests and practice of the States concerned [14]. Since 1995, Romania has advanced a series of proposals for trilateral cooperation with several countries, in order to identify new ways of trilateral cooperation in the region: Bulgaria – Romania-Greece (1995), Romania-Bulgaria Trilateral – Turkey (1997), Romania – Hungary – Trilateral Serbia (2003).

The international security organizations have signaled the importance that the region holds in achieving peace and security globally and have initiated a number of mechanisms:

- a Development Program, launched by the United Nations;
- a partnership for peace, initiated by NATO;
- a plan of action for Individual Partnership with countries in the Black Sea region;
- a program of the Environmental Safety and toxic substances involved in the transport of oil and gas in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea region ";
- the European neighborhood policy, launched by the European Union;
- the INOGATE Interstate Transport – oil and gas to Europe;
- the TRACECA Transport Corridor-Europe-Caucasus-Asia;
- a PETRA – the Pan-European Transport;
- a DANBLAS- Ecological Force of Danube-Black Sea region, as well as other programs launched by the OSCE and GU(U)AM.

Moreover, in addition to these mechanisms, the states have come to *intensifying the forms of multiple, interdependent, cooperation with wide opening to all areas* [15], especially in the environment. An issue being debated on the comprehensive security agendas of States in the region is linked to the conservation of the natural environment, whereas the Black Sea region is facing serious problems related to environmental degradation. Such initiatives were institutionalized:

Black Sea Commission, established in 1992, with the ratification of the Convention for the protection of the Black Sea against pollution, which includes: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine. The declared goal is cooperation between members of the local and international community for the protection and rehabilitation of the Black Sea.

Commission Communication on the European Union's environmental cooperation in the Danube-Black Sea Region - to transform environmental policy and substantial to match that of the EU.

Black Sea Foundation (established in 1997) include 53 universities in the Black Sea region and see the identification and improvement of intellectual resources needed for sustainable development of the region.

There have also been created cultural initiatives, to reduce the number of acts of intolerance, violence, terrorism, racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and discrimination, marginalization directed against national minorities, ethnic, religious and linguistic, refugees, immigrants and other vulnerable social groups. One such example is the **Network for Tolerance in the Mediterranean Region and the Black Sea**, was initiated by UNESCO in November 1995.

The Black Sea region has changed considerably in recent years and will continue to evolve. The European Commission has set up a program for the Black Sea cross-border cooperation within the framework of the European neighborhood and partnership instrument (ENPI). This program of cooperation in the Black Sea basin is focused on supporting civil society and cooperation at the local level in coastal regions of the Black Sea. The program is managed at the local level within the region, the partners being equally responsible for its implementation.

Strengthening the European Neighborhood policy (ENP), including the creation of a thematic dimension to its progressive development and free trade agreements and increase cooperation in the area in detail. Links between the EU and the BSEC make, first of all, the dialogue at the regional level.

In this context, the regional cooperation initiative of the EU [16] "**Black Sea Synergy**", launched in 2007, complementary to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) complements the useful range of activities currently bilateral and sector level. This transparent and inclusive initiative is based on the common interests of the EU and the Black Sea region and takes into account the results of consultations with all States of the Black Sea. It also contributes to the formation and harnessing the synergies made the experience gained through existing regional initiatives linking the Black Sea region to the EU, such as the Danube cooperation process. [17]

The scope can be extended beyond the region itself since many activities are closely related to neighboring regions, in particular from the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and South-East Europe. Thus, there was a close link between the Black Sea and approach of the EU strategy for Central Asia. Black Sea cooperation including interregional and important elements are taken into consideration and also other regional cooperation programs supported by international organizations and third countries. [18]

Within the framework of the Black Sea synergy, Romania is the owner of the environmental projects, having regard to the initiative of the development and implementation of a regional partnership on the environment. Currently the synergy seems to have lost little of visibility and interest, especially due to the occurrence of the new Eastern Partnership initiative [19]. It is, as the main promoter of Synergy, to bring your goals and especially the concrete projects involved in the agenda of the European Union, including in terms of the instruments and mechanisms of implementation and financial resources.

The European Union's presence in the Black Sea region opens the path to new perspectives and possibilities, which involves actions consistent and long term allowing the exploitation of these opportunities fully and to bring greater stability and prosperity in the region.

Regional cooperation in the Black Sea area is for Romania a significant dimension of its foreign policy, complementary to the process of European and Euro-Atlantic take part. Therefore, the existing regional structures have been created to strengthen the economic and political stability in the area, in order to ensure member states ' development in a climate of peace, security and good-neighborly cooperation. Some of these structures are not exclusive area around the Black Sea, but their existence influences the climate of security and co-operation inside it.

Even though Pontic basin do not constitute a political unit, cultural or religious practice, it is the crossroads of the Eurasian migrations, the interference of civilizations, cultures and religions of the European, Asian and Arab, by concentrating the hot spots, the conflicts are about to evolve

— such as the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, but also the influence of conflicts in Central Asia and the Arab States.

There are some political and strategic ways to achieve stability and security in the Black Sea area [20], of which the most important are:

- an international architecture, developed and imposed by international organizations and bodies, in particular the United Nations and the major powers;
- political and military deterrence of crises and conflicts, isolation, and resolution of existing impoundment and preventing those possible with a strong economic support;
- dynamic expansion of strong security and stability, particularly in regard to the EU and NATO;
- strengthening of security and stability of States.

The design and implementation of an opera international architecture to prevent war and armed conflict and lead to security and stability can be achieved only through collective action.

3. Conclusions

The Black Sea region offers opportunities and challenges that require coordinated action at the regional level. This concerns in particular the key sectors such as energy, transport, environment, movement and security. The objective of enhanced regional cooperation is not to directly treat the old conflicts in the region, however, could lead to greater mutual trust and, over time, would help to eliminate certain obstacles. Having regard to the merging of cultures in the Black Sea region, greater regional cooperation could have beneficial effects in and outside the region.

Romania, as a holding of the Danube mouths, so of the strategic corridor, whose economic importance grows significantly, especially in relation to European overland transport network, together with Bulgaria, Turkey, the NATO member countries, which hold more than half of the Black Sea coast, in cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and the Caucasus

bordering countries, but also with other countries in the enlarged area an active role, and of utmost importance, becoming a key country in the construction of the South-Eastern European region.[21]

In this context, Romania fully supports the objective of creating an area of stability and security in its eastern neighborhood, through all the initiatives of cooperation new or already existing that proposes this objective. Although initially showed reluctance (for Bulgaria) against Poland and Sweden's initiative to create the Eastern partnership, for fear a reduction in interest and attention given to the Black Sea Synergy initiative, whose main promoter, Romania is now a supporter of the Eastern partnership project, the eastern dimension of the ENP is gaining particular significance. Romania pleads consistently for any new framework of cooperation should be complementary to already existing initiatives and to abide by all the principles of the European Neighborhood Policy.

Thus, controversies arising in connection with the future of this region and, in particular, the interest manifested by various actors of the international security environment, we have to study carefully the present forms of cooperation, but also those looming here.

In the 21st century, considered the overall policies, it becomes essential to a common policy on security and defense and co-operation of States in the Black Sea region, to the existence of a space without political tension, promoting a series of principles related to international peacekeeping: the ability to establish a climate of confidence; ability to promote the control of armaments; disarmament; cooperation in the interests of common security; crisis prevention capacity and efficient reaction in situations of crisis.

All of these things lead us to the conclusion that many Western geopolitical actors have in the Black Sea area, focus in particular on reduction of inter-State and inter-ethnic contradictions, crisis management new and emerging, as well as the realization of a safe and quiet environment to enable stability and appropriate economic development of the States belonging to it.

In the 21st century, considered the overall policies, it becomes essential to a common policy on security and defense and co-operation of states in the Black Sea region, to the existence of a space without political tension, promoting a series of principles related to international peacekeeping: the ability to establish a climate of confidence; ability to promote the control of armaments; disarmament; cooperation in the interests of common security; crisis prevention capacity and efficient reaction in situations of crisis.

In order to remain current and at the same time accessible, the initial objectives pursued by states must be built amid the changing political situation [22]. In the new European-Atlantic reconfiguration and Eurasian-security environment, NATO expansion and the European Union and the rearranging of the power centers of strategic partnerships, as well as the battle for resources, co-operation between states should defuse any pressure and to create conditions for the consolidation of a stable security environment and long-lasting.

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- [12] <http://www.rcc.int>.
- [13] <http://www.bserc.eu>.
- [14] Daniela Popa, *quoted opera*, p. 109.
- [15] Grigore Alexandrescu, Alexandra Sarchinschi, *quoted opera*, p.11.
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- [17] An initiative developed by Austria, Romania, the European Commission and the stability pact to broaden and strengthen the Danube Cooperation and give them a political and economic dimension.
- [18] For example, United Nations programmes, OSCE, OECD and the Council of Europe and the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation of the GMF of the United States.
- [19] The Eastern partnership, launched at the Summit in Prague (May 2009), comprises six neighbors to the East and adds a dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy East multilateral. its primary objective is to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and economic integration between the EU and the partner countries concerned. With the launch, it has been decided and the limited growth in the volume of EU aid.
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International Cooperation in Combating Money Laundering in the Black Sea Region

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Abstract: At the regional and international level there is a pressure upon the fight against money laundering. International organizations are trying to provide the legal and institutional framework by which countries could comply with regulations in this area. The paper outlines the typology of criminal activities and the money laundering circuit stages.

Keywords: organized crime, evasion, fraud, money laundering.

1. Introduction

Means of tax evasion are numerous, practically infinite, because everything takes place beyond the legal framework in order to avoid legal taxation. The legal tax evasion imposes a certain constraint of the law (there is a so called swing), but the fraudulent evasion is the remainder, meaning a combination of circumstances, cases, facts, strategies that go beyond the limits of the law.

In the business world there are areas where honesty, fair play, morality, conscience are abstract, lacking real value. The key word is money. This includes the manufacture and sale of narcotics, weapons, organized crime activities, stock theft, and espionage. Of course, these markets operate according to certain rules of trade, but they, however, have regard to legal compliance.

On global level, there are several strategies aimed at combating money laundering, terrorist financing and drug trafficking. These efforts are

considering weakening global economic forces of criminal organizations and removing the effects and criminal economy on the official one¹.

In order to implement different strategies to combat money laundering world states and organizations use several international legal instruments such as the 1988 Convention of the United Nations against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

In addition, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Convention against Corruption have expanded the scope of the offense of money laundering. All of these tools encourage states to have a national regulatory regime for individuals and legal entities, as well as banking and non-banking institutions.

1.1. What about the Money-Laundering?

Criminal activities have as main purpose the obtaining of a profit at the individual or group level. Money laundering is the process by which it can be concealed the illegal origin of these activities without jeopardizing their source. The money laundering generates large sums of money which stimulates the desire to legitimize illegal gains by this process.

There are many definitions of money laundering which describe this process:

Article 324-1 of the Criminal Code (France) defines money laundering as "*that facilitate, by all means, false justification of the origin of goods or income or the author of a misdemeanor crime and it's procuring a direct or indirect profit. Equally constitute money laundering the fact to bring competition to a job placement, concealment or conversion of direct or indirect product of a crime or offense*"².

¹ www.unodc.org

² Criminal Code, art. 324-1, France

INTERPOL's definition of money laundering is: "*any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources*"³.

