

# History and Civilization

EUBSR 2013 International Conference, Volume 2

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# History and Civilization



# **History and Civilization**

## **EUBSR 2013 International Conference, Volume 2**

Edited by:  
**Gavriil PREDA**  
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# Viewpoints on Roman Traditions in the History of Intelligence Services

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**Abstract:** Republic of Rome and Roman Empire had intelligence structures/services organized in two parts: one was military and the other one was civilian. These parts served indirectly the Emperor. The main troops engaged in the intelligence products were the *frumentarii*, the *speculatores*, *exploratores* and Praetorian Guard. The creation of the *frumentarii* like a component of “Roman Intelligence is mentioned in the Reign of Hadrianus and this form was perpetuated till Diocletianus. The last one transformed the troops in the *agentes in rebus*. We discuss in this material about Intelligence in republican period and in the Pricipate’s “Intelligence Service”.

**Keywords:** *frumentarii*, *speculatores*, *exploratores*, *delatores*, Roman Empire, Dacia province.

## 1. Introduction

Importance of intelligence was and is generally recognized by all people of the state, although not to the extent that it should. Advancement of science, technology and communications has increased the efficiency of these services, thus increasing their importance to the security of states and political regimes.

Because only in the last century, some of the modern intelligence actions were popularized, might think that the gathering and transmission of information belongs to the modern age, but, as will be seen below, the germs of intelligence, intelligence information structures appeared and acted even in the oldest human organization, the organization that might resemble what is now called the "State".

## 2. Republican Period

When considering the rapid evolution of web intelligence (agencies / services information) of Middle Eastern empires and the great importance that the rulers of Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, Persia, have given to information, both to defend their country, it is surprising to note that the Romans whose diplomacy has spread over most of the ancient empires of the Middle East, manifested in the beginning of their history, an interest so low intelligence.

This is even more amazing to think that the Roman expansion on Italy, Western Europe, Adriatic, Greece, mediterranean and Middle East territories was due at the start of a desire for conquest and lust for power and domination.

Because, in its early development, the Romanian territory may be crossed only in one day, setting a intelligence structures are not difficult, but it seems that the Romans did not think of the advantages of intelligence.

Evidence about the lack of interest of Romania to intelligence brings in his writings, the Roman historian Livy the Roman historian (59.î.en - 17 AD).

In 390 BC, the Gauls, the Romans angry that allied with their enemies started a war against Rome. Romans defeat would have resulted in the total destruction of the city, where defenders would have resisted the Roman capitol extension siege. If the Romans would have known character, intentions and movements of their neighbors and rivals, it probably would not have come to this.

Known accident during the siege of the Capitol, the sound of geese aroused the Romans giving them the opportunity to reject the Gauls to scale walls, can be cited as an example of their lack of experience in the basic principles of information in the early stages of their history.

Throughout the existence of the Roman Republic there is no trace of any organized system of obtaining information about neighboring peoples or plans of her enemies.

Also will search in vain for traces of the Roman use of even the most primitive means of transmitting information, are signaling by lighting fires or smoke.

The early Republican period, they rely heavily on information on the movements of their potential enemies camp, received from their allies.

Livy's writings that this voluntary information system worked quite well, as long as Rome was in the interest of informing the tribes friend, but soon interrupted, for one reason or another, it had become hostile. Another source of information was the Roman colonists who settled in the major centers in the occupied territories.

Moreover, we see no marked progress in military intelligence. Roman legions used a common strategy for all peoples and taking advantage of information obtained from traitors and deserters, link between the senate and consuls its're on the battlefield, it is very difficult to achieve.

Underestimating the importance of intelligence was matched by diplomatic and military superiority, only to the extent that they had to do disunited tribes of Italy. But when faced with an enemy who knew the advantages of good information, the Romans found themselves in an embarrassing predicament. This and realized during the great battles against Carthage, so - called Punic wars.

Neglect by the Romans the importance of information has made many times during the first Punic War, they are held only in extreme situations and circumstances that battles last moment did not turn into a tragedy.

Of course, the Second Punic War was not so expensive paid, if the Romans would have realized the need for a rapid information service.

By Livy, first during of the II Punic War, used a system of signaling relays military was consul Flavius, which is considered the first lesson learned from the Romans Hannibal.

Another example of the progress made by the Romans is that of the precautions taken by them in connection with the sending of the Hannibal

false orders. after the death in battle of the consul Marcellus, Hannibal placed his hand on the seal.

Information has come to town Şalapa before Roman deserter brought the letter, sealed with the seal citizens asking the city to be prepared for receiving the consul. Therefore, when Hannibal's army reached the city gates were closed behind them and were massacred.

African Scipio, the Roman general who played a decisive role in the victory of the Romans in the Third Punic War, war that led to the decisive defeat of Carthage - made the greatest progress in the art of military and political information. He took so harsh lessons received from Hannibal, as well as those of his friend, the Greek writer Polybius, lessons that put them into practice during his victorious campaign against the Carthaginians.

Writings of another historian, Appian, we can find that, during the siege Numantia (134-133 BC) a major city in northern Spain, Scipio used wisely system information sent by relays, mail, messenger, flashing lights or flags during the day, which replaced smoke signals. System worked perfectly; thanks to this method of transmitting military information, all Spanish attempts to pierce the Roman lines failed. As a means of travel, messengers and messengers Senate requisition system using their allied cities or subject to Rome. This system, however, slowed message and a burden to cities and provinces.

Transport official correspondence containing information for the senate and magistrates in Rome, the magistrates of the provinces were forced to use special messengers, called "statores" which were attached in addition to their offices. Offices Judiciary central function "statores" was owned by "tabellarii". In most cases, both "statores" and "tabellarii" were slaves.

Is considered hard work, mail distribution being made on foot, which requires good physical condition, no longer beating occupy this function, they are considered as a punishment or degradation.

Roads built by the Romans were the first destination troop movements. messengers were forced to use them, but there is no special provision to facilitate their journey.

### 3. During the Civil Wars

By the end of the Republic, a new period opened in the history of intelligence. century BC, Roman power not only to firmly implanted in North Africa, Spain and Gaul, but filed away in the East, his legions treading the path marked by several centuries ago by Alexander the Great. Conflict with Macedonia in the time of King Philip IV and his son, Perseus, ended in 168 BC the destruction of the establishment of the Roman province of Macedonia Macedonian Empire, expansion of Roman influence on states - Greek cities united in the so - called Athenian League and finally, the complete submission of Greece. Asia conflict with Antiochus III, former ally of Philip V and Hannibal, ended with the destruction of the Seleucid Empire and the creation of two Roman province of Asia (129-126 BC) and that of Bithynia (74 BCE). Conquests in the east were closed by subjecting Syria in 64 BC and Egypt in 30 BCE.

To approach negotiations and struggles with Macedonia and eastern states, the Romans were able to gain first-hand knowledge on existing intelligence structures in these nations.

Recently conquered territories were overgrown land speculators Roman merchants, tax collectors and agents finance tycoon Roman. So it was natural that, in their own interest, they report to the provincial authorities any movement which would have jeopardized both their interests and the Roman. All political and military information were sent to Rome by private couriers of these Roman citizens.

In letters to his friends during the time he was governor of Cilicia in Asia Minor, Cicero presents a clear picture of how the provincial governors get information. Thus most reliable information came, yet the allies of the Romans, whose national interests were threatened by the invasion of enemy troops.

So, even in this period, the end stage of the Roman Republic have not made much progress in the organization's intelligence. however, there was a new factor in the evolution of Romanian intelligence structures, namely, private businesses and merchants Roman speculators who voluntarily prevented and financing these services.

Unfortunately, the transmission of information from overseas provinces was hampered by the large number of pirates who roamed the seas and, many times, they captured the messengers that carried mail to Rome. Pompey was the one who ended piracy in all seas and marine routes secured.

But although reopened seas, which was of great importance such as the transmission of information, he has not done anything for the organization of the Romanian Intelligence Service. In this sense, his political rival, Caesar, was more cautious. Great military successes that has achieved Caesar were due both tactics and strategy, and understanding of the importance of intelligence.

Before any campaign, Caesar did his best to obtain the best possible information about the country to conduct operations: local customs, political institutions, their history and their economic situation. the history of wars against the Gauls, "The Bello Gallico," he begins by presenting data on geography, ethno-genesis of this nation, reaching a description of the socio - political and military wartime days.

To obtain this information, Caesar sent the territories that were to be conquered agents to collect complete and accurate data as Gauls habits, to obtain this information, Caesar sent the territories that were to be conquered agents to collect complete and accurate data as Gauls habits.

Caesar did the same thing and before the conquest of Britain. in addition to this method of direct observation, Caesar used during the campaign in Gaul old method of obtaining information from its allies.

Such a man, of course, appreciate the quickness and intelligence expected him to reorganize. But giving up old habits was difficult. So because there were no spaces postal, Caesar used for his travels carts rented from

enterprising citizens, for the supply of equipment travel has become a very profitable business.

Can say that Caesar would have a longer life if it were organized for the whole system of obtaining and transmitting information.

\*

The Roman Empire, first great power in history, with a secular evolution, could've not obtained the stage of military superpower without intelligence services. Few references exist in the specialized historical literature, and for the presence of certain elements of „roman secret service” in the provincial environment only a few studies are known to have been written.

With all of this being said, we will enumerate the prime structures involved in intelligence activities, based on ancient sources – epigraphic / archaeological, literary – and modern and contemporary historiography works.

The roman “secret service” had two components, one part was military and the other was civilian, both of which were indirectly subjected to the emperor. At the level of intelligence activities a number of military categories were found, involved in gathering information, transmitting information and taking measures when the situation required so. In this category we have: *frumentarii*, *speculatores*, the Praetorian Guard, *exploratores*.

The outmost important role was for the *frumentarii*. The opinions regarding their activities, attributes and level of organization are differentiated among contemporary historiography, generating live disputes. These man of science established that they were indeed a “secret service”. Studies undertaken by R. Paribeni<sup>1</sup>, Alfred von Domaszewki<sup>2</sup>, W.

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<sup>1</sup> Paribeni 1905, p. 310-320.

<sup>2</sup> Domaszewki 1967, p. 34-35, 104.

Sinnigen<sup>3</sup>, J. C. Mann<sup>4</sup> și N. B. Rankov<sup>5</sup> organized and brought to light this special structure of the Roman state. S. Pribac is the first Romanian specialist that manages to create an exhaustive study of epigraphical mentions about *frumentarii* and their role in Dacia province<sup>6</sup>.

Inscriptions that mention the *frumentarius* military rank are small in numbers, being usually found around camps of different legions. Their dating period is around 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD.

Evidence of spying and information services existed even before the Principality, but they were not well organized. The political situation from the 1<sup>st</sup> century AD, in which emperors were afraid of losing their power, and were almost paranoid about this fact that they used false or unchecked information to banish or sentence to death the accused. The emperors' means of coercion were the army, the Praetorian Guard and paid assassins. The horrible crime, the elimination of would-be opposers or rivals, resembles the modern meaning of political police. Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Domitianus are just a few examples of a long list of emperors that used and/or created information to serve their interest for the sole purpose of maintaining their reign over the Roman Empire.

The uncertain situation and frail position of Hadrianus beginning reign, until the annihilation of „the plot of the four counselors” , determines Trajan's descendant to create a new service, initially a postal service that would eventually replace the Praetorian Guard's spying duties, through a network of military attachments with spying roles, specialized in collecting information, destabilizing situations on military battlefields and manipulating key persons within an enemy countries governing class. <sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Sinnigen 1959, p. 238-254; Sinnigen 1961, p. 65-72; Sinnigen 1962, p. 213-224.

<sup>4</sup> Mann 1988, p. 148; Mann 1988a, p. 149-150.

<sup>5</sup> Rankow 1990, p. 176-182.

<sup>6</sup> Pribac 1996, p. 123-127.

<sup>7</sup> *Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Vita Hadriani*, 10, 2 – 11, 1 (SHA); Syme 1988, p. 159-160; Birley 2008, p. 137.

Rose Mary Sheldon supports the hypothesis that Domitianus was the first to create a roman military secret service. The hypothesis is interesting because Domitianus was known to have used secret police to silence his rivals, but there is no archaeological or epigraphical evidence to confirm the authors' assumptions.<sup>8</sup> The conversion of the *frumentarii* into a secret service and the fear they brought to people is evidence that they were used for political repression. But all these will be forgotten in Antoninus Pius's reign of freedom and trust.<sup>9</sup> Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius's governing styles influenced the transformation of the *frumentarii* from a political police into an „intelligence service”, with the temporal limits attached to the term itself. The etymology of the term *frumentarii* indicates the initial role of this military rank, which is to supply the roman army with *frumentum* – grain supply.<sup>10</sup> This fact will serve as a cover-up for the real activities of the above mentioned military rank.

Hadrianus also gave a law in which only Italians citizens could become centurions. In the time of Septimus Severus, a *centurio frumentarius* could become *hastatus*, and the strictness behind their origin ceases.<sup>11</sup>

In the beginning, the *frumentarii*'s prime role was to deliver messages from the emperor to the provinces and vice versa, as evidenced by Casius Dio's opera and by a funerary inscription from Salona<sup>12</sup>; and *cucurrit frumentarius* on the tomb stone<sup>13</sup>. In the stories of Maximus and Balbinus's lives, *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* reminds us of: „*scriptum est praeterea ad omnes provincias missis frumentariis*”<sup>14</sup>, and an inscription from Appia

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<sup>8</sup> Sheldon 2005, p. 250-251, probably base on Tacitus information, *Agricola*, 40, 1; 41, 4.

<sup>9</sup> Birley 2008, p. 153.

<sup>10</sup> *ERE*, s.v. *frumentarii*, p. 211.

<sup>11</sup> Pribac 1996, p. 124-125.

<sup>12</sup> Cassius Dio, *Istoria Romană*, LXXIX, 14.1; 79, 15.1; 79, 39.3.

<sup>13</sup> *CIL* III, 2063 = *ILS* 2370.

<sup>14</sup> *SHA, Vita Maximi et Balbini*, 10.3; cf. Herodian, *Istoria Imperiului Roman după moartea lui Marcu Aureliu*, VII, 7.5; In 4<sup>th</sup> Century AD, *frumentarii* were identified with *agentes in rebus*

(Asia) referred to a letter from emperor Phillipus Arabs to M. Aurelius Eglectus, that was delivered by a *frumentarius*<sup>15</sup>. In *SHA, Vita Hadriani* there is a reminder about a *frumentarius* sent to spy on a prominent roman senator, and in the biography of Macrinus and Claudius, military men are assimilated by imperial spies. They even appear as assassins in the service of the emperor in the stories about Commodus, Iulianus and Pescenius Niger, activity mentioned even by Herodian, that described the attempt of Septimus Severus to eliminate Clodius Albinus<sup>16</sup>. In the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD, the name of this special corps gained a negative connotation<sup>17</sup>, that will lead finally to emperor Diocletian's reform<sup>18</sup>.

Studies undertaken by archaeologists specialized in roman history have laid some foundations for specific elements. Thus, the general headquarters of the *numerus frumentariorum* was *Castra Peregrina*, situated on Mons Caelius, in Rome<sup>19</sup>. Archaeological excavations brought to light the size of the barracks from *Castra Peregrina*, which could house approximately 400 military men, which means 12-13 from every roman legion<sup>20</sup>. Their commander was a *princeps peregrinorum*, military man with rank and stature of a senior centurion. Next in the military ranks were the *subprinceps*, with rank of centurion, other military ranks that have been epigraphically certified in Rome are: *optio peregrinorum*, *canalicularius* and

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or *veredari*, cf. Sancti Hieronymus, *Abdiam*, 1 în <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/Hieronymus.html> (20.11.2012).

<sup>15</sup> CIL III, 14191: „*Iulius P]hi[lippus P. F. Aug.] ... M. Au[r. Eglecto] pe[r] Didymum mili[t]e[m]frum[entarium]*”.

<sup>16</sup> Spioni: *SHA, Vita Hadriani*, 11; *Vita Macrini*, 12; *Vita Claudi*, 17.1; cf. Cassius Dio, *Istoria Romană*, LXXVIII, 17.1.; asasini: *SHA, Vita Commodi*, 4.5; *SHA, Vita Iuliani*, 5.8; *SHA, Pescenius Niger*, 2.6, cf. *CIL X*, 6657 = *ILS 1387*; Herodian, III, 5.4-5.

<sup>17</sup> Cassius Dio, *Istoria Romană*, LXXIX, 15.1.

<sup>18</sup> Aurelius Victor, *Liber de Caesaribus*, 29, 44.

<sup>19</sup> Ammianus Marcellinus, *Istoria Romană*, XVI, 12, 66: „*in castris peregrinis, quae in monte sunt Caelio*”.

<sup>20</sup> Sheldon 2005, p. 251.

*aedilis castrorum*. The information officers, *frumentarii*, were sent into imperial provinces, were they operated under their own centurions, *centuriones frumentarii*<sup>21</sup>.

There is evidence of the presence of *stationes*, near Rome Aeterna, which belonged to the *frumentarii*, but these are non-existent in the imperial provinces. Bases of this service existed in the capitals of the provinces, or near the headquarters of some legions located in the military capitals of some provinces: one *frumentarius* named as head jailor in Ephesus<sup>22</sup>; one *frumentarius* serving in the staff of Pannonia Inferior's governor, apparently in charge of the construction of a *schola* at Aquincium for *speculatores* from legio I Adiutrix and legio II Adiutrix<sup>23</sup>; a *centurio frumentarius* charged by legionary detachments to take care of the reconstruction of the walls of Salona, the capital of Dalmatia province<sup>24</sup>.

A dispute created the hypothesis that the *frumentarii* served in the *officium consularis* of the provinces governors, A. Von Domaszewski bringing arguments in favor of this hypothesis, and J.C. Mann and N.B. Rankov denying the hypothesis because there wasn't enough evidence, but what is known is that they were transferred in the *officium* for acts of valor or at the end of service. And we have evidence that two *frumentarius* were advanced in the *officium tribunus legionis*, one from legio VIII Gemina and one from legio XXII Primigenia, registered afterwards as centurions in the same legions<sup>25</sup>. There are also *frumentarii* mentioned to have gained the ranks of *optio peregrinorum* and *centurio frumentarius*<sup>26</sup>. For special merits and loyalty, *frumentarii* were advanced from the company of governors directly

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<sup>21</sup> Mann 1988a, p. 149.

<sup>22</sup> Ephesus, capitala Asiei cf. *CIL* III, 433 = *ILS* 2368.

<sup>23</sup> *CIL* III, 3524 = *ILS* 2375.

<sup>24</sup> *CIL* III, 1980 = *ILS* 2287.

<sup>25</sup> *CIL* XIII, 8282; *ILS* 9279; *AE* 1930, 151 = *AE* 1938, 20; *CIL* XIII, 668.

<sup>26</sup> For *optio peregrinorum* see *CIL* XI, 1322; for *centurio frumentarius*: *CIL* III, 2063; *CIL* VI, 36853 (possibly centurion in a legion).

by the emperor. They could've been promoted through the speculator stature into centurionate, becoming eligible for advancement in *Castra Peregrina*, alongside others that have not been implemented as spies in the company of governors. A *frumentarius* which operated under the orders of a centurion had not only the freedom to arrest<sup>27</sup>, but also to kill on order<sup>28</sup>. The promotion of a centurion guaranteed him access to duties within the knightly order.

J.C. Mann sets as a foundation for his idea, a list discovered at Lambaesis, that is partially intact and that contains the names of those working in the *officium* of Numidia's governor, dating from the beginning of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD<sup>29</sup>. After four *speculatores* and 30 *beneficarii consularis*, there are 6 *candidati* and 5 *ex-frumentarii, quaestionarii, 5 beneficarii sexmestris* and one *haruspex*<sup>30</sup>. Other Latin epigraphs register promotions of some persons from the rank of *frumentarius* to the rank of *beneficarius consularis*, indicating a promotion in the *officium consularis*<sup>31</sup>. These *candidati* were on the waiting list for a *beneficarius* rank, like the *ex-frumentarii*<sup>32</sup>.

We consider that, although the appearances seem to indicate that these were part of the governors *officium*, their role was another. The members of this special category answered only to the emperor, for which they gathered information, performed secret missions or transmitted special assignments for the provinces governor. The hypothesis that the

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<sup>27</sup> Eusebius, *Istoria Ecceziastică*, VI, 40.

<sup>28</sup> *SHA, Didius Iulianus*, 5, 8 cu *CIL X 6657 = ILS 1387, AE 1945,80*

<sup>29</sup> Domaszewski 1967, p.34; Mann 1988a, p. 149-150.

<sup>30</sup> *AE 1917, 18,57*.

<sup>31</sup> *CIL II, 4154 = ILS 2369; CIL III, 3020; CIL VIII, 17627*.

<sup>32</sup> Three inscriptions attest the existence of a *beneficarius consularis exfrumentario*. Promotion in the *officium consularis*: at rank of *beneficarius consularis*: *CIL II, 4154; CIL III, 3020 = ILS 10057 (ex fru(mentario) bf. cos.)*; *CIL VIII, 17627 (e]x frumen[ta]rio bf cos)*; *AE 1917/18, 57* indicates five *ex frum(entariis)*; Spomenik, 71, 1931, no. 209 (*bf cos ex fru(mentario)*); at rank of *commentariensis*: *CIL XIII, 1771, apud Rankov 1990, nota 19, p. 180*.

beneficiary of some precious information could've been the governor, the emperor's image in the province, as well.

Many cases of „information officers” being sent in the vast territories of the Roman Empire existed and were studied, from which we remember: legio VII Gemina (Hispania Tarraconensis), a *centurio frumentarius* in I Audiutrix (Panonia Superior), in Noricum, where legio II Italica was transferred in 171 AD; a *frumentarius* from legio I Audiutrix and a *centuriones frumentarii* from legio III Cyrenaica (Arabia) and legio II Traiana (Egypt) in Dalmatia; *frumentarii* from legio I Italica (Moesia Inferior) and legio X Fretensis (Syria Palaestina) in Achaia; *frumentarii* from legio VIII Augusta (Germania Superior), X Gemina and I Audiutrix (Panonia Superior), from legio VI Ferrata (Syria Palaestina), one *centurio frumentarius* from XIII Gemina (Dacia) in Asia<sup>33</sup>. We specify that every military province always had a *frumentarius* at one of the stationed legions<sup>34</sup>.

In Roman Dacia there are mentions of members of the Roman Secret Service. The first documented attestation of a *frumentarius* in Dacia province is represented by the latin epigraph from Apulum, that mentioned Ti. Claudius Vibianus, *centurio frumentarius* in legio XIII Gemina. The inscription dates from the time of emperor Publius Aelius Hadrianus, therefore between 117-138 AD<sup>35</sup>. For legio III Flavia a *centurion frumentarius* is attested, C. Titius Ianuarius, native from Camulodunum (Britannia), died in Drobeta. This dates from the time of Emperor Hadrian<sup>36</sup>. In a funerary inscription from Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa a

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<sup>33</sup> Rankov 1990, note 6 with all epigraphic mentions, p. 177.

<sup>34</sup> The only exception to the rule appears in Dacia, cf. *CIL* III, 1474 (VI Victrix from Britain); *IDR* II, 35 (a centurion of legio III Flavia - Moesia Superior) and in Numidia, cf. *CIL* VIII, 2867 (legio V Macedonica from Dacia); a military man from legio VI Victrix was commemorated by his father, which denotes a commemoration from his family, as the one in the Drobeta inscription, *apud* Rankov 1990, nota 7, p. 177.

<sup>35</sup> *CIL* III, 7041.

<sup>36</sup> *IDR* III, 35.

*miles frumentarius* is mentioned, killed at 19 years old, Publius Antonius Victor, from legio VI Victrix. Chronologically it can be framed, based on name analysis, in the time of emperor Gordian Tres, therefore between the years 239-244 AD<sup>37</sup>.

Two inscriptions mention combatants of legio XIII Gemina Severiana. The first one discovered at Sarmizegetusa, is dedicated to Caius Iulius Valerianus, *frumentarius et decurio* of the above mentioned Colony, in honor of Caius Iulius Valerius, former beneficiary counselor, *decurion et duumvir* in Sarmizegetusa Metropolis<sup>38</sup>. It can be dated in 222-235 AD, through the known fact that Severus Alexander is the emperor that gave Sarmizegetusa the title of „*metropolis*”. The second is from Rome, it being an inscription raised by Marcus Aurelius Sophaenitus, in honor of Severus Alexander, together with a *frumentarius* colleague from legio VIII Augusta. In this same inscription we find a mention of a „*statio*” of the *Frumentarii College*<sup>39</sup>. The epigraph is dated in 222-235 AD, and the cognomen Sophaenitus indicates a greek-oriental origin.

Marcus Aurelius Berulus is the forth *frumentarius* belonging to legio XIII Gemina. His name appears engraved into a funerary inscription in Rome<sup>40</sup>. Taking into account that Septimius Severus is the first emperor that grants access to non-Latin individuals in key positions within the roman military and administration, we can date this epigraphic monument after 193 AD.

We consider that disclosure of the identity of the officers during their activity was not practiced. This fact is shown by mention of these titles in funerary monuments, but very rare on honorific monuments, and the later case, only after the individual retired or ended a mission. Members of this

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<sup>37</sup> IDR III/2, 379. This is a distinct case because of the officers age. It can be affirmed that entry in this specific unit was achieved at early age. The causes that lead to the death of this young man are unknown, and this leave places for interpretations.

<sup>38</sup> IDR III/2, 113.

<sup>39</sup> Pribac 1996, p. 123-124.

<sup>40</sup> CIL IV, 3356.

specialized military category that died in Rome were commemorated by the *frumentarii* of the legions from the province in which they served<sup>41</sup>. The resemblance with *speculatores*, with which they had strong bonding, is clear evidence of the allegiance to the Roman Secret Service and of activities specific to the secret front.

The other group involved in the Roman secret service as military component is the *speculatores*. They formed a special department of the Praetorian Guard, which was originally created as a courier order, research and espionage. It was the equivalent of internal information service, engaged in counter, interceptions information. *Speculatores* alongside the compartment consisted of *questionarii*, received a sinister reputation, that of paid assassins and torturers at the service of the Roman emperor<sup>42</sup>. The need for such a special body was a natural one, knowing many non-military functions of the imperial guard. It seems that the shared headquarters - *Castra Peregrina* with *frumentarii*.

In time, *speculatores* have become familiar with the intrigues of the palace, because of the information they had access to. The name of Lucius Aelius Seianus, *praefect praetorius* during Tiberius, is linked to the first use of this military corps in espionage, assassination or cruel torture.

One could gain access to *speculatores* rank only if they were a veteran, and only after a minimum of five years of service<sup>43</sup>. In the time of Nero, *praefect praetorius* – Ofonius Tigellinus used *speculatores* to hunt down his enemies, especially those involved in Piso's plot. There are mentions that Vespasian, Titus and Hadrianus even used them for harsh interventions<sup>44</sup>. A historical fact denotes the use of *speculatores* by Publius Attianus Acilus, *praefectus praetorius* of Hadrianus, against rebels. Through their use, the

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<sup>41</sup> Rankov 1990a, p. 167; Faure 2003, p. 411.

<sup>42</sup> *ERE*, s.v. *speculatores*, p. 512.

<sup>43</sup> Clauss 1973, p. 82-109.

<sup>44</sup> Sheldon 2005, p. 278.

four generals that participated in the “counselor’s plot” were executed<sup>45</sup>. And the examples could go on.

Within the *officium* of the province governor, the *speculatores* served as couriers, spies, and also as a force of repression against any act of rebellion. Being former praetorian guards, they were elite soldiers that only answered to the supreme leader – The Emperor. From the numerous examples of punitive measures written in ancient works, we can observe that the *speculatores* fulfilled their orders promptly<sup>46</sup>.

In roman Dacia, approximately five *speculatores* are mentioned through epigraphic works, at Apulum there was even a *schola speculatorum* at the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century AD, an association or college of military men active near legionary camps<sup>47</sup>. The other four epigraphs from Dacia are dated around 3<sup>rd</sup> century AD.

From the study of ancient sources and epigraphs we can conclude that the actions of these two big informative categories are intertwined, *frumentarii* acting in information gathering, and *speculatores* acting in repressive actions.

Without dwelling too much on the other units involved in information gathering, we will present their role. Thereby, the previously mentioned categories have the emperor and the state apparatus as the beneficiary, whereas the specialized military units below were used mostly on battlefields.

*Exploratores* seem to belong to an external information service or the information service of the military. They were organized in small light cavalry units composed of barbarians, serving under roman military rule<sup>48</sup>. *Exploratores* or *numeri exploratorum* were basically scouts, which were in

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<sup>45</sup> SHA, *Vita Hadriani*, 10, 2 – 11, 1; Birley 2008, p. 137-138.

<sup>46</sup> Rankov 1990, note 26 with all bibliography, p. 180-181.

<sup>47</sup> IDR, II, 141; CIL III, 7741 = 14479: *schola speculatorum* (Apulum, circa 198-199 p.Chr.).

<sup>48</sup> Southern 1989, p. 110-112, 124-126; Southern 2006, p. 227, with all all discussions.

charge with scouting, reconnaissance and patrolling during military expeditions, on the borders of the empire, in *Barbaricum* and enemy territories, observing tribes or neighboring states<sup>49</sup>. In Dacia, there were troops of scouts organized in *numeri*: *Numerus Exploratorum Germanicianorum* (Orastioara de Sus) and *Numerus Exploratorum Britannicianorum* (Cigmau), the last being morphed into the enigmatic *pedites et equites singulares* from Apulum (possibly *Numerus Singulariorum Britannicianorum*, Dacian governors guard)<sup>50</sup>. Units of type *numerus* were not only unordered units formed on ethnic principle, they also consisted units of special missions, as is resulted from the given examples: *frumentarii*, *pedites et equites singulares*, *statores*, etc<sup>51</sup>. Based on the text of *Roman History* of Ammianus Marcellinus, we can observe a clear difference between the informational activities of *exploratores* and *speculatores*. *Exploratores* did only scouting missions, as operative units, going deep into enemy territory, unlike *speculatores* which acted undercover and solitary<sup>52</sup>. This ancient work makes references to the scouts' activities of collecting information, they being called: *excursatores*<sup>53</sup>, *procuratores*<sup>54</sup> and *proculcatores*<sup>55</sup>.

The Praetorian Guard and the *equites singulares* were elite troops that ensured the safety of the emperor and that of the provinces governors. The Praetorian Guard was composed of ten *milliaria* cohorts and numbered 10.000 soldiers. Besides protecting the emperor, this military unit was also engaged in military parades but was also involved in numerous assassinations and crimes. Their military leader was the *praefectus praetorio*, which

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<sup>49</sup> *ERE*, s.v. *exploratores*, p. 205.

<sup>50</sup> Davies 1976, p. 134-144; Speidel 1983, p. 63-65; Rankov 2007, p. 55, 72.

<sup>51</sup> Southern 1989, p. 84.

<sup>52</sup> Lee 1993, p. 171.

<sup>53</sup> Ammianus Marcellinus, *Istoria Romană*, XXIV, 1, 2.

<sup>54</sup> Ammianus Marcellinus, XXV, 8, 4.

<sup>55</sup> Ammianus Marcellinus, XXVII, 10, 10.

answered to the emperor. The power gained in time by the *praefectus praetorio*, was the source to some known plots in history, from which the guarded emperors became the guarded prisoners. The Praetorian Guard was created by Octavian Augustus, having *Castra Praetoria* as headquarters in Rome. Due to the never ending plots Constantine the Great destroyed *Castra Praetoria* and disbanded the guard<sup>56</sup>.

On the battlefield there are other documented military units that had roles in information gathering and strategy, necessary for military success. Information was collected on site, delivered to the military major staff, and it was eventually disseminated by the high roman staff<sup>57</sup>.

We draw attention to characters whose importance can be assumed, not demonstrated clearly. *Interpretes* were people in intermediate commercial transactions, used as translators in the dealings between the empire and the populations that lived beyond the borders. Recruited from locals, *interpretes* are present both in civilian and in military environments, in Rome, and in the provinces<sup>58</sup>. In the provinces near the borders, these were integrated into *apparitores* corps, near the governors. *Itinerarium Antonini* reminds of *interpretes singularum linguarum*. Other testimonies appear at Quintus Curtius Rufus, Rufinus, Isidor din Sicilia, Orosius and Ulpian. A passage from Caesar reminds of C. Valerius Procillus and M. Metius's case, sent to negotiate with Ariovistus, but also to collect information from him and report everything back<sup>59</sup>. Relevant in the present debate are *interpretes* situated on the *limes* with *Barbaricum*: the Renan *limes* and the Danube *limes*. The case of Marcus Ulpus Celerinus, attested in a inscription from

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<sup>56</sup> Rankov – Hook 1994, p. 4-62.

<sup>57</sup> Information gathered by *venatores* and *exploratores*. Other military units with surveillance and information gathering attributes stationed in sarmatian territories from west dacian *Barbaricum*, in the time of Diocletian are *vigiles* mentioned in *Notitia Dignitatum*, Occ. XXXII, 41 – XXXIII, 48 *apud* Lee 1993, p. 179-180.

<sup>58</sup> Stoian 2007, p. 165.

<sup>59</sup> Caesar, *De Bello Gallico*, 47, 4-6.

Brigetio (Pannonia Inferior), is an argument of the Dacian presence being spread into modern day Slovakia: „*sal(ariarius) legionis I Ad(iutricis) p(ia) f(idelis) interpres Dacorum*”<sup>60</sup>. Celerinus is present in the context of fighting the barbarians in time of Caracalla, and Maximinus Thrax, he was a civilian employee of the legion<sup>61</sup>.

At Aquincum (Pannonia Inferior) Marcus Aurelius Flavus is attested, *interpes Germanorum*<sup>62</sup> and Caius, *interpres Sarmatorum*<sup>63</sup>. They were both in the *officium consularis*, serving in the governor’s staff<sup>64</sup>. Based on the narrative sources about their utilization in the military environment, we can observe that the activities of the *interpretes* were not limited only to translation, they were also used in espionage. The advantages of this can be understood quite well: although they were romanized, they are natives from populations within *Barbaricum*, that were easy to insert into enemy territory, and they could’ve gathered information more easily, information that was priceless to the military roman staff. In absence of clear evidence regarding the *interpretes* activities we propose this idea as a working hypothesis.

In data collection about territories beyond the *Orbis Romanus*, an important role seem to have had the merchants, engaged in commercial relations with the barbaric populations. The *negotiatores* traveled for material purposes beyond the border, but the permanent travel on these routes created the need to mark them on the map. These *itinerarii* had mapped the distance between cities, rivers, access roads. It is very possible that the *negotiatores* were the ones that gave the roman military the information necessary to create the *itinerarii picti*. Roman actions in enemy territory indicate good knowledge of the terrain, of the communication

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<sup>60</sup> *IDRE*, II, 273.

<sup>61</sup> Stoian 2007, p. 168-169.

<sup>62</sup> *CIL III*, 10505.

<sup>63</sup> *CIL III*, 14349.

<sup>64</sup> Austin – Rankov 1995, p. 89.

lines, of the fortified centers and of distances calculated in *milia passum*<sup>65</sup>. A relevant example is found in the dacian-roman war, when the armies of Trajan march unto the center of power from within the Sureanu Mountains.

The civilian component is well documented in ancient historiography, being based on informers and denunciation. Latin authors recall the many acts of denunciation, some true, others invented against some officials, other public persons, or the Christians in the Roman Empire. *Delatores* were informers or accusers in Rome, and their actions were based on two laws – *lex Papia Poppaea* (law regarding conspiracies) and *lex Iulia de maiestate* (law of betrayal). Civilians notified the authorities about facts or information that could put the emperor to harm<sup>66</sup>. Besides the initial notification they offered evidence and testified in the process. In the period of the Principate, because of some notifications, many people were accused with treason or plot, following the “*lex maiestatis*”, and in the majority of cases they were convicted<sup>67</sup>. The punishments were very harsh: from death penalty and confiscating treasure to exile and fines. Because the informers would get 25% of the accused treasure, many informers lied and some were even informers by profession. These served as informative agents of the emperor, the *praefectus praetori* or of some influential officials<sup>68</sup>. W.T. Sinnigen named the ones that collected information – *curiosi*, being the equivalent of informers, but not of *frumentarii* as the author believed<sup>69</sup>. Many Roman emperors took action against false denunciations, and in that sense, there are numerous mentions of ancient authors. Roman officers and

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<sup>65</sup> Salway 2001, p. 22-26; Coulston 2001, p. 125-126.

<sup>66</sup> *ERE*, s.v. delatores, p. 171.

<sup>67</sup> *Maiestas* represents the roman concept of betray eland from 1<sup>st</sup> Century AD it becomes the weapon of imperial tyranny. *Maiestas* was included in *Lex Appuleia* (103 sau 100 a.Chr.), and afterwards in *Lex Iulia maiestatis*. From the Augustan epoch, *maiestas* was associated with the emperor; the direct insult of him was equivalent with *perduellio*.

<sup>68</sup> *ERE*, s.v. delatores.

<sup>69</sup> Tertullian, *De fuga in persecutione*, 13, 3, claims that these *curiosi* and *beneficarii* had lists of Christians; Sinnigen 1961, p. 72.

informers involved in the above acts were, in fact, the political police in the service of the emperor.

The specialized roman military categories, engaged in the information service, accomplished actions against internal and external enemies, but they also served as political police. Their complex missions necessitated the approach of new forms, with remnants in present days, and when the historical conditions demanded it, the informative segments of the Roman Empire were reorganized. We consider that the roman “secret service” left its mark on the political and military life of the empire, influencing the institutional and historic evolution of the roman state. The manipulation of information determined harsh reactions from the emperors against his personal, or against the states enemies, and military information, that included data about the enemy force, the terrain, the enemy fortifications, guaranteed the roman technical and tactical advantage on the battlefields. Although the modern intelligence services are far more superior, we can see customs being transmitted to the heirs of Latin Europe.

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# Again on Legio II Traiana Fortis

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**Abstract:** One yet unsolved problem of the roman military history is the location of the legio II Traiana Fortis in the first ten years of its existence. Some authors placed it in the East, others saw it assigned on the Danube, especially in Moesia Inferior. The career of L. Cossonius Gallus Vecilius Crispinus Mansuanus Marcellinus Numisius Sabinus was considered by some scholars as a proof for the participation of legio II Traiana Fortis in Trajan's Parthian War. We will demonstrate in this paper that Cossonius' command over legio II Traiana is not consistent with this view. We shall also submit the hypothesis according to which the legion was stationed in Moesia Superior in the first years after its creation.

**Keywords:** legio II Traiana Fortis, L. Cossonius Gallus, Moesia Superior, Parthian war, Trajan, Judaea.

## 1. The Creation of Legio II Traiana Fortis

According to E. Ritterling, *legio II Traiana* must have been created by Trajan during his first expedition against the Dacians (101-102) [1]. H.M.D. Parker held that the unit came into being “between the first and the second Dacian War or between the Dacian wars and the Parthian War” [2]. Ronald Syme assumed that the legion was raised in the year 103, along with *XXX Ulpia Victrix* [3]. The great British scholar also supposed that both legions may have fought in Trajan's Dacian War, something that could be deduced from their *ex-virtute cognomina* but cannot be taken for granted. The annexation of the Nabataean Kingdom or the contemplation of a future campaign against the Parthians might as well have played a role in the creation of the two legions by the conquerer of Dacia [4]. The whereabouts of the legion in the years preceding its deployment in the East are unknown. It was suggested that the unit might have been stationed on the Lower Danube [5].