Article 1 of the draft European Communities (EC) Directive of March 1990 defines it as "*the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from serious crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in committing such an offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his action, and the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from serious crime*"⁴.

Money laundering includes the following aspects⁵:

- The transfer of property that comes from illegal activity to conceal the illicit origin or to relieve a person from the legal consequences of the offense committed by the acquisition of that property;
- Hiding the true source or origin of the property which comes from illegal activity;
- Possession or use of a good that came from criminal activity;
- Attempts to commit criminal actions, support or counseling the commission of illegal activities.

Criminal activities include drug trafficking, illegal arms trade and "white collar" economic crimes (see table 1). To give a legal tint to these revenues the entities involved have to make certain changes or money laundering⁶.

³ <http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Financial-crime/Money-laundering>

⁴ European Communities (EC), Directive of March 1990

⁵ Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, *Anti-Fraud, Corruption, Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Policy*

⁶ Siska Josef, *Die Geldwäscherei und ihre Bekämpfung in Österreich, Deutschland und der Schweiz*, Wien, 1999

Organized Crime

Drugs	Property	Economy	Violence	Nightlife	Weapons
Drug-related crime	Theft	Investment fraud	Armed robbery	Procuration prostitution	Nuclear
Narcotics	Illegal car movement	Economic subsidy fraud	Protection money	Illegal gambling	Break of embargo
	Burglary receiving	Payment fraud	Kidnapping	Human trafficking	
leads to Money Laundering					

Source: Siska Josef, Die Geldwäscherei und ihre Bekämpfung in Österreich, Deutschland und der Schweiz, Wien, 1999

Table 1. The main areas of organized crime

We can make another classification of criminal activities which from arise money laundering.

Criminal activities

Drugs and psychotropic substances	Prostitution
Terrorism	Forgery
Theft/Burglary/Robbery	Blackmail
Kidnapping illegal restraint and hostage taking	Extortion
Deception	Tax Evasion
Corruption and bribery	Evasion of Exchange Controls
Fraud	Smuggling
Participation in an organized criminal group and racketeering	Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling
Sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children	Illicit arms trafficking
Illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods	Counterfeiting currency
Counterfeiting and piracy of products	Environmental crime
Murder, grievous bodily injury	Insider trading

Table 2. Different criminal activities that conduct to money laundering

Even if the methods are varied, money passes three stages to become "clean".

The first step is to place them in financial and banking institutions in the country, securities or transportation abroad. This stage where money is introduced into the banking system requires the complicity of employees of financial and banking institutions. Thus, in countries struggling for years against money laundering, the conclusion was predictable: all attempts to establish the money insertion into the banking system and all the complicated electronic surveillance and reporting systems (which tend to have a central place, as money transfers made through computer networks increases) fails face to the actions of people within the system, which are working with mafia structures. Although in many countries, financial institutions are required to examine and report any unusual transaction or not legal basis, it is impossible to prevent officials to warn customers that the reports of their shipments were communicated to the authorities⁷.

For this first step it can be used two techniques⁸. The first technique, "primary deposit", involves the quickly placement of money from criminal activities. The total amount is divided in small amounts in different banks to the limit of declaring income. Another method refers to the purchase of existing banks or to place them in offshore countries. However, is much easier to bribe bank employees, so you can infiltrate in the legal financial system.

The second technique, "secondary deposit" is an indirect infiltration of money supply in the banking system. So, the financial institutions are changed and the money from criminal activities is converted in to other assets through a person who trades on behalf of another person.

The second stage involves a complex mechanism of financial and commercial operations designed to conceal the illicit origin of the money.

⁷ Couvrat J. Francois, Nicolas Pless, *La face cachee de l'economi emondiale*, Hatier, Paris, 1988

⁸ Friedrich Schneider, *Money Laundering and Financial Means of Organized Crime: Some Preliminary Empirical Findings*, "Paolo Baffi" Centre Research Paper Series No. 2008-16, 2008

This implies successive transfers and sales, and of course many investments.

The last step is aimed to create an apparent legal form for these incomes and consists in obtaining loans, getting false invoices and transfer amounts across multiple borders⁹.

There are also artisanal methods, such as recycling money by purchasing artwork, challenging transactions through fake process and money laundering "at home" through carrier's suitcases and briefcases. In this area, the imagination knows no bounds¹⁰.

1.2. Mis-selling Overpriced

1. A dealer sales overpriced false works of contemporary art or African and pre-Columbian statues. Objects are difficult to identify.
2. Before the sale, he sent a sum of cash to an accomplice.
3. Dealer sells quickly the artworks at a huge price to the accomplice. The first receives for the items sold the exactly amount that he intends to launder. The amount is sent to the representative of the auction house.
4. After the sale, the accomplice returns the artwork to the old owner and collects a commission.

Art trade is one of the least controllable acts because the object identification is very difficult, sometimes impossible. The value of an artwork is subjective, so difficult to verify. Many money-laundering operations were made on artworks market, resulting in a general increase in prices.

⁹ Riegler, Wolfgang, *Die Quantifizierung der Geldwäsche*, Diploma Thesis, Institute of Economics, University of Linz, 2004

¹⁰ Beauchamp Andre, *Guide mondial du secret bancaire*, Ed. Grasset, Paris, 1983

1.3. The False Trial

1. Money that has to be laundered is illegally deposited into the bank account of a company in the Cayman Islands.
2. The company from Boston which has to recover the laundered money must initiate a process to the Cayman Islands Company and it requests \$ 10 million. From this point, there are two possibilities: to agree or to lose the process.
 - In the first case, the company from Cayman Islands is willing to pay 8 million in exchange for the abandonment of the trial.
 - In the second case, the company allows to be convicted and must pay the amount requested by the arbitration authority or the court law.

The used technique operates upon a very simple principle. Forgery trial requires that the person who wants to launder the money must have at least two companies, one located in the origin country of money and one in the country where the laundered money should reach. The person involved must have time to do all the process. But the trial can be accelerated using the procedure of arbitration which is widespread in international trade. It will be very difficult for the police in proving that the process was simulated. Money received by the company that wins the trial will not be subject to tax, so we can say that justice has contributed to the mechanism of money laundering.

1.4. Reverse Money Laundering

1. The Russian Mafia diverts Siberian oil and sells it on the open market from Rotterdam at \$ 40 million.
2. Money is deposited in a bank account in London.
3. The Russian Mafia, that controls several banks, makes an order for new bills to New York bank.
4. The London bank has transferred \$ 40 million to the private New York bank.
5. The bank from New York purchases new bills (that worth \$ 40 million) from Federal Reserve Bank.

6. Federal Reserve Bank delivers the new bills and they are sent by different controlled banks in Moscow.

1.5. Some Aspects of Money Laundering in the Black Sea Region

One of the most important international institutions which carry out the fight against money laundering is the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime¹¹. This UN body is responsible for putting into effect the Global Programme against Money-Laundering, Proceeds of Crime and the Financing of Terrorism. The most important objectives of this programme are the following¹²:

- contributing to the implementation of the universal legal instruments that states could use in the fight against money laundering;
- providing expertise and resources to implement national legislation in accordance with General Assembly regulations and decisions;
- providing help for the internationally and regionally exchange of information and mutual assistance in the fight against terrorist financing;
- strengthening the legal and operational capacity for states in order to be efficient in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.

For the region around the Black Sea, the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank play an important role in the fight against terrorism and money laundering. Its mission is to promote and stimulate regional economic cooperation. In this respect, according to the articles of incorporation of the bank, it can establish policies and procedures aimed to control and to regulate systematically the risks stemming from the fight against money laundering. The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank want to ensure that risks will be at the most possible low level, both internally and in its relations with third parties. The Bank has introduced a policy and

¹¹ Radulescu Irina Gabriela, *Duality of World Economy*, UPG Publishing House, Ploiesti, 2007

¹² <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/programme-objectives.html>

associated procedures aimed at fighting against illicit activities. The Bank has also initiated cooperation relationships on sharing information with authorities from the Member States and with international organizations that hold relevant abilities¹³.

In order to have a more efficient strategy, the Bank must have the following objectives:

- To introduce additional controls for the projects being funded;
- To identify those businesses most vulnerable to the risks arising from the fight against money laundering;
- To ensure that all procedures in force are viable and practical;
- To evaluate constantly the effectiveness of introduced controls.

Ideally, these objectives should be comparative with those which any other international body has. For a better understanding and effectiveness of the fight against money laundering countries should have a linear view of what that means this process. A good example of an anti-money laundering regime is the French one which includes three phases: intelligence, investigation and judicial (see table 3).

¹³ Radulescu Dragos Lucian, *Organizații regionale și politici de cooperare*, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, București, 2013

TRACFIN Intelligence phase	Number of suspicious transaction reports
	Number of files transferred to the competent authorities
Police Investigation phase	Number of investigations
Courts Judicial phase	Number of indictments
	Number of legal proceedings
	Number of convictions
	Number of confiscations

Source: Cynthia TAVARES, Geoffrey THOMAS, Mickaël ROUDAUT, Money Laundering in Europe, EUROSTAT and DG Home Affairs, 2010

Table 3. French anti-money laundering regime

Many countries, especially those from European Union, determine the rates shown in the table 3 in order to establish the efficiency of the anti-money laundering. Of course, it is difficult to measure with accuracy the criminal activities. So, the levels of the real criminal market will be always higher than those of known one.

In Romania, data on selected indicators for the three phases are recorded by the National Office for the Prevention and Control of Money Laundering. In table 4 it can be observed various suspicious transactions that lead to money laundering.

Type of suspicious transaction reported	
Credit institutions	1545
Life insurance companies	5
Investment firms	3
Money transfer institutions	17
Notaries	225
Real estate agents	2
Casinos	12
Traders in goods above Euros 15000	51
Company service providers	2
Others	468
Financial institutions	5
Total	2338

Source: Cynthia TAVARES, Geoffrey THOMAS, Mickaël ROUDAUT, Money Laundering in Europe, EUROSTAT and DG Home Affairs, 2010

Table 4. Number of Suspicious Transaction Reports in Romania, 2008

In the investigation phase the most important indicators are the number of cases initiated by law enforcement agencies and the number of cases brought to prosecution.

	Number of cases initiated by law enforcement agencies	Number of cases brought to prosecution
2005	-	22
2006	-	29
2007	-	21
2008	719	36

Source: Cynthia TAVARES, Geoffrey THOMAS, Mickaël ROUDAUT, Money Laundering in Europe, EUROSTAT and DG Home Affairs, 2010

Table 5. Indicators of the investigation phase for Romania

In the judicial phase there is a distinction between the entity which is convicted for self laundering activities and the entity convicted for third party money laundering actions.

	2005	2006	2007	2008
third party	0	0	0	0
self-laundering	13	2	7	4
unable to distinguish	0	0	0	0
Total	13	2	7	4

Source: Cynthia TAVARES, Geoffrey THOMAS, Mickaël ROUDAUT, Money Laundering in Europe, EUROSTAT and DG Home Affairs, 2010

Table 6. Number of entities convicted for money-laundering offences in Romania

2. Conclusions

Because of its specific features, money laundering exists outside the scope of statistical monitoring. However, experts in the field have attempted to estimate the size of a phenomenon; the International Monetary Fund said that the actions of dirty money laundering worldwide would amount to 2-5% of global GDP. Experts in money laundering sell services, contacts, experience and knowledge of the quality of the money circuit, with the latest electronic technology support, any dealer or criminal ready to pay their fees. This process continues to complicate the implementation of the law, especially by mixing the lawful with the unlawful funds from many sources and expansion throughout the world, away from the crime scene.