## 2. The Career of L. Cossonius Gallus

One of the earliest evidence on legio II Traiana is the inscription from Antiochia Pisidiae of Lycia-Pamphylia, dedicated to L. Cossonius Gallus Vecilius Crispinus Mansuanus Marcellinus Numisius Sabinus [6]:

[L(ucio) Coss]nio L(ucii) f(ilio) Stel(latina tribu) | Gallo Vecilio | Crispino Mansuanio | Marcellino Numisio | [S]abino leg(ato) Aug(usti) pro pr(aetore) | provinciar(um) Galatae Pisid(iae) [P]aphlagoniae, sodali Fla|viali, proco(n)s(uli) prov(inciae) Sard(iniae), | leg(ato) legionum I Italicae et | [I]I Traianae Fortis, praef(ecto) frum(enti) | dandi, curatoriar(um) Clodiae | Cassiae Anniae Ciminiae Traj(ianae) novae, praetori, trib(uno) pl(ebis), | quaestori provinc(iae) Ponti et | [B]ythiniae, leg(ato) Asiae, IIIvir(o) capital(i), | [trib(uno)] milit(um) leg(ionis) XXI Rapacis

There is also, another inscription discovered at *Caesarea Maritima*, in Judaea, which describes the career of the same senator [7]:

[L(ucio) Coss]onio L(ucii) f(ilio) S[tel(latina tribu) Gallo | Vecil]io Cris[p]ino Ma[nsuanio | Marc]ellino Numi[sio Sabino | co(n)s(uli), VI]I vir(o) epul(onum), [leg(ato) Imp(eratoris) Hadri]ani Aug(usti) p[r(o) pr(aetore) [p]rov(inciae) Gal]atiae, pro[co(n)s(uli) prov(inciae) Sardiniae, | leg(ato) leg(ionis) I Ita]licae] et leg(ionis) I[I Traian(ae) Fort(is) --]

*L. Cossonius Gallus Vecilius Crispinus Mansuanus Marcellinus Numisius Sabinus* governed Judaea shortly after his consulship in 116 AD [8]. Most authors consider *Cossonius Gallus* the successor of *Lusius Quietus* in Judaea, who was executed by Hadrian shortly after accepting the purple imperial vestments [9], and his governorship of the province between 118-120 AD [10]. He is also the first safely attested consular legate of Judaea.

Prior to his consulship, *L. Cossonius Gallus* served in the province of Galatia, Pisidia, Paphlagonia between 113/114-115/116 at the latest [11]. The last attested governor of the unified Cappadocia-Galatia province (comprising also Pontus Polemoniacus, Pontus Galaticus, Isauria, Paphlagonia and Pisidia and Armenia Minor) is *C. Julius Quadratus Bassus* [12]. It was supposed that the last legate of this ‘Cappadocian complex’

before its severance was *L. Iunius Homullus* [13]. Someothers believed that *M. Junius Homullus* was the first governor of the expanded Cappadocia as a consequence of the annexation of Armenia Maior [14]. This last contention could be supported by the view of H.-G. Pflaum that *L. Caesennius Sospes* (consul 114) was the first governor of Galatia, Pisidia, Phrygia, Lycaonia, Isauria, Paphlagonia, Pontus Polemoniacus, Pontus Galaticus after its separation from Cappadocia [15]. This view has not been accepted by others scholars. According to R. Syme, *L. Caesennius Sospes*, a senator of praetorian rank, replaced *L. Antistius Rusticus*, the consular governor of the Cappadocia-Galatia conglomerate, who died in office in 93 or 94. The province was temporarily divided and *Caesennius Sospes* took over Galatia and Armenia Minor and *legio XVI Flavia Firma* from *Satala* [16]. The Cappadocia-Galatia province was restored shortly after, in 95, when the consular *T. Pomponius Bassus* assumed the governorship [17]. In our view, although not impossibile, the hypothesis proposed by R. Syme and supported by W. Eck is improbable. It is more likely that *L. Caesennius Hospes* assumed the governorship of Galatia in 112/113. The separation of Galatia from Cappadocia, Pontus Polemoniacus and Pontus Galaticus might have occurred at that very date [18]. It results that *L. Junius Homullus* took over Cappadocia, Pontus Polemoniacus and Pontus Galaticus. In 114|115 Armenia Maior was added by Trajan to the Cappadocia conglomerate and *L. Catilius Severus* took charge of these territories [19]. It results that *L. Cossonius Gallus's* governorship of Galatia, Pisidia and Paphlagonia could not occur earlier than 113.

Prior to the accession to this office, *L. Cossonius* assumed the governorship of Sardinia as a proconsul [20]. As noticed by W. Eck in a paperwork, *Cossonius Gallus* might have been the first senatorial of this former procuratorial province [21]. He assumed this office in 112/113 at the latest [22].

The first office held by *Cossonius Gallus* after the praetorship was the *cura* of *viae Clodia, Cassia, Annia, Ciminia* and *Traiana nova*. The latter offers as *terminus post quem* the year 109 AD [23]. The office of *curator viarum*

was followed by the minor senatorial post of *praefectus frumenti dandi*, in 110 AD.

I've especially reserved the end of this foray for the analysis of the legionary commands of *Cossonius Gallus*. It has been suggested that the an iterated command might have been linked to the movements of legions and of legates during the second Dacian campaign of Trajan or the Parthian War of the same emperor [24]. If one examines more closely the career path of this senator can see that the time spent as commander of the two legions (*I Italica* and *II Traiana Fortis*) does not match either the Dacian War or the Parthian War time frames. These commands span from 111 to 112/113 [25]. *Cossonius Gallus* commanded the two legions in succession. As R. Syme had noticed, the iteration of a legionary command was so rare that it deserves scrutiny [26]. This iteration reminded him the unusual command of two legions in succession, *I Adiutrix* and *III Flavia Felix* [27] held by *T. Julius Maximus Manlianus Brocchus Servilianus Aulus Quadronius Verus Lucius Servilius Vatia Cassius Camars*. This iterated command was dated to 104-108 AD by some authors [28]. It had been considered that *T. Julius Maximus* commanded *legio I Adiutrix* during Trajan's second Dacian expedition 105-106. Then, by 105 or 106 he took the command of *legio III Flavia Felix* and probably fought against the Iazyges along with other units of Dacia and Pannonia Inferior [29]. However, there is no ascertainment. *T. Iulius Maximus* is attested as an imperial governor in Pannonia Inferior in 110 [30] and a consul in 112 [31]. This might move up two years later his command over *legio III Flavia Felix*, i.e. 108-110.

Some scholars have also adduced the parallel of *P. Tullius Varro* who commanded *legio VI Victrix* after *legio XII Fulminata* in Cappadocia [32]:

*P(ublio) Tullio | Varronis fil(io) | Stel(latina) Varroni co(n)s(uli), | auguri, proco(n)s(uli) provinc(iae) | Africae, leg(ato) Aug(usti) pro pr(aetore) | Moesiae superior(is), curat(ori) | alvei Tiberis et riparum | et cloacarum urbis, praef(ecto) | aerari(i) Saturn(i), proco(n)s(uli) prov(inciae) | Baeticae ulterioris Hispaniae, leg(ato) leg(ionis) XII Fulminatae | et VI Victris P(iae) F(idelis), | quaestori, urb(ano) tribuno | milit(um) leg(ionis) XVI Fl(aviae)*

*Xviro stlitibus | iudicand(is) praetori Etruriae quin|quennali Tarquinis | P(ublius) Tullius Callisto posuit*

His command of the *legio VI Victrix* was associated with the transfer of the unit from Germania Inferior to Britain [33]. The arrival of this legion in Britain was related to the disappearance of *legio VIII Hispana* from Britain [34]. The purpose of the present paperwork is not to discuss about the fate of *legio VIII Hispana*, a matter that has been the subject of much speculation. But, as R. Syme rightly pointed out, iteration of legionary command ‘indicates something abnormal’ [35].

Yet, unlike the two situations presented above, the case for an ‘abnormal situation’ or a crisis as a reason for the iteration of a legionary command by *Cossonius Gallus* is not very well fundamented. During 109-113 there was no major event which the command of *Cossonius Gallus* of the *legio II Traiana* or *I Italica* might be related to.

### 3. **Legio II Traiana Fortis in Judaea under Trajan?**

In a paperwork published in 1984, W. Eck advanced the hypothesis of the presence of the *legio II Traiana Fortis* in Judaea since 107/108 [36]. As a consequence of the arrival of this second legion, Judaea, which, from 70 AD, had praetorian rank, became a province of consular rank. Following his governorship in Lycia-Pamphylia, *Q. Roscius Coelius Murena Silius Decianus Vibullius Pius Iulius Eurycles Herclanus Pompeius Falco* (*consul suffectus* July 1, 108) [37], governed a second praetorian province, Judaea. Unusually, in the inscription that describes *Pompeius Falco*’s career, this appointment is combined with the command over Judaea legion, *X Fretensis* [38]. There is no known precedent for such an appointment and the next recorded case came decades later during Marcus Aurelius’ reign. The governor of an praetorian imperial province also held the command of the legion stationed within it therefore the two offices are not mentioned separately. As the governorship of Judaea and the term ‘consularis’ come together in ILS 1036, Eck concluded that *Q. Pompeius Falco* held the province as a consular legate. According to Eck’s hypothesis, *Pompeius*

*Falco* assumed a consulate *in absentia* and Judaea changed its status in 108 [39]. R. Syme rejected this view on the reason that neither ILS 1035 nor AE 1957 336 mentioned that *Falco* held Judaea as a consular legate. He concluded that the word *consularis* was an error of the stonemason [40]. I also assume this conclusion and therefore I do not agree with Eck's hypothesis. Judaea didn't change its status in 108 and *legio II Traiana* was not transferred from the Lower Danube to Judaea by this date.

The next evidence about *legio II Traiana Fortis* comes from *Sidon*. It's a funerary inscription dedicated to a Roman soldier, dating from 118 AD [41]:

G(aio) Ant(istio) Ve(tere) | co(n)s(ule) G(aius) Iu|lius Fabi|anus G(ai)  
f(ilius) | Cy(rina tribu) Uti(ca) m(iles) | l(e)g(ionis) II Trai(anae) f(ortis) |  
vixit ann(os) | L, mil(itavit) an(n)o(s) | XXIII

E. Ritterling concluded that the legion was in the East as a part of the garrison of a province, possibly Syria or might have taken part to Trajan's Parthian War [42]. Perhaps the latter situation is the most appropriate since in 118 in Syria already hosted three legions: *III Gallica*, *III Scythica* and the recently transferred *XVI Flavia Firma*. It is very possible that the legion was part of the expeditionary force commanded by the dynamic and effective general *Lusius Quietus* sent by Trajan to suppress the uprising of the Jews from Judaea in 117. By that time, *Quietus* was a *vir consularis* (a consulate held *in absentia*) and commanded a larger force [43]. Some authors were sceptic about the status changing of Judaea by the time of *Quietus'* governorship of this province and believe that his appointment was due only to his energetic and ruthless generalship [44]. The hypothesis of the status change of Judaea in 117 AD was advanced by R.K. McElderry in 1908 and defended by M. Avi-Yonah [45]. This last hypothesis comes to be confirmed by the inscription engraved on a milestone discovered by B. Isaac and I. Roll during a survey carried out on the road connecting *Ptolemais* (Acco) and *Diocaesarea* (Sepphoris) [46]:

[Imp(erator) Caesar divi Tra]iani | Part<h>ici fil(ius), D[ivi Nervae] nepos,  
| Hadrianus Aug(ustus), pontif(ex) | max(imus) trib(unicia) potestas (sic)|  
III, co(n)s(ul) III, Leg(io) II T(raiana) | IX

The inscription was engraved at an unknown date during the fourth tribunician power of Hadrian (10<sup>th</sup> dec. 119-9<sup>th</sup> dec. 120). In my view, the epigraph from *Sidon* and the one discovered by Isaac and Roll near *Diocaesarea* prove that *Legio II Traiana Fortis* took part in Trajan's Parthian war and then followed *Lusius Quietus* in Judaea in 117. The legion might have been garrisoned since its very arrival in Judaea at *Caparcotna* (Kefar 'Otnay), called later *Legio* [47].

#### 4. Conclusions

We conclude that shortly after its creation by Trajan, *legio II Traiana Fortis* was garrisoned on the Lower Danube, most probably in Moesia Superior, whose forces were depleted by the transfer of *legio III Flavia Felix* from *Singidunum* in the newly created province of Dacia [48]. *Legio II Traiana* was deployed in 113/114 in the East in order to take part to Trajan's Parthian War. However, the inscription describing the career of *L. Cossonius Gallus Vecilius Crispinus Mansuanus Marcellinus Numisius Sabinus* brings no proof on the deployment of this legion against the Parthians. The legion was assigned under the command of *Lusius Quietus* who took command of an expeditionary force sent by Trajan to quell the rebellion of Jews from Judaea in 117. The legion was the garrisoned in Judaea which became a consular province by that very year.

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- municipior(um), prae[fecto] | frum(enti) dand(i) ex S(enatus) c(onsulto), praetori, | aed(ili) curul(i), q(uaestori) Cret(ae) et C[yr(ena)], | trib(uno) leg(ionis) XXII Primigen(iae), | Illvir(o) a(uro) a(rgento) a(ere) f(lando) f(eriundo) | Thiasus lib(ertus).*
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## Appendix

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- [2] AClassUnivDebr: Acta Classica Universitatis Scientiarum Debreceniensis, Debrecen
- [3] AE: Année Épigraphique, Paris, 1888 –
- [4] AJPh: American Journal of Philology, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore-Maryland
- [5] AMN: Acta Musei Napocensis, Cluj

- [6] ANRW: Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschungen (ed. Hildegard Temporini, Wolfgang Hasse), Berlin-New York, 1970 —
- [7] BASP: Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists, Ann Arbor, Michigan
- [8] CIIP: Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaeae|Palestinae: A multi-lingual corpus of the inscriptions from Alexander to Muhammad. Vol. I, Jerusalem, Part 1: 1-704; Part 2: 705-1120, Cotton, H.M., Segni, L.D., Eck, W., Isaac, B., Kushnir-Stein, A., Misgav, H., Price, J., Roll, I., Yardeni, A. (eds.), Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG. Berlin. 2010; Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaeae|Palaestinae :Corpus Inscriptionum Iudaeae|Palestinae: A multi-lingual corpus of the inscriptions from Alexander to Muhammad. Vol. II. Caesarea and the Middle Coast 1121-2160, Ameling, W. Cotton, H.M., Eck, W., Isaac, B., Kushnir-Stein, A., Misgav, H., Price J., Yardeni A. (eds.), Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG. Berlin|Boston. 2011
- [9] CIL: Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum, I-XVII, Berlin, 1863-
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- [11] DNP: Der Neue Pauly. Enzyklopädie der Antike
- [12] Epigraphische Studien: Epigraphische Studien, Düsseldorf
- [13] GRBS : Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, Duke University, Department of Classics Durham- North Carolina
- [14] Historia: Historia. Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart
- [15] IASHP: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities Proceedings, Jerusalem
- [16] IEJ: Israel Exploration Journal, Israel Exploration Society, Jerusalem
- [17] IIt XIII: Attilio Degrassi, Inscriptiones italiae academiae italicae consociatae ediderunt. Vol. 13. Fasti et elogi. Elogia, Libreria Dello Stato, Roma, 1937
- [18] ILS: H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, Berlin, I 1892, II 1902, III 1916
- [19] JRS: Journal of Roman Studies, London
- [20] OCD<sup>3</sup>: Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (eds.), 1996. The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Oxford University Press. Oxford and New York, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition.
- [21] PBSR: Papers of the British School at Rome, London, British School at Rome
- [22] PIR<sup>2</sup>: *Prosopographia Imperii Romani saec. I. II. III*, editio altera, Berlin: I 1933 (A-B), II 1936 (C), III 1943 (D-F), IV|1 1952 (G), IV|2 1958 – E. Groag and A. Stein; IV|3 1966 (I), V|1 1970 (L), V|2 1983 (M) – Leiva Petersen; V|3 1987 (N-O) – Leiva Petersen, J. Burian, K.-P. Johne, L. Vidman, Kl. Wachtel; VI, 1998 (P) (L. Petersen, Kl. Wachtel et alii); VII|1, 1999 (Q-R) (Kl. Wachtel et alii)
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- [24] RE: Real-Encyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart
- [25] RhM: *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, Sauerländer, Frankfurt am Main
- [26] RMD: Margaret M. Roxan, *Roman Military Diplomas 1954-1977*, Londra, 1978 (no. 1-78) I; eadem, *Roman Military Diplomas 1978-1984*, Londra, 1985 (no. 79-135) II; eadem, *Roman Military Diplomas 1985-1992*, Londra 1993 (no. 135-189) III; Margaret

M. Roxan, Paul Holder, *Roman Military Diplomas*, IV, Londra, 2003 (no. 202-322);

Paul Holder, *Roman Military Diplomas*, V, Londra, 2006 (no. 323-476)

[27] TA: Tel Aviv. Journal of the Institute of Archaeology of Tel Aviv University

[28] ZPE: Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, Dr. Rudolf Habelt GmbH, Bonn

# Types of European Vessels in the Painting of the Medieval Churches in Romania

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**Abstract:** The importance of the navy in the economical life of Romanian Countries, in the defense politics of our leaders was reflected, of course, in the local spirituality. The ships painted on the walls of some churches and monasteries reveals the frequency of contacts with the navy, and maritime activities from ancient times until 14<sup>th</sup> – 15<sup>th</sup> centuries. The oldest medieval pictures, preserved till our days, were made in the period of time when the first form of state appeared in the Carpathian–Danube-Black Sea area (10<sup>th</sup> to 12<sup>th</sup> centuries). Beginning with the 13<sup>th</sup> century, the pieces were preserved very well. At first glance, these old paintings made of the Romanian painters, had brought, after the centuries, the same proof of an old and custom occupation, endowed with intelligence and sensibility. More than 30 images of ships from Moldavian monasteries pictures, like: Sucevița, Râșca, Moldovița, Voroneț, Neamț or Episcopal churches from Roman and Bălinești, painted in 15<sup>th</sup> – 16<sup>th</sup> centuries were constituted in real historical sources, allowing the reconstruction of European medieval type of ships which sailed in the Black Sea.

**Keywords:** navigation, ships, medieval pictures, churches, monasteries, the Black Sea.

## 1. Introduction

Endowed by nature with neighboring the Black Sea and the Danube Delta, Romanians have enriched their navigation knowledge inherited from the Geto-Dacians, Greeks and Romans through their own experiences and the connections they had with maritime nations that sent their ships to the pontic ports. The Venetians and Genoese people were the most popular navigators of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries<sup>1</sup>. The Pisans and the Amalfitans were also well known but in a much smaller percentage. Echoes of the Italian maritime activity in the Lower Danube and the west coast of the Black Sea are also found in the ecclesiastic mural painting in the Romanian Middle Ages, as an evidence of the contacts between the two civilizations.

The oldest evidence of the medieval painting preserved until today was made in the era in which the first states came into being in the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic area (X-XII centuries). Since the thirteenth century, the pieces that we received have had less time to be altered by the passing of time and the action of the aggressive agents. Under the eye of an expert, these old testimonies of the Romanian painters' work stand over centuries as a confirmation of an older earlier attention paid to with intelligence and sensibility<sup>2</sup>.

Before developing this issue there are some general considerations to be made on the ecclesiastic medieval painting in the Romanian area. When Romanian medieval painters adopted the painting approach of the Byzantine art, this one gained the qualities that made it be closer to a vividly art, to an art connected to the environment. The theological concept required by the Eastern Church is the one to be applied in order to suggest some ideas and actions regarding the Byzantine art, portraiture and the art of placing people in a painting<sup>4</sup>.

The Moldavian school of painting is chronologically the last among the national schools of Byzantine tradition. Its beginnings are placed in the second half of the fourteenth century intermingling with the very beginnings of the Moldavian state established in 1359. But one of the most difficult problems and at the same time important to the art of an era, as well as to defining the personality of an artist is the style. The style is a word that has two meanings: it is about the personal style of each artist and the general style of an era, of a society<sup>5</sup>.

However, it was often impossible to define the style or the author of the paintings in a church primarily because of the successive restorations many of them have been subject to and secondly, because of the teamwork. The latter meant that the various parts of a painting be worked differently, according to their importance, by one of the members of the team painters. That painter had a degree of appropriate training not only according to the importance of that specific part of the painting but also to the specific difficulties and phases of that part. Thus, people's faces and hands were

painted only by the team's heads. Sometimes the fact that the intervention of the painters was delayed (the mortar was quite wet) made that the resistance of some parts of the painting be poor in comparison with the rest of the painting<sup>6</sup>.

When talking about the Romanian art, there is to be mentioned that the mural art, the great touchstone of all the great European artists of all times, was made from the beginning up to the end of the Middle Ages. Nicolae Iorga said that the Romanian painters proved "a deep sense of mural painting decoration ... the heritage of the great Byzantine era" through their mural art. The structure of the Romanian medieval mural art is often close, in terms of layers of mortar, reinforcement series and work, to the mural art found in Athos<sup>7</sup>.

The mural art is used in the large parietal decor. The absolute advantage of the art "al fresco" (the so called fresh coating) lies in the painting's durability resistant no matter the weather. The weather doesn't attack the painting (the colors used being of mineral origin not vegetable) but the frame, namely the coating. The best proof is the outdoor mural paintings of the churches in Moldavia in the sixteenth century, for example: Humor, Moldovița, Voroneț and Sucevița<sup>8</sup>.

It often happens several years to pass between building the churches and their painting. For example, while referring to the church of Cozia, the period of time until it was painted was of 3-4 years, for Râșca-Botosani Monastery, as well as for Sucevița, it took almost a decade, as for Moldovița the painting was done after 4-5 years. Sometimes it took some decades or even a century from the time the establishment was built and its painting<sup>9</sup>. Thus it would be very difficult to date a painting according to the moment that establishment was built.

The research done on the mural painting from the XV-XVI centuries shows the fact that the painters in the reign of Ștefan cel Mare, if they were locals, they must have learned the art of mural painting at the same school the miniaturists had trained. Thus the painters knew how to paint the evangelists. Indeed, almost all the painters in Ștefan cel Mare time -

Voroneț, St. Ilie, Bălinești, Popăuți – as well as the ones in Rares time - St. Gheorghe, Suceava, Moldovița, Părhăuți, Arbure - reproduced the prototype of the Gospel in 1429<sup>10</sup>. In this context, along with many other sources of inspiration as I said, the paintings with the vessels on the walls of some churches and monasteries reveal the frequency of contact with shipping, with the maritime activity<sup>11</sup>.

More than thirty ships in the Sucevita, Râșca, Humor, Moldova, Voroneț, Neamt wall paintings or in the Episcopal churches in Roman, in the Bălinești church painted in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, were genuine historical sources, allowing the reconstruction of ship types both commercial and military ones, ships that sailed into the Black Sea and Lower Danube in the Middle Ages. In the following we will try to present some of the most important places that host such images and naval symbols as a testimony of the importance of the water and water-related occupations in the Romanian spirituality.

## 2. Bălinești

The church in the village has a mural painting on which there is the carrack from the fifteenth century, with her round bow fitted with square sails and small Latin sail on her mizzen mast<sup>12</sup>. *Father* Gabriel is the painter of the mural paintings in Balinesti, a church situated about 15 km west from Siret. *Father* Gabriel the "first well known painter in the time of Stefan cel Mare is a remarkable personality that combines solid knowledge of theology - illustrated by the complexity and clarity of the iconographic program - with full knowledge and mastery of the means of expression, which allows him defining his own style, where the Byzantine canons are not rigid schemes anymore but starting points for a vivid art marked by the great artist's personality"<sup>13</sup>. It is obvious that *Father* Gabriel traveled by sea learning the art of painting in a classic Byzantine school from the Empire, an art that he completed then by introducing a secular element. In one of the mural paintings existing here, there is a carrack from the fifteenth century, having a round bow fitted with square sails and small Latin sail on her mizzen

mast.

### 3. Roman

The ships painted in the Episcopal Church in Roman are eloquent testimony. They are quite remarkable and less important at all in comparison with the ships which appear in the iconography of the maritime powers of old times: Spain, Holland, England, and France and of course Venice and Genoa. Here, the sailors are portrayed wearing a national costume like the fighters appearing in the scenes of Posada Battle that took place a century and a half ago. The red flag imprinted with the famous bull's head, a symbol of bravery and an emblem for the voievods of the Romanian United Principalities in the eastern Carpathians<sup>14</sup>. A characteristic of all the vessels with square sails in the paintings from Bălinești, Moldova, Sucevita, Voroneț churches from northern Moldavia, is the ornament of the sail through red contour lines and sides' stitches and the reinforcements, similar to the traditional popular towels distinctive for that region<sup>15</sup>.

### 4. Moldovița

It is situated near the confluence of Ciumărua River and Moldovița River, in a meadow bordered to the north by a Carpathian ridge where the ruler Alexandru cel Bun built "Buna vestire" (the Annunciation) stone church. There is to be mentioned that a monastic settlement of Moldovița Monastery developed around that stone church<sup>16</sup>. Mentioned in 1410 as "the new monastery," the first building of the monastery that had a church built on a conch plan fell into ruin due to landslides in the first decades of the XVI century<sup>17</sup>. The Ruler Petru Rareș chose a better place - about 500 meters farther west from the laical establishment founded by Alexandru cel Bun - in 1532 he built the church that is seen today. Around it, the prince built sanctums, a princely house, defense towers and thick walls, thus Moldovița has the appearance of a small fortress<sup>18</sup>.

It was adorned, both outside and inside, with mural paintings made by an

artist trained in the Moldavian painting school that developed a lot during the reign of Petru Rareș. Kept in a very good condition (except for the northern facade), these paintings are magnificent through their monumentality, expressive power of the drawing, warm chromatic harmony and also through the clarity of the iconographic program. In general, the characters have human traits and the perspective compositions where one can notice the movement, have a sense of proportions and taste in distributing the colors<sup>19</sup>.

It seems that the one in charge of the group of painters, who painted the church of Moldovița Monastery in 1537, was Toma from Suceava. He is also the author of the mural paintings to be found at Humor (1535). This painter is one of the greatest masters of the old Romanian art. In a document from 1541, he calls himself the "Painter Toma of Suceava, nobleman of Petru Rareș, the glorious Moldavian prince". His painting is characterized by chromatic subtlety (using worm colors, red color being the one to prevail) his style distinguishing by the extensive compositional movements, fine and safe drawing, and varied typology<sup>20</sup>.

The scene we are interested in is on the wall of the narthex. The whole cycle of the "Siege of Constantinople" that materializes the idea of the Ottoman fight, familiar to the Romanian iconography, is represented by that scene<sup>21</sup>. Using the above perspective and below perspective of the citadel, the Moldavian artist managed to give a panoramic view of Constantinople, with the exterior wall and the interior one, with the hills where the house together with its triangular gables and some Moldavian style churches are<sup>22</sup>. The hustle and bustle of the citadel is suggested to detail. There are to be noticed archers and gunners, on the front tower and on the ramparts. They are shooting at their enemies that are approaching the fortress by land and sea. The sea waves are conventionally painted like sparkling circles. A carrack is painted in front of the fortress, on the waves. A vessel from the XV-XVII centuries appeared as a result of mutual influences of the characteristics of vessels launched in northern and southern Europe. She was designed primarily to transport troops and goods, but she was often used as a warship<sup>23</sup>. The length of the vessel exceeded 50 meters and her

width 15 meters. She had four masts with square sails (on the bow mast and on the central one) and triangular sails (located on the aft masts)<sup>24</sup>. The bow of this ship is taller as an adaptation to the harsh conditions of navigation in the Black Sea. On the mast of the vessel there is an observation post called also a "crow's nest" that was designed to facilitate distance observation, and to ensure, in case of a collision, sufficient height to allow throwing rocks and make redundant the protection of lateral borders against arrows fired from the top down<sup>25</sup>.

The vessel's capacity apparently reached 300 tons. She was able to have on board up to 700 people. She had heavy guns placed under the main deck, while smaller caliber guns were on two or three floors of the castles<sup>26</sup>. In many of the scenes represented here, the painter, like a writer, knew how to tell about episodes which were not only once dramatic<sup>27</sup>. Like a miniaturist the painter painted in different colors people's clothes to make them be easily spotted<sup>28</sup>. The battles, during Petru Rares' reign and even before that, against the armies of the Ottoman Empire influenced the artist in painting those scenes<sup>29</sup>.

## 5. Humor

The carrack, the same type of vessel described above, is also found at the entrance in Humor Monastery. It is about a vessel from the thirteenth century the moment the vessel is called "nef" at the end of some transformations. For example: her width gets to half of her length – thus being called "round ships" - and gets high bridges for fighters on the stern and bow. Originally merchant ships, they will turn into warships becoming narrower and longer. These modified nefs will be called galleons<sup>30</sup>. Toma from Suceava, the son of a great painter, the main painter of Humor, transposed in this painting the Romanian skillfulness in choosing and blending the colors to the finest nuances<sup>31</sup>.

## 6. Voroneț

Situated on a high hill, surrounded by the dark fir-tree forest of the

mountains, Voroneț is located in an area of rustic enclosures found on lower hills and crossed by still streams<sup>32</sup>. "Sf. Gheorghé" church, situated at 5 km far from Gura Humorului, was the church that was part of the old Voroneț built by Stefan cel Mare for Daniil Sihastrul<sup>33</sup> in 1488<sup>34</sup>. The monastery was built only in a few months from May 26<sup>th</sup> to September 14<sup>th</sup>, as the inscription carved in stone said.

The church of the old Voroneț Monastery is the last one built among the four monuments raised at Stefan cel Mare orders in the summer-autumn of the years 1487 (Milisăuți and Pătrăuți) and 1488 (Sf. Ilie and Voroneț)<sup>35</sup>. The church as it is today is due to the initiative of the scholar Grigorie Rosca, the metropolitan bishop of Moldavia that ordered mural paintings on all the walls. Having a deep blue background these paintings are characterized both by a chromatic harmony and artistic power. From an artistic point of view Voroneț is located at the crossroads of tradition and innovation<sup>36</sup>.

The hypothetical author of the paintings of this institution, in 1547, has the name mentioned in an inscription painted on the south facade of the monument: Marcu Pristavul. He seems to be the author of the medieval Romanian painting masterpiece as "Last Judgement" is considered to be. Painted on the entire western wall of the church, the painting is impressive due to its dramatic intensity and rich imagination. Everything is bathed in the Moldavian bright blue sky<sup>37</sup>. The fourth register of this scene has a first image "resurrection of the dead" continued by another one underneath, the fourth and the fifth register representing the resurrection of those drowned at seas<sup>38</sup>. Both scenes are presided over by a deity of higher proportions. The upper one, situated on a hill, is wearing a helmet and holding a tomb - a small box with a dead who has risen. This one is pictured in a shroud and has blackish complexity while the deity has an oriental look.

The deity flying over the drowned people is sitting on a huge dolphin. She looks more like a deity from the Hellenistic period, and also holds a vessel in her hand<sup>39</sup>. This ship is a galleon whose common dimensions were 28 meters long and 9 meters wide, had a mixed rig: the sails were square on

the main mast and foremast (the mast from the bow), and there was a triangular sail on the mizzenmast (the aft mast). The galleon was originally intended to be a merchant one but later she was equipped with cannons so that to counter the pirates<sup>40</sup>. There is also another ship painted on the walls of Voroneț, a carrack for crusaders. St. Nicholas is on that carrack too. What is interesting is the fact that the iconographic program of the mural paintings made by the Moldavian painters in the fifteenth century, promoted not only a degree of religious education, not only the intention to engrain the fear of sin, but also an important manifesto, political thought, to mobilize the Romanian nation against the Ottoman danger<sup>41</sup>.

## 7. One Wood Monastery

A galleon, this time of the nineteenth century, is to be found on the walls of the one wood monastery, founded by a nobleman contemporary to Matei Basarab and the cousin of Preda Brâncoveanu. The mural paintings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were made here by the painters' Ianache and Preda trained at the famous painting school in Hurez<sup>42</sup>.

## 8. Sucevița

Sucevița hermitage is situated in the area protected by Plesul, Furcoi and Crucii peaks as mentioned in the documents of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries<sup>43</sup>. Sucevița is the last great monument of the sixteenth century, and symbolizes the spirit of the age when it was raised. Built at the crossroads of centuries, it is founded by the first boyars that ascended the throne of Moldavia without voievodal tradition. Grigore Ureche mentions that it was „built by the bishop Gheorghe of Rădăuți in 1584, and the steward Ieremia and the butler Simion" sons of Ioan Movila, chief magistrate of Hotin under Petru Rares and later, the great chancellor<sup>44</sup>.

Admirably preserved, traditional and innovative at the same time, both in terms of technique and iconography and stylistic expression, the paintings of Sucevița look like a big fairy tales book<sup>45</sup>. The work was accomplished, according to the notes from an old manuscript, by two Moldavian painters

Ion and his brother Sofronie in 7104 (1595-1596) under Ieremia Movilă<sup>46</sup>. There are images of ships on the walls of the monastery, in scenes like "Great returning victims of the Sea", "Life of St. Nicholas" and an image of the altar (it is something newer than painting)<sup>47</sup>.

The vessel which is the best depicted is the one which appears in the scene of St. Nicholas' life. The painters also painted the lives of St. Ioan Nou, Gheorghe and Moise on the walls of Sucevita<sup>48</sup>. The bow is raised and slightly curved back like Roman merchant ships from the second century AD. This is an element of Roman continuity in shipbuilding, adopted later by the ottoman vessels<sup>49</sup>. The "Draper" ship, because she is the subject, was estimated to have a length of 17.6 meters, a width of 4 meters, a draft of 1.8 meters and a displacement of 60 tones<sup>50</sup>. The ship had a single mast and rig consisting of a square sail designed for sailing with the wind aft and a backrest to sail the wind abeam. The crew was made of 5 or 6 sailors and a helmsman<sup>51</sup>.

## 9. Căldărușani

A Moldavian ship, similar to the Draper appears also at Căldărușani, this time on a sixteenth century wooden icon. This monastery, built by Matei Basarab houses an important collection of ancient art works: manuscripts, crosier, candles, monstrances, icons<sup>52</sup>.

## 10. Polovragi

Valuable development of monastic architecture located in front of Cheile Oltețului, in Polovragi village (Gorj County), the church was founded by the late fifteenth century. Its mural painting is a masterpiece of Brancovanian art, and it is the work of painters Constantinos, Andrei, Gheorghe, Istrate and Hranite, all trained at Hurez School<sup>53</sup>. There is a Greek transport ship at Athos Mount on the walls of the church in Polovragi, a trekandiri ship type and the infirmary there are painted two open deck galleys of XVIII century. The Gallery has a single row of large, heavy frames (about 18 meters long), each frame being handled by 5 or 6

people. They have also two or three masts with Latin sails (triangular ones), for navigation, sails which were more maneuverable, its main feature being its great mobility galley in battle<sup>54</sup>.

## 11. Conclusions

Images of vessels are to be found in the ecclesiastic mural painting of every religious establishment. For example, there are to be found, a fishing boat with St. Peter on board and a three masts transport ship from the XVIII century<sup>55</sup>, at Secu, in the Monastery's infirmary. Founded by Petru Rares, Râșca Monastery preserves the image of a coaster having a square sail from the seventeenth century. At Snagov there is to be found the navigation symbol within the religious painting "Great returning victims of the Sea"<sup>56</sup>, the same symbol reappearing two centuries later (eighteenth century), in the same scene on the walls of the Gura Motrului Monastery.

The Navy had an eventful past history, complex and interesting in its specificity. There have always been sailors, adventurous and brave people that were skillful in handling ships, having experienced the harsh forces of nature. Such sailors have been existed since the earliest times both in the Romanian waters and in the border ones. Important factors in the trade development on water in peacetime, sailors made in times of real distress, boat flotillas and caravels with which rulers such as Mircea cel Batran, Vlad Tepes, Stefan cel Mare, Ioan Voda, Mihai Viteazul, Constantin Brâncoveanu defended their ancestral land.

The naval symbols that are found on the walls of over 30 Romanian churches stand as proof that there were contacts between the Romanian inhabitants and those seafarers, the Italians, who were the real maritime power of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

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# “Men of Frontiers”: From Marcu Beza – Diplomat and Promoter of the Black Sea Region to the “Founding Fathers of Europe”

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**Abstract:** Robert Schuman, born and brought up in Luxembourg, ascribed a major significance to his identity as a „man of frontiers”. Ultimately, so-called „founding fathers of Europe”, except Jean Monnet (pure French), were men from linguistic and political Europe’s frontiers (Konrad Adenauer born in Rhineland; Alcide De Gasperi in Pieve Tesino, northern Italy, Paul Henri Spaak, in bilingual Schaerbeek, Belgium). Europe’s diversity impulse to unite. Whith 141 years ago, near Salonika, was born Marcu Beza, writer and literary critic, historian and diplomat of Aromanian origin. As a diplomat (between 1921-1929, as secretary of the Romanian embassy in London, or between 1931-1939, as consul general of Romania to Jerusalem) or as a writer, Beza are portrayed archetypal Balkans images. It’s a kind of obsessive, but nostalgic return to a distinct humanity in the amalgam of ethnicities in the Balkans.

**Keywords:** frontiers, men of frontiers, founding fathers of Europe, Marcu Beza.

All through his life, Robert Schuman (1886-1963) considered himself a Lorrainer. And Marcu Beza (1882-1949) – a Balkanic one. Like the Franco-German border, the Black Sea was once a bridge and a border, a buffer zone and a transit between Europe and Asia at the junction of the former powers and empires.

## Two Characters – Two *Men of Frontiers*

### Robert Schuman

Contemplative and discreet, Robert Schuman remained, even for many of his contemporaries, always behind the spotlight. An ... inspired puppeteer, always surrounded by successful people, become its spectacular spokesmen.

One of his close collaborators, Henry Beyer, who was chief of staff until the day before death, surprised, perhaps, his major secret: „not confessed, entirely, to anyone, anytime“<sup>1</sup>. He knew how to close his collaborators and friends, but there is always a line that no one could ever overcome.

Through mother, Eugénie, born Duren (1864-1911), one of Bettemburg<sup>2</sup> (Luxembourg), a smooth and cultivated woman<sup>3</sup>, has been identified to this *little* european people. Through father, Jean Pierre Schuman (1837-1900), born into a farmer family, came to french-german space, but, equally, to french-luxembourg border (his father, french citizen, came from the village of Evrange in Lorraine on the French border with Luxembourg, but after the Alsace-Lorraine was annexed by the German Empire in 1871, became a german citizen). Jean-Baptiste Nicolas Robert Schuman was born on 29<sup>th</sup> June 1886<sup>4</sup> in Clausen<sup>5</sup>, a suburb of Luxembourg. Even if his mother tongue was Luxembourgish, at school, the little Schuman learned French<sup>6</sup> (which is mandatory in Luxembourg<sup>7</sup>) and he was also fluent in German. The

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<sup>1</sup> Henry Beyer, Robert Schuman, L'Europe par la réconciliation franco-allemande, Lausanne, 1986, p. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Near Evrange.

<sup>3</sup> Daughter of a customs official from the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

<sup>4</sup> Exactly, 29<sup>th</sup> June is the celebration of Ss Paul and Peter and Robert Schuman associated, through his entire life, this high patronage with his succes.

<sup>5</sup> Meaning "enclosure".

<sup>6</sup> Schuman and his mother corresponded with each other in French.

<sup>7</sup> German and French were both official languages in Luxembourg.

young Robert went to primary school and secondary school in Luxembourg<sup>8</sup>. And then, it was formed under the German educational system because he inherited German citizenship from his father<sup>9</sup>. He received his law degree after studying at the universities of Bonn (1904), Munich (1904-1905), Berlin (1905-1906), and Strasbourg (1906-1908). He set up practice as a lawyer<sup>10</sup> in Metz, in June 1912<sup>11</sup>. Two years later, war broke out. On health grounds, Robert Schuman was excused from military service. In November 1918, Alsace-Lorraine returned to France. One year later, Robert renounced German citizenship in favor of French. He was elected to the Chambre des députés (Chamber of Deputies), representing the département of Moselle (1919-1928) and the circonscription of Thionville-Est (1928-1940)<sup>12</sup>.

The Second World War changed his life radically. He joined the Cabinet of Paul Reynaud as under-secretary for refugees (1940), because of his expertise on Germany. Same year, he was arrested by the German secret police (14 Sep 1940), for acts of resistance and protest against Nazi methods, and was imprisoned in Metz (1940-1941) and then sent to Neustadt an der Weinstrasse, Germany (1941). In 1942, Schuman escaped

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<sup>8</sup> At Atheneum, between 1896-1903, a former Jesuit college. In 1900, unfortunately, his father died (for biographical facts, see Raymond Poidevin, *Robert Schuman: homme d'Etat, 1886-1963*, Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1986.

<sup>9</sup> To enter a German university, he had to pass the Abitur exam (1904) in the Kaiserliche Gymnasium in Metz, German Reich.

<sup>10</sup> Between 1908-1910, he worked as legal intern in Metz and in 1910 he earned doctor's degree.

<sup>11</sup> In 1911, his mother died, event that has profoundly Robert.

<sup>12</sup> In this period, he served as secretary (1920-1927, 1936-1940), vice-president (1927-1929) and president (1929-1936) of the Consultative Council of Alsace-Lorraine in Strasbourg; member of the parliamentary finance committee (1929-1939); general councilor the Cattenom region (from 1936). As a deputat for the Alsace-Lorraine region Robert Schuman followed all events connectet to Central European situation. See, for ex., Gergely Fejerdy, „Les visites de Robert Schuman dans le bassin du Danube”, in Sylvain Schirman, editor, *Robert Schuman et les Pères de l'Europe: culture politique et années de formation*, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2008, p. 69-86. In mid 1930 years, he considered that „situation in central Europe could become dangerous for the entire evolution of Europe” (p.77).

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and was hiding in a monastery, in France, moment when he joined the Popular Republican Movement (MRP).

After the war, the political succes has not left him. He was elected a member of the first (1945-1946) and second (1946) Assemblée nationale constituante (Constituent National Assembly), representing Moselle. Also, he served as minister of finance (24 June 1946 - 16 December 1946, 22 January 1947 - 24 November 1947) in the governments of Georges Bidault and Paul Ramadier. Then, he formed his first government of Troisième Force (represented by gaullists, socialists, and radicals) and took the office of President of the Council of Ministers (24 November 1947 - 24 July 1948)<sup>13</sup>. After the fall of his Cabinet, he was appointed minister for foreign affairs (26 July 1948 - 8 January 1953) in the Cabinet of André Marie and then he taking up the office of President of the Council of Ministers (2-11 September 1948) and continuing as minister for foreign affairs, but his government failed to recieve approval of the Assembly (7 Septyember 1948), collecting 289 votes out of 293 required. Robert Schuman joined then the Cabinet of Henri Queuille as minister for foreign affairs and held this office in the next few cabinets.

Since the difficult years after the war, the dream of an strong and peaceful Europe did not leave. His words of 1949 demonstrates both the power of fate, and the desire to see his dream fulfilled: „We are carrying out a great experiment, the fulfillment of the same recurrent dream that for ten centuries has revisited the peoples of Europe: creating between them an organization putting an end to war and guaranteeing an eternal peace. The Roman church of the Middle Ages failed finally in its attempts that were inspired by humane and human preoccupations. Another idea, that of a world empire constituted under the auspices of German emperors was less disinterested; it already relied on the unacceptable pretensions of a «Führertum<sup>14</sup>» whose «charms» we have all experienced. Audacious minds, such as Dante, Erasmus, Abbé de St-Pierre, Rousseau, Kant and Proudhon,

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<sup>13</sup> A diffical period of revolutionary strikes and attempted insurrection.

<sup>14</sup> Meaning "domination by dictatorship".

had created in the abstract the framework for systems that were both ingenious and generous. The title of one of these systems became the synonym of all that is impractical: Utopia, itself a work of genius, written by Thomas More, the Chancellor of Henry VIII, King of England... The European spirit signifies being conscious of belonging to a cultural family and to have a willingness to serve that community in the spirit of total mutuality, without any hidden motives of hegemony or the selfish exploitation of others. The 19<sup>th</sup> century saw feudal ideas being opposed and, with the rise of a national spirit, nationalities asserting themselves. Our century, that has witnessed the catastrophes resulting in the unending clash of nationalities and nationalisms, must attempt and succeed in reconciling nations in a supranational association. This would safeguard the diversities and aspirations of each nation while coordinating them in the same manner as the regions are coordinated within the unity of the nation (...) This new policy... constitutes probably the supreme attempt to save our Continent and preserve the world from suicide”<sup>15</sup>.

Only together can we succeed. Only a strong, united Europe may be the solution for the future. A regional cooperation – the dream of a men of frontiers...

Schuman ascribed particular importance to his identity of a „man of the frontiers”, and attributed much of his enthusiasm and that of Adenauer and de Gasper for European Integration to their similar backgrounds<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Strasbourg, Festival Hall, 16 May 1949. This speech follows the signing of the Statutes of the Council of Europe on 5 May 1949 at St James's Palace, London, where Schuman also told Europe's foreign ministers that a supranational union should be the foundation for the future.

<sup>16</sup> See the interview with the magazine *Realites*, no. 96, ian. 1954 or “Les dures leçons de l'histoire ont appris à l'homme de la frontière que je suis à se méfier des improvisations hâtives, des projets trop ambitieux, mais elles m'ont appris également que lorsqu'un jugement objectif, mûrement réfléchi, basé sur la réalité des faits et l'intérêt supérieur des hommes, nous conduit à des initiatives nouvelles, voire révolutionnaires, il importe de nous y tenir fermement et de persévérer.” Été 1963, peu avant sa mort le 4 septembre, in *Pour l'Europe*, APUD <http://>

## Marcu Beza

„Constantly upon the road, among mountain tops and plains, always in fear of the foreigners among whom they pass, their life manifests a great spiritual concentration”, Simion Mehedinți<sup>17</sup>. Inspired definition of personality Balkan scholar and diplomat Marcu Beza.

Was born on 30<sup>th</sup> June 1882, at Vlaho-Clisura<sup>18</sup>, Macedonia. Begin their studies in Greece, in Bitola, then hemoved to Bucharest. In Romania, he attended the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy in Bucharest, where he had Titu Maiorescu and Nicolae Iorga teachers, Iorga who had praised his work of the essayist and publicist – „a later junismist”.

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www.touteurope.eu/?id=2189), in Alan Fimister, *Robert Schuman: The Neo-Scholastic Humanism and the Reunification of Europe*, Peter Land, 2008, p. 141.

<sup>17</sup> Simion Mehedinți, „Preface”, in Roumanian Stories. Translated from the original roumanian by Lucy Byng, London, John Lane, 1920, p. V.

<sup>18</sup> At part of Macedonian area, with main cities, like: Bitolia (Monastir), Magarova, Tárnova, Nijopole, Gopes, Moloviste, Crusova, Ohrida, Iancovat, Upper Beala, Calive-Istoc, Vlaho-Clisura, Neveasta, Blata, Resna, Belcamen, Pisodei, Negovani, Hrupistea, Gramostea, Moscopole, Pleasa, Calive-Jarcan, Lunca, Birlslau, Osani, Cerna-Reca, Cupa, Huma, Veria, Kokinoplo, Ramna, Turai, Porina, Piscupie, Murmulistea s.a. (see Adina Berciu-Draghicescu, Maria Petre, *Introducere, Scolii si biserici românești din Peninsula Balcanica. Documente (1864-1948)*, vol. I, Bucuresti, Editura Universitatii din Bucuresti, 2004, 666 p.) For an interesting analyse of this area, we recomand Gheorghe Zbucnea, *O istorie a romanilor din Peninsula Balcanica. Secolele XVIII-XX*, Editura Biblioteca Bucurestilor, Bucuresti, 1999, p. 81.

Community picture appears in the writings of other contemporary: “Pour arriver à Vlaho Cleisoura: Cette ville habitée par cinq cent familles de Valaques Dassarets, la plupart, réfugiés de Moschopolis, est surnommées par les Grecs, Cosmopolis. Ses habitants croient que la colonie par laquelle elle fut fondée, arriva dans les hauteurs du mont Sarakina, vers la XVe siècle, temps où les Turcs qui dessolaient la Macédoine obligèrent les chrétiens à se retirer dans les montagnes les plus inaccessibles pour éviter l’esclavage ou la mort.” (François Pouqueville, *Voyage de la Grèce*, Volume 3, 1826).

A community which, according Ottoman census of 1870, has 6,400 people, the second largest city in the region Katori.

Today, the community is named Klisoura, in Kastoria regional unit, West Macedonia, Greece.

In short period, he obtained a scholarship in London, where he promoted Romanian culture and literature. Since 1909, has been interpreted in Romanian Legation in London, until 1914, studied in parallel letters to London and Oxford. In London, he was a reader in Romanian at King's College. In 1920, Marcu Beza edited the first Romanian grammar in English and Ion Creanga's *Memories from My Childhood*, translated by Lucy Byng. Also, he was the first Romanian in PEN Club<sup>19</sup>.

In London, he combined his literary career with the diplomatic one. Between 1921-1929 he was secretary of the Romanian embassy. The mission was the same: promote Romanian spirituality, specificity of the peoples of the Danube basin.

In 1925, Beza was elected corresponding member of the Romanian Academy.

His studies of English literature materialized in two syntheses, *The English Romanticism* and *The Contemporary English Romanticism*. At the same

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<sup>19</sup> „Cel dintai scriitor roman care a aflat de PEN-Club si a facut parte din el a fost Marcu Beza... Cred ca prin 1923, la indemnul lui, putusera sa apara la Stratford-pe-Avon, la o adunare anuala a Societatii in preajma lui Shakespeare, d-nii M. Antoniadu si I. Al. Bratescu-Voinesti. Era ca un fel de intaie luare de legatura, dupa care trebuia sa urmeze in tara organizarea. Prin noiembrie acelas an, Marcu Beza se gasea in Bucuresti si, intre altele, alergand din om in om, izbutea sa injghebeze acea intaie sedinta a PEN-Clubului Roman, careia pana astazi n-a mai putut sa-i stea o a doua, la fel de mareata, alaturi.“ (“The first writer who found the PEN Club and was part of it was Marcu Beza ... I think around 1923, at his instigation, had been able to appear at Stratford-on-Avon, at an annual meeting of the Society around him Shakespeare, together with M. Antoniadu and M. I. Al. Bratescu-Voinesti. It was like a kind of first making the connection, then you have to follow the country organization. By November of the same year, Marcu Beza was found in Bucharest and, among others, running from man to man, managed to scrape together the first meeting of the PEN Club Romania, which until today I never could stand a second, equally great, with”, Emanoil Bucuta, *Boabe de grau*, septembrie-octombrie 1934).

time, he extended his investigations on Romanian history and civilization in Britain, publishing *English Travelers on Romanians* (1580-1825)<sup>20</sup>.

„A teacher of Romanian is first listed in the Calendar of The School of Slavonic and East European Studies of 1919-1920 – he was Marcu Beza, a member of the Romanian legation. In 1926-1927, he is bracketed with Henry Wickham Steed<sup>21</sup> under the title «Lecturer in Roumanian» (...)

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<sup>20</sup> Marcu Beza marked the beginning of a new phase of literary Anglo-Romanian relations, continued successfully by Dragoș Protopopescu. About Rumanian studies in Great Britain, see J.W.Entwistle, „Rumanian studies”, in Jstor, Vol. 3, 30 June 1932, pp. 100-102.

„Another significant figure among the promoters of the Romanian literature and culture at the beginning of the 20th century is Marcu Beza. Beza was an essayist, a literary critic, a folklorist, a poet, a prose writer and a translator, as well as one of the first Romanian specialists in British culture and civilization (together with Dragoș Protopopescu and Iancu Botez). His role was outstanding in the propagation of Romanian cultural values across the Channel (...)Continuing the work started by Iorga in 1917, Beza’s writings mention the establishment of English-Romanian and Romanian-English associations, cases of British intellectuals interested in the situation in Romania at the time, pointing at the same time at the presence of Romanian books in private British libraries. A true ambassador of our culture in Great Britain, Beza also wrote a study in Romanian folklore, *Paganism in Romanian Folklore (Elemente păgâne în folclorul românesc)*, written directly in English in 1928 and published in London, and a bilingual edition of proverbs, *The Romanian Proverbs (Proverbe românești)*, in 1921” (Oana Surugiu, “Translating and Promoting Romanian Literature In the Interwar and WW2 Periods”, <http://fsu.valahia.ro/user/image/9.-oana-surugiu.pdf>). For more interesting perspective, see also the recent Ernest H. Latham Jr, *Timeless and transitory. 20th Century Relations Between Romania and the English-Speaking World*, Editura Vremea, București, 2012.

<sup>21</sup> Henry Wickham Steed (1871-1956), British journalist and historian; editor of The Times from 1919 until 1922. In 1923, Steed became editor of Review of Reviews (1923–1930).

When SSEES<sup>22</sup> was given its independence from King's College, in 1932<sup>23</sup>, Beza, now Roumanian Consul-General in Jerusalem, was listed as a corresponding member" (Dennis Deletant<sup>24</sup>).

After leaving London, diplomatic service took him all over the world. But, the mission remains the same: promote Romanian spirituality, specificity of the peoples of the Danube basin.

Between 1931-1939, Marcu Beza was consul general of Romania to Jerusalem. In that period he took long trips to south-east Europe, north-east Africa and Asia Minor. Occasions which raised numerous documents, photographs, and films<sup>25</sup>. But he dedicated time for writing: *Lands of many religions: Palestine, Syria, Cyprus and Mount Sinai* (London, 1934), *Romanian Traces in the Near East* (Bucharest, 1935).

During the Second World War, as a cultural adviser to the Romanian Legation, was steel in London, and continued to publish papers on history

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<sup>22</sup> In 1915, The School of Slavonic and East European Studies was set up in King's College on the initiative of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and Robert Seton-Watson and with the support of the British Government. Masaryk, who later became President of Czechoslovakia, inaugurated the School on 19 October 1915, with a Public Lecture on «The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis». Edvard Benes's opinion, ten years later, it remains, we believe, valid too for Romanians: "The meeting gave us the opportunity to bring our political and national aims and desires before the political and learned world of Great Britain; and it was a political success, from our point of view, precisely because of the interest shown in British political and intellectual circles" (Edward Benes, "The problem of the small nations after the world war", in *The Slavonic Review*, Vol. 4, No. 11 (Dec., 1925), pp. 257-277, p. 257).

<sup>23</sup> In 1932 the School became a self governing department of the University of London.

<sup>24</sup> Dennis Deletant, "Romanian Studies in the UK", A presentation given by Dennis Deletant, Professor of Romanian Studies at SSEES/UCL, at The British Library on 12 October 2005, <http://www.ssees.ucl.ac.uk/RomanianStudiesUK.pdf>.

<sup>25</sup> The most known is *Calatorie la locurile sfinte* (Travel to the holy places, 1934), recently presented at International Film Festival of Art, Ecology and Tourism "Document.Art", 27 – 29 September 2012. see also Eroulla Demetriou, "British and american travel accounts of pilgrimage to Cyprus during the british occupation, at <http://openjournals.library.usyd.edu.au/index.php/MGST/article/download/5979/6545>.

and culture: *Origin of the Roumanians*, Worchester, London, 1941; *The Roumanian Church*, London, 1943.

He died at 30<sup>th</sup> May 1949, in Bucharest, in his house at 17<sup>th</sup> Berzei Street, before which dominates one of the oldest plane trees in town.

The journey spirit marked his entire life; overcoming borders, searching for similarities. Always on the road. Does an extension of an old, ancestral macedo-romanian habit? Leave Ioan Nenitescu tell the story: „In the mid and late October, macedo-romanians, whether traders or industrialists, leave their families and go through the boroughs and cities, where they trades or jobs over the years and in the early or mid-June accustomed to return to their homes, their families stay all summer, and fall, after supplying their home and family for refreshments, clothing and fuel, leaving again through foreign”<sup>26</sup>.

A man of Balkans<sup>27</sup>, of frontiers, fighting against them, against any kinds of boundaries. Against both political and psychological borders. „La frontière n’est pas un fait spatial avec des conséquences sociologiques, mais un fait sociologique qui prend une forme spatiale” (George Simmel<sup>28</sup>). “What’s border” – asked Nicolae Iorga – “if not an obstacle goods and people? If peace treaties were also removed obstacles from the start, for those of us who live in Central, life would be much less bitter. So I was always of the opinion that border revision, in other words, moving from place to place of evil represented by them, but destroying borders by gradual and

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<sup>26</sup> Ioan Nenitescu, *De la românii din Turcia europeană: studiu etnic și statistic asupra armânilor*, Institutul de Arte Grafice Carol Göbl, București, 1895, p. 11. See also Tache Papahagi, *Aromânii, grai, folclor, etnografie. Cu o introducere istorică*, București, 1932 or most recent dictionary Emil Țârcomnicu, *Obiceiuri și credințe macedoromâne*, Editura Biblioteca Bucureștilor, București, 2009.

<sup>27</sup> The Balkans: “the land between the linguistic frontier of the German- and Italian-speaking peoples on the west and the political boundaries of the former Soviet Union on the East” (Paul Robert Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe*, 1993).

<sup>28</sup> George Simmel, *Sociologie: études sur le forme de socialisation*, Paris, Presse Universitaire de France, 1999, p. 607

progressive spiritualization what they are, will bring happiness to the nation entitled”<sup>29</sup>.

Along with other scholars Romanian - Nicolae Iorga, Grigore Nandriș (1895-1968), Teodor Bodogae (1911-1994) - Beza sought relations with the Romanian culture and especially southern Balkan Peninsula with Mount Athos, highlighting the strong influence of the monasteries of the Holy Mountain those in the eastern Mediterranean.

Ever since, the now distant nineteenth century, one of the concerns of people of culture in the Romanian space was to identify the external sources, in particular, historical documents. An project of a systematic detections binds on parents of national historiography<sup>30</sup>. „Noi ne vom sili să adunăm câte vom putea, însă mijloacele noastre nu ne iartă a întreprinde călătorii prea îndepărtate ca să adunăm toate câte se vor găsi” („We will force them, far as we can gather, but we forgive our means to undertake travel too far to gather all that will be found”, Nicolae Bălcescu<sup>31</sup>). And then, with an increasingly visible connection to European realities and, especially, with the establishment of an effective Romanian historiography school, travel impediment was somewhat outdated. Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi to Vienna, Constantin Esarcu to Venice, Ioan Bianu to Krakow and Lvov,

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<sup>29</sup> Nicolae Titulescu, speech, 3th June 1937, apud Gheorghe Buzatu eds., *Discursuri și dezbateri parlamentare (1864-2004)*, Editura Mica Valahie, București, 2011, p.626.

<sup>30</sup> Virgil Cândea, *Mărturii românești peste hotare: creații românești și izvoare despre români în colecții din străinătate*, Biblioteca Bucureștilor, București, 2010.

<sup>31</sup> Nicolae Bălcescu, „Cuvânt preliminaru despre izvoarele istoriei românilor”, în *Opere*, vol. I, editori G. Zane, Elena G. Zane, București, 1974, p. 101.

Alexandru Ciorănescu in Spain or Marcu Beza to London, Athos, Athens, Istanbul, Jerusalem, Mount Sinai<sup>32</sup> or Cyprus<sup>33</sup>.

The scientific travel's spirit, overcoming the borders, birth of European cultural projects, birth of a new historiography, national or an European one. Drawing for a new Romanian state<sup>34</sup>. From the search of national identity, from description of his own people and history draw the new Europe<sup>35</sup>.

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<sup>32</sup> Marcu Beza, *Urme românești în Răsăritul ortodox*, București, 1935. One interesting discovery is the presence of Constantin Brancoveanu's portrait at St. Catherine's Monastery on Mount Sinai.

<sup>33</sup> Again, as in many other areas, Nicolae Iorga remained emblematic of research in many European cities, among which the most representative investigations were related to Budapest, Dresden, Vienna, Berlin, Nurnberg, Gdansk, Erfurt or Stockholm.

<sup>34</sup> "In less than a hundred years, Romania has been transformed almost beyond recognition. (...) Everything has been changed. The race for the new civilisation has been almost breathless. The time has not yet come for calm reflections, or for a proper consideration of the spirits that were moving, and of the forces that were driving the Nation in that rapid change", M. Gaster, "Preface", in Marcu Beza, *Papers on the rumanien people and literature*, London, McBride, 1920, pp. V-VI.

<sup>35</sup> "M. Beza, by his work has well deserved of the Romanian nation, of which he gives such a faithful picture, and of the English readers who owe him a deep debt of gratitude for his illuminating and inspiring book", M. Gasper, op. cit.

# Aspects from the Internal and Foreign Policy of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Commented in the Swedish Diplomatic Reports (1862–1864)

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For almost four decades, between 1812 and 1850, Sweden's foreign policy was conducted „in the shadow of the Holy Alliance, dominated by the Austrian Chancellor Metternich and by the Russia's Tsars”, despite the severe criticism of the Swedish liberals<sup>1</sup>. The personal sympathies of King Oscar I (1844-1859), the son and heir of King Carl XIV Jan, former marshal of the Emperor Napoleon I, on his name Jean Baptiste Jules Bernadotte, Prince of Pontecorvo, were not consistent with that direction of the foreign policy. He, as his closest collaborators, were searching means to pull Sweden from the „tutelage” of the „conservatory line adopted by his father in 1812”<sup>2</sup>, with the outburst of the Crimean war, in 1853, he had the opportunity to do so. As a consequence, in December 1853, Sweden signed, together with Denmark, a neutrality Declaration regarding the military conflict started in Eastern Europe, but in terms which were favorable to the European Powers, offering to the British navy the Swedish ports in the Baltic sea, that were very useful against the Russian military bases and especially against St. Petersburg. To the great disappointment of Sweden, the allies decided to wage the war in the Black sea, aiming to conquer Sevastopol. A decision that made Oscar I to state that „*instead of grabbing the giant by his throat*” (Russia – n.n.), meaning the attack St. Petersburg, “*they were happy to crush his toe*” (s. n.)<sup>3</sup>. Despite this, Oscar I tried, through

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<sup>1</sup> Jörgen Weibul, *La Suède. Un aprçu historique*. Traduction Hubert X. L. Drabs, Institutul Suedez, 1993, f. l., p. 98.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, p.99.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 101.

a sustained propaganda in the French and British press, to determine them to change their strategy. The only result of his efforts was materialized in the Treaty, signed with the Western Powers, in November 1855, according to which France and Great Britain offered support to Sweden in the case of a Russian attack<sup>4</sup>. The treaty, which „*meant the definitive rupture with Russia and with the pro-Russian line of the Swedish foreign policy*” (s. n.)<sup>5</sup>, opened for Sweden the perspective of entering the anti-Russian war. This perspective did not materialize because the Crimean war ended a few months after the conclusion of that Treaty. The Peace Treaty of Paris, from March 30<sup>th</sup> 1856, scattered, at the same time, forever, the Swedish hopes of regaining Finland from Russia or, at least, of the Åland islands. All that Sweden could obtain was to force Russia, through the Convention of Åland, to demilitarize the islands and to promise that it would not build another fortress there<sup>6</sup>. Even if the Treaty of November 1855 did not bring to Sweden the results it expected, the reconstruction of its position as a Baltic Power, it had, however, a particular importance in the further evolution of the foreign policy of the United Kingdom of Sweden-Norway, because it built „*the foundation of its neutrality policy which remained in place until the beginning of the twentieth century*” (s. n.)<sup>7</sup>.

So, the interest the Swedish diplomacy showed to the political events which were taking place in the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, during the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, shows, once more, the large international echo and the direct and indirect implications over the interests of states with secondary weight in the European political system and even with remote geographic position in the Eastern Europe.

In the case of the Swedish diplomacy, the attention paid especially to the political processes which were taking place in the Romanian space was

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<sup>4</sup> Alf Åberg, *A concise History of Sweden*, Translated by Gordon Elliot, M. A. (St Snd.), Natur och Kultur, Stockholm, 1994, p. 84-85.

<sup>5</sup> Jörgen Weibul, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>7</sup> Alf Åberg, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

justified by the ascending evolution of the juridical status of the United Principalities, not only in the Ottoman political system but also in the European one, all this amid a aggravation of the Eastern crisis after the end of the Crimean war, in 1856. Or, it is well known that this evolution was determined by the domestic and the foreign policy promoted by Alexandru Ioan Cuza, and the fact that this phenomenon will produce a new political map of Eastern Europe. From this perspective, we can suppose that the ruling circles from Stockholm considered necessary to know the ways in which the possible changes could have on the juridical status of the Danube, in order to promote the commercial interests of Sweden in the Black sea area. We have in mind, among others, the implication of the United Principalities in the regulation of the juridical status of the Danube and also in the return, according to the decisions of the Peace Congress of Paris, in March 30<sup>th</sup> 1856, of the Sothern Bessarabia from Russian control, which meant that the United Principalities now controlled the lower course of the river<sup>8</sup>. This interest, which was already mentioned, will be analyzed in the pages of this text.

So, the leaders of the Swedish foreign policy had to be informed, equally, on the coordinates of the domestic policy of Alexandru Ioan Cuza and on the objectives of the Prince regarding the relations with the Porte and about the ways in which he wanted to conduct them. In this context, equally important was the way in which the Porte and the Guarantor Powers perceived this policy.

According to information provided by the Swedish diplomats accredited in Istanbul, at the beginning of 1862, the domestic policy was under the influence of the efforts made by Cuza for the reformation of the state and

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<sup>8</sup> Veniamin Ciobanu, *Problema orientală (1856-1923)*, Editura Junimea, Iași, 2009, p. 64; for details see also Ștefan Stanciu, *Comisia europeană a Dunării și românii în prima sa perioadă de activitate (1850-1861)*, in „Studii și Materiale de Istorie Modernă”, Vol. XV, Editura Academiei, București, 2002, p. 75 and following; Mirela-Ana Voicu, *Congresul de la Paris și problema Dunării*, in vol. *Congresul de pace de la Paris (1856). Prefaceri europene, implicații românești*, Edited by Dumitru Ivănescu și Dumitru Vitcu, Editura Junimea, Iași, 2006, p. 158 and following.

the diminishing, if not the annihilation of the opposition, to his domestic policy or to the means through which he fulfilled his objectives. One of these was the promulgation of the Press law, which took effect on April 13<sup>th</sup>/25<sup>th</sup> 1862 and provoked, according to the information which Oscar Magnus Fredrik Björnstierna, the Chargé d'Affairs of Sweden-Norway to the Porte, started a virulent debate between the Moldavian and the Wallachian members of the Parliament, whose works were opening, at Bucharest, on January 24<sup>th</sup>/5<sup>th</sup> February 1862, preceded by the formation of the first unitary government led by Barbu Catargiu. Nevertheless, even if the law was, as the Swedish diplomat thought, "restrictive", it was voted. So, as he was informed, „*tous les journaux communicant cette nouvelle étaient encadrés de noir*” (s. n.)<sup>9</sup>. In return, the Swedish diplomat recoded, with the same occasion, also the accomplishment of „*un ouvrage de grande utilité*” (s. n.) for the United Principalities, that of the concession to a British company, which he did not name, to build a railroad between Iași and Galați, which was to be put into operation until the end of 1865<sup>10</sup>.

However, not even until the end of 1862, the political crisis in the United Principalities was not solved, continuing to manifest itself in a form that raised concerns, a fact that drew the attention of Oscar Magnus Fredrik Björstierna. According to the information sent by him to Count Christoffer Rutger Ludvig Manderström, Minister of State and Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway, on November 21<sup>st</sup> 1862, „*l'enthousiasme pour l'union paraît s'être singulièrement refroidi dans cette-ci, surtout en Moldavie où le mécontentement se prononce ouvertement*”, and the Parliament was expected to be dissolved (s. n.)<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> See the report of Oscar Magnus Fredrik Björnstierna, addressed to Count Cristoffer Rutger Ludvig Manderström, Minister of State and of Foreign Affairs of Sweden-Norway, on May 8<sup>th</sup> 1862, in Sveriges Riksarkivet, Kabinettet/UD huvudarkivet, E2D, 259, Konstantinopol, 1862-1864; the documents in this fund have no page number.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>11</sup> His report from November 21<sup>st</sup> 1862, in Sveriges Riksarkivet, Kanbinettet/UD Huvudarkivet, E2D, 259, Konstantinopol, 1862-1854.

At the middle of 1863, Oluf Stenersen, Chargé d’Affairs *ad interim*, signaled a series of events that predicted the establishment of Cuza’s authoritarian political regime. According to the information he had, the political situation in the United Principalities was degrading more and more. The efforts of the Prince to form a new government (after the assassination of the Prime Minister, Barbu Catargiu, on June 8<sup>th</sup>/20<sup>th</sup> 1862 – n. n.) failed because „*la moitié des anciens Ministres ont donné leur démission sans que le Prince puisse trouver à les remplacer*” (s. n.)<sup>12</sup>. As it is well known, finally Cuza managed to form a new Cabinet, June 24<sup>th</sup>/July 6<sup>th</sup> 1863, the so-called government of “the middle way”, under the presidency of the liberal-moderate Nicolae Kretulescu. However, the Swedish diplomat reported, on July 16<sup>th</sup> 1863, „*au milieu de la fermentation générale qui règne dans tout le pays le gouvernement n’ose pas convoquer les chambers quoiqu’il ait grandement besoin de leur concours pour être délivré de la gêne extrême où se trouvent les finances*” (s. n.)<sup>13</sup>. In that context, he thought that „*se manifestent de plus en plus les tendances despotiques du Prince qui, en qualité de commandant général de l’armée, agit en dictateur de fait, quoiqu’il n’ose pas braver les risques d’un coup d’état ouvert*” (s. n.)<sup>14</sup>. As a result, before he could take those risks, it seems that he „*a chargé son agent ici (Istanbul – n. n.), M. Negri, de la tâche de convaincre la Porte de la nécessité urgente d’une dictature provisoire*” (s. n.)<sup>15</sup>.

The aggravation of the financial crisis determined the Prince to convoke the Chambers, in order to solve this issue, because, thought the Swedish diplomat, „*ne trouve plus plaisant de régner sans un budget régulièrement voté*” (s. n.)<sup>16</sup>. For this, Cuza needed to ensure the majority of the votes of the representatives and formed, in advance, a new government with

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<sup>12</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen to Count Mandeström, from July 16<sup>th</sup> 1863, in *ibidem*.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>16</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen to Count Mandeström, from November 15<sup>th</sup> 1863

members of a fraction of the opposition, led by Mihail Kogălniceanu, after the resignation, on October 11<sup>th</sup>/23<sup>th</sup> 1863, of the government led by Nicolae Krețulescu. Although Oluf Stenersen did not name anyone, he considered that „il parait en effet que cette dernière mesure a concilié un peu l'opinion publique, quoique les chances d'une réussite complète pour le gouvernement restent toujours excessivement douteuses” (s. n.)<sup>17</sup>. That is why „le Prince S'est préparé pour toutes les eventualités”<sup>18</sup>, already with two months before the installation of the new government, through a demarche which revealed his decision to make the so-called *coup d'état*. Because, according to the information the Swedish diplomat had, „il a averti la Porte que dans le cas que les chambres continueraient cette fois encore leur opposition contre le gouvernement, Il se verait dans la nécessité de les disoudre, d'octoyer une nouvelle constitution et une nouvelle loi électorale et d'établir un Sénat élu presque exclusivement par Lui” (s. n.)<sup>19</sup>. By doing so, „Son Altesse” prepared „ainsi de long main et ouvertement un coup d'état pour lequel Elle a sollicité d'avance l'assentiment de la Porte et dont Elle a donné avis en même temps, d'une manière officieuse, aux Représentants des puissances garantes” (s. n.)<sup>20</sup>.

As a result, commented Oluf Stenersen, Cuza put the Porte in a serious dilemma. In case of a refusal, the Porte risked to be exposed to the „à l'affront de voir Prince Couza passer outre et accomplir son coup d'état malgré elle ”; on another hand, „si elle ne protestait pas, elle aurait l'air d'accepté et compromettrait ainsi sa position vis-à-vis des puissances garantes” (s. n.)<sup>21</sup>. That is why, it resorted to the solution of delaying and waiting to observe the evolution of the events. And, in the response that the Porte finally gave to the Prince was mentioned only the fact that, „comme

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem.*

*une des puissances garantes*<sup>22</sup> (of the Peace Treaty of Paris, from March 30<sup>th</sup> 1856 – n. n.) *elle ne peut pas se prononcer seule sur la question, qu'elle en a saisi les autres Puissances, et qu'une conférence de toutes devra en décider*" (s. n.)<sup>23</sup>.

In his opinion, the problem was very difficult to solve in this manner. Because, due o the "powerful opposition", the Guarantor Powers would not be able to adopt a unitary attitude. As arguments, the Swedish diplomat mentioned the position of every one of them. Otherwise, „*la Russie, l'ennemi de la Turquie et des principautés, voit avec plaisir se tendre de plus en plus les rapoports entre la Porte et son vassal et espère qu'il en sortira un jour des troubles dont elle pourrait profiter, si le moment lui était opportun, pour humilier la Turquie et pour imposer en même temps sa volonté au Prince Couza et détruire à tout jamais les aspirations des Roumains vers l'unité et vers l'indépendance*" (s. n.)<sup>24</sup>. He considered that, for the moment, „*tous les efforts russes sont dirigés vers le but de maintenir jusqu'à une autre époque le statu-quo dans les principautés, pour que le Prince ne vienne pas se créer trop tôt une position indépendante asez forte pour le mettre en état de se défendre, et se maintenir*" (s. n.)<sup>25</sup>.

Great Britain „*travaille pour le même but, dans la conviction que l'indépendance des principautés serait bien plus dangereuse pour le Sultan que pour l'Empereur de Russie*" (s. n.)<sup>26</sup>. In its turn, Austria „*en fait de même, parcequ'elle prévoit que la formation d'un état régulier sous le sceptre du*

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<sup>22</sup> A quality that Turkey assigned abusively because, as it was appreciated in the historiography of the problem „Turkey was a *signatory* or *contracting party* of the treaty of Paris of 1856 and of the following acts, but it was no Guarantor Power" (s. a.) (Gh. Cliveti, *Tratatul din 30 martie 1856 de la Paris. Problema garanțiilor*, in vol. *Congresul de pace de la Paris (1856). Prefaceri europene, implicații românești*. Edited de Dumitru Ivănescu și Dumitru Vitcu, Editura Junimea, Iași, 2006, p. 88).

<sup>23</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen from November 15<sup>th</sup> 1863.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*.

*Prince Couza excitera des vellités d'adhésion parmi ses nombreux sujets de race roumaine*" (s. n.)<sup>27</sup>. France, in contrast, „*plus ennemie de la Russie qu'amie de la Turquie, protège fortement Prince Couza et use de tous ses moyens pour le rendre fort et puissant*"; because, „*elle rêve en lui un allié dévoué qui, à la tête d'un peuple latin, fortifiera son influence dans l'Orient et l'aidera un jour contre la Russie*" (s. n.)<sup>28</sup>. Finally, Italy „*suit, comme toujours l'exemple de la France*", and Prussia, „*qui n'a point l'intérêt direct dans cette affaire s'est aussi montré disposée à appuyer le Prince*" (s. n.)<sup>29</sup>. Thus, he concluded, „*on peut donc prévoir, dès-à-présent, que les nouvelles conférences préparées par la Porte n'aboutiront à rien*", and Cuza „*fera son jeu en dépit de toute délibérations diplomatiques*" and that „*si peu redoutable qu'il puisse paraître aujourd'hui, pourrait bien devenir un jour, dans un temps de guerre et de bouleversement général, un autre Mehémet Ali pour Sultan Abdul Aziz*" (s. n.)<sup>30</sup>.

On this background, the political situation from the United Principalities was evolving, in 1864, towards the result predicted also by the Swedish diplomats accredited in Istanbul. Because, as it was observed in the historiography of the problem, „*la ligne politique adoptée par Cuza a consisté en se servir de parties opposés pour les mettre en situation de se heurter, de se détruire réciproquement*" (s. n.)<sup>31</sup>. Thereby, even though, on April 13<sup>th</sup>/25<sup>th</sup> 1864, the Chamber, dominated by conservatories, gave a vote of censure to government led by Kogălniceanu, Cuza refused to accept his resignation. Thus, the head of the government proposed the project of the rural law, and two days later he handed to the Chamber the project of the electoral reform, and the Prince postponed it until May 2<sup>nd</sup>/24<sup>th</sup>, when he

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem.* He was referring to Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt, which had separatist tendencies, manifested strongly in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century, which created great difficulties to the Porte and tensioned the political relations in Europe.

<sup>31</sup> Apostol Stan, *Grupări și curente politice în România între Unire și Independență*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1979, p. 161.

summoned it in an extraordinary session. As the Chamber opposed the reforms proposed by the Prince, among which, the agrarian and the electoral reform, he dissolved it, thus making his well known *coup d'état*.

These events were also followed by the Swedish diplomat accredited in Istanbul, the same Oluf Stenersen, who transmitted to Stockholm, on May 16<sup>th</sup> 1864, detailed information about them.

The decision to dissolve the Assembly, correctly explained, by its “almost unanimous” refusal to discuss the project of the electoral law as long as the government led by Kogălniceanu was in power, was accompanied by another interesting information for the recipients of his reports, that according to which the Prince „*a dû envoyer des gendarmes dans la salle des séances pour en expulser les députés recalcitrants* (s. n.)”<sup>32</sup>. By doing so, the Prince accomplished what he was preparing for some time and, in the opinion of the Swedish diplomat, the *coup d'état* was not, by itself, an illegal measure<sup>33</sup>. Although, according to his information, he „*a parfaitement imité l'exemple donné par l'Empereur Napoléon*”; even more, as he knew for sure, „*a agit à ce qu'on m'assure d'après des instructions directes reçues de Paris*” (s. n.)<sup>34</sup>. Stenersen was also convinced that the result of the popular vote for the adoption of a new constitution was going to be the one expected by the Prince<sup>35</sup>.

This report, from May 22<sup>nd</sup> 1864, contained the information that the news about Cuza's *coup d'état* was not approached in the Conference of the ambassadors of the Guarantor Powers, and was the subject of some confidential discussions and that the Marquis Lionel Désiré Marie François René Mustier, the Ambassador of France to Istanbul, „*a chaleresement défendu le Prince Couza qui a été vivement et habilement attaqué par*

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<sup>32</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen from May 16<sup>th</sup> 1864.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*.

*M[onsieur] Novicov*”, the Russian Chargé d’Affaires (s. n.)<sup>36</sup>. More than this, the French Ambassador would have threatened his colleagues that he would leave the Conference if this subject would have been approached in other manner than in private discussions<sup>37</sup>.

But, „*meanwhile the Prince focused its efforts towards some important reforms, his political rivals worked to erode his throne*”, inside and outside the country (s. n.)<sup>38</sup>. And „*those who were impatient enemies of the Prince*” (s. n.)<sup>39</sup> – as the well known Polish historian of the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Juliusz Demel, noted, staged a Suțu-Lambert plot, discovered by the police, on May 8<sup>th</sup>/21<sup>st</sup> 1864. As one can expect, Stenersen hastened to inform his superiors about that event, the he described as „*une conspiration réactionnaire tendant au renversement du Prince Couza, à la séparation des principautés et au rétablissement de l’ancien ordre de choses antérieur à la Convention de Paris*”<sup>40</sup> (from August 19<sup>th</sup> 1858 – n. n.). Among the most compromised, he nominated Prince Suțu<sup>41</sup>, Minister under the reign of Barbu Știrbei (June 16<sup>th</sup> 1849 – October 17<sup>th</sup> 1853), arrested in Bucharest, and Panait Balș, arrested in Iași. The documents seized from the plotters (especially from doctor Lambbru, collaborator of Suțu – n. n.)<sup>42</sup>, „*démontrent la connivence des conspirateurs avec l’étranger*” (s. n.)<sup>43</sup>. And according to his point of view, „*il n’est pas douteux que c’est aux intrigues russes et autrichiennes –*

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>38</sup> Apostol Stan, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

<sup>39</sup> Juliusz Demel, *Aleksander J. Cuza*, Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo, Wrocław-Warszawa-Krańów-Gdańsk, 1974, p. 183.