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The Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Geopolitical and Military Issues

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Abstract: The Balkan wars of 1912-1913 had important geopolitical, military and territorial consequences over the balance of power in the European south-east. The origins of the Balkan wars were territorial rivalries between the great powers and the mixture Balkan states in the region. The military actions in the Balkan' area took place simultaneously with efforts political and diplomatic undertaken in London, St. Petersburg and Bucharest for to stop the conflict. The study aimed to demonstrate that the small states are able to find viable solutions at the rivalry one of them, and the Peace Conference held in Bucharest (July 16/29 - 28 July/10 August 1913) confirmed this hypothesis.

Keywords: Balkan wars, great power, diplomacy, Balkan states.

In the practice of the European diplomacy from the nineteenth and twentieth century organization of peace conferences that have succeeded the various conflicts was the exclusive privilege of the great powers, as a mean to promote and impose geopolitical interests. From this perspective, the Peace Conference held in Bucharest (July 16/29 - 28 July/10 August 1913) was an obvious exception. The peace treaty signed in Bucharest on 28 July/10 August 1913 was a response given by the small Balkan powers to the problems of peace and war in the Balkan Peninsula, considered as a real "powder keg" of Europe because of the increasing of the tensions in the region.

The negotiations held and the decisions which were made in the peace conference held in the Romanian capital highlighted the effort of the participating states to find viable solutions to the problem of security in an area where there was a conflict of interests of almost all European powers, especially those of the Ottoman, Russian and Austro-Hungarian, but also inter-regional rivalries. The "management" implemented by the great

powers to the Balkan problems envisaged their geopolitical interests and in a limited extent, took into account the ethnic, religious, historical and cultural specific the peoples which living in that area and the interests states within the south-east of the continent. nations. Constant interference of the great powers contributed to the emergence and manifestation of tense relations between the south-eastern states.

The political and military evolutions, the territorial changes occurred in the Balkan region during 1912-1913 have influenced the balance of power in Europe and imposed a new diplomatic approach within the European geopolitical frame of those years. Geopolitical changes of the Balkan region in the years before the outbreak of First World War highlights the role of the particular factors that led to the solution organizing of a peace conference without the direct involvement of the great powers in the capital of a small power in the region, and, the most important thing, in making decisions that have contributed to keeping the balance of power and to achieve the goals pursued by most of the Balkan states.

At the beginning of the twentieth century rivalries between the great powers for the Balkan area have been intensified, actions that have resulted in an mixture increasingly evident in the political life and penetration in the economy of the states in the region, including disputes between these small countries. The external interference, existing rivalries "both among the Balkan states and the great powers" have made the sense of insecurity and the mistrust to reach a very high level¹.

Austro-Hungary developed a sustained political and economic offensive in the Balkans, and after the annexation of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1908, consolidated its position, exerting a significant influence over the policy of the states in the region.

¹ Charles și Barbara Jelavich, *Formarea statelor naționale balcanice.1804-1920 [The Formations of the Balkan National States]*, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1999, p. 249.

Defeated in Asia (in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905), Russia resumed its expansion to Straits. Russian diplomacy has initiated a number of actions meant to restore St. Petersburg's influence in the Balkan region and to bring Balkan Christian states under its control. The Russian Minister in Belgrade, Hartwig² was the architect of an alliance between Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, alliance which was led and supported by Russia. Russian diplomacy succeeded, after great efforts to convince governments from Sofia, Belgrade and Athens to overcome the differences between them and to sign the political treaties and bilateral military conventions in the spring and summer of 1912³. The establishment of the Balkan alliance represented a success of Russian diplomacy. Russia acquired a dominant position in the region, the Balkan alliance being a useful tool for geopolitical the objectives pursued by it. The Balkan Alliance could be engaged, according to the St. Petersburg policy, against both Austro-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. The diplomacy in St. Petersburg underestimated the capacity of the states in Balkan Alliance to be independently. The governments of within the Allied Balkan states started without the consent of Russia the war with the Ottoman Empire, in October 1912. Russia's efforts to stop the war in the Balkans was determined by the fact that the Russian state was not able at that time to deal with a European conflict because it hadn't completed its fleet and military modernization program.⁴

² Nikolai Ghenrihoviici Hartwig (1857-1914) - diplomat, representative of Russia in Belgrade between 1908-1914.

³ Serbia and Bulgaria signed a political treaty February 28 / March 13 1912 which led to the formation of the Balkan League. Greece and Montenegro have signed at May 16 /29, 1912, respectively September 12, 1912, joining the Balkan League. Subsequently, on June 29 /July 12 first three states have concluded a military convention which completed the political agreements.

⁴ Nicoleta Ciachir, *Istoriografia bulgară cu privire la relațiile politico-diplomatice româno-bulgare în perioada 1912-1940*, PhD thesis, Library of the University "Valahia" in Târgoviște, 2012, p. 38.

The establishment of the Balkan League between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia has changed the balance of power in the Balkans. The total number of soldiers from the four allied Balkan states was over 630,000 people, a formidable force, almost double compared to the number of soldiers of the Ottoman armies which were deployed in Europe, estimated at about 350,000 people⁵. The geostrategic importance of the Balkan alliance was also amplified by the difficult strategic situation of the Ottoman Empire, which had most of its military forces deployed in Tripolitania, on the Italian-Turkish front⁶.

Allied Balkan states took advantage of the military defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Italy, of the unfavorable strategic situation in which its army was and decided to start the war being as its aim the liberation the countrymen which were under Ottoman rule. The attack of the military forces of allied Balkan states surprised the Ottoman army engaged on two fronts located very far one by another. The maneuver of forces and means carried by the Ottoman army on the front of Tripolitania to the front in the Balkans was made under difficult conditions and with great delay. The simultaneous offensive triggered by the Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek and Montenegrin armies was successful and led to the defeat, in a very short time of the Ottoman troops located in the Balkans theater of operations.

Less than two months after the onset of the conflict, the Ottoman Empire lost almost all European territories (except for the region Istanbul and the cities of Edirne, Iannina and Scutari). The intervention of the great powers saved the Ottoman Empire from disaster. The fights ceased due to pressures from the great powers on the states in The Balkan alliance, who

⁵ Gl V. Economu, mr.Gh. Gheorghiu, *Discuțiuni asupra războaielor balcanice*, București, 1926, pp. 52-53.

⁶ In September 1911, Italy attacked the Ottoman possessions in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea and conquered Tripolitania, Cyrenaica (Libya today), the Dodecanese Archipelago, and other territories. Peace was signed on 18 October 1912, the day that Ottoman Empire started war against the military forces of states of the Balkan League.

were forced to accept, in late November 1912, the armistice requested by the Ottoman government.

The quick victories obtained by the armies of the Balkan states against Ottoman military forces surprised the European world, but created new problems in the region. The territorial conquests achieved by the Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek and Montenegrin armies endangered the Ottoman possessions in Europe, but also the objectives pursued by other major powers in the Straits region. Russia was hostile to a possible occupation of Istanbul by the Greek and Bulgarian armies, because such a situation constitutes a many good excuse for the other European powers to deploy fleets of war in the Straits. An international squadron, consisting of 35 warships (4 British, 5 French, 6 German, 7 Italian, 4 Russian, 4 Austro-Hungarian, 2 American, 1 Spanish, 1 Romanian and 1 Dutch) was already concentrated at the end of October 1912, in the Straits⁷. Serbian territorial expansion to Adriatic coast represented an unacceptable situation for the government in Vienna because it was blocking its geopolitical project conducted under the slogan *Drang nach Salonik*. As a result, Austro-Hungary adopted a very aggressive attitude towards Serbia. While the Serbian armed forces were defeating the Ottoman armies in Albania, from Sangeacul Novi Pazar and were advancing towards the Adriatic, the Vienna government ordered the mobilization of army corps and concentrated some of its troops at the border with Serbia. Germany supported Austro-Hungary's actions, stating that they did not rule out the possibility of a war in Europe. France openly expressed its support for Russia, assuring it that in the event of a German aggression will keep its pledges towards its ally. England came in a steady position to block the tensions which appeared between the Franco-Russian bloc and the German-Austrian one. As regards the evolutions in the Balkans, English diplomacy did not adopt open action

⁷ Romanian Military Archives, fund Ministry of War, file 214/1913, f 20-21. (Romanian attaché Report in Turkey, Lieutenant Colonel Aristide Razu, of January 29, 1913).

to support the Balkan alliance because it persisted to strengthen its position in Istanbul and eliminate of the strong German influence⁸.

The crisis occurred between Belgrade and Vienna could lead to an extension of the Balkan conflict across the entire continent. Direct engagement of a great power such as Austro-Hungary, in the Balkan conflict would cause a dangerous situation for the European peace, given to keep also account of the continent the existing system of alliances between the great powers and the interests these in the south-east.

Political and diplomatic actions undertaken by Britain, France and Russia led to overcoming the crisis and prevented the onset of a generalized European war⁹. Edward Grey, Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, said that in case of a European war that will involve France and Germany, England would remain neutral. The position of the British official was its government's response to the statement of the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, on 2 December 1912 according to whom an "attack" against Austro-Hungary will force Germany to fulfill their "duties as ally". The English government warning changed the attitude of Germany. The government in Berlin urged authorities in Vienna to refrain from military action against Serbia and to accept to settle the dispute by means of an international conference. Austro-Hungary accepted to declare that gave up to solve the crisis with Serbia by diplomatic means, on condition that the small Serbian kingdom did not gain the access desired to the Adriatic Sea. In turn, Russia made great pressures a Belgrade and forced Serbia to waive its conquered territories in Albania and the Adriatic Sea output¹⁰.

The role of the UK in global politics, which by its industrial, financial and military force imposed a *British Pax* in the international system and the

⁸ *Histoire Universelle, De la Revolution au monde contemporain*, Larousse-Bordas, 1998, Paris, vol. 3, p. 282.

⁹ Serge Bernstein, Pierre Milza, *Istoria secolului XX [The History of the XX Century]*, BIC ALL Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 64.

¹⁰ Robert Gildea, *Barricades and Borders. Europe 1800-1914*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987, pp. 415-417.

constant concern of British governments towards the issue of the Straits, have made London to become the venue of diplomatic negotiations aimed at resolving the Balkan issues. In the British capital were held simultaneously two international conferences with the same theme: the Balkan area, which highlights the particularly important role which this region had in continental geopolitics. Diplomatic envoys of the six great European powers: England, France, Germany, Russia, Italy and Austro-Hungary met in the Conference of Ambassadors whose works were carried out between 16/29 December 1912 and 12/25 August 1913. In the conference, the great powers have negotiated first their interest for the Balkans and then took into account the objectives pursued by the states in the region. The discussions focused on the problems resulting from the operation of the Balkan conflicts, such as: Serbian access to the Adriatic sea, the Albanian matter, the problem of Epirus, the situation of Macedo-Romanian population from Pind and Macedonia, the issue regarding the division of the Aegean islands, the territorial dispute between Romania and Bulgaria¹¹. Although the stated purpose of the Conference of Ambassadors in London was to establish an agreement between the major European countries regarding the issues from South-East, divergences between the great powers have canceled the possibility of reaching a consensus on the situation in the Balkans¹². The activity of Conference Ambassadors was marked by inefficiency, being perceived as a diplomatic event which will be recorded as an "original chapter in textbooks of international law"¹³.