<sup>40</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen, from May 27<sup>th</sup> 1864.

<sup>41</sup> „The same which begged the Sultan to restore the old order in Romania, even through the use of arms” (Juliusz Demel, *op. cit.*, p. 183).

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>43</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen from May 27<sup>th</sup> 1864.

*secondées par le mécontentement de quelques Bojars envieux de la fortune du Prince Couza (s. n.)*<sup>44</sup>. Only, he added, the result was completely contrary to the goals of the plotters. Because, its discovery, „*en temps util ne peut servir qu'à fortifier encor plus la position du Prince dans le pays et à augmenter Sa popularité parmi les paysans et la plus grande parti de la bourgeoisie. Ainsi l'indignation est-elle générale et le vote universel pour un plébiscite est de tous côtés rapporté comme étant presque unanim en faveur du Prince*” (s. n.)<sup>45</sup>.

The results of the plebiscite were not so appreciated by the Guarantor Powers which, as the Swedish diplomat considered, „*sont des juges plus sevères que le peuple moldo-valaque*” (s. n.)<sup>46</sup>. Because, most of them, „*peut-être même la plupart désireraient bien profiter de cette occasion pour renverser à tout jamais le Prince Couza et pour refaire la Convention de Paris*” (s. n.)<sup>47</sup>. And, searching for an explanation for this attitude, he found it in the fact that „*c'est la France seul qui a gagné par la réunion des principautés sous le sceptre du Prince Couza*” (s. n.)<sup>48</sup>. So, „*c'est l'Empereur Napoléon plutôt que le Sultan Abdul-Aziz qui est aujourd'hui le véritable suzerain de la Roumanie*” (s. n.)<sup>49</sup>. Or, he thought, in order to end this situation and with it the French augmented influence in the East, the only effective way was to dethrone Prince Cuza and to separate the two Principalities, under two rulers<sup>50</sup>. A plan which could not been applied in those circumstances, but „*il n'en est pas moins certain que tant les Représentants de la Russie et de l'Autriche que Sir Henry Bulwer – et je crois*

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<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>45</sup> He was referring to the plebiscite held between 10<sup>th</sup>/22<sup>nd</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup>/26<sup>th</sup> of May 1864; for the results see also Juliusz Demel, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

<sup>46</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen, from May 27<sup>th</sup> 1864.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>48</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>50</sup> *Ibidem.*

*même S. A. Aali Pacha – sont prêts à l'appuyer de tous leur moyens dans le cas que la marche des événements permette de le produire un jour ouvertement comme une question à discuter*" (s. n.)<sup>51</sup>. This could have been possible and the fact that the Ambassador of Great Britain to Istanbul already found a candidate for the throne of Wallachia in the person of the Prince of Samos, was a proof in this regard<sup>52</sup>. However, this solution was not applied, possibly due to the fact that, as Juliusz Demel thought, Cuza „acted with diplomacy. He did not make public the implication of Turkey and, at the end of July 1864, he declared amnesty” (s. n.)<sup>53</sup>.

It was, already, a well known fact that „the reign of Cuza, characterized in the plan of foreign affairs as a succession of acts of affirmation and consolidation of the national autonomy, stood out also through the tendency to prepare or even fulfill the ideal of national independence”<sup>54</sup>.

Or, one of the effects of this policy affected even the Swedish diplomacy.

The development of the navigation on the Danube, and the extension of the commercial activities of Sweden and Norway in the Black sea, put the Swedish government in the situation to ask the Porte for the permission to establish a vice consulate in Brăila, near the one in Galați, which functioned since 1851, even naming Nicolo Armelin for this post. Following, Sweden's Minister of Foreign Affairs sent, on October 21<sup>th</sup> 1862, to his Diplomatic Mission in Istanbul, the appointing documents. Conforming to his orders, Oluf Stenersen, Chargé d'Affairs, made the necessary demarches at the Porte, from which he received the firman which he sent to the Vice Consul Luis Mandl in Galați, with the instructions to acknowledge the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Principalities<sup>55</sup>, and that is exactly what he did, on July 9<sup>th</sup>/21<sup>st</sup> 1863. Contrary to the expectations of the Swedish diplomat, the Ministry did not take into consideration neither the decision

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<sup>51</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>53</sup> Juliusz Demel, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

<sup>54</sup> Apostol Stan, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

<sup>55</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen, from August 31<sup>st</sup> 1863.

of the Swedish government or the express disposition of the Porte. In the response given to the letter, signed by E. V. Scany, probably a Secretary of State, it was invoked the fact that the level of the commercial relations between Romania and Sweden did not justify the necessity of the establishment of a new vice consulate, much less in Brăila, a port situated so close to the one in Galați. So, the Romanian government was not interested to create a precedent which could have been invoked by other states „*pour la creation ultérieure et sans limites des Agents de la même nature dont la multiplicité constituerait chez nous une extension anormale des droits exceptionnelles*” (s. n.)<sup>56</sup>. Therefore, the refusal to give effect to the Swedish demand was according to „*les principes du droit des gens [qui] justifient l'exercice plein et entier de notre libre arbitre*” (s. n.)<sup>57</sup>. And, in order to materialize that *free will*, the Romanian official informed the Swedish Vice Consul that the decision in discussion was not a singularly case; of course, we can say that this could have been interpreted as a discrimination, as long as the Romanian authorities refused a similar request received from the government of Holland, with which Romanian had more intense commercial relations<sup>58</sup>.

Commenting on the position of the Romanian government, Oluf Stenersen thought that the motives invoked were nothing else but „*des prétextes pour cacher le seul motif véritable, savoir que le gouvernement du Prince Couza, cherchant toujours toute occasion de se montrer indépendant de la Porte, veut s'arroger maintenant le droit de décider lui-même de l'opportunité de tout changement et de toute augmentation du corps consulaire dans les principautés et qu'à cette fin il se refuse constamment à respecter les exécutions données par la Porte, à moins que le nouveau nommé ne soit muni aussi d'une lettre d'introduction de la part du gouvernement qu'il représente, pour le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Bucarest*” (s. n.)<sup>59</sup>. And, in order

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<sup>56</sup> Annex 2, to the report of Oluf Stenersen.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>59</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen, from August 31<sup>st</sup> 1863.

that his superiors in Stockholm can form a complete image on the stage in which the relations of the United Principalities with the Suzerain Power were, Oluf Stenersen informed them that the latter proved, on many occasions, to be incapable to impose its will. This is the reason why many complaints addressed to the Ottoman government by other states which had similar issues remained without result. In order to be successful, Oluf Stenersen decided to change its technique. Responding to the suggestions of the heads of other Diplomatic Missions, especially to those of Sir Henry Bulwer, he addressed, in secret, the Romanian Diplomatic Agent to Istanbul, C. Negri, trying to find a mutual solution, before addressing the Porte. To his satisfaction, Negri proved to be very conciliatory. After he exposed the reasons that determined his government to decide the establishment of a new post of Vice Consul, proving that Brăila was the destination port for a great part of the Swedish commercial vessels which navigated the Danube and that it was impossible for the Vice Consul of Galați to oversee, from such a distance, that interests, Negri promised hit to do what was in his power to determine the Romanian government to reconsider the refusal and he was sure that it would do so. However, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, the Chargé d'Affairs of Sweden and Norway *ad interim* informed Aali Pasha about his demarche, which „*m'a paru fort content d'être débarassé, du moins pour le moment, d'une nouvelle difficulté avec le gouvernement du Prince Couza: difficulté que selon toute probabilité il n'aurait pas été dans le cas de résoudre*” (s. n.)<sup>60</sup>.

Indeed, the issue with the Romanian government was solved, exactly in the way the course of the foreign policy indicated it to Prince Cuza. So, on September 10<sup>th</sup> 1863, Oluf Stenersen informed Count Manderström that, „*les difficultés soulevées à Bucarest contre l'installation d'un nouveau vice-consul du Roi à Brăila sont parfaitement aplanis*” (s. n.)<sup>61</sup>.

Because, in the answer which the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave, after the demarches of Negri, the Swedish diplomat was informed that

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<sup>60</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>61</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen from September 10 1863..

it was decided that the establishment of a new Vice Consulate of Sweden and Norway in Brăila, was approved. But stated he „*bien qu'il m'eût été très agréable de pouvoir attribuer aux motifs que j'ai fait valoir dans ma conversation avec M. Negri le mérite d'avoir amené ce bon résultat, je ne puis m'abstenir pourtant de croire que le motif pour la condendance montrée maintenant, ainsi que pour les difficultés soulevées auparavant, a été seulement et uniquement l'orgueil national qui se trouvait flatté de pouvoir constater que dans les principautés rien ne peut être obtenu par la Porte, mais tout par le gouvernement national*” (s. n.)<sup>62</sup>.

As arguments supporting its assessments, he added the information according to which „*le Ministre de Prusse, averti par l'exemple donné à notre égard, vient de s'adresser également à M. Negri afin de s'assurer de l'approbation du gouvernement des principautés pour l'établissement d'un nouveau vice Consulat de Prusse dans une petite ville de la Valachie, et qui M. Negri lui a donné aussi la promesse qu'on ne ferait point l'objection à reconnaître le nouveau fonctionnaire*”(s. n.)<sup>63</sup>. The next argument had to be even more convincing. That, „*par contre, le Ministre de Holland ayant réclamé à la Porte contre le refus du gouvernement moldo-valaque de reconnaître un nouveau vice Consul de Holland à Giurgevo, sans avoir communiqué là dessus avec l'ageant politique du Prince Couza, le refus qui date déjà depuis plusieurs mois reste encore en vigueur*” (s. n.)<sup>64</sup>. More than this even, Negri declared to him that „*en dépit de tous efforts de la Porte le gouvernement de Principautés ne consentira jamais à le revoquer*” (s. n.)<sup>65</sup>.

And, if this was not enough, the Porte was more and more concerned because of other manifestations, even more flagrant, of independence. Or, these were taking place in „*la bonne entente et la presque intimité qui règne entre ses deux vassaux*” le Prince Michel (of Serbia – n. n.) et le Prince

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<sup>62</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>63</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>64</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>65</sup> *Ibidem.*

Couza<sup>66</sup>. Because, explained the Swedish diplomat, The Ottoman government was sure that the objective of the secrets of their Highnesses could not be other than the invariable interest that they had in common: that of opposing, as much as possible, „à toute immixtion de la Porte dans leurs affaires intérieures et extérieures, et de tâcher de Se rendre de plus en plus parfaitement indépendants” (s. n.)<sup>67</sup>. As a result, in the ruling circles of the Porte „croit-on pour sûr que les deux Princes ont conclu une alliance secrète pour une assitance mutuelle contre la Turquie en cas de quelque aggression ou quelque attaque de sa part” (s. n.)<sup>68</sup>.

The Swedish diplomat proved to be more than a simple observer of the events he knew directly or indirectly, in the latter case only from reliable sources, as he mentioned each time to his superiors, and tried to fulfill his mission and suggest to his superiors ways and means through which some of the forms of manifestation of the Eastern crisis could have been resolved. In this case, he thought that „l'interruption de toute communication entre les deux pays (the United Principalities and Serbia – n.n.) sera probablement aussi la première mesure que prendra la Porte contre le Prince Couza dans le cas que les puissances garantes se décideront à user contre Lui des moyens coërcitifs pour Le forcer à Se conformer aux stipulations de la convention de Paris” (s. n.)<sup>69</sup>. A possibility that, the Prince predicted and „a concentré maintenant la plupart de Ses forces évidemment dans le but d'empêcher des troupes entrangères de se mettre entre Lui et Son Alliè” (s. n.)<sup>70</sup>. All the more,

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<sup>66</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen, from January 13<sup>th</sup> 1864.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibidem*.; for some aspects of the independence policy promoted by Mihail Obrenovici, see also Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balcan National States, 1804-1920*, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London,, 1977, p. 64-65; for some aspects of the foreign policy of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, see Dorina Rusu, *Acțiuni diplomatice ale României în vremea domniei lui Alexandru Ioan Cuza*, in vol. *Omagiu Virgil Căndea la 75 de ani*, București, 2002, vol. II, p.195-205.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibidem*.

explained the Swedish diplomat, „le gouvernement et le peuple dans les principautés s'attendent à quelques mesures hostiles de la partie des puissances garantes et tous les efforts son faits pour mettre le pays en état de repousser toute tentative d'une occupation étrangère: l'effectif de l'armée régulière a été augmenté – à ce qu'on me dit – à 50,000 hommes, et l'on a organisé une milice nationale assez nombreuse d'après le modèle serbien; à l'usage de cette milice on vient de distribuer dans tous le districts du pays 50,000 fusils qui ont été apportés, comme toujours, par les vapeurs des Messageries Impériales françaises” (s. n.)<sup>71</sup>.

Already initiated in the backstage of the European diplomacy concerning the Eastern Question, Oluf Stenersen considered that, despite the crisis that was imminent, it was difficult to believe that any military operations could be triggered against Alexandru Ioan Cuza. Because „on sait que Son Altesse prend toujours Ses instructions de Paris et que la Princesse Hélène, Son Épouse Se trouve toujours là pour lui servir d'intermédiaire et de plénipotentiaire” (s. n.)<sup>72</sup>. The Swedish diplomat was also sure that „en face de cette fermeté inébranlable – on pourrait dire passion – avec laquelle la France protège le Prince, et face du refus péremptoire de l'Ambassadeur de France ici de s'associer aux Représentants des autres puissances garantes – sauf celui de l'Italie – pour envoyer à Bucharest une protestation formelle contre l'acte de la sécularisation des biens dédiés aux couvents – ce serait risquer une rupture ouverte et peut-être même une guerre avec la France que de vouloir maintenant envoyer des troupes contre le Prince Couza” (s. n.)<sup>73</sup>. And, he ended his argumentation, „je pense que même les diplomates fanatiques comme Sir Henry Bulwer y regarderons à deux fois, avant de conseiller des mesures qui pourraient avoir des conséquences aussi funestes pour la paix de l'Europe” (s. n.)<sup>74</sup>.

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<sup>71</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>72</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>73</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>74</sup> Ibidem.

Following closely the evolution of the Eastern Question<sup>75</sup>, Oluf Stenersen observed the more and more obvious implication of the United Principalities in its evolution. In this context, he seen that „*la situation dans les principautés danubiennes est dans le moment actuel* (in January 1864 – n. n.), *observé ici* (in the political and diplomatically circles in Istanbul – n. n.) *avec un intérêt tout special; car tout porte à croire que si une nouvelle guerre vient définitivement à éclater en Orient, ce sera dans les principautés danubiennes que partira le premier coup de canon*” (s. n.)<sup>76</sup>. The fact that he found to be most remarkable was that, during this active implication of the United Principalities in the new Eastern crisis, „*les rapports entre le Prince Cuza et Son peuple ont subit dernièrement un changement remarquable*” (s. n.)<sup>77</sup>. And „*en vue des dangers qui semblent menacer de dehors, le patriotisme des Roumains s’est subitement enflammé, à un tel point que toute dissension intérieure et toute mésintelligence entre le gouvernement et le peuple sont pour le moment complètement oubliées*” (s. n.)<sup>78</sup>. Therefore, he accentuated that „*pour la première fois depuis la création du monde lorsque tous les Roumains se réunissent dans une seule et même pensée: celle de la défense de leur pays contre toute attaque étrangère*” (s. n.)<sup>79</sup>. And, as a form of manifestation, the Swedish diplomat invoked the „*enthousiasme militaire*” which „*semble avoir gagné tous les esprits, contrairement aux goûts et aux habitudes de la nation*” (s. n.)<sup>80</sup>. As a consequence, „*des suscriptions volontaires ont été ouvertes dans tous les districtes du pays pour l’acquisition d’un nombre de canons rayés, et d’autres pièces d’artillerie dont le gouvernement avait besoin et l’argent est afflué dans une telle abondance que déjà au bout de trois semaines on a pû commander un parc d’artillerie*

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<sup>75</sup> For other forms of its manifestation in this period see also Veniamin Ciobanu, *op. cit.*, p. 66 and following.

<sup>76</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen, addressed to Count Mandertröm, from January 22<sup>nd</sup> 1864.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>78</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>79</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>80</sup> *Ibidem.*

*de 100 pièces*”(s. n.)<sup>81</sup>. And, to complete the picture of this general state of spirit, the Swedish diplomat added this attitude reached the Chambers, which, only a few months earlier voted, „à une forte majorité une adresse à leur Prince des plus méfiantes et des plus insolentes, viennent maintenant de voter, non seulement les 8 millions de piastres demandés par le gouvernement, mais encore de leur propre chef 10 autres millions qui n'étaient ni demandés ni en aucune manière attendus”, and all for the better organize the army (s. n.)<sup>82</sup>. Oluf Stenersen did not forget, obviously, to nominate a solid reason of danger for the country's security, the fact that the Guarantor Powers did not approve the secularization of the wealth of the dedicated convents, secularization approved in unanimity by the people who considered it to be „un acte de souveraineté intérieure” (s. n.)<sup>83</sup>. However, the Swedish diplomat observed another element which stirred thing up through „par ces sentiments de patriotisme et d'indépendance”, namely, „les paroles obscures qu'à prononcées le Prince Couza devant la députation qui Lui présentait les félicitations des Chambres, à l'occasion du vote passé dans la question des couvents. « Messieurs » – a dit Son Altesse – «une autre question plus sérieuse reste encore à résoudre et pour son heuresse résolution je place toute ma confiance dans Votre dévouement et dans Votre patriotisme »” (s. n.)<sup>84</sup>. Commenting on them, the Swedish diplomat thought that the Prince „veut imiter Son Grand Protécteur à Paris (the Emperor Napoleon III – n. n.), en étonant le monde, comme Lui, par d'obscures phrases à double entante” (s. n.)<sup>85</sup>. Their deciphering was, in his opinion, a real problem in the Principalities, where „on est généralement d'avis” that „Son Altesse a voulu parler d'une lutte à entreprendre pour

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<sup>81</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibidem*; the idea of the necessity of „organizing a national army, well instructed, equipped an armed”, as „one of the necessary conditions for the proclamation of independence was sustained especially by the radicals” (Apostol Stan, *op. cit.*, p. 142).

<sup>83</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen, from January 22<sup>nd</sup> 18864.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibidem*.

*l'émancipation et l'indépendance de la Roumanie; mais comme personne ne peut être certaine d'avoir trouvé la véritable signification des mystérieuses paroles, tout le monde est plongé dans une attente fiévreuse de quelque chose qui doit arriver, et l'esprit de patriotisme et d'enthousiasme militaire a été porté au plus haut point par le vague presentiment de quelques dangers qui approchent et de quelques sacrifices qu'il font faire pour les conjurer" (s. n.)<sup>86</sup>.*

This avalanche of information could confuse the Swedish ruling circles and prevented a better understanding of the nature and the *juridical essence* of the relation between the Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza and the Porte, his suzerain. Or, their representative from Istanbul was the most suitable to give the necessary explanations, as one in direct contact with a series of factors which influenced this relation. That is what he did by analyzing two documents, that were, in his opinion, the key for understanding this relation.

The first one was the letter sent by Cuza to the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aali Pasha, on December 1863, immediately after he was informed that the Porte and most of the Guarantor Powers were about to protest against the secularization of the dedicated convents. But, he thought, the haste in which the Prince decided to give explanations, even before being asked, could only confirm „*l'ancienne règle: qui s'excuse s'accuse*" (s. n.)<sup>87</sup>. Because, from his point of view, the letter seemed „*très-faible*", in exchange, „*est forte et remarquable, comme preuve de la ferme décision du Prince de maintenir à tout risque le vote de l'assemblée*", in the issue of the dedicated convents (s. n.)<sup>88</sup>.

The other document was another letter, addressed, this time, to the Grand Vizier, Fuad Pasha, as an answer to the two vizirial letters, which he addressed on June 2<sup>nd</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> 1863, through which he demanded explanations in regard with his constant arming and he protested against

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<sup>86</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>87</sup> His report from March 9<sup>th</sup> 1864, addressed to Count Manderström.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibidem.*

the secularization of the dedicated convents. Even though the answer of the Prince was dated February 22<sup>nd</sup> 1864, it reached the Vizier's chancellery on March 9<sup>th</sup>. Nevertheless, Oluf Stenersen ensured his superior, Count Manderström, that he managed to obtain, in great haste, a copy of this document which he promised to send and later to comment on the impression it made on the Ottoman government. For the moment, he only observed that „*la première partie de cette remarquable lettre, ressemblant, par son ton hautain, plutôt à une Note, adressée par un gouvernement indépendant à un autre gouvernement, qu'à une explication demandée à un prince vasal par le gouvernement suzeraine, et traitant la sécularisation des monastères comme un fait accompli qui ne peut plus être rétracté, - démontre assez que sur ce point le Prince est sûr de Son fait et qu'Il ne craint plus la résistance de la Porte et des autres puissances garantes qui Lui ont notifié leurs protestations*” (s. n.)<sup>89</sup>. The Swedish diplomat found the explanation for this „arogante” tone in the fact that it was possible that not only France and Italy supported him in this endeavor but also Great Britain which adopted the French point of view<sup>90</sup>.

Regarding the second part of the letter, the one concerning the arming he „*maintient avec une ferme dignité l'indépendance des Principautés Unies dans toute question intérieure, mais il semble pourtant, par la modération de son langage, par sa juste appréciation des intérêts communs de l'Empire Ottoman et des Principautés Unies, aussi bien que par l'amplitude des explications données, de nature à pouvoir sinon parfaitement disperser les inquiétudes de la Sublime Porte, du moins amoindrir Sa défiance à l'égard de son vassal, et il n'est pas impossible que cette communication ouvrira la voie à une meilleure entente et à des relations plus intimes entre le gouvernement des Principautés Unies et la Cour suzeraine*” (s. n.)<sup>91</sup>. Suggestions which, as it was expected, could only remove the Swedish concerns which was not interested in the outburst of any other open conflicts between the Porte and

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>90</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>91</sup> *Ibidem.*

the United Principalities because it would have brought prejudices to its commercial interests in the Danube area and in the Black sea.

An important moment in the relation between Alexandru Ioan Cuza and the Porte was, as it is well known, his visit to Istanbul, at the beginning of June 1864, with the purpose of obtaining the approval for the new constitution. As Oluf Stenersen knew, the visit was initially scheduled at the request of the Porte, but the Prince postponed it until after the final results of the plebiscite regarding the Developer Statute of the Paris Convention and the electoral law, were known, even though the Ottoman authorities made preparations for his arrival<sup>92</sup>.

Cuza received a special reception from the Ottoman government and from the Sultan Abdul Aziz, even better than the one he received in 1860, as Juliusz Demel observed<sup>93</sup>. The entire visit was closely followed and recorded, even in the smallest details, by Oluf Stenersen, from whose commentaries we can find out the attitudes not only of the Ottoman central authorities but of the representatives of the Guarantor Powers and of other diplomats accredited to the Porte towards the Prince and his internal and external policy.

We will not insist on details, numerous and very interesting, but we will concentrate our attention only on the moments which the Swedish diplomat found to be most important.

In the day of his arrival, the Prince was received in audience by the Sultan Abdul Aziz who „ *a fait un accueil des plus gracieux, et Lui a même tendu la main en Le priant de S'asseoir à côté de Lui*” (s. n.)<sup>94</sup>. After the audience, Cuza made visits to the Grand Vizier, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Austria and to the Prussian Minister, on which occasion, noted the Swedish diplomat, „ *l'ont tous reçu*

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<sup>92</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen from May 16<sup>th</sup> 1864.

<sup>93</sup> Juliusz Demel, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

<sup>94</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen from Juin 14<sup>th</sup> 1864.

*en grand uniformes, sauf l'Internonce, qui était habillé en petite tenue*" (s. n.)<sup>95</sup>. The Prince did not visit any other head of Diplomatic Mission, not even the Russian or the Italian Chargé d'Affairs, which were „assez étonnés" (s. n.)<sup>96</sup>.

The position the foreign diplomats took was observed by Oluf Stenersen in every stage of the protocol of the visits. So, at the reception given in the honor of the Prince by the French Ambassador all the heads of the Diplomatic Missions attended, with few exceptions, that of the British Ambassador, Sir Henry Bulwer, of the Austrian representative and of the Russian Chargé d'Affairs, Novicov. The first because, „*comme doyen du Corps diplomatique, été mécontent de ne pas avoir été consulté sur l'opportunité d'une pareille démonstration*"; the second invoked „*un deuil de famille*", and the last „*a déclaré qu'il n'avait pas l'honneur de connaître Son Altesse*" (s. n.)<sup>97</sup>. Significant was also the fact that at the reception given by the British Ambassador only the member of his suite were invited, along with a few Turkish Minister, not even the French Ambassador or other members of the Diplomatic Corps<sup>98</sup>.

Regarding the results of the visit, initially, according to his opinion, the Prince fully achieved his goal. Because, „*il s'est assuré les bonnes grâces de la Porte en faisant, du moins en apparence, un acte de soumission qui est venu apaiser les inquiétudes du Sultan à Son égard ; il a assuré encore plus les liens qui Le rattache à deux ou trois des puissances garantes ; et Il a acquis la certitude que Ses adversaires ne sont pas pour le moment assez forts pour Le renverser ; qu'on Lui pardonnera Ses actes arbitraires et que tout la sécularisation des couvents que les Corps d'état passeront sans beaucoup d'obstacle dans la catégorie des faits accomplis*" (s. n.)<sup>99</sup>. He insisted on some conclusions, giving them new meanings in relation with the difficulties

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<sup>95</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>96</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>97</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>98</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>99</sup> *Ibidem.*

Cuza had during his negotiation with the Porte and the Guarantor Powers. The first obstacles was, in his opinion, the official recognition of the new internal order, established by the *coup d'état* from May 2<sup>nd</sup>/14<sup>th</sup> 1864, which the Porte accepted with some reserves, regarding the new Constitution, the composition of the Senate, the amount of the census. According to his information, on the occasion of the departure audience, the Sultan was about to communicate him „*cet heureux résultat des négociations*” (s. n.), and to grant him the Osmaniai order, with diamonds<sup>100</sup>. In this context, he informed his Foreign Affairs Minister that „*il avait été convenu d'avance, que les Représentants des six puissances garantes ne seraient pas saisis de la question du coup d'état avant qu'une entente eût été établie la-dessus avec la Porte*” (s. n.)<sup>101</sup>. However, he considered that due to the fact that Cuza thought he will be victorious in Istanbul „*l'adhésion des autres puissances garantes ne pourrait guère Lui être refusée*” (s. n.)<sup>102</sup>, even if the British Ambassador, the Austrian representative and even the French Ambassador, tried to convince the Porte to adopt their point of view. The fiercest opponents proved to be the British Ambassador and the Austrian representative which, according to Cuza's Foreign Affairs Minister, Bălănescu, who discussed with the head of the Prussian Diplomatic Mission, „*ont empêché la Porte de suivre ses propres impulsions dans cette affaire et donner sa sanction plein et entière à des actes intégralement et sans reserves qui « avaient été dicté par la nécessité la plus absolue et qui dans toutes éventualité » ne pouvaient être retractés*” (s. n.)<sup>103</sup>. Because, added the Romanian official « *un coup d'état peut ou ne pas réussir, mais il doit être jugé tel qu'il est, et non pas tel qu'on eût pu le désirer* » (s. n.)<sup>104</sup>. Otherwise, the British Ambassador did not hide his discontent regarding the policy of the Prince, not even with the occasion of the dinner he organized in honor

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<sup>100</sup> The report of Oluf Stenersen from Juin 19 1864..

<sup>101</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>102</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>103</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>104</sup> *Ibidem.*

of Cuza. Then, as Stenersen found out, he toasted in Cuza's honor, „dans des termes qui, très polis et même bienveillants, por la forme, étaient évidemment conçus d'une manière a contenir une leçon assez rude au Prince, pour la manière arbitraire dont Il avait agi. S. E. a fini en buvant « au succès de la legalité » ; « oui, a répondu le Prince, buvons tous au succès légalisé » (s. n.)<sup>105</sup>.

A success „légalisé” by the Conference of the Ambassadors of the Guarantor Powers. The Protocol written with that occasion was signed by all the participants, „bien que le Chargé d’Affaires de Russie ait cru devoir donner selement sa signature ad referendum” (s. n.)<sup>106</sup>.

Summarizing it, until he was able to procure the entire text, for the use of his Foreign Affairs Minister, the Swedish diplomat noticed that the most remarkable stipulation of the Protocol was the one stating that, „qu’à l’avenir ce n’est plus aux puissances garantes - ce qui est peut-être le plus remarquable - mais au Prince Lui-même conjointement avec Ses chambres de décider sur l’adoption de telle autre modification dans la loi fondamentale que les besions du pays pourraient ultérieurement rendre nécessaire, sauf à respecter toujours les liens de vasselage qui rattachent la Roumanie à la Porte” (s. n.)<sup>107</sup>. It was referring to the well known *Additional Act of the Convention* of August 7<sup>th</sup>/19<sup>th</sup> 1858 which stated the recognition of the full autonomy of Romania and meant, at the same time, the recognition, by the Guarantor Powers, of the *coup d’état* of May 1864.

It ended, as it is already known, the period in Alexandru Ioan Cuza's reign in which the most important political, social and economical achievements were made, as were observed by Oluf Stenersen and transmitted to the Minister of State and Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom of Sweden and Norway. And we can suppose, from some phrases in his reports, that he did so not only to fulfill his obligations as an observer of events important for

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<sup>105</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>106</sup> Report of Oluf Stenersen from Juin 29 1864.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibidem*.

the Swedish interests but also due to a withheld admiration, from his position as a representative of a neutral state towards the personality of Cuza. A close study of those reports can offer us, the researchers of that period, suggestions for the approach from other points of view of the political and diplomatic history of Romania, in the first decades of the second half of the nineteenth century.

# The Royal Parliament and the Voting Situation for the Elections from May 1939, under the Authoritarian Constitution of 1938

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**Abstract:** The Royal Parliament was the expression of one political organisation, The National Renaissance Front, party in charged with accepting and proposing eligible candidates. In this way the State gained the monopoly of the electoral candidacies, which then led to the unanimity of votes. The vote for the election of members of Parliament was mandatory, otherwise the regime applied penalties. The unique party, The National Renaissance Front, was the expression of King Carol II political will and in which the functioning of the Parliament was subordinated to the initiatives and the instructions issued by the Head of the State. The Parliament was transformed into a decorative and perfunctory organ, without any authority.

**Keywords:** Terms of voting, “Electoral campaign”, authoritarian regime, National Renaissance Front, monopoly of the candidacies.

## 1. Introduction

This article aims to analyze how the royal Parliament from the period of the authoritarian monarchy, 1939-1940, was formed on the basis of the Constitution adopted on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February 1938, demonstrating the influence of the corporate single party, the National Renaissance Front in action. Furthermore, the study sheds light on the types of penalties and failures of the electoral process, by voters exiting the voting booth, because these facade elections were held for the first time in Romania, based on public vote by acclamation. As the legislative institution was structured, citizens could vote and stand for election only if they were literate and thus was introduced the dictatorship of pluralist vote. Voting citizens had only one practicing profession specified in the Constitution and the Electoral Law, namely one of the following professional categories: agriculture and manual labour, trade and industry and intellectual occupations.

The working hypothesis of this research article is the following; as the elected belonged exclusively to a single party, the National Renaissance Front, the new regime became one institutionalized and legalized by the Constitution of February 27, 1938. The main question relates to its role as a royal legislative institution in a state, which, in the following years, would be deemed authoritarian and even totalitarian. Therefore, which were the constitutional elements, if any, which determined the electoral conditions, under which the Elections of 1<sup>st</sup> to 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 1939 were held?

## **2. The Theoretical Framework and Doctrine Elements of the Royal Parliament**

The functioning of the Parliament was effectively subordinated to the initiative and the directive of the Head of State. The Legislative body could not meet and work by its own initiative, only if it was summoned by the King and he thought it is appropriate and necessary. Likewise the King could prorogue or delay the sessions of the Parliament, he had the power to dissolve at once either both Assemblies or only one of them. From all these reasons, we may conclude that the Parliament was subordinated in an evident way to the initiative and the will of the King and his Government.

The Constitution of 27<sup>th</sup> of February 1938 abandoned the parliamentary regime based on universal suffrage and adopted a Parliament, which was an emanation of professional guilds. In this way, the structure of the two chambers was completely changed. Using the Constitution of Charles II, the regime tried to remove completely the influence of the Parliament, arguing that the National Renaissance Front - a state organisation based on corporatism, had the sole right to hand in their candidatures for electing the Parliament and that they did not represent petty political interests.

The law organising the National Renaissance Front was reproduced in the electoral law where it was specified that future candidacies will be only the ones accepted by the Front's leaders. The electoral law represented the instrument through which the architecture of the 'old regime' (the plurality of parties), was eliminated from the new institutional landscape. Armand

Călinescu explicitly stated that ‘no one was prohibited by the electoral law and by the National Renaissance Front, to actively take part in politics’, but ‘our innovation with respect to the authoritative regime, like the one we have today, when we are not indifferent to what Parliament members do or what their attitude towards State life is, did not go so far as to ask them for blank resignations, like they old regime did, through the voices of the representatives of the integral democracy and of today’s defenders of immaculate freedom.’<sup>1</sup>

Victor Iamandi argued that in the new regime, the members of Parliament had a real personal importance, as they were elected by uninominal voting’, “and elections are conducted by county, on a very large circumscription, it insures a strict selection through the fact that only personalities held in high regard can amass such numerous votes, and their presence represents an active element of the social life, specifically an effective exercise of productive professions. The derail of oral and written propaganda is stopped. Any candidate can only present a short appeal, which he has to present to the judge himself.”<sup>2</sup> For Victor Iamandi, a real democratic system had never existed in Romania, but the new regime, through the corporate Parliament of June 1939, had brought in a social-political reality, which had lacked in the old democratic regime.

The political instrument of the regime was an unique party, “because the NRF was built to give the country an new parliamentary institution, with an essential role in legitimatizing the new regime’s institution, funded on professional criteria. The programme of the new movement was substituted for the State programme and the NRF served as a primary tool for applying the new Constitution”<sup>3</sup>. The Minister of Internal Affairs,

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<sup>1</sup> The Universe, 1939, the 55<sup>th</sup> year, No.119 from May 4<sup>th</sup>. “The Solemnity of taking the county commandants oath of the National Guards” page 11.

<sup>2</sup> Victor Iamandi, 1939, „Parliamentary Debates”, Senate, Meeting from the 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1939, *Monitorul Oficial*, No. 9, Part III, Central Printing House, Bucharest, page 13.

<sup>3</sup> The Universe, 1939, No.5, from January 7<sup>th</sup>, The newspaper „Vreme” from Belgrade reveals the importance of the NRF”, page 11.

Armand Călinescu, stated that the National Renaissance Front was not a party in the old meaning of the word. It was a movement, as it didn't represent the interests of a group of people or of a social class, but it represented the collective interests of the State and of the Nation. Therefore, they could not take shelter, amid the newly established organisation, the demagoguery of the old politics and they stopped encouraging the ambitions of a clientele"<sup>4</sup>.

*La Libre Belgique*, a Belgian newspaper with Catholic inclinations, also wrote about the Romanian elections "Thus, the policies of King Charles are widely plebiscitary. The electorate voted to make Romania a free and prosperous country. At these elections voting was open to electors aged 30 and above, who had previously mastered a job. All the members of the Cabinet, Armand Călinescu and Grigore Gafencu among them, were elected with an overwhelming majority of 258 deputies and 88 senators". As presented by *La Libre Belgique*, these results are reflected by Charles II's personal action, who in 1937 did not hesitate to take control over all the mechanism of power, establishing for a short period of time a semi-dictatorial regime. The Constitution subjected to the vote of the plebiscite led to a large majority. The constitution was enacted and these elections for Parliament were the first official manifestations. The NRF success indicates that the king's actions, that were initially criticised, were understood by his people"<sup>5</sup>.

After voting the new Constitution, and the creation of the new electoral law, a new Parliament was summoned, which had a decorative role and lacked the legislative power of the old regime. Thus, an article from *Le Soir*, a Belgian newspaper with liberal views, entitled, *The new Romanian parliament reunites*, specifies that "the reunion of the first Romanian Parliament elected under the hand of the National Renaissance Front took place in the Science Hall in the Chamber of deputies, which had remained

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<sup>4</sup> Idem, 1939, No. 58 from the 1<sup>st</sup> of March, „The anniversary of the new Constitution, A. Călinescu's speech”, page 4.

<sup>5</sup> *La Libre Belgique*, 1939, No. 156, Monday, 5th of June, page 5.

unused for the last eighteen months. The King thanked the people for the welcome they have given to the new Constitution. He insisted on the work of the government which has followed a peace policy, but the peace being conditioned by the respect for freedom and complete independence of the nation”<sup>6</sup>. By creating the Constitution of 27<sup>th</sup> of February 1938, the legislative power was handed over to the King, who couldn’t exercise it personally, but only through the Chamber and the Senate. Paul Negulescu stated that “the legislative apparatus had technical functions that worked in the name of and for the King”<sup>7</sup>.

The role of the Legislative, under the Constitution of 1938, explains the relations between the legislative-executive emphasising the structure of the executive created by the fundamental act. The King, designated by Article 32 of the Constitution as head of the executive power, exerted his power through his government. In the Constitution, they have tried to remove completely the influence of the Parliament, the purpose being represented by the fact that only one political organization, the National Renaissance Front, a state organisation based on corporatism, had the right to run in the parliamentary elections, excluding the representation by political criteria. Paul Negulescu argued that the era ended on the 27<sup>th</sup> of February, was that of a parliamentary regime, later, a new regime was created, the governmental regime, in which the Executive had pre-eminence. Article 46, line 7, had as an object to present the King’s report to the Legislative Chambers and to complete the means through which the king could control and circumvent the parliament’s activity. The constituent’s conception, placed the Parliament as factor of a second order and intermittent of the legislative activity, whose scope for action was conditioned by the initiative of the King”<sup>8</sup>. With regard to the new electoral

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<sup>6</sup> *Le Soir*, 1939, *The new Romanian parliament reunites* No. 160, Friday 9<sup>th</sup> of June, page 4.

<sup>7</sup> Paul Negulescu, 1938, „Study on social and political Constitution of Romania from the 27<sup>th</sup> February 1938”, *The public law magazine*, No. 3-4, The Institute of Graphic Art, „Marvan”, Bucharest, page 431.

<sup>8</sup> G.G. Mironescu, 1939, „The innovations of the 1938 Constitution”, *Annals of the Bucharest Law Faculty*, No. 2 and 3, June-September, page. 20.

law, the Belgian newspaper *Le Soir* mentioned that it specified the conditions of the electoral consultations. Therefore, the deputies were divided in three categories: representatives of agriculture, industry and the intellectuals. Within the Senate, 86 senators were elected and 86 were directly appointed by the king. The following were senators by right: the Heir Apparent, the representatives of the high clergy and certain members of the parliament, which were elected several times in the old assemblies. The women chosen in the Chamber will not be able to be elected deputies though. The women chosen in the Senate could become senators, in the same conditions as men. Both Senators and Deputies had to attend the meeting dressed in the uniforms of the National Renaissance Front. The candidates to the Senate or the Chamber, designated by the NRF, were divided into ten groups, corresponding to the ten administrative regions. Each elector received as many ballots as there were candidates, with a photograph attached, and with as many names as were written on the regional list, on average 25 candidates for the Chamber and 8 for the Senate. An innovation was the electoral manifest that could not exceed than 100 words”<sup>9</sup>.

### 3. Electoral Rules and Restrictions in 1939

The way in which a candidate could have been elected was with the help of photographs. The candidate’s photographs were on display at the entrance of the voting section, along with their profession. The way that the election campaign was conducted, was conditioned by a legal regulation and coercion, which were in contradiction with the liberal parliamentary regime. Even electoral manifestos and publications that contained no instigations against public order and state security or slander could not be published freely in newspapers or posted in the streets or public squares, but only in designated places for public adverts. “Those who intend to

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<sup>9</sup> *Le Soir*, 1939, No. 131, Thursday, May 11, page 4.

destroy or post, in a different place than those designated for public adverts will get a fine from 5000 to 20000 lei”<sup>10</sup>.