¹¹ Gheorghe Zbucea, *România și războaiele balcanice. 1912-1913. Pagini de istorie sud-est dunăreană* [Romania and the Balkan Wars. South-Eastern Danubian History Foles Pages. 1912-1913], Albatros Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, p. 59-60.

¹² Anastasie Iordache, *Criza politică din România și războaiele balcanice. 1911-1913* [The Political Crisis in Romania and the Balkan Wars. 1912-1913], Paideia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 203.

¹³ Nicolae Ciachir, Gheorghe Berca, *Diplomația europeană în epoca modernă* [The European Diplomacy in the modern Epoch], Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1984, pp. 441-442.

A day later, on 17/30 December 1912, started in London also the Peace Conference which was attended by the delegations of the States participating in the First Balkan War: Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Greece and the Ottoman Empire. The peace negotiations between the delegations of the belligerent states were conducted in several rounds, being influenced by the different opinions between the participating countries, by the changes in the theaters of military operations and, last but not least, by the constant interference of the great powers. A first round of negotiations took place between 17/30 December 1912 and 28 January/10 February 1913 and ended with no result due to the irreconcilable positions that were by the participating delegations. The military operations were resumed on 30 January/12 February 1913 and the Ottoman military forces registered new defeats. Meanwhile serious divergences emerged, including the military ones, between the allied states - between Greeks and Bulgarians in the Adrianople region and between Bulgarians and Serbs in Macedonia¹⁴. Subjected to a strong military pressure, the Ottoman Empire called truce in early April 1913. After the cessation of the military actions, on the 2nd/15th April 15, 1913 the peace negotiations were resumed. The peace treaty between belligerent states was signed on the 17th / 30th May, 1913, due to the imperative demand addressed by Edward Grey to the participating delegations¹⁵. In fact, the documents signed in London, were represented rather a postponement and not a solution to the disputes between the participating states. the Ottoman Empire experienced a drastic reduction of its in Europe possessions (while had included only the city of Istanbul and the surrounding region) but it was saved by the great powers concerned to maintain balance in the Straits region. The peace treaty did not provide a solution accepted by the parties involved to the numerous problems in

¹⁴ Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fund 71/1900-1919, vol 11, f 178-185, 205-207. (Further will be used AMAE logo)

¹⁵ Edward Grey asked the delegations to sign immediately a peace treaty, and those who do not want this, it would be better "to leave London." (Apud, MA Potemkin *The History of diplomacy*, vol II, 1947, p 268).

the Balkans region, especially in the territorial issues (sharing Dodecanese islands, setting boundaries of Albania, sharing Macedonia etc.).

The Treaty signed in London was not ratified by the parliaments of the belligerent states, the public opinion in those countries being disappointed by the results of the peace conference. The Governments from Sofia, Belgrade and Athens were charged internally that they had not accomplish the politico-territorial targets for which their countries were engaged in the conflict with the Ottoman Empire. The media of the Balkan countries, the parliamentary political debate reflected in extension the deep frustration felt by those people towards the Treaty of London¹⁶. Bulgaria demanded that its territorial expansion to be in accordance with the military successes achieved. Establishing an independent Albanian state (a success of Austro-Hungarian and Italian diplomacy) led Serbia to seek enhanced regional claims in Macedonia, action that caused great in satisfaction in Sofia. In Athens and Belgrade was considered that the Bulgarian territorial claims were excessive and jeopardize the principle of balance of power in the region. Within in the peace negotiations Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek governments had a completely different approach to the territorial problems order in comparison with the statements made since the outbreak of the war against the Ottoman Empire. Initially the Member States of Balkan Alliance said they did not search territorial for annexation in the triggered war, but only to improve the political, social situation and cultural life of their countrymen in the Ottoman Empire¹⁷. This meant that those states complied the territorial status quo in the Balkans established at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. At the peace conference in London become clear that none of the winning states did not take into account the reasons they entered the war, i.e. the introduction of reforms in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire in order to ensure the ethnic and cultural

¹⁶ A.M.A.E. fund 71/1900-1919, vol. 12, 27-77 f.

¹⁷ B. Stambler, *Les Roumains et les Bulgares. Le Traité de Bucharest (28 juillet - 10 Aout 1913)*, Paris, 1914, pp. 86;126.

individuality of their countrymen, but took into account the annexation of territories. The direct consequence of the military successes achieved by the allied Balkan states was the total cancellation of the pre-war status quo¹⁸. Through their military actions, the Balkan League states aimed, in fact, for a territorial extension, including through the annexation of territory less justified in terms of ethnic, historical, religious, linguistic, etc.. This transformation of the war goals generated great rivalries and led to the collapse of the Balkan League. The changes of borders resulting from territorial conquests made by Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro on in daune at the expense of the Ottoman Empire led to a new territorial architecture in Balkans. Under the pressure of events in the region, the great powers recognized the newterritorial reality by the formula "The Balkans for the Balkan states"¹⁹."

The political and military evolutions in the south of Danube concerned in a particular the authorities in Bucharest as their consequences had a great importance for the future of Romania and of the way whole area southeast in Europe.

The involvement of the authorities in Bucharest with concern of the interests in the South Danube was determined by the objectives pursued by the Romanian state in the Balkans, namely: defending the political cultural and religious rights, of the Aromanian populations²⁰ from the south of Danube²¹, keeping the balance of power and preventing the occurrence of

¹⁸ In fact, the territorial status quo in the Balkans established at the Peace Congress in Berlin in 1878 was infringed by Austro-Hungary and Bulgaria in the autumn of 1908. Austria-Hungary annexed the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in early October 1908. Meanwhile, Bulgaria has incorporated Rumelia, proclaimed its independence, elected king the prince Ferdinand of Saxe Coburg, who received the title of tsar significant title through which Sofia is considered the heir of Byzantium.

¹⁹ B. Stambler, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

²⁰ Romanian-born populations in the Balkans were called in several ways: Macedo-Romanian, Cutout-Vlachs, Aromanians etc.

²¹ Protection of Aromanian population of the Balkans was a permanent objective of the Romanian foreign policy after obtaining the state independence. Ottoman government

a the hegemon State in the region²². Given the establishment of the Balkan alliance and of the new political and military evolutions in Balkans, the government in Bucharest acted to support the authorities in Istanbul, Sofia, Belgrade and Athens to protect religious and cultural rights of the Aromanian population living in the territory of countries of South Danube and prevent situations where Macedo-Romanians became victims of aggressive actions of nationalist Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs²³. Romania kept its freedom of action and did not sign any military commitment to the parties which were in conflict. Romania situated itself at the direct interference of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and German influence spheres, but also in the context of a strong diplomatic offensive to France, Italy and England to southeastern Europe. The attitude of the authorities in Bucharest was a reserved, one dictated by rivalries between the great powers, by the status of Romania as one ally of the Central Powers, by its ProGerman orientation constantly promoted by King Carol I, by the necessary caution to the actions of the Russian Empire, the main supporter of the Balkan States Alliance. Romania's neutrality was particularly beneficial for Balkan alliance in general and especially for Bulgaria, which

approved since 1878 certain measures on the free exercise of religion and education in the national language for the Romanian inhabitants of the empire. Legitimate rights of the Aromanian and cutout-Vlach populations from the Balkans to preserve the individuality of ethnic, cultural and spiritual were rejected by the authorities in Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. The authorities in those countries, civil and religious, acted very aggressively against the Aromanian and cutout-vlach populations encouraging terrorist acts, including the assassination of the Aromanians leaders. The attitude of governments in Athens and Sofia towards the Aromanian and cutout-Vlach populations had given rise to tensions and crises in bilateral relations with Bucharest. On a diametrically opposed position stood the Ottoman government in 1905 recognized all rights religious, ethnic and cultural of the Aromanian population within the Ottoman Empire (see widely *Românii de la sud de Dunăre. Documente [Romanians to south of the Danube. Documents]*, ed. Stelian Brezeanu, Gheorghe Zbucnea, Bucharest, 1997.)

²² Charles și Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

²³ *Românii de la Sud de Dunăre. Documente*, coord. Stelian Brezeanu, Gheorghe Zbucnea, Bucharest, 1997, pp. 222-238.

received with great satisfaction the Declaration of the government in Bucharest²⁴. The neutral position of the Romanian state was equally important and useful for Austro-Hungary, concerned to maintain its influence in Sofia as a counterweight to the alliance between Belgrade and St. Petersburg. When the conflict broke out, Romania declared its "strict" neutrality towards the war arose between the states of the Balkan alliance and the Ottoman Empire²⁵. The Romanian government declaration of neutrality was a conditional and temporary, one indicating that it kept the right to change their attitude in terms of occurrence of major territorial changes to south of the Danube. The sweeping victories obtained in a short time against the Ottoman troops surprised the whole European world, including the Romanian authorities.

Within the new geopolitical framework resulted from the defeating Ottoman troops and the major territorial changes occurred in the Balkans area, the government in Bucharest considered that the strict neutrality commitment taken by Romania was obsolete. As a result, on 27 October / November 9, 1912, the Romanian government considered it necessary to start the proceedings meant to lead to a modification of the border with Bulgaria in Dobrogea²⁶. The territorial dispute between Romania and Bulgaria in Dobrogea was the result of Russian policy, which adopted a position of obvious hostility towards Romania at the Peace Congress in Berlin in 1878 due to the fact that the government in Bucharest had protested strong against annexation of southern Bessarabia by Russian Empire. The original route of the Romanian-Bulgarian border in Berlin was changed in favour of the Bulgarian part by the representatives of the Russia.

²⁴ *Documentes diplomatiques, Les événements de la Péninsule Balkanique. L'action de la Roumanie*, Bucharest, Imprimerie de L'Etat, 1913, p. 4.

²⁵ "The Universe" from September 23 / October 3, 1912.

²⁶ *Documentes diplomatiques, op. cit.*, p. 7.

Romania was forced to accept the boundary changed in Dobrogea under pressure of the major powers and the Russian threat²⁷.

The major change of the territorial status quo in the Balkans after the war won by the Southern Danube states against the Ottoman Empire led the Romanian government to act in the sense of changing the border between Romania and Bulgaria in Dobrogea. Romania's territorial claims brought new complications in the Balkans affairs, and in the European journals appeared numerous articles, many of which were hostile towards the steps taken by the government in Bucharest²⁸. The Great powers pursued "with interest" the position adopted by the authorities in Bucharest. Romania was under the influence of Germany and Austro-Hungary and Bulgaria was in the Balkan League, a creation of Russian diplomacy. A conflict between Bulgaria and Romania had to be avoided "because the danger that world threat the general situation in Europe would be even greater knowing that Romania's interference in the conflict would cause an inevitable rupture of neutrality from the part of any power" which could lead to serious complications "in Europe"²⁹. The Romanian authorities refused the offer of the Russian diplomacy as the Romanian-Bulgarian territorial dispute to be made in patronage of St. Petersburg. Romania had not forgotten the hostile behaviour of the Russia's representatives towards Romanian interests during the years 1878-1879. The Romanian-Bulgarian direct negotiations took place in Bucharest, London and Sofia. The most substantial negotiations were held in London in January 1913 and ended without any result. At the proposal of Great Britain, the governments in Bucharest and

²⁷ *Pari romani-bulgara Silistra. Un vecchio problema*, in „Corriere de la Sera” from 11/24 January 1913.

²⁸ View widely AMAE, fund 71/1900-1919, Special Folders, vol 12, f 1-3, 25-41 - 55-57 (*Les revendication roumaines* in "L'Etoile Belge" of December 25, 1912; *Que vent to Roumanie*, in the "Journal de Genève" of December 31, 1912; *Роль России в румыно-балгарских переговорах* in "РЕЧИ" December 28, 1912).

²⁹ AMAE, fund 71/1900-1919, vol. 12, f. 34. (*Romania e Bulgaria nel conflitto dei Balcani* in "Il Giornale d'Italia" of January 16, 1913).

Sofia accepted the mediation by the great powers with regards to territorial dispute between the two countries. The Russian capital was chosen as the place of the diplomatic action intended to resolve the dispute between Romania and Bulgaria. Before the start of the conference in St. Petersburg, the government in Bucharest sent on February 15 / 28, 1913 a confidential memorandum to the governments of six major powers who presented its reasons for its request to change the border in Dobrogea³⁰. A similar document sent on February 18 / March 3, 1913 by the Bulgarian government to diplomatic representatives of the great powers accredited to St. Petersburg. The Ambassadors' Conference held in St Petersburg took place February 18/ March 31 - April 26 / May 9, 1913 and ended with the final adoption of a Protocol meant to give a solution for the Dobrogean problem from the Romanian-Bulgarian border. The main meant of the document adopted by the representatives of the great powers who had been in the Russian capital issues were: Silistra and the area close nearby had to be returned to Romania, school and religious autonomy for the Macedo-Romanian population in Bulgaria and the right for the Romanian State to subsidize Macedo-Romanians schools and churches. Romanian-Bulgarian territorial dispute was peacefully resolved by means of the intervention and support of all the European powers, even if the final protocol signed in St. Petersburg displeased the government and the public opinion both in Bulgaria and in Romania.

The diplomatic efforts made by the great powers to order to end the conflict in the Balkans area– The Ambassadors' Conference in London, The Conference in St. Petersburg, the negotiations that led to the signing of the Peace Treaty in London in May 17/30, 1913 - did not lead to a decreasing reduction of interstate the tensions and to restoration of peace in the region. The aggressive nationalism, the intolerance towards the neighbours, the conquering spirit manifested stronger and stronger in the political life, in the also public opinion and in the media within all Balkan

³⁰ Titu Maiorescu, *România, războaiele balcanice și Cadrilaterul*, [Romania, the Balkan Wars and the Qadrilater] volume edited by Stelian Neagoe, Machiavelli Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, p. 193-201.

states. Bulgarian society was dominated by deep resentment with regard to the requirements of the documents signed at London and St. Petersburg, which did not recognize the military victories achieved by the Bulgarian army and had undermined the objectives pursued by the Bulgarian state in the Balkans. The same atmosphere can be found in the internal politics of Serbia and Greece. Applying the provisions included in the Treaty signed in London led to a series of military clashes, constant harassment from Balkan allies.

On April 24 / May 7, 1913, Romanian military attaché in Sofia informed the War Office in Bucharest about the existence of a campaign plan the Bulgarian army against Serbia and Greece. The plan was presented by the generals Ficev and Savov to the King Ferdinand and stated that the main effort was to be made against Serbia. In the plan was stipulated that in the first phase to introduce in the Serbian territory about 5,000 fighters organized into "gangs" to terrorize Serbia and determine it to leave the regions desired by Bulgaria³¹. Restless because of the reactions of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece conclude their military and political agreements between them to defend each other in case of a Bulgarian attack. Belgrade and Athens authorities appealed to the government in Bucharest to attract Romania in an alliance, hostile to Bulgaria. Romanian policymakers who decided the foreign policy of state - King Charles I and the prime minister, Titu Maiorescu - refused any alliance which might limit the freedom of action of Romania towards the future development of events.

The territorial disputes between the Balkan allies led restran to serious deterioration of relations between these countries. The establishment of conflictual relations between the Balkan allied states placed the Russian diplomacy in a very complicated situation. St. Petersburg made great efforts to prevent the breakup of the Balkan alliance, but the Bulgarian territorial ambitions affected a from part the Russia's interests in the Straits and endangered this great power relations with Serbia and Greece. On May 28

³¹ Romanian Military Archives, fund the Ministry of War, 169/1913, 491 f. (Confidential rapport of military attaché in Sofia of May 7, 1913)

/ June 8, 1913, Emperor Nicholas II wrote to King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and to King Peter I of Serbia asking them to prevent the onset of a "fratricidal war" between their countries and warned them that Russia kept the whole "freedom action" against the State which would start such a conflict³². Russia's mediation efforts were canceled by the rigid position of the Bulgarian authorities which set conditions deemed unacceptable by the Russian sovereign. Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy took advantage of the deterioration of relations between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, and worked to destroy the Balkan League. As a result, the government in Vienna supported and encouraged Bulgarian position on territorial disputes with Serbia and Greece³³.

On a general level, political and military tension in Balkans continuously increased after the end of the Ambassadors Conference in St. Petersburg and signing the Treaty of London. Under the influence of public opinion, of the nationalist-extremist circles in Bulgaria and encouraged by the Viennese diplomacy³⁴, Sofia authorities ordered, during the night of 16/17-29/30 June 1913, the surprise attack of its former allies³⁵. The Russian diplomacy made great efforts to immediately end the war between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, conflict that was in total opposition to the purposes of the Balkan League. Bulgarian military action was a surprise for Europe, both in trigger mode (former allies attack without declaration of war) also severe consequences which the new conflict generated to the continent's peace. As a result to the fact that the government in Sofia has started a new war, Bulgaria was perceived as an aggressive state with hegemonic

³² *Documentes diplomatiques, op. cit.*, doc. 143, p. 108-109.

³³ Gheorghe Nicolae Căzan, Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *Romania și Tripla Alianță. 1878-1914 [Romania and the Triple Alliance. 1878-1914]*, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1979, p. 327.

³⁴ Austria-Hungary was prepared to intervene militarily in the Balkan conflict to support Bulgaria. (Gheorghe Nicolae Căzan, Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *op. cit.*, p. 114, Apud K. M. von Lichnowski, *Vers L'abîme. Rapports, souvenirs et autres écrits*, Paris, Payot, 1929, p. 233).

³⁵ *The History of diplomacy*, vol. 3, *op. cit.*, p. 270-271, Gheorghe Zbucnea, *România și războaiele balcanice ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

ambitions towards all its neighbours, which might endanger the regional stability and the efforts of the European powers to put out the conflict in the Balkans.

The political, diplomatic and military evaluations of the Bulgarian government proved to be wrong. Starting the Second Balkan War in less than two months after signing the Peace Treaty of London, Bulgaria faced a serious international isolation process. Sofia „succeeded” in having conflictual relationships with all its neighbouring countries, and its military option to be condemned by all major European powers except Austro-Hungary. Under the pressure from other major powers, Austro-Hungary was not able to provide the support promised to Bulgaria.

From a military perspective, the Bulgarian government started the new war in a geopolitical and geostrategic context which was totally inappropriate. The major European powers, did not completed their military training and thus they were concerned with preventing widespread outbreak of the war on the continent. The Bulgarian army was forced to fight initialis on two fronts, then after Turkey and Romania's entry in the conflict, its strategic situation became catastrophic. It overestimated the support that Austro-Hungary could give³⁶ against the possible reactions of the authorities in Bucharest. It misjudged the position of Romania and did not ensure its benevolent neutrality. The war started between the former allies allowed the return of the Ottoman Empire in the war³⁷.

The political and military evolutions occurred to the south of the Danube created a favorable situation to Romania whose territorial demands on the expense of Bulgaria had increased in Silistra - Balchik line to the line Turtucaia - Balchik. The government in Bucharest declared that in the situation of restarting the hostilities to south of the Danube, the Romanian

³⁶ *Afirmarea statelor naționale independente unitare în central și sud-estul Europei (1821-1923)*, coordinators Viorica Moisuc, Ion Calafeteanu, Bucharest, 1979, p 65.

³⁷ Mustafa Ali Mehmed, *Istoria Turcilor*, [The Turkish History] Bucharest, 1976, p. 364.

army would be mobilized, position that had been transmitted through a circular all Romanian legations since May 23 / June 5, 1913³⁸. Following the declaration of the Romanian authorities, the Bulgarian government requested the intervention of Austro-Hungary and Russia to prevent a Romanian military involvement in to the political and military problems in the Balkans. Austro-Hungary exerted a strong pressure on the government in Bucharest to prevent a rapprochement of Romania with Serbia and Greece against Bulgaria, considering it to be inconsistent with Romanian - Austro-Hungary alliance. Despite the Austro-Hungarian pressures, the Romanian Government followed its own policy towards the Balkan problems, with the support of German diplomacy, according to which "the single point of support for the Triple Alliance in the Balkan chaos was Romania."³⁹

The crisis between Romania and Bulgaria led to some serious divergences between Romania and Austro-Hungary. In order to destroy the Balkan League and to ensure its influence over Bulgaria, the authorities in Vienna came into opposition with the governments in Berlin and Rome who had a different perspective on the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic actions. Vienna intended to achieve a rapprochement between Romania and Bulgaria and in order to accomplish this project, the Viennese diplomacy gave an ultimatum to Romania to avoid attacking Bulgaria and, meanwhile, was exerting pressure on Bulgaria to meet the required territorial claims by the government in Bucharest. Vienna's diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful nor in Bucharest or Sofia, which meant the failure of Count Berchtold's geopolitical project to bring Bulgaria along with Romania in the Triple Alliance⁴⁰.

In the same time Russia pressured the Balkan states to reduce the tensions between the former allies. Russia's relations with the Warring States were very difficult after the start of the second war in the Balkans, because it

³⁸ *Documentes diplomatiques...*, *op.cit.*, p. 154

³⁹ Gheorghe Nicolae Căzan, Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 345-349.

failed to prevent the broke between the allies because of conditions set by Bulgaria.

In the political-military situation generated by the Bulgarian attack over its former allies, the great powers considered that Romanian involvement in conflict was necessary and Romanian army was able to restore peace in the Balkans. The government from St. Petersburg considered that Romanian intervention was "the only means to avoid an overwhelming defeat of Serbia and breaking the balance of forces in Balkans⁴¹". Romania's entrance in the war was made after the Russian diplomacy efforts to stop the war between the former allies failed. Romanian Government correctly assessed the existing balance of power and valued for its optimum time created by the failure of the Russian diplomacy, explaining to the public opinion that its military option was dictated by the necessity of restoring peace in the Balkans and not the territorial dispute with Bulgaria.

The positive attitude of Russia towards the Romanian military intervention may be explained by the fact that it offered the chance to the diplomacy of St. Petersburg to get out of the complicated option to choose between Sofia and Belgrade in the "fratricidal" conflict. The Romanian Minister in Berlin conveyed to Bucharest that in the opinion of German diplomacy Romanian military intervention to south of the Danube was an "decisively act called to accelerate the solution of the crisis on solid and durable foundations, ensuring balance in Balkans⁴²".