The new regime, in its attempts to distance itself from the old democratic regime’s ways, would fine even the candidates who made demagogical promises. The fine that was given for posting the electoral manifestos in prohibited places, was accompanied by a fine for the candidates who manipulated the electorate. So: “Those who made deceitful or unrealizable promises, both in writing and verbally, for themselves or for those that are making propaganda, were sentenced to prison, 6 months to a year and they lost their political rights for 2 years.”<sup>11</sup>

The parliamentary elections from the 9<sup>th</sup> of June 1939 showed the undemocratic and coercive character to which the members of the National Renaissance Front were exposed to. The fact that the propaganda was prohibited under any form, even during the electoral campaign, was subscribed to Charles II’s constitutional order. The right to vote the members of Parliament was compulsory, otherwise fines would have been given. All citizens were compelled to vote in the corresponding section to their place of residence. All the voters placed their votes based on special cards that were released by the president of the county electoral bureau, at least 3 days before the elections. The vote sanctions under Charles II’s dictatorship were of punitive order. The voters that would not vote for the Deputy Chamber, without a legitimate reason, were given a civil fine of 5000 lei, issued by the president of the voting section. The fine for the voters from the senate colleges was of 10000 lei, without the possibility to be excused<sup>12</sup>. It was specified that the fines were given in the interest of the commune where the fined voter resided. The royal dictatorship imposed the mayors to list the names of the fined voters by posting the minutes.

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<sup>10</sup> A.N.I.C, Royal House Fund, Preliminary draft electoral law, the Legislative Bodies (House and Senate), File, no. 89/1938, sheet 47.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, sheet 47.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*, sheet 33.

To give fines to passive citizens, was not a creation of the authoritative regime, it existed from the first elections under the empire of the universal vote from 1939 from the Old Kingdom. The citizens that could not justify their absence from the voting were fined with symbolic amounts of money. The electoral law from March 1926, which was based on the 1923 Constitution, stated that the citizens who did not make use of their right to vote, were to be fined with a civil fine of 500 lei, by the voting section president. The electoral law from May 9<sup>th</sup> 1939 underlined, on the principle of avoiding absenteeism, the compulsoriness of voting and that the voters would be fined if they failed to participate.

The interwar elections were based on the principle of universal suffrage and the compulsoriness of voting. The inspiration for the compulsoriness of voting was Belgium, which in 1893 included this principle in its electoral system<sup>13</sup>. The constitutional compulsoriness of citizens to take part in voting was represented by the *sine die* of the democratic regime functioning, with the universal suffrage conditions. In other words, the methods through which the candidates were elected, for the state positions and the way the interwar democratic elections took place, were in contradiction to the principles of the Constitution and of the Electoral Law.

The elections for the corporate Parliament from June 1<sup>st</sup> -2<sup>nd</sup> 1939 organized by the single-party, were meant to observe the liberal and democratic principles. Even though they took place under the standards of the universal vote, the elections for the royal parliament only represented the confirmation of a regime with authoritarian tendencies.

#### 4. Electoral Practices

The interwar electoral methods and practices continued to function under the same principles, as they did during Charles II's iron fist rule. In practice, clerks were brought to the voting section by their superiors, who supervised

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<sup>13</sup> Cristian Preda, 2002, *Postcommunist and Interwar Romania*, Meridiane Publishing, Bucharest, page 68.

their votes. The Candidates were nominated by the secretariats and approved by the NRF Executive. The fact that the vote was uninominal meant that lists were not voted anymore, but personas who were popular and who could be easily recognized, so they could be identified on the voting ballot. The ballot was no larger than an A4 page or a 4 page letter<sup>14</sup>, this being the regular dimension, specified the *Preliminary draft of the electoral law of legislative bodies*. The case of the Suceava County Police inspectorate is relevant, in this case. In a note, it is brought to the Suceava Chief Inspector's attention that "during the elections for the Chamber of Deputies from June 1<sup>st</sup> 1939, when the votes were counted, in the farmers and labourers urn, an envelope was found containing the pictures of General Cantacuzino and C.Z. Codreanu. In the Intellectual's urn, on an envelope that contained George Vântu's photo marked with an X ,was written in green ink "Long live the Captain!". Gheorghe Vântu was elected as a deputy in the corporate parliament, and was a sub-secretary of state at the Internal Affairs Ministry, under the Ministers Counsel Presidency led by Gheorghe Tătărescu.

The note showed that the legionaries had added 7 or more candidates or different candidates, or destroyed the pictures, so the vote be cancelled.<sup>15</sup>

Electoral fraud was achievable even under an authoritarian regime. The regime was the expression of the danger represented by the legionaires, which could not accept an oppressive regime as predicted in their social and political programs. The result of the June 1939 elections was considered by the main political figures as being a second plebiscite through which the regime and the people's representatives were legitimized in the corporate parliament.

The electoral law stated that for the Deputy Assembly, to be a voter, it was necessary to practice one of the professions mentioned the fundamental act: agriculture or manual labour, commerce or industry, or be an

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<sup>14</sup> A.N.I.C, Royal House Fund, File No. 8/1938, sheet 27.

<sup>15</sup> A.N.I.C, Fund-Variou Interior Ministry, File no. 9/1939, „Everything Party Country”, sheet 197.

intellectual. Through Article 5 from the law decree for electoral reform an additional condition was submitted: *voters needed to be literate*. The electoral sign was submitted in the electoral legislation through the 1918 decree, which enshrined the universal suffrage and facilitated the illiterate voters, the possibility to distinguish different candidates. On the one hand, in Charles II authoritarian regime, the electoral sign, was not just a simple mean to distinguish the list, but became a symbol, means of propaganda, of suggestions and training of the voters.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, the 1926 electoral law, brought changes to the electoral system, but continue to keep the geometric signs for the political groups and candidates, that were to be elected.

The electoral sign, in the interwar era, represented the only means through which a party could win the elections. Choosing a sign was not an option for one party or for the other. The electoral signs had the purpose to create confusion in the electoral body. Voters could vote lists of candidates by simply looking at the sign, without reading, due to their illiteracy. The interwar electoral system represented the choice for the party's sign. The ballots were composed of lists that had both the electoral sign of the party and candidate, with the name of the political faction to which they belonged<sup>17</sup>. The resemblance between the independent candidates and the party signs were generating confusion among the illiterate voters. Even though, the submittal of the electoral sign created the premises for the mass voting, it did not belong in a country that wanted to be alphabetized.

The electoral signs represent, under these conditions a continuance of the universal vote, which was maintained until the promulgation of the electoral law in May 1939.

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<sup>16</sup> A.N.I.C, *Prime Minister's Fund*, File no. 17/1938, sheet 21.

<sup>17</sup> Sorin Radu, 2004, *Voters in Romania during parliamentary democracy (1919-1937)*, Publisher European Institute, Iași, page 192.

## 5. The State Monopoly over the Candidacies

The monopoly over the submission of candidatures was reserved for the single party, which led to the unanimity of votes, at the 1939 June 1<sup>st</sup>-2<sup>nd</sup> elections. The remodelling of the electoral body, during the royal dictatorship, by imposing the requirement of literacy and the actual practice of a profession, resulted in an elimination of the vote takeover and cancellation. "The new regime inclined more to the elites, regards to the recruitment process of the new legislative body, in order to tame the vote"<sup>18</sup>. The eligibility conditions, according to the electoral law, for the Chamber of Deputies, were the following: a) to be Romanian citizens, b) to be aged 30 or above, c) to have the civil rights exercise and to be enrolled on the electoral list for the category of job they represented, d) to have their residence in Romania. The length of the mandates was extended from 4 years to 6 years. Women were not eligible for the Deputy Assembly. The age for someone to be able to vote was 30. The Deputy Assembly had 258 representatives, elected for 6 years. The election of deputies was made through a secret vote, mandatory and expressed uninominal election by district. There were 11 electoral districts, one for each County and one the country's Capital<sup>19</sup>.

The architecture of the Deputy Assembly leadership was the following: Alexandru Vaida-Voevod was elected president of the Deputy Assembly, as vice-presidents Stan Ghițescu, Voicu Nițescu, Ștefan Ciobanu were elected and as secretaries George V. Apostoleanu, Ovid Ciordaș, Onufrei Lunguleac and Șerban Flondor. Stan Ghițescu held as well the position of Labour Minister, under Ion Gigurtu's government. The professional character given to both Chambers was stated by the constitution, with the

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<sup>18</sup> Ioan STANOMIR, 2003, "Constitution" Crown "and" country ", constitutionalism and authoritarian monarchy between 1938-1940, *Studia Politica, Revista Română de Știință Politică*, Vol. III, No.1, University of Bucharest, Publisher Meridiane, Bucharest, page 96.

<sup>19</sup> Andrei RĂDULESCU, 1940, „Constitution, King Charles II, "Ten years of the reign of MS King Charles - II , political, legal and administrative, Vol, I, in, Publisher Cartea Românească, Bucharest, page 98.

evident emphasis of the corporatism at the Senate, where in order to be elected senator, it was imperative that the eligible was part of one of the three professional categories. In the case of the Senate two developments were observed: the emergence of senators named by the King and the emphasis of the corporate, through which the direct intervention of the King to the Chamber was eased.

The innovation introduced by the constituent from 1938 was represented by the emergence of senators appointed by the king and by right. The elected senators, 88, were equal in number with the appointed senators, who were designated through a mandatory vote, which was direct, secret and expressed through uninominal election. However, the senators elected by the state established bodies, were under the executive power that chose them<sup>20</sup>. On the other hand, "the length of the mandate enjoyed by senators by right was of 9 years, whereas the length of an elected senator's mandate was renewed by a third, from three to three years by lots."<sup>21</sup> According to the Constitution, senators by right, by virtue of their high position in the state and the church, were the following: a) the heir to the throne at soon as he reached the age of 18 b) all the Royal family princes, aged 18 and above c) the Patriarch and the bishops; d) Romanian Orthodox bishops and Greek-Catholic because they were chosen according to the laws of the country; e) heads of al communities recognized by the state, one from each religion, because they were appointed or elected under the laws of the country and represented a total of 200,000 believers f) Senators by right recognized until February 27, 1938, under the electoral law of March 27, 1926<sup>22</sup>. The eligibility conditions, under the electoral law, for the Senate were the following: a) to be a Romanian citizen, b) to be 40 years old or older, c) to have the civil rights exercise and to be enrolled on the electoral

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<sup>20</sup> Eleodor, FOCȘNEANU, 1998, *Romania's Constitutional History 1859-1991*, Publisher Humanitas, Bucharest, Second Revised Edition, page 77.

<sup>21</sup> Official Gazette, 1939, no. 106 of May 9, "Decree Law on Electoral Reform," State Printing House, Bucharest, pages 1-2.

<sup>22</sup> Andrei RĂDULESCU, *op.cit.*, page 99.

list for the category of job he represented, d) to have their domicile in Romania<sup>23</sup>. From the total number of 228 senators, more than half of the number was represented by appointed senators and the senators by right, because the number of the elected, 88 was equal to the named, which was 88 as well. Therefore, if we subtract 88+88 from 228, we get a number of 52 *real senators* of the parliament; the rest represented the will of the king. The Senate Leadership. Constantin Argetoianu was elected as the Senate president, as vice-presidents Professor Ion Tănăsescu, Ion Agârbiceanu, a priest, Ion Grigore Periețeanu and Anibal Teodorescu, and the Bureau secretaries: Alexandru Romalo, Maria Pop, Agricola Cardaș and Alexandru Samoil. The Senate's quaestors were Alimăneștianu Virgil, Ioanițiu Th. Nicolae, Negel D. Dumitru and Roth Otto Hans<sup>24</sup>.

The incompatibility of being chosen and to choose was written even in the electoral law pre-project. The people that were undignified for this quality were: those who were convicted of murder, crime, illicit exploit, those who were convicted for avoiding the recruitments order by the Romanian state or that have declined to do military service, those who own brothels or gambling houses, active soldiers, priest, members of the clergy, teacher, state clerks and spirits retailers<sup>25</sup>. *The NRF organizing law*<sup>26</sup> was replicated in the electoral law were it was specified that the future candidacies will be the ones accepted by the Front's leadership. "Nobody was prohibited, through the electoral law and NRF law, to actively take part in the political life, and the innovations, in an authoritarian regime, didn't stay unnoticed, regards to what the members of parliament did or what was their view towards the State life, they didn't go as far as to ask resignations in blank,

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, page 99.

<sup>24</sup> "Alphabetical Index of speakers", "Parliamentary debates", 1940, *Senate* hearing on 3 July 1940, Official Gazette, no. 1, Part-III, Central Printing House, Bucharest, page 3.

<sup>25</sup> A.N.I.C, Royal House Fund, Preliminary draft electoral law, the Legislative Bodies (House and Senate), File, No. 89/1938, sheet 18.

<sup>26</sup> Law Renaissance Front National, 1940, Library Publishing National Renaissance Front, Bucharest.

as they used to in the old regime, by the representatives of the integral democracy and *today's* immaculate freedom defenders”<sup>27</sup>.

The adhesion to the only party was considered as an expression of the citizens will and was compared to the results of the corporate parliament elections. The role of the NRF, in the June 1939 elections, was essential; as it was considered that the party accepted multiple candidatures, “undemocratic”. There were candidates as many as they wished to be, the elections took place in an environment of full freedom, and the results revealed elements that, under the old regime, were impossible to be chosen, and to represent in a serious manner in the parliament, the country’s interests”<sup>28</sup>. The Minister of Internal Affairs opinion regards to the freedom of the elections and candidates contradicts with the general mood among the regime’s opponents. The Timiș Police Inspectorate gained possession of a legionnaire’s flyer. The content of this flyer was conclusive in showing the way that the NRF representatives were chosen and named in the corporate parliament. With this flyer the legionnaires were warned not to vote and notified that” all those who will enter the parliament have been chosen a long time ahead. The elections have been made, so that the people could not make them responsible, that they placed in the parliament people that they thought they were good and the people would not want”<sup>29</sup>. If the interwar were defrauded and they took place on a political command, almost undemocratically, in this new regime the elections took place in full freedom, stated the regime’s demagogical defenders. The authoritarian regime was meant to be democratic having elements like the right to vote and transparency of the elections, while the interwar democratic regime was considered to be the party chief authority. The reversal of the democracy sense can be made only in authoritarian regimes.

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<sup>27</sup> *Universul*, No. 119 of May 4, 1939, "Solemnity commanders took oath of National Guards", Speech by A. Calinescu, page 11.

<sup>28</sup> Victor IAMANDI, *op.cit.*, page 13.

<sup>29</sup> A.N.I.C., Fund-Variou Interior Ministry, File no. 9/1939, "Everything for Country", sheet 212.

The national Parties were defined as being immoral, because the candidates did have a profession to ensure their living. Armand Călinescu argued that the old parties, according to the electoral law deposition, placed their candidates on the electoral lists only with the chief's approval. If the party chief didn't provide the signal and the approval, no one could run for that county, under that party's name. Therefore there was a censorship and a tyranny that many times led to the removal of candidatures that were supposed to be presented, while the NRF, with the approval of candidatures, could have only 2 criteria: one is the merit and real profession that the candidates should have and the second was the indubitable moral authority of the candidates"<sup>30</sup>.

The construction of the new parliament had a corporate trend, because of its structure based on professions.. The legislative institution was the instrument of the only party who's leader was King Charles of Romania considered by the National Renaissance Front establishment law as the supreme "leader".

## **6. Conclusions**

The Royal Parliament, one with corporatist valences, was composed, exclusively of members of the unique party, FRN, that, in the demagogic way, claimed that respected the principles of freedom and democracy. Although the Royal Parliamentary elections were held under the sway of universal suffrage in single-member colleges, one for every Province, it only accounted for confirmation of an authoritarian regime, supported and legitimized by royal constitution on 27 February 1938, which institutionalized the state siege and military presence in the entire administrative apparatus, in the single party and in the corporate parliament. Constitutional monarchy was transformed in this way, in a ministerial royal administration and the constitutional separation of

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<sup>30</sup> Victor IAMANDI, *op.cit.*, page 13.

powers in the state, built corporate, allowed the executive primacy over the law.

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# About Constanța Harbour and Romanian Oil Export during the Interwar Period

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**Abstract:** Constanta harbour represented the main export gate for the Romanian oil products during the Interwar period. As a grosso modo evaluation, almost 80% from the Romanian oil export went through this harbour. The quantities exported through Constanta harbour decreased towards the end of the period, due to the World War. Therefore, while 81,29% from the export grand total went through this harbour in 1936, the export amount dropped down up to 66,01% from the quantities grand total in 1939. The shipping which made this transport was prevalingly under foreign flags. The number of the Romanian oil ships decreased from 59 in 1933, to 15 in 1939. In 1937, the marine and fluvial shipping under Romanian flag owned the following cargo ships: „Oltul”, „Siretul”, „Prahova” (belonging to the "Romania" company), „Steaua Română”, „Oltenia”, „Barbu Știrbei” (belonging to the "Steaua Romana" company) and „Bucegi”, „Carpați”, „Oituz”.

**Keywords:** Constanța harbour, oil export.

## 1. Introduction

Within the Romanian territory, oil has been archaeologically certified and perpetually used since Geto-Dacians ancient times until present times. It was used, as everywhere, for therapeutic purposes or domestic and economic use: lighting, heating, cart shaft greasing, etc. Throughout the whole Middle Age, oil was used by its main component, black oil, resulting from crude oil exposure to the sun. The first documentary certifications come, not by chance, from the areas which will later acknowledge the oil industry: Moldavia, 1440 and Walchia, 1517 [1]. The step forward to the industrial universe was accomplished quite late, in the second half of the XIX-th century, when oil activities gloriously entered the industrialization *empire*.

In 1857, the Romanian oil industry showed off three world initial performances: the first officially registered oil production; foundation, in Ploiesti, of the first modern refinery and Bucharest proclaimed as the first city publicly oil lightened [2]. The oil production constantly and spectacularly grew, from 275 t in 1857, 250000 t in 1900, 1885619 t in 1913, to 8784000 t oil in 1936, when the production reached the climax between the two World Wars [3]. The number of the refineries grew in the same manner. While in 1863, in Ploiesti, the county residence with the greatest oil resources of the country, there were three refineries, in 1894, in the city and its surroundings, 18 refineries were running [4]. Throughout the country, 87 refineries were registered, and Prahova county owned almost half of their number. During the Interwar period, the number of the refineries was large and quite constant (55 refineries in 1925 and 62 refineries in 1936). But it was a significant difference regarding their refining capability. For example, the first 17 refineries succeeded in processing 99% from the whole quantity and almost all these great refineries were placed in Ploiesti and its surroundings. The climax of the refined oil quantity was reached in 1935, with 8134300 t, meaning 96,90% from the entire oil production of Romania [3]. It is also retainable the effort of the Romanian oil industry to lay down a national system of oil products transportation through the pipelines [5]: 760 Km owned by the state and 2600 Km to the oil companies [1].

Due to the production and, especially to its export, Romania held a leading position in the global hierarchy of the oil-producing states. During 1857-1900, Romania held the third position among the European producers, and in 1935 and 1935, Romania held the fourth position among the worldwide producers. During the whole period between the two World Wars, Romania was situated among the elite of the oil global producers and exporters [6]. In 1928, Romania was classified on the sixth place among the great global exporters, with 4,10 % from the total of the worldwide export, after USA, Venezuela, Mexico, Persia, USSR, and in 1937 it held the fifth place in the same hierarchy. Within the European continent, Romania constantly held the I<sup>st</sup> or the II<sup>nd</sup> position, after USSR, in the oil global

export [7]. Almost 80% from the Romanian oil export between the two World Wars went through Constanta maritime harbour.

## 2. The Constanța Harbour

Modern construction of the port of Constanța started in the year 1896, only one year after the completion of the Cernavodă bridge, that was stretching over the Danube, and the București-Constanța rail line. The port's oil station was built between 1903 and 1904. This endeavor was mostly undertaken by the Bucharest based company E. Wolff. This company is responsible for the construction of the station's metal components and mechanical installations. Until 1916, all the tanking and mechanical systems were used for oil export.

The oil products that were brought into port via pipelines or cistern cars were unloaded into five tanks. From here, using merely gravity, the oil products would drip through special tubes in the port's storage tanks. In 1916, the port of Constanța had 39 tanks, each having a storing capacity of 5000 cubic meters (with the exception of a 1000 cubic meter tank).

In 1925, the port of Constanța had 45 tanks (37 with a 5000 cubic meter capacity and eight with 1270 cubic meter capacity each). The port's operational capacities were outstanding. At Constanța one could simultaneously fill five trains full of oil products, among which one with gas, one with refined oil, one with distilled oil, and two more with crude oil. The unloading capacity of the first three trains was of 300 tons per hour, while the diesel ones had a capacity of 100 tons per hour. In the meantime, four container ships could be loaded via the port, each with a different load: gas, refined oil, distilled oil (all three with 120-140 tons per hour capacity, and diesel with 100 tons per hour capacity [8].

The data of that age reveal interesting information about sailors' living and working conditions. For example, in 1928, the sailors working on the oil tank vessels, of "Steaua Română" society, worked 8 hours per day, between 08.00 am and 05.00 pm, with an hour break in the middle of the working programme. The extra-work was paid additionally. When the vessel was at

sea, there was a 12 hour working schedule. Their salary was paid monthly, in pounds. Beside salary, each employee took advantage of one meal, a place to sleep in a common barrack, with lighting, heat and laundry soap. These additional facilities were also acknowledged for 1942, when it came out a diversity of preoccupations for the employees' families who were given essential food products, winter supplies, (potatoes, wood, coal), allowance for children, etc. [9].

### **3. Oil Export**

In 1938, 3.349.095 tons of oil products were exported through the port of Constanța including: gas, lighting oil, white spirit, gasoline, diesel, mineral oils, asphalt, paraffin and crude oil. All these represented almost 74,51% of the total Romanian oil exports [10]. In 1939, 301.304 tons of lighting oil reached Constanța through the Băicoi pipeline, 36.516 tons lighting oil through the Câmpina pipeline and 30.879 tons lighting oil through the one in Ploiesti. Out of the total oil transports recorded that year, half of them went straight to the port of Constanța. The dynamics of lighting oil transport via pipelines and the export total made through the port of Constanța between 1930 and 1939 can be seen in the following Table [11].

Once they reached Constanța, Romanian oil products were exported via ships belonging to different nations. In 1939, a meager 3,4% of total exports were conducted via Romania's 15 ships. The rest of the exports were handled by a fleet of 127 ships sailing under the British flag (27,9% of total exports), 136 ships sailing under the Italian flag (25,2% of total exports), 51 ships under Norwegian flag (15,4% total exports), 61 ships under Dutch flag (10,9% of total exports), 32 ships under French flag (7,4% of total exports), 66 ships under Greek flag (4,3% of total exports), 3 ships under Swedish flag (1,7% of total exports), 7 ships under German flag (1,6% of total exports), 29 ships under Panamanian flag (1,3% of total exports), 4 ships under the Turkish flag (0,7% of total exports) and a ship under Belgian flag (0,2% of total exports). The destinations of these fleets were as follows: Britain, Gibraltar, Malta, West Indies, Ireland and Cyprus (23,36%

of total exports), Italy and Albania (23,09% of total exports), Germany and Czechoslovakia (15,90% of total exports), France, Tunisia, French Morocco and Algeria (13% of total exports), Belgium (5,11% of total exports), Switzerland (3,73% of total exports), Egypt (3,11% of total exports), Greece (2,73% of total exports), Syria and Lebanon (1,52% of total exports), Turkey (1,08% of total exports), Palestine (0,68% of total exports), Spain (0,45% of total exports), Yugoslavia (0,42% of total exports), Denmark (0,11% of total exports), Bulgaria (0,08% of total exports), The Low Lands (0,05% of total exports), Sweden (0,04% of total exports), Norway (0,08% of total exports), Guatemala, Portugal and finally Japan with extremely small quantities [12].

Year	Lighting Oil /t	Index 1930=100	Total exports	Index 1930=100
1930	515.371	100	2.932.647	100
1931	758.832	147	3.901.303	133
1932	671.111	130	4.382.296	149
1933	648.891	126	4.953.341	169
1934	792.938	154	5.512.804	188
1935	751.555	146	5.514.153	188
1936	671.888	130	5.596.568	191
1937	506.059	98	4.467.504	152
1938	454.580	88	3.349.095	114
1939	368.699	72	2.754.662	94

The Quantities of Lighting Oil Transported Via Pipeline and the Total Export Quantities through PTE Port of Constanța

The number of the Romanian oil ships decreased from 59 in 1933, to 15 in 1939. In 1937, the marine and fluvial shipping under Romanian flag owned the following cargo ships: „Oltul”, „Siretul”, „Prahova” (belonging to the "Romania" company), „Steaua Română”, „Oltenia”, „Barbu Știrbei” (belonging to the "Steaua Romana" company) and „Bucegi”, „Carpați”, „Oituz” [13].

The quantities exported through Constanta harbour decreased towards the end of the period, due to the World War. Therefore, while 81,29% from the export grand total went through this harbour in 1936, the export amount dropped down up to 66,01% from the quantities grand total in 1939 [14].

#### 4. Conclusions

One can unmistakably state that the oil industry had the greatest impact in the modernization of Romania during the interwar period. Constanta harbour represented the main export gate for the Romanian oil products during the Interwar period. As a *grosso modo* evaluation, almost 80% from the Romanian oil export went through this harbour.

The port of Constanța can also be seen as a decisive factor in the economic, financial and technical mechanism, being perfectly adapted for the transportation, storage and export of high quality Romanian oil products.

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# A Comparative Analysis of Food Rations System from Romania (1941–1989)

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**Abstract:** The study presents the similitudes and the differences of food politics applied during authoritarian and totalitarian regime. The decisions to reduce food consumption were caused by military, economic and financial developments. The trade development, the categories of beneficiaries, rations, compliance with delivery schedules, rising prices, lower standard of living are described to the lecturer in a synthetic and analytic way. The consequences of reducing consumption showed economic inefficiency, constant dissatisfactions of the population and they even contributed to the end of the communist regime.

**Keywords:** food rations, cards, queue, livestock, shortage.

## 1. Introduction

The wealth of a nation is tested both through human and mineral resources but also through food sources. The procurement and food production have generated countless military conflicts, trade agreements, identify opportunities for supply, ensuring a guaranteed consumer family members, tribe and people. The predicaments emphasized the abilities or the limits of the political leadership to manage the food system and thus to control the crowds. The actors of power led the Romanian society in an authoritative, unequivocal and apprehensive manner during 1941 – 1989.

On this background a series of events with immediate effect on population (authoritarian regimes, participation in war, economic and social sacrifices etc) have been produced. Antonescu's regime (1941 – 1944) inaugurated the food system cards and this was even taken over by the communists in the first postwar decade. The increasing investment in the food industry, the livestock advantageous contract for the Romanian

peasants and Moscow's suggestion (to give up the food ration) allowed the suppression of that distribution system (since December 1954).

The intensive and insufficient productive industrial policy promoted by the Ceaușescu's regime led to poor results and contributed to the increasing external debt. Borrowing heavily from international financial institutions imposed finding urgent solutions at the beginning of eighties. Among the easiest decision was to reduce the consumption of food, energy and fuel, but with serious social consequences.

Food rations system analysis is referring to the three chronologically defined: the developments of the war (1941 – 1944), the recovery effort (1944 – 1954) and the economic outlook in the Ceaușescu's last decade. The study aims to point out the causes, the objectives, the deployment/development and the effects of rationalization consumption presented as synthetic as possible and in an accessible manner to readers.

The general causes offer the major coordinates of the period: participation in war (support front line by food dispatched to army and administration, lack of means of transport, the trend of speculation); economic recovery and payment of war reparations (directing monetary funds and supplying priority economic sectors, the delivery of agricultural products and food-stuffs in the payments of war); external debt payments (paying financial obligations with food exports in increasing in the late 80s).

The main objectives aimed limit consumption in order to allocate food stocks fairly for the population; control, collection and marketing in a centralized system; blocking quantities of grain and establishing state monopoly; the reserves to support the war; reducing inflation; the food export.

*The sale of ration products* were done by: distribution units: „economate” (shops founded by trading companies), state trading enterprises („Alimentara”, „Aprozar”, „Comcar”, „Aprolacta”); governmental institutions: Undersecretary of State for supplying army and civilian population, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, INCOOP, and

beneficiaries were officials, workers, teachers, other employees, students, landowners with areas less than 0.5 ha vineyard and 1 – 2 ha land.

*The main suppliers of agricultural products were classified chronologically:*

1941 – 1944: peasants and landlords were the most important forwarders of cereals, meat and vegetables; also Bessarabia, Transnistria and Ukraine sent food supplies and feed;

1944 – 1954: farmers, large landowners (until 1949) delivered livestock, grains, milk, vegetables and fruits on account of animal compulsory quotas, and collectivist structures and imports provided necessary food in a variable way.

Convincing farmers to deliver more goods was achieved through the development of mutually beneficial contracts (starting from 1953). Food sources in the last decade of the communist regime were provided by animal and poultry units, C.A.P.-s, I.A.S., processing plants and farmers (cattle, horses, sheep and pigs, milk and milk products).

Throughout the studied period the collection and distribution system with direct influence on sales volume were observed more disfunctions. The most significant were: the monopoly of cereals (seizure or compulsory deliveries of exceeding quantities (200 kg); lower acquisition prices offered by state (grain, livestock, vegetables for the period 1949 – 1954); miscalculations on livestock, disorganization, lack of interest and reporting fictitious (1980 – 1989); rational use of energy has caused increased mortality in poultry and swine mills; the imposition of delivering by the population of the excess of livestock (1983) generated the phenomenon of alienation, hidden and illegal trade; thefts and missappropriate property; party customers delivering (leaders and activists of the communist party, Militia and Securitate's workers).

During the war quantitative restrictions on sugar and oil (June 1941), meat, lard and soap (December 1941), bread (January 1942) and wheat flour (April 1942); bread ration was determined 300 g/day for 5 days, and corn (2 days/week) for the urban population and workers have imposed;

peasants ate corn. The weekly meat requirement was set at 250 g beef or pork; in addition to this amount a rate of 2.4 kg meat (200 g/month) was also calculated while rural population benefited of about 7.9 kg/capita/year.

The first postwar decade has remained in the consciousness of people by acute food shortages, the economic recovery, drought and war reparations payment perpetuated food cards system. The authorities have set new quotas for regulated rations system (decision no. 2.436/21<sup>th</sup> of August 1945 of the Council of Ministers). In the city it was distributed 300 g bread/person/5 days/week and 300 g maize/person/2 days/week; bread and corn were bought only based on individual card bills.

The farmers had to reserve for themselves only 200 kg wheat, rye or corn, the rest of the crops being directed to collection centers; to take into account that some occupational categories (shepherds and daily workers) had extra rations (200 g/day) and those in the field of non-productive activities (children and old people) received 400 g corn/day. The capital was supplied with priority, but without covering the request (bread 250 g, 400 g corn, 250 ml oil/month etc). Bucharest numbered 1.008.556 cards distributed to its inhabitants of which 530.179 were allocated to the persons without job and family members aged under 14 years old.

After the statement of the communist regime (1948) the restrictive food policy including marketing of industrial products continued and was expanded. Products sold on trade and ration cards targeted two types of items: food goods (bread, meat, fat, sugar, pasta, semolina) and industrial goods (cotton fabrics, wool, silk, garments, knitwear, leather footwear and soap).

The supplies were insufficient, however, the political apparatus was sufficiently able that to supply the workers' centers and to avoid amplification of socio/economic dissatisfactions. Grocery shops were stocked irregularly and insufficiently; the phenomenon of huge queues was an inevitable part of everyday life [1]. Official data emphasized that the number of beneficiaries amounted to 4.76 million cards, and those who were purchasing products at low prices were approximately 1.000.000

persons. On the background data and the administrative inefficiencies in collection activities (livestock and grain), acquisitions, storage and distribution of food and supplies rate was low and associated with the rising trend of discontents.

After short periods of fulfillment of the food rations there were long periods of delays in the distribution of commodities. For example, food supplies were exhausted at the end of the second quarter/1953 and, in order to solve the situation, were encouraged individuals and the import of grain from the USSR; in addition, vegetables ensured the current needs of the population. The status improvement was confirmed by doubling the quantities of bread traded freely, sugar and flour products (July – August 1953) [2]. In Bucharest, the sale by socialist trade units quantities of the quantities of oil and butter had a positive influence for the prices of fat to those existing at the end of June, but maintaining a higher level at the beginning of the previous month.

Shops and public catering establishments in Bucharest had been supplied in abundance during the World Festival of Democratic Youth (30.000 young visitors from 12 countries participated in the competition, hosted by Romania in August 1953). The rest of the country, particularly in workers' centers, Miner's Day celebration and August 23<sup>rd</sup> coincided with the most significant supply of consumer goods to the population. In fact, the comments were the same: „a good supply depends on major events or holidays” [3].

The new Soviet hierarchy existed since Stalin's death, stated clear intentions about Romania. Reconsidering the economic policy was one of the recommendations which had to be carried out by Dej's regime. Plenum of the Central Committee (C.C.) of the Romanian Workers' Party (P.M.R.) from 19 – 20 August 1953 had set specific actions to increase the production of consumer goods and industrial supply and the intensification movement of goods.

The ensuring quantities of necessary goods created premises to abandon trade card (except meat and fat) during the year 1954 [4]. Grigore Preoteasa

(Deputy Foreign minister) informed the international press (New York Times) about the living rise standards by adopting the following measures; the cessation of work at the Danube – Black Sea canal (the main consumer of financial resources of national income), the new economic policy orientated towards the increasing consumption and food industry, the cards abolition [5].

## **2. The Food Situation in 1954**

Although the production of consumer and food was unsatisfactory (inadequate supply of raw materials) however the Political Bureau decided to suppress food rations system after the meeting on the 20<sup>th</sup> of October 1954 [6]. The Plenary of C.C. of P.M.R. from 25<sup>th</sup> of December 1954 adopted a resolution on the abolition of cards in Romania (with effect from the 26<sup>th</sup> of December 1954, 18.00 h).

The abolition of food rations was doubled by the granting of monetary compensation for the population; the measure was necessary due to low wages and higher prices for products sold without being limited (meat, milk, beans eggs and beverages rose by over 20 %). The amount of aid was between 33 – 109 lei/month. However, bread and sugar consumption remained as a weekly ticket.

Giving up the rational distribution occurred in the latter part of the fifth decade amid increased production, intensification of the goods and increasing opportunities to purchase. Continuous decrease of the quantity of foodstuffs for the population marked significant socio-economic and political relations in the 80s.

Financial liquidity needs, expansion of the agricultural areas and the allocation of significant resources to fulfill economic objectives, generated a food shortage. The forms of expression were characterized by the lack of basic necessities products or small quantities for sale and perpetuation of the queues in grocery stores. The queue can be seen as an expression of the solvent demand existing only in the situations where the supply remains below demand [7]. The mess instituted in supplying the population forced

the government to find solutions to regulate the quantities and consumption of food.

Food specialists, doctors and members of the political apparatus formed a committee with the task of developing a national program for rationalized food; indirectly, the rational consumer sanction was official [8]. The program, approved and implemented in 1982, established the distribution of food products in relation to the physical and intellectual effort (very high, high, medium, low effort) and specified the average annual per capita (meat and meat products: 60-70 kg; fish and fish products: 8-10 kg; milk and milk products: 210-230 liters; eggs: 260-280 pieces, total fat: 16 to 18 kg; vegetables and vegetables products: 170-185 kg; fruits and fruit products: 85-95 kg; grain vegetables: 3-4 kg; sugar and sugar products: 24 - 25kg; potatoes: 70-100 kg; cereal products, in flour equivalent: 120 - 140 kg) [9].

The quantities were not fully distributed and they were even consistently diminished; the causes were identified in the lack of raw materials, the inefficient production and processing units, the increasing exports and preferential treatment given to some socio-economic categories.

The queues, bag, "cutlery" chicken (wings, head and feet), "sneakers" (pig hooves) and "Petreuş brothers" (two rickety chickens, bruised and sad, with long necks, named after two folk singers from Maramureş) were specific keywords in the last communist decade [10]. The queue phenomenon highlighted some characteristics of the period, and we have to point out: the form of assembled communion (all family members actively participated in procuring food), intensification of propaganda, poor quality of goods, value of some professional categories (shop assistants, butchers etc) and supply opportunities through the "acquaintances and relationships."

The shortage of consumer goods is synonymous with the preservation of power, and the queue is a tool for rationalizing the amount of power that the system is willing to give up to the social actors [11]. The irregular deliveries of rationed products (bread, meat, fish, milk, dairy products,

butter, cheese, vegetables, potatoes, fruit, sugar, oil, eggs) have mainly influenced the mood of the population and also demonstrated its ability to adapt in any condition.

The Securitate's structures have produced a series of briefings by signaling the people mood in the rationalization scheme and its promoters. Rothgeber Elisabeta, Timișoara, in a letter sent to the relatives in West Germany, emphasized the rationalization scheme "... We get now a kg of sugar, half a kg of oil, a bushel of flour and two pounds of corn for each person per month " [12]; cards were also applied in the case of bread (300 g/day or not more than two loaves in Bucharest/person).

In late October 1989, the sugar and oil ration increased by 15-20%, but was severely limited to eggs (15 pcs./month), meat (500 g/month) and sausage (200 g) [13]. During the period 1 – 15 November 1989 deliveries of agricultural products from the state fund to the market fund in 21 towns and worker-cities were realized under the provisions of "self-management" and "self-sufficiency" programs at chopped meat (39%), meat (49%), fish and fish products (73%), milk (58%), milk products (59%), butter (52%), cheese (40%), vegetables (46%), potatoes (37%), fruits (50%), sugar (81%), oil (77%) and eggs (55%) [14].

Progressive reduction continued in November and December 1989; in the capital markets, on 19<sup>th</sup> of December 1989 there were major drawbacks to cut meat (66.9%), meat dishes and cooked food (84.1%), cheese (53.3%), potatoes (70.7%) and beans (87.4%) [15].

*The effects of rationalizing consumption* were: the tendency of speculation; preferential distribution of food; the prices constantly have gone up; increased drought crisis (1946 – 1947); failure quantities provided; lack of regularity in providing rations and huge queues; production of articles focused on rationalized products and almost non-existent professional interest to widening and improving the quality of goods assortments sold free; the heavy movement of goods and therewith of the funds; maintaining a significant bureaucracy (institutions, enterprises, organizations and business units); committing frequent abuses, frauds and thefts; lower

pricing diminished and sometimes voided the manufacturer's gain; lack of profitability destabilized the economic and financial system

### **3. Conclusions**

The solution of rational system was a transitory one, but the authorities perpetuated the decision more than a decade (1941-1954). Capital accumulation and directing it towards the primary industry prevented the development of other economic sectors (e.g. food). The infusion of financial resources and the suppression of the cards created the premises of rising production, lower cost price and of the increasing purchasing power.

Population required food rations between 1944 – 1954 – 1956 and 1981 – 1989 revealed several features found in any political system, but also some differences. In the category of similar measures emphasize imposing of basic food rations (bread, meat, oil, sugar, flour), frequent delays in honoring cards, small quantities of food supplies, poor quality of goods traded, the flourishing illegal market and negative moods population.

The noticeable differences consisted in addition of a new products in the list of rationed (e.g. potatoes, dairy products), the implementation of scientific diet program as a reason for dramatic decreasing deliveries in the 80s, setting up shops with close circuit.

On the segment of social relations, the adoption of ration consumption is specific to war economy, but the application in peacetime aims the establishment and strengthening of control, directing and induce a passivity state of the society. From a political perspective, enthronement and accentuation of rations system contributed significantly to the fall of communism in December 1989.