The Romanian government ordered the military mobilization on June 23 / July 6, 1913 - the operation ended in only eight days, and in June 27/July 10 Romania declared war on Bulgaria. Taking advantage of the very difficult situation in which Bulgaria was, the Ottoman Empire resumed the military action against the Bulgarian troops on July 3/20, 1913 the Ottoman forces

⁴¹ N. Schebeko, *Essai historique sur les origines de la guerre 1914*, Bibliothèque Diplomatique, Paris, 1926, p. 161, <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5721034b/f185.image>.

⁴² *Documentes diplomatiques*, op. cit, doc. 199.

conquering again Adrianople. The Bulgarian government sent a note of protest to the great powers claiming „l'acté injustifié de la Roumanie⁴³”. Both Russia and Austro-Hungary were concerned that Bulgaria should not be "broken" and, in this respect put pressure in Bucharest and in the other Balkan capitals⁴⁴.

Meanwhile, Romania, along with other opposed countries Bulgaria, had an interest in ending the war as quickly as possible to avoid a possible involvement of the great powers in the conflict. The Bulgarian government tried to obtain a separate peace from Romania, but the request came from Sofia was rejected by the authorities in Bucharest. Under the pressure of the neighbour armies of four states, Bulgaria surrendered military. The peace negotiations were held in Bucharest. Germany proposed the Romanian capital as a the venue to host peace negotiations solution which was agreed both by the Warring States and the great powers. The peace conference was held from July 17 / August 1 - July 28 / August 10 1913 under the chairmanship of Romanian Prime Minister, Titu Maiorescu. Romania assumed the role of ensuring the moderation among all stakeholders: the winning states, the great powers, the defeated state⁴⁵. The basic principle that dominated the peace spirit in Bucharest was to ensure the balance of power in region, considered "essential" factor to preserve peace in Balkans⁴⁶. The Peace Treaty was signed on July 28 / August 10 1913 and it established new frontiers in Balkans, observing the territorial provisions of the Treaty of London of May 17/30 1913 related to Albania. Macedonia was divided between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. Sangeakul Novi Pazar returned to Serbia and Montenegro. Greece received Western Thrace with the port of Kavala, and Bulgaria received exit to Aegean with the port of Dedeagaci. Quadrilateral was returned to Romania. The way in which was applied the principle of balance of power in the peace negotiations in

⁴³ „L'Independence roumaine” of 4/17 iulie 1913.

⁴⁴ Gheorghe Zbucnea, *op. cit.*, p. 266; *Documentes diplomatiques...*, doc. 208.

⁴⁵ B. Stambler, *op.cit.*, p. 161.

⁴⁶ "The Times" of July 28, 1913(*Interviul acordat de șeful delegației Greciei, M. Venizelos*).

Bucharest, took into account especially the spirit of this conferences that led to a paradoxical situation, unprecedented in the practice of diplomatic events of this type. By its provisions, the Treaty of peace led to territorial expansion of all belligerent states, both the four winners, as well as the defeated one, a fact revealed in Table 1.

State	Surface		Population	
	Before Conflict	After Conflict	Before Conflict	After Conflict
Serbia	48.000 kmp	88.000 kmp	1.300.000	4.250.000
Greece	64.600 kmp	121.600 kmp	2.800.000	4,700.000
Bulgaria	96.300 kmp	110.800 kmp	4.300.000	4.250.000
Montenegro	9.000 kmp	15.000 kmp	255.000	530.000
Romania	131.300 kmp	138.800 kmp	7.260.000	7.567.000

Table 1. Territorial and demographic situation of the Balkan states after the Peace of Bucharest⁴⁷.

The Balkan crisis during the years 1912-1913 was an undeniable impasse for European peace and ended following the signing of the Peace Treaty. Caused by the involvement of the great powers in the region, located throughout the crisis on different positions, without having a unified vision of Balkan issues, major European chancellors announced their intention to review the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Bucharest.

The geopolitical architecture of the Balkan Peninsula was completely changed after the political-military crisis carried out in 1912-1913. Serbia,

⁴⁷ Ștefan Pascu (coord.), *Istoria militară a poporului român [The Military History of Romanian People]*, vol. 5, Militară Publishing House, Bucharest, 1988, p. 283-284; Gheorghe Zbucnea, *op. cit.*, p. 294-295, 304, Nicolae Ștefănescu Iacint, *Războiul româno-bulgar*, Bucharest, 1914, p. 140.

Greece and Bulgaria acquired similar demographic and territorial dimensions, which created a real balance of forces in the region. The Ottoman Empire was virtually eliminated from Europe and ceased to be a real power within the continental balance of power.

Initially Balkan wars started in order to free entirely the countrymen being still under Ottoman rule, but subsequent the actions of the states' Balkan League were dominated by a tendency to annex as many territories as possible. This trend became apparent in the second Balkan war, when ethnic and historical motives have passed in background, and the security reasons, to keep the balance of power dominated the political and military decisions. In this logic has entered the action of Romania to become militarily involved in the Second Balkan War and attach Quadrilateral.

Russia and Austro-Hungary's attempts to revise the provisions of the Peace of Bucharest in an international conference were rejected by the other great powers. Romanian Minister in Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, informed the government in Bucharest about satisfaction of the German government towards "the conclusion of the Balkan conflict". In the view of Germany, France, Italy and Britain government they had no interest in reviewing the Peace Treaty signed on August 10 1913. Referring to Austro-Hungary, the German government gave assurances that „exerce en ce moment toute son influence pour calmer appréhension Vienne”⁴⁸. Russia gave up its revision project of the Treaty of Bucharest, as the insistence of the Russian Ministry in Paris, Count Izvolski, besides the French government „sont restes sans rezultat”⁴⁹, communicated in Bucharest the Romanian Minister from the French capital.

Balkan Wars changed the balance of power between states in the region, but also spheres of influence of the major groups of states over the Balkan area. Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Romania were concerned with

⁴⁸ AMAE, fund 71, vol. 13/1914, f. 104.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, f. 109. (Telegram no. 33145 of August 8, 1913).

preserving the territorial balance created by the provisions of the Peace of Bucharest, while Bulgaria and Turkey were acting for its revision.

The new regional balance of power created by the Peace from Bucharest has meant a failure of the Austro-Hungarian and German diplomacy. The military defeat of Bulgaria and Turkey, together with the strengthening of Serbia and Austro-Hungary's deteriorating relations with Romania were just the many actions that weakened the international position of the Central Powers. At the same time, the influence of France and Russia grew in Serbia and Romania. Romania's support given by France during the Balkan crisis was part of the French diplomatic efforts to weaken the Triple Alliance. After the crisis, the French diplomacy, seconded by the Russian diplomacy, have persevered in their actions meant to alienate Romania from the Triple Alliance, success which would have had great importance in the Balkan power rate, but also in the Continental one.

Perspectives on the Challenges and Opportunities of the Future Enlargement of EU

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Abstract: The structural change in the international system level, such as Globalisation and the end of the Cold War, have impact on the Security agenda. This type of challenge consists on new linkages between political, security and economic threats, which have challenged the capacity of the state to perceive and to respond to new challenges and needs for action in one side and on institutional challenge relating to the competence of existing institutions for international action in the other side and finally to the potential for co-ordination between state and other non-state (transnational and subnational) forces. Our analysis puts the several questions about the real threats for the internal Security of the EU, the enlargement towards CEEC or “social fracture” of Globalisation.

Keywords: Europe, opportunities, challenge, internal security, European Enlargement.

1. Introduction

1.1. Challenges and Opportunities for a New European Humane Security Order

This introductory chapter has three sections: first deals with ignored types of threat showing the economic influences on popular disturbance and the link between Globalisation and European integration, the second introduces the common opportunities and challenges of EU enlargement towards CEE space and the third one, proposes the paradigm of cooperation, starting point for a new Model of Global Humane Governance. All three sections present the issues from a feminine perspective: new paradigm of Humane Security taking into account the ignored types of threats, the opportunity of Cooperative relationship instead of Competitive relationship for overcoming the main common

challenges of all actors involved on European, humane governance for sustainable development.

This first section of the introductory chapter evaluates how structural change in the international system level, such as Globalisation and the end of the Cold War, have impact on the Security agenda, by looking at those ignored types of threats¹ related to security in post-Cold War Europe, from a feminist point of view; hunger, disease, illiteracy, person abuse and exploitation, pollution of the air and water and especially unemployment.

Comprehensive security concept is a big challenge for state and other existing institutions. This type of challenge consists on new linkages between political, security and economic threats, which have challenged the capacity of the state to perceive and to respond to new challenges and needs for action in one side and on institutional challenge relating to the competence of existing institutions for international action in the other side and finally to the potential for co-ordination between state and other non-state (transnational and subnational) forces.

This first section also explains the relationship between Integration and Globalisation, by warning on the present and future impact of integration on the poor of the most of the CEEC. An analysis of challenges and opportunities of European Enlargement is not an end in itself; it is a useful way of understanding the social and political world in order to change it, in a neo-Gramscian, feminist perception, producing a more “feminine” society and a new model of governance, by adapting the emergent geo-governance to the realization of human rights.

We continue trying to answer what is the relationship between these three simultaneous processes in the most of the CEEC: multilevel and multidimensional process of transformation, the process of integration into

¹ the complexities involved in trying to understand the ignored security challenges have been and continue to be discussed, for example by N.Dimitris. Chryssochoou, M. J. Tsinisizelis, Stelios Stavridis and Kostas Ifantis, *Europe in Change, Geopolitical imperatives of system change order and security in post-Cold War Europe, Theory and reform in the European Union*, Manchester University Press, 1999, New York, pp.83-104

the EU and both of these processes are occurring in the larger context of the Globalisation process. All these three macro-processes are strongly interrelated and it is difficult or even impossible to distinguish clearly the transformation, integration and global processes and their impact on the economies and societies of the transition countries because we don't have a theoretical approach able to explain this simultaneity and existent theory of integration are limited.

We assume that if we would like to find solution in the real life we have to find solution also at the theoretical level, taking into account the power of ideas for change. We need a new theory of integration as a useful instrument for generating alternative models of governance adequate to the reality of European Integration. We need new theory because the old ones are limited and are not able to explain the reality.

Despite the continuing domination of states, multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, intergovernmental organisations and supranational institutions such as the EU share the stage of global politics affected by economic and political development combined with technological changes. The inability for governments to manage problems arising from trans-border transactions requires co-operation even at the cost of losing autonomy. The first section of the second chapter will demonstrate the impotence of state - the Romanian case study - to guarantee humane security and sustainable development and consequently their priorities of foreign policy to fill this vacuum of security, by the CFPS regime of EU and by integration, potentiality for a win-win game instead of zero-sum game scenarios. We will also demonstrate that state sovereignty and personal sovereignty are myths only, because in reality, multi-national corporations are not subordinated to states and International organisations, such EU and law have superior authority and for this reason states can't determine their own policies. These actors have different interests and power politics is made less important because they are operating within the societal domain and beyond direct state control. We are summing, in this section, the existent theories of integration pointing out their limits.

Neo-functionalism explains European Integration through an emphasis on the internal dynamics of European Politics, of spill - over, from different sectors of economy to political sector. The wider structure, within European Integration is situated, is completely ignored. It is impossible to take into account structural change such Globalisation and the end of the Cold War.