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# Visits and Consequences. The Moscow Reactions toward the Romanian-American Opening from May-June 1964 and August 1969

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**Abstract:** The needs of the Romanian economy in the second half of the twentieth century led the Bucharest leadership to steer their foreign policy attention more to the West than they had done it before. In this new strategy the U.S. had a privileged place, especially in its position of hegemon of the capitalist world. The Romania opening toward United State immediately triggered the replica of Kremlin. The Moscow allegations to Romanian new foreign policy had multiple facets. Among them, the accusation of political inexperience, a potential factor of deviation from the existing political system, a danger and also a threat to the entire image of communism. The paper focuses on the manner in which Romania was able to defend her foreign policy and safeguard her option to the Soviet Union, applying a simple three point strategy: counterargument, accuse, inform the others.

When the leaders from Bucharest grasp the existence of a period of thawing in East - West relations in the mid-sixties, they took the decision to reinitiate a new tentative, after the one from 1957, of rapprochement toward The United States. Facilitated by Washington's new position on the relationships that the White House had to apply in relation with the socialist countries in Eastern Europe<sup>1</sup> that were adopting an independent

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<sup>1</sup> Mircea Răceanu, *Istoria Clauzei națiunii celei mai favorizate în relațiile româno-americane*. Editura Institutului Național pentru Memoria Exilului Românesc, București 2009, 49.

position toward Moscow<sup>2</sup>, one that was intended to bring them closer to the West, the Romanian initiative will prove to be an appropriate one.

The visit of the delegation led by Gheorghe Gaston-Marin in The United States during May-June, 1964, occurred shortly after the publication of the Statement of April, a document that was perceived by American diplomatic representative in Bucharest, W. Crawford<sup>3</sup>, but also by overseas mass-media<sup>4</sup>, as a new proof of an independent line adopted by the regime led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej toward Moscow, will lead to positive results in the bilateral Romanian-American relations. The obtaining of some advantageous credit facilities and technology licenses, all of this necessary to implement the Bucharest economic policies, as well as the raising of the two countries diplomatic representatives at the embassy rank, ending in being a successful visit, even if the so much craved status of the most-favored-nation could not be obtained<sup>5</sup>.

In the same period the delegation led by Gaston Marin was in The United States, a similar delegation led by Chivu Stoica traveled, from May 26 to June 9, in the Soviet Union. The Romanian representant, reminded during the meeting with NS Khrushchev on 27 May, that Romania wanted to purchase from U.S. certain licenses that only the Americans had, this while expressing reservations about the possibility of receiving all the products required by the Romanian side<sup>6</sup>. Without condemning the Romanian

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<sup>2</sup> Thomas Alan Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe in the Shadow of Vietnam*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2003, 256.

<sup>3</sup> Mioara Anton, *Ieșirea din Cerc Politică externă a regimului Gheorghiu-Dej*, Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, București, 2007, 186.

<sup>4</sup> Dan Cătănuș, *Declarația din aprilie 1964: context istoric și ecou internațional*, în *Arhivele totalitarismului*, nr. 3-4/2006, p. 129, Moraru, Constantin, *Politica externă a României 1958-1964*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2008, 201.

<sup>5</sup> Harrington, Joseph F., Courtney, Bruce J., *Relații româno-americane 1940-1990*, Editura Institutul European, Iași, 2002, 235-236.

<sup>6</sup> Direcția Națională a Arhivelor Istorice Centrale (hereafter D.A.N.I.C.), Fund C.C. of P.C.R., Section Foreign Relations Externe, file 34/1964, 23.

initiative, Khrushchev rather encourage this approach by saying: Everything that it is good should be taken from capitalists. And I tell you, it must be purchased from the capitalists with courage. We must learn from them. Buy from them and we will get it from your<sup>7</sup>. In the same time the soviet leader wanted to point the possible danger involved in the Romanian action. He emphasized in the same meeting that: "Now there is also some kind of evolution that occur in the Americans mind. President Johnson said publicly that a process of change it is taking place, in terms of trade, with the socialist countries. Five years ago something like this was out of the question. They want to use trade with the socialist countries for dismantling of our socialist world. I read in the foreign press as you read, and I see that capitalists are deluding themselves, saying that if Romania is situating herself on a different position than that of Moscow, than she must be drawn on to their side through trade. Of course all this is nonsense"<sup>8</sup>.

Khrushchev will specify afterwards that the Romanian-Soviet relations were mutually advantageous, and suggest that between the two countries there was not a relationship of interdependence, at least not a one food: "We do not feed the Romanians and the Romanians do not nourish us. Each eats his one bread"<sup>9</sup>. Chivu Stoica stated in turn that "capitalist machines do not change the content of our socialist country", and indicated that to the Americans question of whether the Romanian are willing to buy on credit they answered in the affirmative way: "Essential is to take"<sup>10</sup>. The loans problem received from the U.S. will again draws Khrushchev's attention, which stated that: " If they will propose us to take loans from them we will take, we will take even from the devil"<sup>11</sup>. The time will come when they will give even to us on credit. Now, pursuing their political goals,

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 26.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 26-27.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 27

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 27.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 27.

they are giving to you. They believe that by doing so we will argue. It is a foolish hope" and to the Romanian mention of the desire to acquire a isoprene plant, Khrushchev will state: "Buy from them and we will buy from you, whether we are going to steal it from you"<sup>12</sup>. It should be noted that all these discussions came not only after the Pițunda meeting from March, a meeting that will not just leave Khrushchev a "bad taste" in the mouth, but also the impression that after this meeting, though as polite as always, the Romanians have never been as warm and opened as before<sup>13</sup>, but also after the April Declaration.

The visit of the Romanian delegation headed by Gheorghe Gaston Marin in The United States in May-June 1964, will also be remembered during the meeting from Snagov, of June 5, held between Gheorghiu Dej and Bodnaras with the Chinese Ambassador to Bucharest, Liu Fan. During the discussions, recalling the allegations of lack of enthusiasm for economic cooperation within CMEA manifested by R.P. Romania, accusations appeared in the Russian-language radio broadcasts, Dej stated that: "We have taken only commercial loans, but the Soviet Union as Comrade Khrushchev said, take loans even from the devil. But what, they have the monopoly of loans with the capitalist world? Others are not allowed because it would catch capitalism? We are not allowed to have relations with England, France, Italy, Japan, countries with which they have relations?"<sup>14</sup>. The delegation, pointed Dej, was sent to The United States "not to sell socialism and purchase capitalism. We trade - selling, buying ", and Moscow's attitude in this regard, noted the Romanian official, was taking the character of interference: "What do you have with us? Why do you criticize us? You want us to ask your permission? But what are we, children?"<sup>15</sup>. The only reason, resume Dej, for which the Romanian

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 29.

<sup>13</sup> *Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 3, Statesman 1953-1964*, Edited by Sergei Khrushchev, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pennsylvania, 2007, 716.

<sup>14</sup> D.A.N.I.C., Fund C.C. of P.C.R., Section Foreign Relations, file 5/1964, 35.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 36.

delegation was sent to The United States was to investigate the possibility to import some industrial facilities, and the Russians could only have "illusions" about the purpose and the results of the visit<sup>16</sup>. The speculation launched with the occasion of this mission, Dej claimed, came from Soviet informative circles. The same time with the Romanian delegation in The United States also arrived a delegation from the Soviet Union, but, as the Romanian leader said: "Our companion's task is to not inform about anything"<sup>17</sup>.

Also during the discussions with Chinese Ambassador, Liu Fan, Gheorghiu Dej specified what were the reasons that influenced the decision to send a delegation of the Soviet Union in United States in the same period with that of the Romanian one led by Gaston Marin. Thus the main reason that caused sending a delegation of the Soviet Union at Washington was represented, highlight Dej, be the need to countering the influence of the Romanian mission, and, in the same time countering the negative assessments against Romania propagated among Soviet citizens thru soviet political decisions<sup>18</sup>.

The visit of the Romanian delegation to The United States from May-June 1964, was furthermore the subject of discussions also at the Romanian-Soviet meeting during the visit of a delegation led by John George Maurer in the first decade of July in Moscow. Even from the first day of the arrival in the U.S.S.R. capital, Kosygin warned the Romanian side by the fact that: "The U.S. are a complicated partner. The current situation is complicated in the socialist camp and the Americans benefit from this situation; they are looking for cracks in order to break the united front of socialist countries"<sup>19</sup>. To the accusation enunciated by Podgorny that: „The Romanian comrades lately not only they do no consult, but they did not

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 38.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 38.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 39

<sup>19</sup> D.A.N.I.C., Fund C.C. of P.C.R., Section Foreign Relations, file 36/1964, 170.

even inform. For example: the visit The United States of which we took note from the newspapers and about which we were not informed”, the answer from the Romanian side was linked to the Caribbean crisis: “We, the Romanians, we need to Cuba as the fifth wheel. But we were supposed to go at war for it”<sup>20</sup>. Podgorny also pointed out that the Romanian media was not taking any action against those foreign articles which referred to Romania’s exit from the "shackles" of the USSR, claims that could not be accepted by the Soviets<sup>21</sup>.

During the meetings on July 9 from Moscow, the Romanian Prime Minister will mention to the Soviet side that Romania will continue to purchase the latest technology from the West in a very energetic way, technology unavailable in other socialist countries, all this while recalling that the Soviets were trying to accomplish the same thing. The Romanian economy was organized, state Ion Gheorghe Maurer, in such a way for her to not depend on imports from capitalist countries, thus avoiding dependence on them. Therefore the Romanians did not understand where the Soviet fears came from regarding the possibility "of selling the soul" as a resultant of maintaining economic relations with the West. The Soviets believed that these relationships were a step, Maurer stated, toward transition to capitalism and to renunciation to the socialist constitution, which equate with a lack of confidence in the Romanians leadership experience<sup>22</sup>. Maurer will try then to list the reasons that caused this reaction from the Soviets in an interrogative intervention: "The possibility to discuss with the capitalist countries is the monopoly of only a few socialist countries? What origin can this mistrust have? Only U.S.S.R., C.S.R., P.R.P. can discuss? This is the question we are asking ourselves "<sup>23</sup>. This attitude could have only three reasons, from the Romanian side: 1) the Soviet lack of confidence in the

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 48.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 78.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 120.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 120.

Romanians ability to negotiate; 2) the desire of the Soviets to control Romania's relations denoted that Moscow does not wished this kind of relationship to exist and 3) a combination of the two<sup>24</sup>.

If the visit of a Romanian delegation in May-June 1964 in The United States cause some concern in Moscow, mainly due the Kremlin susceptibility of a possible derailment of the political line in Bucharest, as a result of contacts with Washington, the visit from August 1969 of the American President, R. Nixon, in Bucharest, will trigger more pronounced accusations by the soviet ladders toward the foreign policy promoted by the Romanian political régime, led this time by Nicolae Ceausescu.

After circumventing the State Department position on his intention to pay a visit to Bucharest<sup>25</sup>, afterwards the decision belonged to him only<sup>26</sup>, and announced the Congress the fact that he did not wish like his visit to Romania to lead to antagonistic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union<sup>27</sup>, in early August 1969 R. Nixon became the first U.S. President to visit a socialist country after the Second World War.

The main reasons given by R. Nixon regarding the visit he intended to carry in the S.R. Romanian, and shared with Romanian ambassador to Washington<sup>9</sup>, C. Bogdan, were: the fact that the U.S. did not want to draw a line between the countries with which the U.S. wanted to have good relations and those with which didn't wanted; the necessity to approach those issues in bilateral relations that required further discussion, among them trade, part that interest specially the Romanian authorities, but also, a reason that was more related to the sentimental aspect of the U.S. President, a desire to reunite with those who had induced him a "warm

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 120.

<sup>25</sup> Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Little, Brown and Company, 1979, 155-156

<sup>26</sup> Robert Dallek, Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger Partners in Power*, Harper Collins Publishers Inc, New York, 2007, 142.

<sup>27</sup> Yukinory Komine, *Secrecy in US Foreign Policy, Nixon , Kissinger and the Rapprochement with China*, Ashgate, Hamshire, 2008, 98

feeling" during his 1967 visit<sup>28</sup>. Of course to all these there will be added that of the good relations existing between Bucharest and Beijing, relationships that R. Nixon intended to use for a normalization of relations between the U.S. and P.R. China, plus the possibility of using the Romanian channel to settle the conflict in Vietnam<sup>29</sup>.

The decision to invite the U.S. President in Bucharest took into account the possibility of an adverse response from Moscow, however the Romanian leaders believed that "moral and psychological" benefits of such a visit should would weighed more heavily than any repressive measures taken by the Soviet Union. What was not taken into account was the possibility that the Soviet leaders will cancel their visit in Romania established for the end of July<sup>30</sup>. Reality will demonstrate, however, that they were wrong. Soviet ego was too big to swallow such an affront. On July 14 they announced the postponement of the meeting until the end of the year.

The relations of Romania with the other socialist countries will be visibly marked by Nixon's visit to Bucharest. During the works of the Tenth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, postponed for August 6 to 12, from the "friendly countries" not even one secretary general was present, there were only second-class members. R.P.D. Korean even motivated her absence to Congress in conjunction to Nixon's visit in Romania. During the farewell visit of the Korean ambassador in Bucharest, Ceausescu mentions to Kim The Hi that the explanations given by the North Korean

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<sup>28</sup> *The President's Conversation with Romanian Ambassador, Corneliu Bogdan*, July 11, 1969, 12:30–12:55 p.m., at <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d180>. Accessed at 12-09-2010.

<sup>29</sup> Richard C. Thornton, *The Nixon Kissinger Years: The Reshaping of American Foreign Policy*, Paragon House Publishers, St. Paul, 2001, 21.

<sup>30</sup> *Comments of a Rumanian official abroad concerning Rumanian reaction to President Nixon's projected visit to Rumania, and considerations affecting the Rumanian decision to invite the President*

at <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d179>. Accessed at 12-09-2010.

embassy were unable to convince the Romanian authorities of the need for such decisions. The Romanian leader told Kim The Hi that Romania "understand the particular circumstances of Democratic People's Republic of Korea, knows that the Koreans suffered after the war, that in South Korea there are U.S. troops, but so should D.P.R. of Korea understand the Romania's relations with U.S. and other states, to understand that through its contacts S.R. Romania seeks to address a number of important international issues"<sup>31</sup>. Ceausescu already perceived himself as a figure of international stature engaged in solving the great problems in the global arena.

The attitude of D.P.R. Korea, however, was not capable to pose problems to the authorities in Bucharest. Instead Moscow's position was more important, and she, although did not express disapproval of the Nixon visit<sup>32</sup>, have send to Congress in Bucharest only a secretary of the Central Committee, K.F. Katushev. During the talks between Ceausescu and Brezhnev in early December 1969, the Romanian leader, after underlining to Soviet counterpart the great importance the Romania attaches to the Romanian-Soviet relations, relations that otherwise should not be affected by problems encountered during the activity and cooperation between the two countries, inform Brezhnev of some existing problems in the bilateral relations<sup>33</sup>. The first group was represented by the economic ones, the second by that of the military techniques and the third issue was that of the agreement on a long-term basis<sup>34</sup>. But Brezhnev put the difficulties in

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<sup>31</sup> *Vizita de rămas bun a ambasadorului R.P.D. Coreene la București, Chim The Hi la Tovarășul Nicolae Ceausescu, președinte al Consiliului de Stat al R.S.R., Predeal, 29 octombrie, 1969*, in D.A.N.I.C., Fund C.C. of P.C.R., Section Foreign Relations, file 92/1969, 5.

<sup>32</sup> *Convorbirile dintre tovarășul Nicolae Ceausescu, președintele Consiliului de Stat al Republicii Socialiste România și Richard Nixon, președintele Statelor Unite ale Americii, 2 august 1969*, in D.A.N.I.C., Fund C.C. of P.C.R., Section Foreign Relations, file 59/1969, 129.

<sup>33</sup> *Discuția dintre tovarășii Nicolae Ceausescu și Leonid Brejnev, Moscova, 5 decembrie 1969*, in D.A.N.I.C., Fund C.C. of P.C.R., Section Foreign Relations, file 193/1969, 52.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, 52-53.

bilateral relations due to deviations "from the known rules of friendship" and conditioned the solving of economic existing problems in relations with the resolving of those between the parties. Brezhnev proposed a meeting between the two parties to discuss issues in an "open, partisan, fraternal way", following a meeting to address the economic issues. He didn't specified a time at which the meetings were to take place, and a recent one was unlikely to take place due the busy schedule of the leaders in Moscow, leaving no room for talks with the Romanian officials<sup>35</sup>

Although in Moscow there were not received any negative comments about the U.S. President's visit to Bucharest, Romanian officials, however, enjoyed a certain reluctance on its part in tackling economic problems with the soviet one, and this was forwarded to the leader of the White House. During the talks between R. Nixon and G. Macovescu from mid-December, the U.S. President was informed that in the last two months the relations of Bucharest with Moscow knew a pronounced degradation, hence the Romanian's insistence on purchasing coal in The United States. The steel sector was one of the weaknesses of Romania on which Moscow could exercise pressure. This news was disturbing Nixon. Romania, he stated was a "test case" of U.S. policy in Eastern Europe and Moscow's negative reaction to his visit to Bucharest could create reserves to other countries toward their relations with Washington. Macovescu wanted at the end of audience to deliver a message from Ceausescu, it contained a reiteration of the Bucharest aid request application to obtain U.S. support for the Romanian economy, which was "the base of the Romanian independence"<sup>36</sup>.

A new meeting between Brezhnev and Ceausescu, after that in the early December 1969, will be held in May next year in Moscow during the Lenin's commemoration. Although the discussions were to take place in May in Bucharest, shortly before they were to start the Soviet leadership

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 55.

<sup>36</sup> *Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 18, 1969, at <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29/d192>. Accessed at 18-09-2010.*

announced that Romanian the delegation was expected in Moscow. Arrived in the capital of the Soviet Union the Romanian delegation led by Nicolae Ceausescu will get a cold reception. Brezhnev will make a real indictment to the Romanian foreign policy, and Nixon's visit to Bucharest figure prominently among the charges brought to the Romanian leadership. The notice by Ceausescu of the discontent of the Romanian part toward the low Soviet representation at the August Congress in Bucharest, gave to the leader in Moscow the possibility to express his opinions about Nixon's visit to the Romanian capital. Brezhnev motivated his absence in Congress due the fact that: "Romania, namely the Central Committee, postponed the Congress to organize a pompous reception for Nixon". The indignation of the Soviet leader was even greater, especially as the visit came after "The international conference of the communist parties which called for struggle against U.S. imperialism"<sup>37</sup>. Moreover "Romania, remarked Brezhnev, decided to postpone the Congress and held a triumphal reception for Nixon, who came from Vietnam and whose actions are condemned for so many years not only by us, but by the entire world public opinion. (...) I saw in the newspapers photos of Nixon reception: dancing, flowers, walks through the shops. Let me tell you frankly, I thought that it was politically impossible to come to Congress, although before I came with pleasure"<sup>38</sup>. Brezhnev also considered that the Romanians' „coquetry” with the imperialist's leaders was a Romanian tendency to prove “its own independence at any cost”<sup>39</sup>. Brezhnev also expressed his bewilderment concerning the factors that led the Bucharest leadership to receive Nixon, and yet in such a way: "We want to be honest: we do not know whether Romania has received something economical or if she intended to obtain certain specific benefits, we do not know. But at the same time, we cannot

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<sup>37</sup> *Stenograma convorbirilor dintre delegația Partidului Comunist Român și Partidul Comunist al Uniunii Sovietice, Moscova, 19 mai 1970*, in D.A.N.I.C., Fund C.C. of P.C.R., Section Foreign Relations, file 19/1970, 28.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, 28-29.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, 29.

overlook the serious damage that was brought to Romania's political prestige in the eyes of her friends"<sup>40</sup>. Brezhnev will then bring reproaches on the Bucharest cultural policy toward Moscow. In this respect he made a comparison between the closure of some institutions which promoted the Soviet culture concomitant with the opening of some American, Italian and French ones<sup>41</sup>.

Ceausescu's responses to the allegations made and launched by Brezhnev expressed firmness. The help provide by Bucharest for Vietnam was the third in value after that of Moscow and Beijing, in addition, the condemning of the American aggression in Vietnam was made even during Nixon's visit and not only in direct talks but also in public toasts, something that was not don by other socialist countries, therefore, noted Ceausescu, Brezhnev's allegations were unfounded<sup>42</sup>. To the latter claims of Brezhnev regarding " the flirting with imperialists", Ceausescu will counterpart, as a counterargument, the existence of some actions between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., which could in turn be put into question by the Romanian part. Those from Vienna were a good example in this sense<sup>43</sup>. Neither Brezhnev's remark about the Romanian damage prestige brought by Nixon's visit was not omitted by Ceausescu. The perception of the leader in Bucharest was opposed to that uttered by Brezhnev. Romanian prestige was not weakened by this visit, on the contrary just the opposite, and this fact represented inclusive a contribution to the prestige of the all socialist countries<sup>44</sup>. Regarding the allegations in the cultural sphere, Ceausescu stated that the Romania was able to reach agreements with the U.S., France and Italy regarding the establishment of exchange libraries, but had not received, except Hungary, no response from the other socialist states when they

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 47.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 69.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 70.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 70.

Bucharest had initiated similar actions in the socialist camp, Moscow included<sup>45</sup>. Ceausescu also specified that the role of foreign libraries was to provide books from the technical field, books that were necessary for the specialization of the Romanian staff.

The decisions of the establishment in Bucharest to start a process of normalization of its relations with Washington in the mid-sixties inevitably triggered the attention and criticism from Moscow. If in 1964 the Kremlin accused Romania for adopting a rebellious attitude toward the Soviet Union and that her actions could lead to changes in the existing political regime in the country, after Nixon's visit in Bucharest, the accusations will focus on the disturbing relations of Romania with The United States, relations that were causing serious damages to the whole socialist camp. The Kremlin was also practicing a subtle economic and political blackmail. To the all allegations from Moscow, the leaders from Bucharest responded by arguments that proved beyond any doubt that the decisions made by the communist in Bucharest were not different from those that Moscow itself had with the West. In the same time Romania did not forget to inform about her relations with the Soviet Union the main two opponents of Kremlin, P.R. of China and The United States.

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# Totalitarian Regimes in High School Manuals of History. Case Study: Romanian Communism

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**Abstract:** The totalitarian regimes are an important issue of study in the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The paper presents the results of an analysis of some high school History manuals used in Romania. The Romanian Communism was chosen in order to identify how the multiple perspectives regarding the presentation of the theme were used, the way in which the materials included in the manuals correspond to the development of competences specified in the National Curriculum for History and avoid the accumulation of encyclopaedic knowledge by the Romanian youth. Another objective of the paper was to identify whether the contents of the manuals offer an integrated perspective of European history and contribute to the study of other dimensions of Romanian history in European context (except the political one).

**Keywords:** Communism in Romania, education in high school, historical sources, manuals, multiple perspectives, National Syllabus for History, Romania, Totalitarian regimes.

## 1. Introduction

The totalitarian regimes represent a theme which can generate a lot of debates at the level of Didactics of History in terms of methods used, how much information should we offer during a class, which are the best resources to be used for approaching such a subject in order to train the competences stated within the National Syllabi etc.

The Romanian Communism is a subject that should be taught with a lot of responsibility because it still represents a controversial theme. In addition to what they learn at school, students receive a lot of information about this

subject from media or online resources or from their families. In this respect, the teaching and learning approach should be focused upon assuring multiple perspectives about the subject, should use a large variety of sources, should valorise the information within school manuals, should stimulate students' personal investigations etc.

The huge mass of information received from various environments must be brought in debates organised in class and corrected. The main purpose of the approach is that students became aware of the differences between the democratic and totalitarian regimes, of the danger that totalitarian ideologies and mechanisms represent for the values of democracy in terms of human rights, separation of state powers, and rule of law or political pluralism.

Starting from these points of debate, the Romanian Curriculum for the upper cycle of high school comprises themes related to this subject. There is also an optional subject which is studied at the level of the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> grades. – History of Communism which has its own syllabus and manual, but this is did not make our subject of study.

Regarding the didactic means, the school manuals should represent the sources from which the competence achievements start in class and consequently they should offer some sources to be analysed within the educational activities organised by teachers or which complete the information while students read them at home.

## **2. Objectives and Methods**

Our study aims to evaluate the way in which the historical sources from some History manuals offer multiple perspectives among a sensitive issue related to recent History of Romania: the Communism, how they contribute to development of the competences defined by the National Syllabi for History – the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> grades, if they offer an integrated perspective of European history and whether they sustain the development of other dimensions of history (besides the political one) such as cultural, economic or social.

In order to achieve these goals, we have studied the national syllabi for History – the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> grades and four high school manuals, two for each level. These are: for the 11<sup>th</sup> grade – “History. Manual for the 11<sup>th</sup> grade” coordinated by Alexandru Barnea, Corint Publishing House 2008; “History. Manual for the upper cycle of high school – the 11<sup>th</sup> grade, all specializations”, authors: Felicia Adăscăliței, Adrian Liga, Liviu Lazăr, Alina Bratu and Viorel Lupu, Corvin Publishing House, Deva, 2006; for the 12<sup>th</sup> grade – “History. Manual for the 12<sup>th</sup> grade. All specializations” by Magda Stan and Cristian Vornicu, Niculescu Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008 and “History. Manual for the upper cycle of high school – the 12<sup>th</sup> grade, all specializations”, authors: Felicia Adăscăliței, Liviu Lazăr, Corvin Publishing House, Deva, 2007.

These manuals have the approval of the Ministry of National Education from Romania. In the following lines we will present our conclusions regarding the way in which these manuals respond to the requirements of the national syllabi for History during the superior cycle of the high school.

### **3. The Romanian Communism within the National Curriculum for History at the Upper Cycle of High School**

In order to identify the way in which themes related to the Romanian Communism are included in the National Curriculum for History corresponding to the upper cycle of high school, we have consulted the Syllabi for the 11<sup>th</sup>, the 12<sup>th</sup> (13<sup>th</sup>) grades.

The syllabi are focused on competences achievement. There are general competences which are available for the entire cycle of the high school and specific competences defined for each year of study. As their name suggests, the specific competences are more detailed and they are correlated with the domains of contents and the themes that must be approached during the History classes.

Nowadays syllabi for History follow five domains of contents: *Peoples and historical spaces*; *People, society and ideological background*; *State and politics*; *Religion and religious life*; *International relations* [1]. The themes that are studied are grouped into these domains of contents. On the other side, the syllabi were designed to offer glimpses of events and patterns of civilization both from Romania and worldwide. This perspective is called “integrated History” where 60% of themes are dedicated to the Romanian history and the other 40% to world history [2].

Contents related to the Romanian Communism are included mostly in the domains dedicated to *People, society and ideological background*; *State and politics* and *International relations*. In this respect, the Syllabus for the 11<sup>th</sup> grade within the domain *People, society and ideological background* the theme related to “Rural economy – urban economy in Romania; \*Romanian Diaspora and exile” (*Economie rurală – economie urbană în România; \*Diaspora și exilul românesc*) contains references to the economic transformations during the Communist regime.

The domain dedicated to *State and politics* comprises the theme “Romania – from the totalitarian regime to the state of law” (*România – de la statul totalitar la statul de drept*). The domain dedicated to *International relations* contains a theme that refers to the international affairs during the Communist regime – “Romania within the Warsaw Treaty” (*România în Tratatul de la Varșovia*). This is recommended to be used as a case study for the classes specialized in Philology and Social Sciences [3].

The Syllabus for the 12<sup>th</sup>, respectively the 13<sup>th</sup> grade includes several themes related to the Romania during the Communist period. *People, Society and Ideological background* comprises the following contents – “The 20<sup>th</sup> century between democracy and totalitarianism. Political ideologies and practices in Romania and Europe” (*Secolul XX – între democrație și totalitarism. Ideologii și practici politice în România și în Europa*). “Building democracy and the totalitarian ideology in Romania. People, facts and ideas” (*\*Studiu de caz: Construcția democrației și ideologia*

*totalitară în România. Oameni, fapte și idei.*) is the case study approached in this domain of content.

Another theme dedicated to this subject is related to the Romanian Constitutions where the both the democratic and totalitarian ones are analysed. *State and politics* contains the theme “Postwar Romania. Stalinism, National-Communism and Anti-Communist dissidence. Building the Post-Decembrist democracy” (România postbelică. Stalinism, național-comunism și disidență anticomunistă. Construcția democrației postdecembriste).

The *International Relations* domain comprises the theme “Romania during the Cold War” (România în perioada „războiului rece”) and the case study called “Romanian diplomacy between Warsaw Pact and European Union” (\**Studiu de caz: Diplomația românească între Tratatul de la Varșovia și Uniunea Europeană*).

Within the domain called *Religion and Religious Life* there is included a case study called “Romania and religious tolerance during the 20<sup>th</sup> century” (*Studiu de caz: România și toleranța religioasă în secolul XX*).

#### **4. New Approaches in Didactics of History**

After 1989 the Romanian education has passed through a process of reformation of the way of teaching and evaluating students’ achievements. Even if the reform in education started in early ‘90s, its first consequences were observed in 1997 – 2000 [4].

The changes were required by the new political regime, the democratic one. History is one of the subjects that mostly transformed. In this way, the way of writing and teaching history transformed and it was slightly adapted to the European tendencies in this domain.

The new way of teaching History adapted its discourse, methods and resources to the democratic perspective, to the need of active social integration, to the new technological achievements applied in almost all

domains of live, to the market economy and implicitly to the new requirements of the labour market etc.

In order to create active citizens, the nowadays approach of History teaching is focused on students, their needs and their achievements in terms of competences. In this way, the History is taught and learned from multiple perspectives, using various historical sources, highlighting aspects that are more connected to the mentalities and social imaginary.

Multiple perspectives in history are essential in offering an objective view regarding the past events and they become a very useful tool if controversial problems from history are approached. According to Mihai Manea, multiperspectivity in teaching History is compulsory in terms of assuring a more comprehensive understanding of past events and historical processes in order to highlight the similarities and differences. The comprehension of the dimensions of social dynamics at a certain chronological level and a better understanding of the Other are two important aspects that improve the understanding of history as a process [5].

These also raise awareness among students regarding the lack of existence of “an absolute truth” in history. The same process or event can be presented differently by various persons, according to their own system of political, social, cultural or economic achievements and points of view.

The multiple perspectives suppose an intensive work of teaching using various historical sources and learning using personal investigation. An approach taking into account the mentalities and social imaginary should be also taken into account while trying to assure a high quality educational activity (even if we talk about formal or non-formal environments).

The use of the new technologies is compulsory in History teaching and learning during the 21<sup>st</sup> century. History teachers should be aware that ICT use increase the quality of didactic activity and establishes a better way of communicating with the youths.

History syllabi for upper cycle of high school mention the necessity of approaching History teaching in this way in order to create or to develop the values and attitudes and to train specific competences.

## 5. Analysis between Manuals

As we mentioned above, reform in education has been targeting several pedagogical domains such as: curriculum, competences, methods, resources and approaches. Another important domain in which Romania made progresses refers to manuals. The former manuals were replaced by the new ones which are centred on developing and training competences, not on offering a huge amount of information without using the critical thought.

The History manuals for the 11<sup>th</sup> and the 12<sup>th</sup> grade that are approved by the Ministry of National Education are structured according to the domains of contents defined at the macro-curricular level. The chronological approach has been abandoned in favour of the one focusing on developing and training the competences mentioned in the syllabi.

The National Syllabus for the 11<sup>th</sup> grade aims at studying the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in an integrative manner that approaches themes regarding both Romanian and world history. In this context, aspects related to the Romanian Communism are studied. The theme dedicated to the *Rural economy – Urban economy* is very well presented in the manual from Corint Publishing House: there are two lessons regarding this content, the sources included for the analyses are various, they include tables, images, primary and secondary sources regarding the way in which the economy during the Communist period [6].

The support text of the lessons is well-balanced. It offers also a chronological perspective which is essential in understanding the transformations appeared after the Second World War and after the Romanian Revolution from 1989. The case study related to Romanian Diaspora and exile comprises also two lessons which offer the same perspective above the theme. A glossary with specific terminology was also

included at the beginning of the first lesson. The same theme in the second manual [7] is presented in two case studies (“Rural economy – urban economy in Romanian society” and “Romanian Diaspora and exile”).

The manual follows a structure that offers a support text of two-four pages, two up to four sources for analysis (documents, images, tables, and maps), a glossary of terms, and the presentation of a personality, online sources and some applications. The case study related to economy during the 20<sup>th</sup> century contains three parts: economy during the Interwar period, collectivization and industrialization (highlighting in this way the most important changes appeared during the Communist period in economy) and transition to market economy. One could be astonished by the fact that this case study does not contain sources to be analysed, but one of the exercises comprised in the application area requires an interdisciplinary investigation which could be successfully used in class in this respect. Students are asked to identify a fragment of fiction which presents aspects related to the economy of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and to present it in historic context.

The same observations should be done in the case of the second case study related to Romanian Diaspora and exile. The applications proposed by the authors are very interesting because they require students’ investigations (most of them online) and not only analysis of sources, but also their identification. In our opinion, this is an added value of the manual because it trains students’ ability to search for historical sources, not only to analyse them. In this way, one of the specific competences mentioned in syllabus is trained in an original, interdisciplinary manner.

The two manuals offer a primary background in order to train the specific competences mentioned in the syllabus for this chapter: comparison of opinions and arguments related to a theme of history; to know and to assume the values of a democratic citizenship; to select and comment historical sources in order to defend or to dispute regarding a certain point of view and for the classes of Philology and Social Sciences – to project a research with historic background. The sources included in the manual

offer the possibility of an analysis where students may compare arguments, may comment upon certain points of view and in case of the second manual, they can even select their own sources which can be brought in class in order to be analysed. There are also plenty of possibilities to project a research with historical background.

*State and politics* domain comprises a content related to Romania – from the totalitarian regime to the state of law. The competences stated in the syllabus for this domain are: analysis of the institutions, governing rules and procedures; use of negotiation strategies and civic cooperation; discover within the sources multiple perspectives regarding the historical events and processes; comparison of the opinions and arguments regarding a theme of history. Like for the other domain, the first manual analysed presents the case study using two lessons. They comprise a well designed theoretical support and several sources like: secondary sources, photos, a poster of propaganda [8].

The sources proposed by the authors and the activities mentioned within the case studies cover all the competences mentioned within the syllabus. The second manual follows the same pattern as for the previous domain. There is a short theoretical text which is very well structured highlighting the context, the main periods in which the theme can be divided, two historical sources and six applications which stimulate investigation, offer multiple perspectives upon the theme (students are invited to interview their parents about people's behaviour during the events from 1989 and the reaction of the factors which led to the beginning of the Romanian revolution) and highlight other aspects of the history – tolerance in this case (the authors propose a debate regarding the religious, ethnic and cultural tolerance during the Communist regime) [9].

In this way, students have the opportunity to investigate, to select their sources, to have multiple perspectives upon the same subject and to sustain their arguments within a debate. A well organised activity using this manual can lead to the achievements of all the specific competences mentioned in syllabus.

The domain dedicated to *International relations* of the Romania during the Communist regime is related to the Warsaw Pact. The first manual [10] reserved two lessons for this theme. These present the facts from the Socialist military bloc before and after 1964. The sources selected are primary ones that are very useful in offering multiple perspectives regarding the theme.

A chronology of the events and a glossary referring to terms such as “Cold War”, “military alliance” etc. are also included. The multiple perspectives and argued points of view can be presented following the applications offered by the manual. Teacher should complete these information or to ask students to use ICT in order to investigate the events and consequently to achieve the specific competence stated within the syllabus (4.2 Use of ICT in order to investigate a historical event or process).

The second manual [11] presents the case study in a single lesson where the following contents were included: a theoretical background which highlights the main events: the revolts from Hungary and Poland, the retreat of the Soviet troops from Romania and its consequences, invasion of the Czech Republic by the countries from Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the attitude adopted by Romania in this context. Regarding the sources, there are only two sources to be analysed, there are no sources to stimulate the multiple perspectives, but students may be trained to investigate in order to identify their own sources using the ICT resources. The applications stimulate debates, but also the use of opinions and arguments in order to write an essay.

The Syllabus for the 12<sup>th</sup> grade at History contains more themes related to the Romanian Communism. The first domain where this theme is approached is *People, society and ideological background* – “The 20<sup>th</sup> century between democracy and totalitarianism. Political ideologies and practices in Romania and Europe”. This theme also comprises a case study called “Building democracy and the totalitarian ideology in Romania. People, facts and ideas”. The first analysed manual [12] has a special design for each lesson. The left page comprises the applications of the lessons and

the right one the theory, vocabulary, chronology and supplementary applications.

For the theme mentioned above there is a lesson and a case study. The lesson called “Political ideologies and practices in Romania” refers only to the first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, actually, only until the abdication of the King Carol II of Romania, in 1940. The case study again refers to the first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century highlighting the features of the democracy in the first part of the century, the authoritarian regime, the political evolution in Romanian during 1938 – 1944.

There is no reference to the Communist regime as an important component of the Romanian totalitarianism. The other theme of this domain is related to the Romanian Constitutions. There we find a sub-chapter dedicated to the Romanian Constitutions adopted during the Communist regime and a table that synthesizes the main provisions of the 20<sup>th</sup> century constitutions. There is also a document presenting seven articles from the 1948 Constitution.

This together with the fragment from 1991 Constitution could provide important background for achieving the competences regarding the comparison of various sources where various points of view and types of discourse are used. The case study dedicated to “Institutions and civil rights” comprise an extract from the 1965 Constitution where are presented the Romanian institutions.

The second manual analysed for this study [13] presents the theme very complex, offering a perspective not only above the Romanian democracy and the totalitarian regimes, but they are put in context, the situation from Europe being also presented. The theoretical text is split by historical sources which comprise some suggestions for analyses. A very important added value is the use of modern methods that can be applied in order to analyse the sources. The texts also underline the differences between democracy and totalitarianism in terms of institutions, ideologies and political practices.

The case study has a very suggestive sub-title called “The impact of the totalitarian ideology upon the Romanian democracy” where a source was also included. The lessons have a rich content both at theoretical level and sources, there are suggestions for applications such as: debates, essays, project products, interdisciplinary investigations etc. The theme related to the constitutions comprises an introduction regarding the necessity of fundamental law and a brief presentation of the 19<sup>th</sup> century constitutions.

The fundamental laws of the 20<sup>th</sup> century are presented in two sections: the democratic and the authoritarian and totalitarian ones. The work with sources is preceded by a short theoretical presentation. The sources represent excerpts from each Communist constitution, following two sub-themes: Romanian territory and the institutions. The work with sources is also accompanied by methodological suggestions and applications.

The chapter dedicated to *State and politics* has in the first manual a sub-chapter comprising four lessons regarding Post-War Romania: Stalinism and National Communism, State and Society within Communist Romania, Anti-Communist Dissidence, Building the Post-Decembrist Democracy [14].

The texts are very well balanced, there are a lot of sources to be analysed which offer multiple perspectives regarding the subjects approached, group activities are also designed and there are activities that elicit argumentations about various subjects. The specific competences mentioned in the syllabus could be fully achieved while applying these activities. The second manual comprises three lessons which cover the theme from the syllabus: Post-War Romania. Romanian Communist Party between taking and maintaining the power in Romania, The Impact of the Communist regime upon society, Building the Post-Decembrist Democracy.

These contain a large amount of theoretic information, but also a lot of sources which enable a good didactic approach of the subject. The specific competences from the syllabus are taken into account while designing the activities of source analysis.

The international relations of the Communist Romania are presented in the first manual in a lesson called “Romania and the Cold War” and a case study “Romanian Diplomacy between the Warsaw Pact and European Union”. The lesson uses photos illustrating two different meetings between the Romanian president, Nicolae Ceaușescu and Charles de Gaulle and the other one illustrates the Romanian president and Mihail Gorbaciov. There is also a photo presenting aspects from Helsinki Conference from 1975.