In contrast to neo-functionalism, which emphasizes the importance of non-governmental interest groups in the process of European integration, inter-governmentalism considers the international structure to be an anarchic system in which states are the only important actors. This approach argues that states pursue rationalist policies of power maximisation and security in order to ensure their survival in the absence of a central power at the International level.

Liberal inter-governmentalism put the predominant emphasis on state as the main actors in international relations neglecting the power of ideas and transnational actors as independent forces behind integration. The behavior of TNCs, after 1980s in the EU, is interpreted as rational adaptation of intergovernmental commitment, while policy involvement and ideas of TNCs are view as the result of intergovernmental demands, but not as independent force.²

Neo-Gramscian alternative gives another answer to this behavior, showing the role and power of influence and control of this transnational capital and financier actors at the European level, being a critical theory which tries to explain the change and treating the human nature and all structures, including the international system, as product of history and consequently subject of change.

The revival of European integration since the mid-1980s has reconciled regional integration with Globalisation. How it was possible? The answer

² A.Bieler, *Globalisation and the Enlargement of the European Union*, Austrian and Swedish Social forces in the struggle over membership, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, pp.1-18

is obviously simple, the same transnational fractions of capital that are behind the current drive of European integration are components of a wider transnational historical bloc, working within high profile fora such as the G-7 meetings (now G8) and including also private organisations such as the Trilateral Commission and the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT). It is this bloc which has generated the ideas, institutions and material capabilities for a global shift towards more neo-liberal forms of state and which influenced the development of European integration making it compatible with Globalisation, not opposed to it. It is correct to agree with Cox, that the task to change World Order begins with the long laborious effort to build new historical blocs and our thesis will try to analyze the potentiality of such occurrence in the post Cold Europe.

Change of the polarity of the international system after the Cold War, reflects the development of new structural variables, as results of trends aiming to revise institutional entities as European Union and state policies. Not all elements of change are causes of conflicts, because it is not polarity but polarisation that can lead to conflicting situations. There is no evidence that such a process will occur in the European subsystem yet, but the coming situations are not predictable, thus this thesis will try to analyze the potential polarisation in Europe, as a product of willingness for change of the losers representing the social power of the European integration process with its both aspects deepening and enlargement, process which is driven by the transnational forces of globalisation, which are the real winners.

What is important to notice is that the states become “a transmission belt” from the global level to the national economy level, “undermining the sovereignty and autonomy in all aspects of security”. This phenomenon “can be called internationalizing of the state”, according to Robert Cox.³

³ R. Cox, *Global Restructuring: Making Sense of the Changing International Political Economy*, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, London: Macmillan, 1994, p. 49.

This phenomenon created the so-called “social fracture”, engine of the conflicts of globalisation. (see annex 1, Conflicts of globalisation, first neo-Gramscian analysis of the author of this thesis).

Linked with this social fracture of Globalisation and European enlargement towards CEEC, we have to start our analysis by looking to the ongoing hegemonic project of “embedded-neo-liberalism” synthesis aimed to unify the transnational capitalist actors (TNCs) and first subchapter of the first chapter elaborates on it. This includes the social purpose supporting the emergent European Order. The Maastricht compromise reflects the gradual rise of what can be called an ”embedded neo-liberalism”. This is neo-liberal view as it emphasizes the primacy of global market forces and the freedom of the movement of the transnational capital. So, as a result of such processes, markets become increasingly disconnected from their post-war national social institutions and we risk a shift from a “national dictatorship” to an “international dictatorship” in these so called transition countries. In one side, one may read “embedded neo-liberalism” as the outcome of the transnational struggle between the three projects of neo-liberalism, neo-mercantilism and supranational social democracy. This was a struggle in which the neo-liberal became dominant but still had to accommodate the concern both of the former neo-mercantilist and of the social democrats. The neo-liberal project incorporated these rival concerns in such a manner that they were subordinated to the interests of globalising capital (neglecting the social democratic concerns in this compromise). In the other side, “embedded neo-liberalism” can also be interpreted as the emerging hegemonic project of Europe’s transnational capitalist class. This class has become dominated by- the leadership of a globalist fraction both in terms of financial firms and global industrial TNCs.⁴

This process of assimilation is an extremely attractive and powerful project, which became the basis for expansion towards Central and Eastern Europe.

⁴ Van Apeldoorn, B., Transnationalism and the restructuring of of Europe’s Socio-Economic Order, in *International Journal of Political Economy*, pp.12-35 1998

Our thesis would like to argue that European Integration is not a win-win scenario yet, as it is considered on the theory of integration⁵; even the removal of barriers to free trade and closer integration of national economies, they have the potentiality to enrich every one, especially the poor. What is the reason for this failure? The neglect of the social protection and the denying of the existence of genuine unemployment by the standard model that economists had used for generations could be one explanation; the only reason that unemployment existed was the wages were too high, suggesting the simple remedy: lower wages. They argued that markets worked perfectly and outworn presumption that markets, by themselves lead to efficient outcomes and this failed to allow the desirable intervention of the government in the market for the guidance of economic growth and make everyone better off. Therefore, the second section of the first chapter deals with the existing social cohesion policy and unemployment policy at the EU level, which is not yet prepared to answer to the social challenges. Some hope for the future exists, taking into account the recent proposal of social working group, to include on the draft of the constitution, as objectives on the Art. 3: promotion of full employment and quality of work, together with social justice and sustainable development.

In sum, “embedded neo-liberalism” is here interpreted as a potentially hegemonic project unifying Europe’s “transnational capitalist class” and expressing its collective interests and identities. The discourse and strategy of the ERT continued to play an important role in the evolving regime of European socio-economic governance into the 1990s. The question is who will articulate and defend the public interest against the global reach of private financial and commercial interests, when the latter will go too far? The third subchapter of the both first chapter and second chapter will introduce the Gramsci’s concept of Civil Society in contrast with the actual concept of civil society at the European level. Gramsci’s concept of civil society has the potentiality to advocate the losers of integration, “organic

⁵ see the ERT Position Paper and Analysis of The Economic Costs and Benefits of EU Enlargement, 2001, http://www.ert.be/pf/enf_frame.htm, 24 January 2003

intellectuals” having the noble mission of imagining a counter-hegemonic project - basis for a new building bloc.

It is possible to analyze the history of European integration revival project, as well as we shall discuss future possible scenarios and developments including the opportunities for resistance against the dominant hegemonic projects. The method of understanding historical processes put forward by neo-Gramscian perspectives open the door for alternatives for European Integration.

The second section of the introductory chapter introduces the common challenges and opportunities for a new European security order in the “post-Wall” period, from the winners and losers of EU integration perspective in an aggregated effort of finding the common denominators in a cooperative paradigm and discusses the need for redefinition of security, in a feminist perspective (related to it, the definition of a threat and its perception also it is necessary). A big challenge at the theoretical level is to find an alternative approach of the theories of integration, which could explain the actual reality of European integration and from this theoretical position to find the mechanism of global governance, which could manage the global structural change in a more humane nature. The biggest challenge for the development of human being in our contemporaneous world is unemployment victim of so-called “framegration” process. The biggest disruptive force appears to be at first glance, economic in nature. Widespread large-scale unemployment in modern industrial economies, resulting in reduced levels of income, consumption and actual tax revenues needed to pay the generous unemployment that benefit the unemployed demand, have imposed painful fiscal sacrifices, such as a higher level of taxation, that have become increasingly accepted as inescapable features of modern societies. Years of unmitigated unemployment have sapped the pride and self-respect of whole generations and have left workers, business and governments in a state of despair and suspicious about the real costs of integration. Paying for the newly eligible recipients of unemployment benefits, who have not

contributed anything in the past and cannot, if unemployed, be expected to contribute anything in the future, has come to be regarded, by some of the richer partner, as too high a price to pay for the luxury of integration. In conclusion disruptive forces like unemployment will challenge the meaning of security and the definition of threat. Any discussion about the common denominators has to start with the opportunity of a new system of collective security in Europe - as they have been expressed through the decisions taken in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Berlin, Madrid and Saint. Malo - and also should take account of the constituent elements of change that produced the "new order"⁶. The elements of Change usually create conflicting relationships; the wisdom and challenge will be to deal creatively with them, transforming these challenges in opportunities for new policy and strategies in an aggregated effort of all European actors involved in building a new Humane Security Order, based on common denominators. This can be an opportunity for the regime-building process, which should draw from states their common interests in redefining the terms of an interstate security community in Europe, recognising non-state actors as "critical supporters" for this process, in a feminist theoretical perspective of cooperation.

The condition for successful security regime building, as an opportunity is the identification and definition of the threat. NATO experience in Kosovo has shown that there is a linear relationship between the internal cohesion of an alliance and the way in which members perceive external threats and challenges. The nature of interstate relations in post-Cold War Europe has changed to such an extent that the definition of a specific threat is very difficult by replacing "the Soviet threat" with a complex of secondary threats or collective risks. (see annex 2).

⁶ By the term "order" we mean a formal or informal sum of relations which produces regular and expected patterns of behaviour and in which commonly accepted views on issues of hierarchy, legitimacy and normative interaction prevail. See R. Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, especially Chapter 6.

The failure of EU states to define the nature and character of post-Cold War threats could not only undermine the attempts to transform the CFSP into "defense policy", but could endanger the integration process in other fields. By linking threats to internal security of the EU to the enlargement project by some politicians, the public opinion would be against enlargement project.

Related to this aspect starts the question: "Is it the real threat for the internal Security of the EU, the enlargement towards CEEC or "social fracture" of Globalisation?"

The answer is not so simple. The more politicians from Western Europe point to international competitive pressures, the EMU, and so to legitimate and push through changes in structures of social policy, the more they run the risk that potential and real losers of such policies will turn against Globalisation and European Integration and demand more control over foreign economic policy, in short protectionism.

The challenge is to explain to the public opinion the real threat for individual security, on one side and to find the principal common denominators of the actors involved on the European affairs, on the other side. Therefore we will try to elaborate on these issues during the journey of our thesis, as an opportunity and challenge at the same time, by looking at the emerging social forces, from Western and Eastern Europe, which potentially have the interest to convert the losers of integration in winners contributing to the emerging project of Humane governance, based on new core values as Humane security and Sustainable development. It is important to challenge the neo-liberal wisdom, which has acquired a status of natural truth during the processes of Globalisation.

The third section of this introductory chapter deals with another question: Can EU neutralise the negative impact of the anarchical international environment by the long-term experience of co-operational and institutional frameworks of normative interaction?

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We will argue that the nature of the new systemic reality, contrary to realist and neo-realist predictions, can converge with the efforts of the EU member states to formulate norms and rules which can promote cooperative state and non-state behaviour and advance the integration process, in a feminist perspective, as a positive compromise for a model of humane governance.

The European model represents a fusion between “liberal” and “realist” visions of the international system, states are basic units of analyses, in the view of realist, but contains the security dilemma within a non-violent conflicting - cooperative - relationship, or even culture of cooperation.

The shift from state, as a unit of analysis, to relationship, as unit of analysis of International Politics, it is the important change in International Relations. Building constructive relationships between all the European powers and actors has been a challenge amplified by the existence of military and economic competition. It was a wise paradox and good example, at the same time.