The sources follow the main aspects related to the international relations of Romania with two political blocs which confronted during the Cold War such as: Declaration of the Romanian Workers’ Party from April 1964, rejection of the Valev Plan, a point of view regarding the events from Czech Republic from 1968 and two sources regarding the relations between Romania and the USA in the late ‘80 – a letter from Ronald Reagan addressed to the Romanian president and Nicolae Ceaușescu’s answer [15].

The theoretical support follows a chronological structure highlighting the Romanian attitude regarding the main institutions and processes which took place until the Cuban Missile Crisis. The second part of the theoretical text refers to the foreign policy after 1962 until 1989. The case study has two parts of theory: Romanian diplomacy during the Communist period and Romanian diplomacy after 1989. There are four sources which can be used and assure the multiple perspectives about the subject. The applications take into account cooperative learning and work with historical sources.

The second manual presents the contents in a lesson and a case study which offer detailed information regarding the Romanian international affairs during the Cold War. Four sources are included in the text of the lesson in order to offer the opportunity to train the competences mentioned in the syllabus and to facilitate the work with historical sources.

The cooperative learning methods are used in this lesson (think/work in pairs/communicate). An academic debate is also proposed starting from a very interesting question: “Would have been Romania able to promote

another politics during the Cold War? Was it able to face in other way the pressures coming from Moscow?”

A suggestion of an interview is also proposed there. The case study follows two paths: “Romania between the Warsaw Pact and alliance with the democratic countries” and “Romania and the European Union”. Two historical sources were included in the case study. The applications take into account the presentation of the factors that enabled Romania to pass from the Warsaw Pact to the European organisations.

The chapter related to *Religion and religious life* contains a case study called “Romania and religious tolerance during the 20<sup>th</sup> century”. The first manual included three sources that present the attitude of the Romanian Communist regime towards religion and religious cults. It offers suggestions of cooperative activities, of investigations and comparisons which can contribute to the practice of the competences mentioned within the syllabus [16].

In the second manual, the case study does not comprise data or sources regarding the attitude of the Communist regime towards Church, but in the lesson called “State, Church and Diaspora” consistent information regarding the State and Church during the Communist regime as well as two sources were included [17].

## **6. Conclusions**

After analysing the four manuals mentioned above, we have seen that the lessons and case studies dedicated to the Romanian Communism are represented according to the requirements of the National Curriculum.

The sources selected are very important in approaching History in terms of task-based learning and multiple perspectives upon the events put in discussion. The methods suggested to be used are those which require critical thought, personal investigation and offer the opportunity to find answers by own effort. These tasks are very important because the students learn by doing certain things. They achieve information, but in the same

time they train certain competences which can be used in many other contexts where these can be put into practice.

The ICT means are also integrated in the process of teaching and learning History during the upper cycle of high school. The authors of the manuals offer the addresses of some online resources that could be accessed in order to complete the information or to select sources that can be used in activities.

The information comprised in the theoretical part of the lessons is well-sized; they avoid the accumulation of encyclopaedic knowledge and allow the work with sources. On the other hand, in the manual for the 12<sup>th</sup> grade [18] the information included in the theoretical part is in small quantity provided that the students have to use the manual in order to prepare the exam of graduation. All the manuals contribute to the achievement of general information regarding the contents from the syllabi.

Manuals published at Corvin Publishing House [19] propose very interesting activities which use the methods of critical thought, which recommend interviews and investigations that should be put in practice by students and have a high degree of interdisciplinarity.

The history of Romania during the Communist regime is presented not only from political and diplomatic point of view, but also from economic, social and cultural. There are lessons where aspects regarding life within the Communist regime are presented.

Other aspects included in the History lesson refer to the new types of disciplines such as: economic education, education for human rights, education for democracy, education for peace etc.

The role of themes relate to Communist regime is to make the students aware of the importance of preserving the means of democracy, the importance of human rights, the importance of freedom and the danger that the totalitarian ideologies and politics represent for societies.

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- [6] Barnea *et alii* 2008, 62-65.
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- [14] Stan-Vornicu 2007, 79-85.
- [15] Stan-Vornicu 2007, 102.
- [16] Stan-Vornicu 2008, 116-117.
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# Peculiarities of Hungary's Sovietization

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**Abstract:** The communization of Eastern Europe was not a single, uniform process, applied strictly and identically in accordance with a unitary model; Moscow acted in relation to the situation of each of the European states that were affected. This led to some distinctive notes and local variations of the Soviet scenario extending its influence. This study aims to examine how the Kremlin adapted its tactics to the realities and circumstances of Hungary and to highlight the features its Sovietization.

**Keywords:** Communization, Soviet Union, Hungary, Soviet bloc.

## 1. Introduction

The end of World War II gave Stalin the satisfaction of defeating Hitler as well as the opportunity to transform *Mitteleuropa* in Moscow's *strategic glacis*. The means to achieve this goal was the export of revolution in the states "liberated"/ occupied by the Red Army.

In April 1945, the Kremlin leader shared his conception of the postwar configuration of Central and Eastern Europe to Tito: "The war is not the same as the previous but the one who occupies a territory imposes its social system. Each imposes its system where his army reaches".<sup>1</sup> It may seem surprising, but for the realization of this vision, the Soviet Union needed to maintain the alliance with US and Great Britain. The concert of the great powers was necessary because Moscow was exhausted with the global clash and could not immediately engage in another major conflict. The extension of cooperation would have ensured that the USSR will not face a hostile Western coalition (in which, eventually, Germany might be integrated,

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<sup>1</sup> Djilas M., *Întâlniri cu Stalin*, Editura Europa, Craiova, pp. 74-75.

too).<sup>2</sup> Stalin hoped to exploit the contradictions between the capitalists in order to undermine their unity. In his calculations was also featured the wish to receive financial support for reconstruction.<sup>3</sup>

This respite would have allowed Moscow to strengthen its sphere of influence that the Soviets had built for themselves in Central and Eastern Europe through military presence. In time, local communists, Kremlin's proxies would strengthen their position, not excluding the possibility that they could acquire just enough popular support for access to power through free elections.<sup>4</sup> But Stalin was aware that the US and England will not become accomplices of his imperial ambitions, even if they had made peace with the Soviet's claim of having "friendly governments" in the region. As such, he opted for a gradual Sovietization who relied on a strategy of "popular fronts". The scenario involved the creation, in the European area that had came under Soviet domination, of governments in which bourgeois parties could be present along with the Communists, at least for a period of time, in order not to affect the sensitivity of the West.

## **2. What Place Went to Hungary, Hitler's Last Ally, in the Kremlin's Plans?**

In December 1941, Stalin told the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, who was on a visit to Moscow, that Hungary has to concede Romania, in the aftermath of hostilities, the occupied territory in accordance with the Vienna Dictate. "This would be an additional punishment for Hungary for its role in war".<sup>5</sup> By the end of the war, Stalin's perception of Budapest

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<sup>2</sup> Calvocoressi P., 2000. Rupeți rândurile! Al doilea război mondial și configurarea Europei postbelice, Polirom, Iași, p. 156.

<sup>3</sup> Mark E., 2001. *Revolution by Degrees. Stalin's National-Front Strategy for Europe. 1941-1947*, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 31, Washington, D.C., p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>5</sup> Constantiniu L., 2007. *Proiectele sovietice de organizare postbelică a Europei*, în "Revista Institutului Diplomatic Român", 1/2007, p. 205.

remained a negative one. In December 1943, the Soviet dictator complained to Edvard Beneš that the Hungarians are behaving in the occupied Soviet territories even worse than the Romanians were.<sup>6</sup> The same hostile attitude was shared by Ivan M. Maiski (the head of the Soviet Commission for the Identification and Recovery of the losses caused to the USSR by Germany and its allies), who wrote a memorandum to Molotov on January 10, 1944. The document constituted a strategic guide for the Soviet foreign policy in the next 30-50 years. Maiski deemed that Budapest was to be treated bluntly: "The USSR is not interested in creating a powerful Hungary. Hungary, and Italy should be let to understand that allies have not forgotten their position in the current war. For this, the Soviet policy towards Hungary must be built minimalistically, just to keep the Hungarian state, but as opportunities arise to narrow its territory, following strictly the principle of ethnicity. In those cases when the application of the principle gives rise to doubts, the problem should be resolved against Hungary".<sup>7</sup>

Another indication of a lack of importance of Hungary for the USSR is the episode of October 9, 1944, when Stalin and Churchill divided Europe into spheres of influence in Moscow. According to the initial decision, Hungary had to be put under joint Soviet-Western tutelage (50%-50%). Later on, during negotiations, Stalin gained 75%.<sup>8</sup> During the same period, Stalin met with exiled Hungarians in Moscow, whom he explained that in Hungary, the Communists could be forced to share power with other parties, for a period of 10-15 years, in order to distract the West from the much faster sovietization of Poland.<sup>9</sup> The minimum limit on the Soviet aspirations in Hungary seem therefore to be the maintainance of preeminence, which could constitute in the mid-term the starting point for

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<sup>6</sup> Kenez P. 2006. *Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviets*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.19.

<sup>7</sup> Islamov T.M., Pokivailova T.A., Vințeler O., 2003. *Din culisele luptelor pentru Ardeal*, Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, pp. 27-28.

<sup>8</sup> Brătianu M.G., 2002. *Acordul Churchill-Stalin din 1944*, Corint, București, p. 56.

<sup>9</sup> Mark E., *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

the transformation of the state into the “dictatorship of the proletariat”. In other words, for Moscow the sovietization of Hungary was not a priority, which did not mean it was being ignored; rather, it was placed within the process of swinging Eastern Europe under the Soviet hegemony.

As of September 23, 1944 the Red Army entered Hungarian territory, which became a battlefield; the Moscow quartet (Mátyás Rákosi, József Révai, Ernő Gerő, and Mihály Farkas) began to receive instructions for implementing the Soviet program. The Hungarian Communists’ political stature became even more impressive because on October 15, 1944 the attempt of Regent Miklós Horthy, the Hungarian head of state, to obtain a truce with Moscow failed miserably.

Without the support of the Hungarian army, largely made up of pro-German officers, Horthy was forced by the Reich official in Budapest to revoke the proclamation and to appoint to the position of Prime Minister Ferenc Szálasi, the leader of the Party “Arrow Cross”. Later on, the “admiral with no fleet” was arrested by the SS and taken to Germany.<sup>10</sup> But General Béla Miklós, whom Horthy had sent to negotiate with the Soviets the terms of the armistice, remained in Moscow where he was accepted to negotiations to form a coalition government. The discussions quickly led to the shaping of a ministerial team. The weak intervention of the moderate Communists was backed by Stalin, who admonished the representatives of the parties in Hungary: “One must say to those invited [in the government] that if they are not willing, others will be and there will be an even more leftist government”.<sup>11</sup>

In parallel, one of the Hungarian communists in Moscow, Zoltán Vas was sent to Szeged to prepare the return home of his companions. On October 26, the Communist assault continued with the arrival in the city, of other

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<sup>10</sup> Lendvai P., 2001. *Ungurii. Timp de un mileniu învingători în înfrângeri*, Humanitas, București, pp. 434-436.

<sup>11</sup> Horváth A., 2002. *Postfață* la Andreescu A., Nastasă L., Varga A., *Minorități etnoculturale. Mărturiile documentare. Maghiarii din România (1945-1955)*, Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, Cluj, p. 843.

“Moscow-ites”: Imre Nagy, Révai, Gerő, and Farkas. On December 2, they created the Independent Hungarian National Front (the Hungarian Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party), whose program was assumed also by the Independent Smallholder Party and the National Peasant Party. Meanwhile, in the area liberated by the Red Army, national committees, Soviet style, were formed. These local bodies of power called, in Debrecen, a Parliamentary Assembly to legitimize the Provisional Government headed by Béla Miklós, whose composition was agreed in Moscow. The communists held the portfolios of Agriculture, Commerce, and Transportation. On January 20, 1945 Hungary signed an armistice with the Allies in Moscow, an armistice which provided for the evacuation of all territories acquired by Hungary after December 31, 1937.<sup>12</sup> The government recognized by the great powers was placed under control of an Allied (Soviet actually) Commission, headed by Soviet Marshal Kliment Efreimov Voroshilov. By February 13, 1945, when the Red Army entered Budapest, the communists' ascent became evident: 30,000 Hungarians already had party cards.

Although it legitimized itself from the Republic of Counsels of Bela Kun of 1919 (Rákosi himself had been the Commissioner of the people), the Communist Party did not have roots in the Hungarian society. It is estimated that during the war the number of communists varied between one thousand and several tens of members.<sup>13</sup> This underground cult led by László Rajk (party secretary) and János Kádár strove shyly to begin a resistance movement against Hitler. The Moscow Quartet arrived in the capital at the same time with the “leading to the military conquest”<sup>14</sup> of the the Soviets and quickly imposed itself in front of the local party.

Between May 20-21, 1945, during the first conference organized by the Communists after being release, Kádár and Rajk still found their place in

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<sup>12</sup> Lendvai P., *op. cit.*, p. 422.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 437-438.

<sup>14</sup> Zilber H., 1997. Actor in procesul Pătrășcanu. Prima versiune a memoriilor lui Belu Zilber, Humanitas, București, p. 29.

the Central Committee and the Politburo of the party hijacked by Rakosi, who imposed a new Guideline: “Let us play the democratic alliance game and that of the coalition governments and, especially, to act without revolutionary zeal and without mentioning any word about the dictatorship of the proletariat”.<sup>15</sup> Relaxed rhetoric was meant to hide their true goals.

A document revealing in this regard is the Minutes of the meeting of June 15, 1945 between the Romanian comrades (Ana Pauker, Emil Bodnăraș, Constantin Pârvolescu, Iosif Chișinevschi, Iosif Rangheț, Gheorghe Apostol, Miron Constantinescu, Ana Toma) and Mihály Farkas, who presented the uncensored agenda of the Budapest Communists.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the first course of action represented the consolidation of the party by increasing the number of its supporters. The workers of large enterprises, rail workers and postal employees were targeted for recruitment. Intellectuals were not ignored either, their attraction by providing financial incentives having already been decided. Those compromised for working with the former regime were promised “amnesty” and “fogness” of the past, if they put themselves to the will of the communists. Farkas suggested that “young fascists”, i.e. those from among the proletariat, could be recycled.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, in July, Rákosi authorized the enlisting of members of the “Arrow Cross” party within the Communist Party.<sup>18</sup>

The second guideline was to undermine the work of other parties and their gradual subordination. The communists believed that their main enemy is Smallholders Party, consisting of “reactionaries” who managed to dominate political life in Hungary. President Zoltan Tildy, whose pro-

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<sup>15</sup> Duplan C., Giret V., 1997. *Viața în roșu. Pionierii*. Varșovia, Praga, Budapesta, București. 1944-1968, vol.I, Editura Nemira, București, p. 57.

<sup>16</sup> Andreescu A., Nastasă L., Varga A., *op. cit.*, pp. 100-116.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 104-110.

<sup>18</sup> Borhi L., 2004. *Hungary in the Cold War 1945-1956. Between the United States and the Soviet Union*, Central European University Press, Budapest, New York, p. 70.

Soviet sympathies were known, could be handled by small signs of kindness: "Our line is to strengthen the left wing and make concessions, but after all our tactics so that it is fragmented, to challenge a break. If we crack when we win, we split the reactionary forces".<sup>19</sup>

Rákosi managed to transform the National-Peasant Party in an annex of the Communist Party. Farkas express clearly this reality: "Here, within the inner circle, I may declare that the leadership, the majority of the leadership and of the members of the party are members of our party".<sup>20</sup> It was expected that the Peasants, who already had nearly 200,000 members, mostly poor and middle-class peasants, be used as bait to attract the electorate of the Smallholders Party. The Social Democratic Party was the exponent of the petty bourgeoisie, who was traditionally anti-Soviet and anticommunist, but its leaders were willing to play the Communists' game. The treatment applied to the Smallholders was prescribed in this case by creating a rift between the various factions and the deployment of party members and supporters. Finally, the Union of Patriots, led by "Grof" Géza Teleki, the minister of Religious Affairs in the Provisional Government of 1945, was perceived as an insignificant group, which could be easily annihilated. Political cleansing used as a weapon did not miss from the picture outlined by Farkas. Under the pretext of "cleansing" the political scene and the state apparatus of "fascists" and "reactionaries", the Hungarian communists could eliminate any undesirable person. The first step was to discredit the opponents through the subservient press and then intervene, as appropriate, to marginalize or to trial them in special tribunals.<sup>21</sup> The third part of this secret file was the seizure of executive power. Officially, the communists had few portfolios in the Cabinet (Imre Nagy – Minister of Agriculture and Ernő Gerő – Minister of

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<sup>19</sup> Andreescu A., Nastasă L., Varga A., *op. cit.*, p. 107.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 107.

<sup>21</sup> Țărău V., 2005. Alegeri fără opțiune. Primele scrutinuri parlamentare din Centrul și Estul Europei după cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial, Editura Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, pp. 351-352.

Communications). Other members of the Communist Government, however, were camouflaged. To summarize the situation, Farkas concluded that “of 12 (ministers), 5 are with us”.<sup>22</sup>

This is the reason why they were not in a hurry to besiege the Government. Farkas explained the reasons for this hypocritical attitude: “If we do this, i.e. take out the reactionaries at once, which would appeal to workers, we would help create a union of the reactionaries and their resistance would increase, which would create a serious political crisis in our country because it would unite the reactionaries inside and would raise and win foreign reaction to their side”.<sup>23</sup> Deliberately the Hungarian Communists delayed the assault on the Executive. They set their minds on operating quietly and gradually, as they were taught by Moscow. Rákosi later on named this patient effort to remove opponents the “salami cutting tactics”.<sup>24</sup> Until the right moment, the fiction of accepting the democratic rules had to be maintained and the respect for the rule of law had to be shown. The insignificant presence, a front, of a few ministers of the “bourgeois-landlords”, who could be disposed of later, was necessary in order not to provoke the objections of the West.

A separate dimension was the absolute oversight of institutions of force. The gendarmerie had been abolished and the Police subjugated. Paradoxically, this created difficulties for the public understood what was the source of the oppression they were enduring. Farkas perfectly illustrated the issue: “90% of the police is completely new, a democratic popular police. The Communist Party has an overwhelming influence on it. The party has more influence than it needs over the police”.<sup>25</sup> In this context, it is not accidental that Mihály Farkas himself would become only

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<sup>22</sup> Andreescu A., Nastasă L., Varga A., *op. cit.*, p. 108.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 108-109.

<sup>24</sup> Tismăneanu V., 1997. Reinventarea politicului. Europa Răsăriteană de la Stalin la Havel, Polirom, Iași, p. 47.

<sup>25</sup> Andreescu A., Nastasă L., Varga A., *op. cit.*, pp. 109-110.

a month later the deputy interior minister, a key sector that Communists will seize, which allowed them to dominate the intelligence service as well.<sup>26</sup> About the latter, Rákosi declared that it is “the only institution in which we have reserved total leadership, categorically refusing to share it with other coalition parties proportionally with the share of each of them”.<sup>27</sup>

The play reveals that in the summer of 1945, the Hungarian communists had already applied a plan whose aim was the complete takeover of power in an confusingly defined period of time, but certainly not too distant one.

Revolutionary optimism has not been seriously affected by the fact that they have suffered a fiasco in the free elections of November 4, 1945. However, Rákosi anticipated that the general elections “will not play an important role in the plans of the Communists”.<sup>28</sup> The Party gathered only 16.95% of the votes, which placed it third. On the elections podium, the Smallholders Party took the first place, reaching the absolute majority of votes – 57.03%. It was assisted by the Social Democratic Party, with 17.41%, while the National Peasant Party had an adherence of only 6.87%.<sup>29</sup>

Ironically, Stalin invoked before the Americans the failure of his Hungarian epigones in order to illustrate the Red Army's impeccable attire. On December 23, 1945, in Moscow, he told Secretary of State, James Byrnes that the articles published in the US and in England, describing the USSR's tempting of the electoral processes in the occupied states were unfounded: “There were Soviet troops and in actual fact the Soviet Union could do pretty much what it wanted there, but that nevertheless the elections had resulted in a victory for a party other than the Communist Party”.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Țărău V., *op. cit.*, p. 351.

<sup>27</sup> Courtois S., Werth N., Panné J.-L., 1998. *Cartea neagră a comunismului. Crime, teroare, represiune*, Humanitas, București, p. 370.

<sup>28</sup> Borhi L., *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

<sup>29</sup> Țărău V., *op. cit.*, p. 365.

<sup>30</sup> Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1945, Volume II, General: Political and Economic Matters, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1967, p. 753.

Generalissimo Stalin reiterated that Moscow's only complaint was not to neighbor hostile states. He added that he leaves to those peoples to designate the parties that will rule them.

The causes of the electoral failure are numerous. The defeat in World War II had finally knelt this little "noble nation" (in the Middle Ages, the Hungarian aristocracy had a significant share in the society, requiring a certain type of exemplary conduct, which subsequently impregnated the national spirit).<sup>31</sup> The Soviet military occupation meant a long and endless procession of suffering: murder, rape, robbery, abuse of all kinds. Of 500,000 Hungarians, who were taken prisoners by the Soviets, their families no longer had any news. To them one might add the tens of thousands of people interned in forced labor camps.<sup>32</sup> The communists were seen as a community of aliens (the Hebrew origin of the quartet was also invoked), in the service of Moscow. The land reform, of which Stalin's students had made a merit, did not resolve satisfactorily the peasant problem, since some 300,000 families had not taken part in the distribution of the expropriated arable land.<sup>33</sup> Economically, Rákosi's team did not stand out through any concrete measures to fight the hyperinflation the country was facing.<sup>34</sup> The conditions of the armistice forced Budapest to pay Moscow huge war reparations. Half of the Hungarian domestic industry (and the whole heavy industry) produced exclusively to cover these war reparations.<sup>35</sup> In addition, the Red Army had many mouths to feed, and all the dependent storehouse services were also in the Hungarians' responsibility. Finally, the pressures of Voroshilov, who even threatened with the risk of the outbreak of a civil war, did not mellow the Smallholders and the Social Democrats

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<sup>31</sup> Constantiniu F., 2006. *1956: Exemplul ungar*, in "Lettre Internationale", No. 57, p. 27.

<sup>32</sup> Lendvai P., *op. cit.*, p. 439.

<sup>33</sup> Tărău V., *op. cit.*, p. 349.

<sup>34</sup> Borhi L., *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>35</sup> Idem, The United States, Hungary, and the Origins Of The Cold War, in "Hungarian Studies", No. 7/1-2, 1991/92, p. 46.

into accepting the idea of participation in the common list, alongside the communists.<sup>36</sup>

Normally, in a democratic society, a political party that lost the elections goes through a recoil of political influence. But the Soviets opposed the legitimacy bestowed upon the opposition by the trust of the masses with the Soviet soldiers' boots. Thus, if Tildy became the head of the Hungarian Cabinet, Rákosi was assigned as Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister respectively. Following the negotiations between the four parties with significant results in the elections, Béla Kovács, the secretary general of the Smallholders was nominated for the Ministry of Interior portfolio, while the Communists were assigned the Ministry of Finance, which was to be acquired by Gerő. Voroshilov spoke again, forcing the Smallholders to cede the Interior Ministry to Imre Nagy.<sup>37</sup> A few months later, things evolved even more in the manner desired by Soviets' clients.

In summer 1946, Rákosi commissioned Gerő and Imre Nagy to go to Romania to describe their Romanian colleagues (at the meeting were probably present Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, Vasile Luca and Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu) the "turn to the left" that Hungary was experiencing. On this occasion, the two invoked a long series of accomplishments. Firstly, the Hungarian communists had managed to abolish the monarchy. The National Assembly unanimously proclaimed the republic on February 1, 1946. Then, they determined the election of Zoltán Tildy as president of the state and convinced the Smallholders to appoint Ferenc Nagy as the head of Government, against their wish to propose a representative of the conservatives. In addition, the party that had just given Hungary a president and a chief of the executive was forced to move to the purge of the "fascists" from its ranks. Gerő and Imre Nagy mentioned also the sentencing of a number of 10,000 "war criminals". For no less than 20 former prime ministers and ministers the death penalty had been decided and they had passed to its implementation. This picture was completed by

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<sup>36</sup> Țărău V., *op. cit.*, p. 363.

<sup>37</sup> Borhi L., *Hungary in the Cold War 1945-1956*, p. 77.

the intention to nationalized the metallurgical concerns (implemented on November 22, 1946) and the other industries. And the National Bank would be nationalized, too. Also within the chapter of achievements it was also mentioned the creation of joint Soviet-Hungarian economic companies, the expression of the economic enslavement of Hungary by the USSR.<sup>38</sup>

Another part of the exposure referred to the visit that a Hungarian government delegation, led by Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, made in the USSR between April 9-18, 1946. It had been ably directed by the Soviets. Rákosi had secretly visited Moscow in March 1946, where it was suggested that there might be some availability on the Kremlin's part to discuss Hungary's territorial claims, if the country accepted the establishment of joint companies and the Hungarian communists were able to neutralize the radicals of the Smallholders. Back in Budapest, Rákosi manipulated Ferenc Nagy, who agreed finally to compromise. On the day the bilateral agreement was signed surrendering Moscow the exploitation of oil, bauxite and aluminum in Hungary, Ferenc Nagy was off to the USSR.<sup>39</sup> Gerő and Imre Nagy did not mentioned all these details in front of the Romanian communists; instead, they confined themselves to present the favorable reception that the Hungarian Premier received in Kremlin. After he thanked the Soviets for the Red Army having liberated Hungary, Stalin replied: "Tell Mr. Prime Minister that the Soviet Government considers Hungary is an autonomous and independent state".<sup>40</sup> In this context, it must be said that, beyond these empty words, the Hungarians – who hoped to get some concessions related to the ease of the conditions for payment of the war reparations or the support of Moscow to revise their borders – did not received anything much from Stalin. But Stalin had the ability to let the Hungarian communists entertain vague illusions about the recovery of these claimed territories.

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<sup>38</sup> Andreescu A., Nastasă L., Varga A., *op. cit.*, pp. 475-476.

<sup>39</sup> Borhi L., *op. cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>40</sup> Andreescu A., Nastasă L., Varga A., *op. cit.*, p. 477.

Gerő and Imre Nagy revealed to their Romanian colleagues that Stalin had discussed separately with Rákosi, who was part of the official Hungarian delegation in his capacity as deputy prime minister. The episode is important in two respects. Firstly, the two talked about the possibility of establishing the Cominform.<sup>41</sup> This detail is extremely interesting, especially since the dominant historiography considers the creation of the Cominform (abbreviation for the Information Office of the Communist and Workers' Parties) as a Soviet response to the "Marshall Plan" promoted by the Americans in 1947. Then Stalin ironically referred to Churchill's Fulton speech. On March 5, 1946 the Briton, who had not been deceived by the national fronts strategy, showed that an "iron curtain" had descended on Eastern Europe. Stalin did not believe that a war would still be possible "in the life of this generation" and interpreted Churchill's gesture as a sign of his desire to intimidate Moscow: "The Englishmen cry out, but they would not manage to yield 100,000 people against us".<sup>42</sup>

For Hungary, the year 1947 would stand under the sign of those discussed in Moscow. On the one hand, externally, Budapest came up hopelessly within the block built by Moscow, being dragged into the whirlwind of the Cold War. The proclaiming of the "Truman Doctrine" (March 12, 1947), the launching of the "Marshall Plan" (May 15, 1947) and the Soviet constitution of the Cominform (Communist Party meeting in Szklarska Poreba, on September 22-27, 1947) marked the clear formation of the two antagonistic "camps", as he called by Andrei A. Zhdanov: the imperialist camp, gravitating around the USSR and the opposite camp, led by the USA. The Soviet hegemony over Hungary received additional confirmation in the aftermath of the signing of the Peace Treaty, on February 10, 1947. Besides the bitterness caused by the fact that, territorially, Hungary was back to the *status quo ante bellum*, it was also forced to bear the Soviet troops stationed on its territory.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 474.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 476.

<sup>43</sup> Borhi L., *op. cit.*, p. 116.

Internally, the communists had unleashed the attack on their main political enemy, the Smallholders Party. On January 5, 1947, the Ministry of Interior (headed by Rajk, dated March 20, 1946) issued a communique in which it was announced the discovery of a “conspiracy against the state”. The identified leader of the subversive movement, György Donáth was sentenced to death and executed. The oppression though did not stop there. The Communists claimed that this conspiracy had ramifications that prove the involvement of Béla Kovács, the party’s secretary general. Kovács was arrested on February 26, by the Red Army troops who escorted him to the USSR, where he was incarcerated for almost ten years. On Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy were launched several accusations of complicity in the alleged coup. In April, Rákosi dreamed even to a show-trial that he could file against Nagy, but withdrew at the urging of Molotov. On May 31, Ferenc Nagy resigned.<sup>44</sup> In his place was named Lajos Dinnyés, who surrendered to the will of the Communists.<sup>45</sup> In July 1948, the President of the Republic himself, Zoltán Tildy, about whom Rákosi said he was a person with whom one can do business<sup>46</sup>, was forced to resign and be arrested in his home. Incidentally, his successor, Árpád Szakasits, the former secretary general of the Social Democrats, had a similar fate. On April 24, 1950, although officially the head of the state, he was arrested and jailed by the Communists until 1956.<sup>47</sup>

The legislative elections of August 31, 1947, held in this atmosphere of terror and rigged beautifully, were marked by the victory of the Left Bloc. The Communists got 22% of the votes, the Social Democrats 15%, equal to the percentage of the Smallholders Party. The National Peasant Party got less than 9% of the votes. The following year, the Social Democrats became

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<sup>44</sup> Courtois S., Werth N., Panné J-L, *op. cit.*, p. 371. Rainer, J.M. *The Years of Changes in Hungary 1944-1948*, paper presented on 19 February 1998, at the Conference “The Czechoslovak February, 1948” – Prague.

<sup>45</sup> Zamfir Z., 1999. *Istoria universală contemporană*, vol. II, Editura Oscar Print, București, p. 201.

<sup>46</sup> Borhi L., *op. cit.*, p. 65.

<sup>47</sup> Lendvai P., *op. cit.*, p. 448.

the victims of the “slicing” scenario. Their Anticommunist wing was isolated and removed, while the rest of the party was forced to accept being swallowed by the Communists. The merger took place on June 13, 1948, giving birth to the Workers' Party.

The proclamation of the People's Republic of Hungary and the passing of a new Constitution on August 18, 1949, completed the establishment of the inspirational Soviet totalitarianism in this country. Rákosi's servility to Stalin proved exemplary. Until the death of the Soviet tyrant, the two leaders had at least six working meetings. The insistence of the Hungarian leader became even annoying. In one case, when appropriate to spend his holidays in the USSR in the same place where his idol rested, Stalin forced Rákosi to drink until he reached the threshold of an alcoholic coma.<sup>48</sup> In the aftermath of the disputes between the USSR and Yugoslavia, Rákosi went to Moscow twice for consultations.<sup>49</sup> Following these consultations, Hungary was the first satellite state to give the green light to the repression against the “imperialist spies” and “Tito's clique”.

Sacrificed in the name of this purple delirium was none other than Rajk. Arrested in May 1949, the former craftsman of the elimination of bourgeois politicians became the victim of his own comrades. Rajk was sentenced to death and hanged on October 15, 1949. But Rákosi did not stop there, seeking “spies” also in other countries with popular democracy regimes. He sent the list of 562 people to Moscow (Czechoslovak, Romanian, German, Bulgarian and Polish) involved in the Rajk affair.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Békés C., Byrne M., Rainer J.M., 2002. *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: a History in Documents*, Central European University Press, Budapest, New York, p. 353.

<sup>49</sup> Rainer J.M., 1997. *Stalin and Rákosi, Stalin and Hungary, 1949-1953*. Paper presented on October 4, 1997 at the workshop “European Archival Evidence. Stalin and the Cold War in Europe”, 1956 Institute, Budapest,.

<sup>50</sup> Muraško G.P., 1998. Represiunile Politice în Țările Europei de Est la sfârșitul anilor '40: conducerea sovietică și nomenclatura națională de partid și de stat, în “Analele Sighet nr. 8. Anul 1948-instituționalizarea comunismului”, Fundația Academia Civică, București, pp. 346-347.

### 3. Conclusions

Given this expose, we can say that, in itself, the communisation of Hungary, started with the Red Army troops' entry on its territory, is not marked with distinctive elements of the process that generated the entry of Eastern Europe into the Soviet sphere of domination. Rightly, Jean-François Soulet appreciated that one can speak of the "cloning" of the the Stalinist system in all satellite states.<sup>51</sup> Special might be considered a certain slowness of seizing total power by the Communists in Budapest, which does not contradict the general pattern but rather indicates a certain lack of importance attributed by the Kremlin to this small country, located on the outskirts Soviet sphere of interest. Thus, the sequences of building the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Hungary correspond to those identified by Hugh Seton-Watson for the entire Eastern Europe: Communist living together with the other parties within a coalition, the removal of opponents, the coalition getting a fictional character and, finally, the monopolisation of power by the Communists.<sup>52</sup> That between 1945-1948 in Budapest the mixed governments worked does not change this periodization.

In the historiography were issued several possible explanations about the discordant note that Hungary had made among the camp states. Among others, it was argued that the national unity government had been allowed for a longer period of time, because Moscow wanted Budapest to be, next to Prague, the window that would deceive the West. Other authors saw a justification in the "local factor". Arcidiacono, for example, believes that the moderation with which the Smallholders Party dealt with the Communists or the USSR led to the extension of the "democratic interlude".<sup>53</sup> Often the comparison is made with Romania, where the

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<sup>51</sup> Soulet J.-F., 2008. "Sovietizarea" Europei de Est, 1945-1953: *Expansionism imperial sau exportarea unui model totalitar*, în Courtois S. (coordonator), "O noapte atât de lungă. Apogeul regimurilor totalitare în Europa. 1935-1953", Editura Vreimea, București, p. 528.

<sup>52</sup> Constantiniu F., 1998. *De la Războiul Fierbinte, la Războiul Rece*, Corint, București, p. 115.

<sup>53</sup> Arcidiacono B., 2000. Les Balkans et les origines de la guerre froide: grandes puissances et "facteur local", in "Relations Internationales", No. 104, pp. 413-432.

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Soviets imposed through pressure and threat on March 6, 1945, the Groza government, practically a Communist government. I take the risk to suggest a different hypothesis, based on the following observation: the Romanian communists had “won” Transylvania, which the Hungarian communists did not “lose”. Joseph Stalin offered Romania a barter: the “red” government in exchange for Transylvania. And Dej and his accolites swaggered with the honor for having reunited the country. But in Hungary the communists officially had only a few ministers in the coalition cabinet led by the “bourgeois” Prime Ministers. In addition, in Budapest the President of the Republic also came from the Smallholders Party. So Rákosi’s group could not be blamed for having betrayed the interests of the nation, as would have happened if it were alone in the Executive. It was ultimately the failure of the entire Hungarian political class, it was the failure of the Hungarian nation. Stalin was careful not to make his students odious in the eyes of the population.

# Developing European Key Competences: Studying History of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century in the Romanian High Schools

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**Abstract:** The reformation of the Romanian educational system required some changes at the level of National curricula. The competences are an important issue introduced in the above mentioned document. The paper presents some competences that are defined in the National Syllabus for History and the way in which these can be trained in case of History classes from high schools. Communication in mother's tongue, Learning to learn, Cultural awareness and expression and Digital competences are the main European key competences developed during the History classes. In this way, the Romanian national system of education highlights the European dimension of education. The article aims at offering some examples of good practices regarding the activities used in this respect. These could be assimilated by the Romanian teachers and put in practice at their classes.

**Keywords:** education in high school, history of 20<sup>th</sup> century, key competences, National Syllabus for History, reformation, Romania.

## 1. Argument

The National Syllabus for History represents a document that defines the competences that students should achieve, the values and attitudes that should be developed during the study of this subject and mentions the contents that should be approached in order to train these skills and attitudes. Nowadays Syllabus encourages teachers' creativity and a personalised approach of the contents according to the class level.

The role of History as a school subject is to create individuals capable of analysing and presenting political, economic, cultural or social contents; to

be aware of the values of the cultural heritage; to develop civic attitudes and to practice the social behaviours. These ideas are defined by the general competences that are stated within the National Syllabus for History.

The history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century represents an important issue studied within the History lessons from the Romanian high schools at the levels of the 10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> (13<sup>th</sup>) grades. In this respect, the History lessons develop and train important interdisciplinary competences, using skills achieved during other subjects included in the formal system of education or non-formal educational activities. Another important aspect is related to the *Values and Attitudes* stated within each Syllabus.

These refer to coherence and rigor in the way of thinking and acting; critical thinking; flexibility; perceiving History as a factor of comprehension of the past and present and also an important factor necessary in order to predict future changes at the level of society, positive civic attitude which implies a non-violent approach of the conflicts, as well as respect for the human rights, tolerance and acceptance for minorities.

In this respect, History of the 20<sup>th</sup> century offers important sequences that can be used in order to achieve the competences, the values and attitudes define within the National Syllabus and thus, to train European key competences. Despite that since now, the European key competences have not precisely mentioned within the National Syllabus for History, the skills are implicitly trained.

## 2. Objectives

The main objectives of this study refer to the analysis of the National Curricula for History corresponding to high schools (10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> (13<sup>th</sup>) grades – where contents related to the 20<sup>th</sup> century are approached) in order to:

1. define the main European key competences that are trained during History classes;

2. analyse the way in which these could be put in practice through activities implemented at History classes,
3. offer some example of good practices regarding the way in which these interdisciplinary skills could be trained through History lessons.

### 3. European Key Competences

The European key competences are those skills that are desirable to be achieved by all the European citizens. There are eight key competences corresponding to knowledge, skills and attitudes that are fundamental for each individual in a knowledge-based society. These were defined in the Recommendation 2006/962/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [1].

According to the above mentioned document, the eight European key competences are:

- *Communication in the mother tongue* refers to the ability to express, analyse and to interact linguistically in various societal and cultural contexts – workplace, educational contexts, or leisure activities. This is the key competence that enables the person to achieve main information and to develop certain skills corresponding to various levels and domains.
- *Communication in foreign languages*, which involves, in addition to the main skill dimensions of communication in the mother tongue, mediation and intercultural understanding. The level of proficiency is illustrated by the capacity for listening, speaking, reading and writing. In order to acquire linguistic skills, a person should have a positive attitude towards multicultural environments. This also refers to the appreciation of cultural diversity. A positive intercultural attitude will create best premises for a successful language acquisition, for integration in new social, cultural and economic environments.
- *Mathematical competence and basic competences in science and technology* refers to the abilities necessary to develop and apply mathematical thinking in order to solve a range of problems in everyday

situations, with the emphasis being placed on process, activity and knowledge.

- *Digital competence* involves the confident and critical use of information society technology (IST) and thus basic skills in information and communication technology (ICT). Since the IT gadgets became part of our life, the digital communication and information offer an important background for a large variety of acquisitions both in formal and non-formal environments of education.
- *Learning to learn* is related to developing specific skills regarding identification training needs, awareness of the training process, identification of the available learning opportunities and assimilation of the new skills, attitudes and behaviours according to the main objective of learning established at the beginning of the learning process. The most appropriate attitude supposes the existence of motivation of the each person to learn and to have confidence that learning can be a continuous process throughout lifetime.
- *Social and civic competences* refer to personal, interpersonal and intercultural competence and all forms of behaviour that equip individuals to participate in an effective and constructive way in social and working life. These are very important in construction of the identities, in appreciation of the political, economic and social changes at the level of the community and worldwide.
- *Sense of initiative and entrepreneurship* is the ability to turn ideas into action. The individual is aware of the context of his/her work/education and is able to seize opportunities that arise. All the plans that a person establishes in his life should be seen as projects. In this respect, a sense of entrepreneurship is required in order to acquire more specific skills and necessary knowledge to implement them.
- *Cultural awareness and expression* involves appreciation of the importance of the creative expression of ideas, experiences and emotions in various shapes (music, performing arts, literature and the visual arts). Achieving this competence is essential to understand cultural and linguistic diversion across Europe, to appreciate the

European and world heritage, to have a positive attitude towards learning languages etc. [2].