New type of relationship between western great powers and transnational capitalist actors is called geo-governance. In this case geopolitical axis will certainly shift from *statist field, balance of power, stability, self-defense, spheres of influence and alliances* to *global market concerns with competitiveness, financial flows, capital sources, trade expansion, coordinating mechanism of labour market.*

The challenge will be to build a common agenda for all actors by a cooperative relationship in short between soft and hard power. The common denominator of all this powers is the struggle for survival and we assume that in a long term only humanistic values like humane security and humane governance for sustainable development can assure the survival for all. The question is could be this struggle transformed in cooperation for survival of the Human being and preservation of the Earth?

In the regulation of power relations, the European system puts constraints on the state behavior and the stability becomes a special vested interest of dominant powers, in the management of the status quo. Despite the

continuing domination of states, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organization, intergovernmental organizations and supranational institutions such as European Union share the stage of global politics affected by economic and political development, but on the other hand, non-adversarial problem solving mechanism would not be promoted in a hierarchical order controlled by elitist decision- making. This is the biggest dilemma.

Our hopes must continue to rest on the democratic energies of the peoples of the world, acting in all their diversity, yet conscious both of the threats that confront them and of the historic necessity to adapt the emergent geo-governance to the realization of human rights, transforming it in humane governance for human security and human sustainable development.

2. Method, Aim and Importance of Choosing the Issue

2.1. Method of the Research

While a full analysis of this process of enlargement is not feasible in the limited space of our study, the application of a neo-Gramscian feminin perspective is a preferable method of investigation such cases of accession and the concepts used by Gramsci can be transferred: like *social forces of globalisation, political society, civil society, hegemony, power of ideas for change*. This is the instrument with which our thesis will look at the EU's enlargement towards CEEC by assessing, which project is currently hegemonic and which are the social forces supporting it, by identifying the winners of this hegemonic project and especially, which can be the alternative project and which are the social forces supporting it, starting from the identification of the present and future losers of three macro-processes, which are under way. The research will be limited on time and space, starting with the analysis of the history of strategy for EU enlargement initiated by his engen, ERT and their actual reports referring to the unemployment, analyzing the social policy available at present, presenting the perspective of enlargement with its main challenge,

unemployment., of both political society and civil society, in gramscian terms. We will continue with the analyses of the concept of European civil society available on the documents of ESC and CIVICUS in contrast with Gramsci's concept of civil society. In comparison with the European political society perspective on challenges and opportunities for EU enlargement we will present CEEC's political society perspective by looking at the governmental documents available dealing with cost-benefits of European Integration and the present threats for security from their perspective. Civil society perspective from these countries will be examined with the aim of finding the loser's challenges and opportunities in this context of integration. For this aim we will use primary and secondary sources available for the author, which are limited but relevant for our aim of presenting new model of humane governance, which has the potentiality to change the losers in winners of these three macroprocesses. The method used will be qualitative analysis of the literature, reviews and articles.

2.2. The Aim of the Research at the Surface Structure

This challenging and consists on explaining to the public opinion the real threat for individual security, on one side and to find the principal common denominators of challenges and opportunities of the actors involved on the European affairs, on the other side, by presenting a prospect of Humane governance for sustainable development. First task is to reveal that an appeal to solidarity, to the European ideal and to the institutional links with CEEC might not be sufficient to sway public opinion⁷, in other words, a successful enlargement will not be possible until Western politicians and civil society are convinced that enlargement will not lead to negative economic consequences and huge budgetary costs. Any calculation of costs should also include those gains to the EU and the costs of prolonging the process of the CEEC's accession to the EU. In order to be successful,

⁷ D.J Van Den Berg, Opening Address by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Report of the Conference Enlargement of the European Union with Central European Countries; Challenges and Constraints, The Hague, 17-18 March, 1995, p.2

enlargement must be with the approval of the citizens of the Union based on cost and benefits to the EU and his member states and correcting the over-optimism of CEEC concerning the benefits of enlargement of the EU.

2.3. The Aim of the Research at the Deeper Structure

This is to argue that established theories of integration - neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism - are unable to explain the elements of structural change, because they are deterministic and take existing power structures as given and to reveal that trans-national social forces of capital and labour, supported by institutions linked to the global economy such as finance ministries, were behind the drive to membership of the EU, making an important contribution to understanding of European integration and globalisation by using a critical alternative, neo-Gramscian, feminist theory.

2.4. Importance of Choosing the Issue

It consists of two aspects: the question of membership has not been linked to Globalisation and the related restructuring processes, which applicant countries have undergone since the end of the Cold War in many studies and articles and our approach will help the better understanding of it, equally the perception that enlargement is in general advantageous to all potential new members has to be proved. It is particularly in these two respects that a neo-Gramscian analysis can contribute to the debate. The future enlargement to CEE has generated a large number of academic studies (e.g. Avery and Cameron, 1998; Curzon Price, 1999; Grabbe and Hughes, 2000; Henderson, 1999; Maresceau, 1997; Mayhew, 1998; Preston, 1997). They are mostly state-centric and empiricist. They presume that enlargement is in general advantageous to all potential new members, and concentrate on the issues between the applicants and the EU and among EU members themselves. Modest research has been carried out in relation to the potential conflicts between the losers and winners of EU membership among the applicants and the losers and winners inside the EU member states. Automatically, the potential opponents and their substitute

approaches have been neglected and the potentiality for a cooperative paradigm of humane governance for sustainable development of both winners and losers.

Another motivation steams from my personal experience and formation. As a political analyst, professor of linguistics and European Affaires, researcher on International Relations, I spent a lot of time researching about the economy and social issues and transition from Communist to market economy, being a strong advocate of the gradualist policies adopted by the Chinese, policies that have proven wise over the past two decades, based on principle of balance. Therefore to avoid this conflict between losers and winners would be better to create bridges between them and enable them to communicate in a perspective of balance and wisdom, inspired from the Chinese and oriental philosophy, avoiding the gap between the winners and losers agendas. The red tread could be the Balance between the power of the economic interest and the wisdom of the creative feminine forces of the “organic intellectuals”, aiming to avoid the polarization of social forces, not the polarity.

2.5. Structure, Theoretical Approach and the Principal Question of the Research

This is motivated by the aim of this research which is double: surface structures on the one side and deeper structures on the other side, which were presented after raising the awareness on the issue of the European Humane Security in the context of the EU enlargement towards CEEC. The integrative theoretical approach, neo-Gramscian, is the instrument for understanding at the deeper structure the European Integration. The explanations, from the second annex of the conflicts of globalisation with the regional version European Integration, versus Unity opens the windows for a deeper understanding of the process of globalisation and European integration, which are the engine of the actual “social fracture” and to formulate the principal question; Can Civil Society from CEEC participate on the potential anti-hegemonic project of European Civil Society against the actual “embedded neo-liberalism”, the hegemonic project of European

Political Society? (EU as an “integral state” in a neo-Gramscian perspective.) An overview of the thesis is necessary for the readers. The EU accession raises economic, social and political issues. Economic dimension, Social dimension and Security dimension are the three issues analysed on the three chapters of our thesis. These three dimensions are interrelated because *«people use to organize themselves to make demands on the political and economic system, but when more orthodox avenues are blocked, they will opt for extreme strategies that entail riots, strikes, demonstrations, rebellions, or even civil war to express their grievances»*⁸ and this represents a big threat for internal security. EU integration will have different effects on social groups and will create losers and winners. The analyses of winners and losers perspective will cover the social dimension of our thesis. A theoretical introductory approach, framework for understanding the European integration and Globalisation processes with three sections; the evaluation of the impact of change on the security concept and the relationship between Globalisation and European Integration, the introduction of the common challenges and opportunities for the design of a common agenda of all types of powers (political power, economic power and social power). The first chapter presents the hegemonic project of embedded neo-liberalism, the powerful child of ERT, which is a big opportunity for a market strategy, from their perspective. The first subchapter of first chapter deals with the big challenge of Europe, unemployment and ERT’s vision for job creation. The next subchapter of the same chapter evaluates the actual EC social policy and policy for unemployment together with the big opportunity for cooperation for enlargement towards CEEC originated on the Germano- British convergence of attitudes towards enlargement. These arguments show the commitment of the EU for economical interest, despite the urgent need for a social policy, which is a common concern for both political elites and civil society from Western Europe. The last subchapter of the same chapter

⁸ C.O.Lerche, Economic Influence on Popular Disturbance in Nigeria, Journal of Asian and African Studies XV, 3-4, 1980, p.193

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makes a comparison between the actual European civil society mission and institutionalisation of it and the old concept of civil society of Gramsci. This comparison demonstrates the impotence of the actual reality of civil society to realise his noble mission of creating a counter-hegemonic project of humane governance, concurrent of the present geo-governance, because it is asymmetrical and even copies the same model of geo-governance, for lack of imagination, independence and material capabilities. We need new ideas, material capabilities and institutions for the creation of a hegemonic project able to challenge the actual hegemonic project of embedded neo-liberalism. The second chapter in a symmetrical way presents the CEEC's political elite perspective on EU integration in terms of challenges and opportunities and reports cost-benefit of European Integration. CEEC Enlargement from the winners' and losers' perspectives forms the second and third subchapter of the second chapter. In this way, we have the views from both sides, Western and Eastern Europe, from the winners' and losers' perspective. The third chapter proposes a prospect of Humane governance for sustainable development based on the core value of sustainable development and humane security. A set of chapter's conclusions and concluding remarks help to identify the common challenges and opportunities in order to establish the common denominators of the common agenda of all actors involved on the Enlargement project in a common effort of survival. This is the structure of the research and the arguments, the case study and the conclusions are useful instruments for the aims of the research, which is made from different perspectives: enlargement as a challenge and opportunity for European Political Society, to expand the "embedded neo-liberalism" towards CEEC, the actual hegemonic project of the European Political Society and governments of CEEC (the present winners of integration) and as a challenge and opportunity for the European Civil Society (the present losers of integration) new potential paradigm of a counter-hegemonic project of "embedded neo-liberalism". These perspectives form the first and second chapter of the research and it would like to show the intensifying resistance against the social forces of globalisation across Europe within the enlargement towards CEE, including identification of the potential losers

of the European integration. These two chapters have in common the socio- economic concerns of the elites and civil society and form the big threat for the new concept of security in Europe, Humane security. The third chapter presents the prospect for a global security humane governance regime in Europe different of the present European governance struggle, based on the collaborative experience of the EU.

In sum this study analyzes the challenges of the potential polarisation of different interests in Europe, especially in the post-Wall Europe and to see if exists any possibility for aggregating interests of the old and evolving actors in Europe. In this logic we have to rethink security from a feminist vision and imagine new policies and strategies at European and national level. In the context of the latter, the analysis in the next chapter and in the following chapter is directed towards the examination of (not only) EU institutional response and adaptation to the new structural elements, but also to assessing the development of strategies, both for state actors (EC as an intergovernmental organisation) and non-state actors (as ERT and trade Union and NGO's) from Eastern and Western Europe, and in the last chapter the opportunity of formulation of effective policies dealing with humane security in the frame of Humane global governance, the anti-hegemonic potential approach of the European Civil Society, divergent in a neo-Gramscian perspective but convergent approaches of Global governance from the Commission on Global Governance image⁹. (*Though the Commission gives the image that global governance is somehow a sum of the actions of all this participants, the process has actually emerged as a conflict between the "top down" elite agenda and the "bottom up" popular agenda*).

⁹ Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.2-3