#### 4. Analysis and Examples

A guide related to the evaluation at History mentions the fact that the general and specific competences stated within the National Syllabus are in accordance with three of the European Key Competences: *Social and civic competences*, *Communication in mother's tongue* and *Cultural awareness and expression* [3].

The structure of the National Syllabus for History has not yet included the clear specification of the European Key Competences, but they comprise a series of competences that refer to these. Examples can be found in all the syllabi analysed for this study.

Some of the specific competences stated within the National Syllabus for History, the 10<sup>th</sup> grade are:

- 1.1 *Presenting a personal opinion using the appropriate lexicon for History*
- 2.4 *Recognizing the continuity, the change and the causes in social evolution*
- 3.1 *Recognizing and accepting the interculturalism*
- 4.1 *Expressing within a debate an opinion regarding a cultural product*
- 4.2 *Appreciation of the values of the past by reporting them to nowadays* [4].

Some of the specific competences stated within the National Syllabus for History, the 11<sup>th</sup> grade are:

- 1.3. *Comparing different arguments and opinions regarding a theme of History*
- 2.1. *Knowing and assuming values of democratic citizenship*
- 3.1. *Selecting and commenting historical sources in order to defend or to dispute a certain point of view* [5].

Some of the specific competences stated within the National Syllabus for History, the 12<sup>th</sup> grade are:

- 1.1. *Providing intra- and multidisciplinary arguments and explanations regarding historic events and processes*
- 3.1. *Comparing historic sources in order to establish their validity and credibility of the information*
- 4.2. *Integrating the knowledge achieved in non-formal learning environments in approaches of analysing the studied historical phenomena*
- 4.3. *Analysing similar, different and complementary points of view regarding the studied historical phenomena*
- 4.4. *Connecting the information found in historical sources with the context of everyday life [6].*

According to the above mentioned specific competences, they comprise at a certain level, the European Key Competences (communication in mother tongue, civic and social competences, learning to learn, cultural awareness etc.).

Within the methodological recommendations, the use of ICT resources is specified in each of the three analysed syllabi. So, the digital competence should be part of the interdisciplinary approach of History during the high school lessons.

In our opinion, most of the European Key Competences can be identified and trained within History lessons. In the following lines we will present some ideas related to methodological aspects that could be taken into account when planning a History lesson.

*Communication in mother's tongue* is an implicit achievement of the History lessons. Through the analysis of historical sources or debates, students develop their vocabulary, their way of interacting with their colleagues using a specific lexicon etc. In this respect, the teacher becomes a facilitator of learning, of achievements at the level of reading, writing, speaking or listening to a message produced in mother's tongue. For example, an analysis of a source regarding the democratic mechanisms during the Interwar period facilitates the achievement of specific vocabulary such as: *ideology, political practice, political party* etc.

If it is to exclude from this study the classes where History is taught in other languages, *communication in foreign languages* would be a competence that is developed more at the level of non-formal and informal environments. While students prepare projects and search for information in online environments gain certain skills in using a foreign language. If an original form of a document is used, then a foreign language should be the mean to achieve certain competences.

For example, a study of the post-war Europe could include Churchill's speech "*Sinews of Peace*" from March 1946. It could be presented in a video version in order to bring the historical sources closer, to create an emotion, and in this way to assure an active listening of a speech presented in English. This is an optional competence that cannot be trained by the History teacher unless their students possess a certain level of proficiency in a foreign language.

*The Mathematic competence and basic competence in science and technology* could be trained in History lessons while applying certain logical algorithms for problem solving. The National Syllabus for History for the 10<sup>th</sup> grade mentions the importance of knowing and using the suitable methods and techniques in order to efficiently solve problems. The mathematic competence could be also used in order to represent in a conceptual map an idea, a notion, the development of a phenomenon etc.

The use of Venn-Euler diagram is a very good example that can be used in History lessons in order to define the similarities and differences. At the level of the 12<sup>th</sup> grade when discussing about Communism and Nazism as ideologies specific for Interwar period, this mathematic resource could be put in practice.

As we mentioned above, all the syllabi that we analysed state the importance of the ICT resources in History learning process: "*The integration of the new ICT technologies (Internet included) within the teaching-learning process is an essential one due to the diversification of the information and communication resources*" [7].

In this respect, we would like to underline the importance of using ICT resources in class, not only Power Point presentations, but a large variety of them. The teacher should not be the only person who manipulates the technology, but also the students. They can be encouraged to lead their own research regarding a theme of recent history. They could interview their family members regarding the Communist period in Romania: How were they perceived by the regime and how did they perceive the regime? How was a day during the Communist regime? Is the democracy better than the totalitarian regime?

In this way, students' achievements refer not only to investigate History from multiple perspectives, but also at civic and entrepreneurial competences. Their curiosity towards a future investigation of the subject would equip them also with skills related to *learning to learn competences*. They will be able to collect, to analyse and to search for more information regarding the theme. The multiple perspectives in History are a compulsory part in studying History at high school level.

In this respect, a multiple perspective regarding a controversial aspect of the 20<sup>th</sup> century history should be exploited in order to generate a change not only in teenagers' attitudes, but also in their skills and competences. Their ability to analyse a primary or secondary historical source from multiple perspective, their curiosity for searching for more information, to filter them and to present them in an interdisciplinary, new manner generates personal and professional achievements and facilitates the integration of the new contents in their own systems of knowledge and attitudes. In this context, the teacher becomes a real facilitator in education and a trainer of competences.

*Social and civic competences* are very frequently trained during the History classes. It refers at didactic simulations of various political, economic or social processes in order to gain certain achievements by practice. The role play is the method mostly used in this respect. For example, students will better understand the mechanisms that stand behind the adoption of a constitution if they try to adopt their own law while simulating the way in

which the real institutions work. In this way students will achieve important skills which will enable them to become active citizens within the communities in which they activate or will activate as adults.

Another important aspect related to social and civic competences is related to the interpersonal and intercultural interactions. The intercultural dialogue is very important within the construction of a democratic society where identities are integrated and respected. When sensitive and controversial issues related to events that took place during the 20<sup>th</sup> century are approached, History teachers should take into account the fact that students are influenced by the environment in which they live (community, family, ethnic groups, etc.).

In order to minimize the negative effects of these issues upon relationships between students, to avoid tensions and to create an objective perspective of the approached subjects, the specialized literature suggests the use of a various range of historical sources which present the same problem from various points of view assuring in this way the multiple perspective of the subject [8].

The education for human rights is an implicit component of History lessons. While discussing about Holocaust, the discussion about human rights should be brought into students' attention. They should be aware of the effects of the abuses and violations of the human rights, but also of the importance of their respect.

An example of civic implication is offered by the persons known as *Rights among nations*, people who tried to save Jews from the repression and death during the Second World War. Sources presenting the attitudes of people coming from various social environments regarding this subject, their actions that led to the salvation of Jewish people are examples of respect, empathic attitude, civic implication etc. These could be successfully used at History classes [9].

A debate regarding the importance of respecting human rights in a democratic society, the danger that the totalitarian regimes represent for the society in general and for people in particular are other issues that are

approached during the History lessons in order to stimulate the civic and social competences. Achieving these skills and an open attitude towards acceptance, respect and empathy will help future citizens to integrate into various environments of work or living. Assuming the Romanian and, in the same time, the European citizenship implies an attitude and a behaviour in accordance with the values of the democracy and multiparty [10].

*The entrepreneurial and sense of initiative competence* refer to cooperative learning methods, to the way in which students develop their skills that will enable them to assume various roles during their adulthood. During the History lessons, the sense of initiative should be valorise in terms of assuming roles within groups, talking for the group, participating at the decisions taken within the group and assuming the consequences. While using cooperative learning methods in order to study historical sources, this competence is trained.

*Cultural awareness and expression* is one of the most important European Key Competence that is created and developed through History formal and non-formal educational activities. The appreciation of the importance of the creative expression of ideas, experiences and emotions in various shapes (music, performing arts, literature and the visual arts) is synthesized in one of the general competences. It is related to *the awareness of aesthetic values of the culture* (the 4<sup>th</sup> general competence comprised in the National Syllabus for History – 10<sup>th</sup> grade). The cultural dimension is also included in the values and attitudes that are also mentioned in the syllabi: assuming the ethnic, religious and cultural tolerance.

The cultural heritage represents an important historical source that can be used within History lessons. Such sources require an interdisciplinary approach and an important preparation of the teacher and students [11].

They should operate with knowledge coming from domains such as: History, History of Arts, Religion, Music, Ethnography, etc.

These cultural sources have the main role of developing identities, even if we speak about national or European identities. The investigations used

within History lessons could contribute to the process of identity development, critical thought, and respect for democratic values, tolerance and responsibility [12].

In this way, the preservation of the heritage is assured and the future generations could also become aware of their identity.

The history teachers have to stimulate the cultural awareness by highlighting themes that could arouse students' interest. In this respect, while discussing about totalitarian regimes and their limitation, themes like censure in culture (music or literature) should be approached. Important musicians or writers whose productions were censored should be analysed.

These will increase the students' interest and will be more involved in the study of sources. Video or audio registrations, images illustrating buildings, paintings, sculptures, etc. are the sources which can be analysed in this type of lessons.

The cultural awareness will facilitate the intercultural dialogue and will promote a sustainable development of the society in which our students will be integrated. A positive attitude towards other cultures refers to a consistent behaviour of a person, a behaviour determined by a set of internalised set of values [13].

## **5. Conclusions**

All these competences should be acquired by all European citizens in order to create a common cultural pattern which develops common skills and attitudes, and on the other side, it allows to the citizens to express their own identities. The idea of preserving diversity in a united Europe is accomplished in this way.

It is recommended that all European Union countries to ensure that these key competences are fully integrated into their strategies and infrastructures, particularly in the context of lifelong learning. Formal education is one of the systems that contribute substantially to these achievements.

Through History lessons, students practice the European Key Competences they become aware of the importance of the intercultural attitude in social integration, of civic attitudes and initiatives in respect of preserving the democratic values, principles and practices. In this way, the connection between theory and practice is assured by applying the most appropriate didactic methods in order to train the European Key Competences and in the same time, the specific competences mentioned in the National Syllabi for History. The History of the 20<sup>th</sup> century offers important events and debates that can be successfully approached for this purpose.

The European Key Competences provide added value for the citizens looking for integration on labour market; they sustain social cohesion and active citizenship by offering flexibility and adaptability, satisfaction and motivation in everyday life.

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# Ideological and International Factors in the Development of a Romanian Discourse on European Security (1966–1969)

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The origins of the concept of European security in the Soviet discourse of foreign policy can be traced back long before the actual initiation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Shortly after Stalin's death, Moscow was confronted with a major security challenge as the Western allies were preparing to integrate West Germany into NATO, thus turning it into a base for American military policies in Europe. At that point, the USSR – through the initiative of its foreign minister V. Molotov – issued a series of proposals calling for a common security system in Europe, including or excluding the United States. It was sometimes ironically referred to as Moscow's request to join NATO. When the matter was once again brought up in the Bucharest Declaration of July 1966, as much as international relations might have changed in the time passed, it was still related to the unfinished business of World War II between the Soviets and their former allies<sup>1</sup>. What Moscow wanted most of all was recognition of its post-war borders.

Romanian Communists, on the other hand, had a radically different perspective on European security. A fulfilment of Soviet objectives represented an implicit confirmation of bipolarity in international relations, *ergo* Western acceptance for Soviet predominance in East Central Europe. At the time, PCR (*Romanian Communist Party*) was engaged in a political and ideological confrontation with Moscow, claiming its

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<sup>1</sup> Mircea Malița, *Tablouri din războiul rece. Memorii ale unui diplomat român*, Editura C.H. Beck, București, 2007, p. 132

independence in the Communist bloc according to the principle of party autonomy in the World Communist Movement. Also, PCR defended its right to develop Socialism according to national specificities, rejecting the Soviet model as universal<sup>2</sup>. PCR could only defend such aims successfully as long as Moscow's control of the Communist bloc was weak, as it had become during the Sino-Soviet conflict<sup>3</sup>.

When the Bucharest Declaration was publicized in July 1966, PCR was in need of partners, as well as new and fresh arguments to use in its struggle to reject Soviet hegemony. On party level, Romanians have claimed their neutrality in the Sino-Soviet polemics, as a form of autonomy, and actively supported the reconciliation between the two major parties: a Communist bloc involving China left little room for Soviet domination, while in China's absence Soviet pressures could have been significantly increased. But, while this was a basic feature of Romanian policies towards the USSR, it could not be valid in a European framework. Nicolae Ceaușescu, although skeptical of any gathering expressing uniformity under Soviet leadership, did agree to sign the Bucharest Declaration in spite of its innuendos to bipolar arrangements<sup>4</sup>.

Shortly after the meeting held in Romania, Moscow launched a new move aimed at consolidating its position in world Communism. Leonid Brezhnev was planning to isolate China by rallying Communist parties worldwide in support of Moscow on the Vietnam War issue<sup>5</sup>. The first initiative to this effect was met with negative reactions by many parties, including PCR, for which reasons Moscow limited its first step to having only a meeting of

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<sup>2</sup> Iván T. Berend, *Central and Eastern Europe, 1944-1993: detour from the periphery to the periphery*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 131

<sup>3</sup> Sergey Radchenko, *Two suns in the heavens: the Sino-Soviet struggle for supremacy, 1962-1967*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, 2009, p. 84

<sup>4</sup> *Declarație cu privire la întărirea păcii și securității în Europa*, în ANIC, fond CC al PCR – secția Cămară, dosar nr. 65/1966, f. 8-9

<sup>5</sup> Mark Kramer, "The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine", in Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, Detlef Junker, eds., *1968: the world transformed*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 116

European Communist parties, on issues of European security, as a test for a future worldwide gathering on much more generous topics. The debates which occurred in the context of the Karlovy Vary meeting of European Communist parties played a major role in the development of a Romanian approach on European security and facilitated the approach between Romanian and Italian Communists deriving from their common goal of countering Soviet hegemony.

The polemics regarding inter-party relations in world Communism, especially Moscow's position in the movement, and the debates on European security were closely connected in this context, because both topics involved major risk for party autonomy: recognition of the bipolar postwar relations and consolidation of Soviet hegemony in world Communism. As long as the West accepted to formalize bipolarity through an event such as a common European conference, Soviet influence in world Communism would have been consolidated. It was exactly what PCR and PCI (*Italian Communist Party*) were trying to prevent.

The agenda for the conference convoked by the Soviets for April 1967 had one goal in particular, to discuss the international impact of the Bucharest declaration. Nicolae Ceaușescu rejected the Soviet plans for such a conference by using one central argument: the European security issue was a matter for governments, not for parties. N. Ceaușescu discussed his controversies with L. Brezhnev in March 1967 in Moscow, having to face a lot of pressure from the Soviets, who were determined to convince the Romanians to take part in the scheduled Karlovy Vary conference. Ceaușescu stood up to Brezhnev and refused to accept participation, much to the latter's irritation<sup>6</sup>. During one of their meetings, Ceaușescu confessed to President I.B. Tito of Yugoslavia his conviction that the planned

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<sup>6</sup> *Stenograma discuțiilor avute la Moscova, în zilele de 17-18 martie 1967*, în ANR, fond CC al PCR, secția Relații Externe, dosar nr. 14/1967, f. 106

conference was nothing but a disguise meant to restore Moscow's leading role in world Communism<sup>7</sup>.

The conference did convene in PCR's absence in Karlovy Vary, in April 1967, and adopted another document, signed by the participating European Communist parties, calling for a common system of European security. A distinct position at the meeting was held by PCI's leader, Luigi Longo. According to his party's vision, as he argued, Communists had to work closely with other "progressive" movements and parties, such as Socialists and Social-Democrats, in their common struggle against Imperialism. "*Allargamento*", meaning the enlargement of the World Communist Movement to other leftist forces, was a key issue for PCI, as the Italians were aware of the fact that they could never accede to government on their own, but only as part of a coalition<sup>8</sup>.

The Italian thesis, nonetheless, was very problematic for the Soviets due to Germany. The USSR was interested in a *détente* with West Germany, especially due to their hopes to obtain recognition of postwar borders, but, as the West German Social-Democrats became part of a governing coalition and vice-chancellor Willy Brandt expressed his wish to reach negotiated settlements with the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe – the first steps of future *Ostpolitik* – West Germany turned into a factor of risk. East German leader Walter Ulbricht initiated his own independent contacts with West German SDP (Social Democratic Party) hoping to convince West Germany to recognize his regime. Also, some Socialist states like Romania manifested a particular enthusiasm towards welcoming West German initiatives, with or without Soviet advice. So, in spite Moscow's

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<sup>7</sup> Stenograma discuțiilor avute cu prilejul vizitei în țara noastră a tovarășului Iosip Broz Tito, președintele Republicii Socialiste Federative Iugoslavia, președintele Uniunii Comuniștilor din Iugoslavia, în ANR, fond CC al PCR, secția Relații Externe, dosar nr. 153/1966, f. 48-49

<sup>8</sup> Maud Bracke, *Proletarian Internationalism, Autonomy and Polycentrism*, EUI Working Paper, 2002, p. 26. See also: Daryl Glasser, *Twentieth Century Marxism. A Global Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2007, p. 85

desire to settle its feuds with West Germany, at the same time it did not wish for things to escape its control, as it seemed to be happening.

As for Luigi Longo's advocacy of "allargamento" and cooperation with Social-Democrats, L. Brezhnev was skeptical because the thesis had the potential to encourage independent initiatives among its satellites. N. Ceaușescu, on the other hand, soon noticed the opportunity. Romania's relations with West Germany had already significantly improved with the establishment of diplomatic relations in January 1967, so defense of "allargamento" presented PCR with two important possibilities: on one hand, to ideologically defend a step that had already been consummated, and, on the other hand, to promote a vision of European security which weakened Moscow's influence and therefore challenged bipolarity. Tito of Yugoslavia had already expressed similar views, in relation to the war in Vietnam, calling for an enlargement of world Communism towards movements of national liberation in the third world.

The meeting in Karlovy Vary was followed, in the summer of 1967, by a series of meetings between N. Ceaușescu and West European party leaders, respectively Luigi Longo (PCI), Santiago Carillo (PCE) and Alvaro Cunhal (PCP) with whom discussions were held regarding the future of world Communism. N. Ceaușescu also met the leadership of the PCF (*French Communist Party*), but the two parties had divergent opinions regarding Moscow's role in the Communist movement. The debates concerning the reform of world Communism played an important part in the crystallization of Romania's discourse on European security, as the Romanians developed a close relation with the West European party leaders, especially Longo, Carillo and Cunhal.

The transcripts of the discussions reveal the fact that European security represented one of the key topics on which N. Ceaușescu consulted his Western counterparts, although they were not leading ruling Communist parties, their influence being therefore limited. The German problem was central to all efforts aimed at a common system of European security and PCR's stance on the issue was much more compliant as compared with that

of other Communist parties in the Warsaw Pact, which attracted criticism especially from Poland and East Germany. In the talks held with Santiago Carillo in May 1967, N. Ceaușescu expressed his belief that Communist parties must be flexible towards the West German Social-Democrats' efforts of reconciliation and advocated in favor of enlarging world Communism towards other leftist movements. Should the Social-Democrats fail in their efforts of rapprochement, this would only involve a consolidation of "reactionary" political factors in West Germany<sup>9</sup>.

During another meeting with a PCI delegation, in July 1967, N. Ceaușescu insisted that cooperation with Social-Democrats and Socialists was essential in the struggle against Imperialism, explaining that PCR too had obtain power after World War II in cooperation with the Social-Democratic Party<sup>10</sup>. N. Ceaușescu also met vice-chancellor Willy Brandt in August 1967 and held extensive discussions with him on issues of East-West cooperation and also European security. Brandt told N. Ceaușescu that his party's efforts to approach East European countries were met with résistance at home, were there were numerous political factors demanding that West German foreign policy remain unchanged. The recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as German border was of particular concern not only to politicians, but also to the public opinion<sup>11</sup>.

N. Ceaușescu seemed sympathetic of Brandt's arguments, since he later insisted among different Communist parties that the West German Social-Democrats be treated with patience and their initiatives welcomed. During the Warsaw Pact meeting in Bucharest, which adopted the Declaration on

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<sup>9</sup> Stenograma convorbirilor dintre tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al CC al PCR și tovarășul Santiago Carillo, secretar general al Partidului Comunist din Spania, ANIC, fond CC al PCR secția Relații Externe, dosar nr. 38/1967, f. 66-68

<sup>10</sup> Stenograma primirii de către tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al CC al PCR, a tovarășului Carlo Galuzzi, membru al Direcțiunii PC Italian, în ANIC, fond CC al PCR, secția Relații Externe, dosar nr. 2/1968, f. 6-8

<sup>11</sup> Dumitru Preda, Claudiu Florian, Ottmar Trașcă (eds.) *România – Republica Federală Germania. Începutul relațiilor diplomatice 1966-1967*, vol. I. București: Editura Enciclopedică, 2009, p. 267

European security, Romania had already opposed the initial Soviet text for its harsh condemnation of the West German “menace” to European peace, asking for a much more moderate tone. The Declaration, argued the Romanians, should have been a platform for common action, for both Eastern and Western governments, which is why it should only emphasize unifying principles, not divergences. In the end, a compromise was reached, between Romanian and Soviet positions.

In 1968, Moscow and some other subordinated parties was preparing a preliminary meeting for a future world conference of all Communist parties, aimed at confirming Moscow’s leadership in the movement. During the discussions preceding the meeting, PCI once again reiterated its objective of having other non-Communist forces joining the movement against Imperialism, as Carlo Galuzzi, member of PCI’s *Direzione*, told N. Ceaușescu in January 1968. PCR was in favor of the same approach, as N. Ceaușescu told his Italian counterpart. The Romanian commitment to “allargamento” was restated on several occasions by PCR leaders and N. Ceaușescu explicitly connected European security with the principle of enlargement in world Communism, as he declared during a discussion with I.B. Tito of Yugoslavia:

“We agree with the necessity of larger contacts. A serious struggle is indeed needed against the sectarian mentality of many Communist parties. It is clear that if we were to act only with the Communist parties of Western Europe, without a larger cooperation with other workers’ organizations and especially with the Social-Democrats, we would stand little chance against Imperialism, for European security.”<sup>12</sup>

On the same occasion, N. Ceaușescu also expressed his conviction that Social-Democratic participation in government in West Germany was a progressive step that had the potential to positively change West Germany’s

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<sup>12</sup> Stenograma convorbirilor ce au avut loc in zilele de 3-4 ianuarie 1968 la Belje –R.S.F.I., între tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al C.C. al P.C.R., președintele Consiliului de Stat al R.S. România, și tovarășul Iosip Broz Tito, președintele R.S.F.I., președintele U.C.I., în ANIC, fond CC al PCR, secția Relații Externe, dosar nr. 1/1968, f. 39

foreign policy. Communists, Ceaușescu told Tito, must work with Brandt and support his initiatives in order to prevent a resurrection of previous “reactionary” policies in Bonn. Recounting his discussions with W. Brandt in August 1967, N. Ceaușescu shared with Tito his conviction that Brandt was honest in expressing his good intentions<sup>13</sup>.

What was N. Ceaușescu pursuing with his defense of “allargamento”? Romania had already defied East Germany and Poland with its decision to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany previously and was interested in enlarging its contacts in the Western world, mainly for economic purposes. The enlargement of world Communism towards other non-Communist forces was meant to weaken Moscow’s control. PCR leaders had the same objective in mind when insisting that European security must not be dealt with at the level of Communist parties, where Moscow’s influence was maximal. Instead, PCR advocated in favor of dealing with European security either at state and government level, or – as far as parties were concerned – in an enlarged framework of workers’ movements, for the same reason of reducing Soviet control and pressures. In this context, debates on European security, prior to the Finnish Memorandum of 1969, were strictly related with the reform of world Communism.

During a meeting with Finnish foreign minister Ahti Karjalainen, who visited Romania in February 1967, N. Ceaușescu said: “we agree that big countries have larger responsibilities and possibilities, but we don’t think it’s wise to leave only these countries to solve problems which concern collaboration among nations and ensuring peace. We believe that it’s necessary for each state to participate in finding the best solutions to the problems which preoccupies the whole world.”<sup>14</sup> From this perspective, PCR’s interpretation of European security issues was one of a poly-centric

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<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, f. 33

<sup>14</sup> Stenograma discuțiilor avute cu ocazia primirii de către tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu a ministrului Afacerilor Externe al Finlandei, Ahti Karjalainen, în ziua de 17 februarie 1967 ANIC, fond CC al PCR, secția Relații Externe, dosar nr. 8/1967, f. 4

international structure, as opposed to Cold War bipolarities. On this particular topic, PCR and PCI again came closer.

After 1969, L. Longo successor at the leadership of PCI, Enrico Berlinguer, promoted a different vision of détente, different from the Soviet one in its rejection of bipolarity. The USSR saw détente in terms of a Soviet-American arrangement, providing stability and control of armaments. Berlinguer's vision of détente emphasized the importance of overcoming bipolarity and transforming the Cold War stage into a world of many independent actors, in which Europe eventually could represent a "third way", a new pole of peace and stability<sup>15</sup>. The "active détente", as it later became known, served PCI's need for adaptation in Italian politics, in which the party's continuous association with Moscow ruined its credibility and appeal to the electorate. International détente had the potential to relieve PCI from many of its internationalist duties, thus making it legitimate for the party to approach other leftist forces to form a governmental coalition<sup>16</sup>. In this sense, "allargamento" and "active détente" went hand in hand, as manifestations of PCI's efforts to find a new identity in Italian politics.

Détente therefore served PCI's interests in that it reduced American pressures on Italy making it possible for Communists to accede to government. In equal measure, détente had the potential to facilitate Romania's contacts in the West, both politically and economically, reducing the regime's dependence on Moscow and also Soviet pressures for internationalist solidarity. But a bipolar Soviet-American arrangement did not serve well such purposes, which is why both Berlinguer and Ceaușescu challenged this approach in favor of multi-polarity. At that time, PCR made

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<sup>15</sup> Laura Fasanaro, "Neither in One Bloc, Nor in the Other. Berlinguer's vision of the end of the Cold War", in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow (eds.) *Visions of the end of the Cold War*, Bergham Books, 2012, p. 163. Regarding the Soviet visions of détente, see: Mike Bowker, "Brezhnev and Superpower Relations", in Edwin Bacon, Mark Sandle (eds.) *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, pp. 90-91

<sup>16</sup> Silvio Pons, "The rise and fall of Eurocommunism", in Melvin P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad (eds.) *Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. III. Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 49

a key feature of its foreign policy rhetoric to promote the concomitant dissolution of both Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty. In a speech held in 1970, N. Ceaușescu stated:

“(…) we consider that the division of Europe in military and economic blocks does not correspond to the interests of the European peoples. In a certain sense, Europe has developed along history in a complete unity. The progresses accomplished by Europe are due especially to the existence of this cooperation. For Europe’s present and future, it is necessary to develop a stronger unity, a new unity, based on the respect for the diversity of socio-economic foundations, but generated by the common interest to insure independence, socio-economic development, prosperity and peace for all European peoples. Only united will the European peoples be able to insure themselves a better future, of complete equality and liberty.”<sup>17</sup>

This vision was also translated into action, in cases such as the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, negotiated by the USA and USSR and signed by numerous other countries in 1968. On that occasion, Romania objected at various levels – during Warsaw Pact meetings, at the United Nations etc. – against its superpower character. Romania demanded that non-nuclear powers be granted guarantees that nuclear powers would not use the atomic bomb against them, as a condition for accepting non-proliferation. The objection was overruled and Romania did sign the treaty as it was, but this did not reduce its activism in foreign policy.

PCR’s reaction to the Brezhnev doctrine and N. Ceaușescu’s firm condemnation of the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia were also facets of this policy of contesting bipolarity. It was the bipolar organization of international relations that gave Moscow the pre-conditions for acting as a hegemonic power in Eastern Europe. PCR, unlike Western Communist parties, was not especially interested in a reform of Socialism, but only in

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<sup>17</sup> Nicoale Ceaușescu. *România pe drumul construirii societății socialiste multilateral dezvoltate*, vol. XXVII. București: Editura Politică, 1970, pp. 369-370.

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the reorganization of relations among parties and states on multi-polar bases.

Romania's discourse on European security developed progressively long before the initiation of the CSCE process and was part of the international policy of PCR aimed at challenging bipolarity and affirm its autonomy in the World Communist Movement. Since European security was a state and governmental process, it employed different forms and strategies and was subjected to numerous influences, among which Non-Alignment was already remarked and analyzed in the literature. Without implying that these influences were the only ones acting on Romanian foreign policy making, this paper described the influences exerted by concepts and theories originating among Italian Communists, in the emergence of Romania's independent position in world affairs and both on European security issues. It emphasized how international debates regarding the reform of the World Communist Movement and also how Western Communist influences helped shape the emergence of PCR's vision of Romania's security policy.

## **Political Decisions in Romania during World War II Taken on the Basis of Special Intelligence Service Efforts**

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### **1. Important Actions Carried Out by the SSI until August 1944**

During the reporting period the following cases are noteworthy and documented by the Special Intelligence Service as having important implications in the informative activity plan:

- a) Research continued on the issue of Autonomus paratrooper's team because as a result of a series of information on the English informative network in Romania which Chastelain, Masterson and Gibson had. Informative documentation actions were extended on all these people.
- b) The Professor Eck espionage group was arrested at the General Staff Intelligence because the members worked for the British and they were conducting an ample informative activity. Because this group operated in connection with the Polish organization of British espionage - Czupprich, previously arrested by the SSI, the whole business intelligence research was transferred to SSI Case, until the Armistice was not judged.
- c) Another matter investigated by the SSI, which has grown through its political connections, was the Țurcan Business and the radio telegraphy station through which Iuliu Maniu liaised with the Allied Quarter in Cairo. The device had been functioning for a while in the Știrbey House, about which there were details that they have been dealing truce in Cairo, Țurcan was related to Maniu, the business being discovered by the Germans. This could have had very serious consequences,

degenerating into a combined German-Hungarian reaction that could result in occupation of the Kingdom.

Researches in the three cases presented were led by Eugen Cristescu, in order to limit any leakage of information to the Germans and to save the country from new disasters.

- d) Another business that has been investigated by The service in this period was the banker Max Auschnitt's running out of the country by a plane piloted by Captain Matei Ghica Cantacuzino, accompanied by engineer Racotă (British spy service). The research has established links with a direction taken to Syria and Cairo. The Germans made a big scandal on this issue, but nothing came of coercive measures.
- e) Another situation that has preoccupied S.S.I. was that of the Soviets Parachute Team launched at Olănești in Vâlcea County in the early days of August 1944 (where Marshal Antonescu could be found for a treatment with mineral waters). The team consisted of three Romanian Iron Guard officers, former prisoners in the USSR (Captain Djona, Captain Miron, lieutenant Gheracostea) and two radio operators. Since land conditions were not favorable, after the launch paratroopers have not met and were captured<sup>1</sup>.

In this situation any archived documents would contribute to a better documentation of these cases that took place in the particular conditions of the Second World War.

## **2. Monitoring Opposition Approaches for Romania's Exit from the War**

In that geopolitical context marked by the increasing number of arguments supporting the idea that Germany could no longer win the conflict, it was obvious that the Romanian political forces would conduct more intense action to find solutions intended to save the country from disaster. In this political spectrum there were two fundamental directions converged only

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<sup>1</sup> ARCHIVE S.R.I. (ASRI), Fond D., File no. 7433, f. 225-226;

in the removal of Ion Antonescu and abandoning the alliance with Germany, namely: left force, the embryo of Communism (PCDR), which was constituted to lead the way for the seizure of power and the establishment of Soviet origin regime (direction in which it has prepared its way by forming "United Workers' Front 'and' National Democratic Coalition" in May 1944<sup>2</sup>); As well as the force that sums up other Romanian political orientations that unquestionably have the objective of returning to democratic values manifested under a constitutional monarchy.

In a note to the Special Intelligence Service on 31 May 1944, an analysis of discussions of the leaders of the Democratic Front on integrating social democrats and communists in that structure<sup>3</sup>. Noteworthy is the fact that those discussions were conducted based on "malleability of Dinu Brătianu... because Maniu's rigidity gravitated towards the failure of negotiations."<sup>4</sup>

The mention in the SSI document of the inflexibility of the peasant leader is not coincidental because it led to an understanding with Socialists and Communists of a prior recognition of the correctness of annexation "by Soviet of Bessarabia and Bucovina."<sup>5</sup>

Special Intelligence Service's concern for the Romanian political circles activity is emphasized by the note dated 30 June 1944 drawn up after the establishment (and the announcement of this endeavor) of the National Democratic Block (the message from June 11, 1944 of Iuliu Maniu<sup>6</sup>). In the document to which I'm referring it is highlighted that the Communists claim that BND is not effective and "will be overtaken by the accelerated

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<sup>2</sup> GIURESCU, Dinu C., *Guvernarea Nicolae Rădescu*, History Library, All Publishing House, 1996, p. 205;

<sup>3</sup> ASRI, Fond D., File no. 7.433, f. 268;

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*;

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 269;

<sup>6</sup> *ISTORIA României în date*, coordonare Dinu C. GIURESCU, Bucharest, Encyclopedic Publishing House, 2003, p. 461;

pace of events"<sup>7</sup>. Besides Iuliu Maniu's idea, who proposed to sequence the Antonescu regime, a general (the name Rădescu being mentioned), the solution backed by communists, who wanted the King's active involvement<sup>8</sup>, is distinguished.

The course of events allow me to consider this last idea to be of Soviet origin, meaning that they wanted to soothe possible popular suspicion regarding the communists access to power, using the first phase of the Royal House as a screen.

The synthesis of the Special Intelligence Service drafted on 13 July 1944 revealed another aspect, namely the communist circles dissatisfaction towards collaborating with other Romanian political forces. It emphasized the following idea: "... Communist group will resume its freedom of action and refused to cooperate with bourgeois parties "(sic) immediately after the signing<sup>9</sup>.

Throughout the period of the Second World War it has become increasingly evident that Ion Antonescu requested and received notes and analysis from the Special Intelligence Service on the actions and concerns of the Romanian political leaders. All this desire to know any other geopolitical solutions have not escaped Germany (which had an impressive informative device, consisting of eleven (!!!) secret intelligence service).

In addition to verbal obligations that he has assumed in discussions with Hitler, Antonescu did not exclude other solutions so that Romania could get out of that exhausting conflagration, but in honorable conditions.

### **1944 January 21**

Note of the ISS on domestic politics in the light of developments in military operations on the Eastern Front<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> ASRI, Fond D., File no. 7.433, f. 497;

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 498;

<sup>9</sup> *Idem*, File no. 4.202, f. 80;

<sup>10</sup> ASRI, Fond Y., File no. 40.010, Vol. 34, f. 140-146;

NOTE Marshal Antonescu had in the recent years the opportunity to know Mr. Iuliu Maniu's ideas on the overall conduct of the war and the special position that Romania has in the conflict between the Great Powers. Although Mr. Iuliu Maniu demonstrates outstanding views, although he was starting in the assessment of general ideas and ignored the immediate realities, although he did not want to take into consideration our limited possibilities of movement, although he suggested solutions that neither he would have been able to achieve, if he had the government's responsibility, however Marshal Antonescu, deeply imbued with historical responsibilities that he had assumed, he always exanimated in a high understanding the patriotic spirit with which the opinions were expressed by former Prime Minister of the country. Mr. Maniu sometimes did not want to know that Marshal Antonescu determined the framework that Romania's war policy was to develop and that the international situation has developed besides Romanian government control. Sometimes Mr. Maniu seemed to forget that in 1940, after the borders were stolen from us, although we had platonic guarantees, we lost the trust of a group of powers, without having gained great military and political friendship which ruled Europe and, later, in the middle of some astounding political and military surprises, Romania was forced to adjust the overall situation, in order to ensure security and to fulfill the high demands of national order, to the extent and in the circumstances imposed by events. But Marshal Antonescu informed about some current ideas that concern the senior management of your group lately. Compared to this information, Marshal Antonescu finds it necessary to make some clarifications, to put you on hand the exact items for assessing the situation. - Marshal Antonescu is notified that Mr. Maniu researched different solutions to achieve Romania's withdrawal from the war with minimum risks and sacrifices - that regarding to his thought , this withdrawal would be immediately necessary to avoid war theater on our territory and to make possible to Anglo-Saxon powers to exercise a meditation or a help in our favor;

- That, to achieve this goal, has to be sought realistic solutions that ensure the least bad conditions to the country, in a very difficult situation;

- That in the present circumstances, the only factor that could to bring the improvement of the situation is Marshal Antonescu and that the Lord would have a new mission to accomplish;
- That the Marshal Antonescu would be able to review its relations with Germany with loyalty and come to consent for our withdrawal from the war. Marshal Antonescu is in the situation to regret that Mr. Iuliu Maniu does not want to take notice - neither this time - to the realities of war, held by the rules beyond our desires and interests. It is not in our power to avoid war theater in our territory. The strategic importance of the country and the amount of our resources will determine. We can withdraw from the war and yet, the hostilities to take place on our territory, as in Italy, but with more serious consequences. Is very difficult for Romania to create a different situation towards the other belligerent group, given the importance of oil and our economy for Germany.
- Mr. Maniu believes, however, that from now on realistic solutions should be sought to change our military and diplomatic position. What are the solutions? Marshal Antonescu asked to be exposed in practice, but you have not been able to show them.
- Mr. Maniu considers, however, that Marshal Antonescu has a mission and that the Lord may immediately withdraw the country from war. What would be the mission? Mr. Maniu should specify it. Relentlessly for three years, are lording the same theoretical ideas that seem deceptive. But Mr. Maniu avoid and hesitate to ask and, especially, to show how it could be done practically Romanian withdrawal from the war, wish that's also of Marshal Antonescu and the entire nation, if the Allies and the Germans would ensure our borders and future. Neither one, nor the other does not give us, do not want, and especially cannot give us these guarantees, which we seek for three years. In these circumstances who can try the solution of surrender or giving up the fight, especially when - and in one case, and in the other - Romania will be forced as Italy by both belligerents to bear the fight on its territory.
- Lord Maniu thinks that Marshal Antonescu may review straightforwardness its relations with the Germans. This test could be

provided to have certain guarantees from Allied, that we don't have , which neither Mr. Maniu does not have and cannot obtain.

- Mr. Maniu does no longer see possibility for Germany to maintain Soviet front and prevent an invasion of Russia in Europe. This case, however, is not totally excluded. Germany's huge military force is not as weak as it seems, and recent developments in the allied camp again prove the hidden intentions of Soviet and the European catastrophe that would occur if the Germans would not be able to keep the Eastern Front.
- Mr. Maniu is wrong but when assumed that Marshal Antonescu based on German assurances, took military and political obligations. Marshal Antonescu took such an obligation, but it is still too early to say that Germany's security was overturned by the latest twists of war.
- Of course, allied obligations cease when they raise serious national security issues of our territory and its inhabitants; of course no one can be required to expose the whole country to the horrors of war and sacrifice the future interests of the Romanian state for the war targets foreign to us. But basically, the thing is impossible. Who looks on map can see that if Germany would be defeated, Southern Reich forces will withdraw to our country, both because of oil, but also without it because the lines of communication: the roads and railways and national defense lines, the Balkans, the Danube, the Southern Carpathians, Bug, Dniester, Prut, Siret, the Eastern Carpathians, etc.. In such circumstances, who is the man who can, without technical and practical solution, to prevent the Germans, the Russians, and the Anglo-Americans to fight on our territory? Is only one: that to which has led to thaw ordinary betrayal by Badoglio. However we would end up the war between brothers, at the war of all on our territory, with easy to deduce consequences.
- It's naive to believe again that it could easily pass from a state of war to a state of non-belligerent and expectant army. It's very hard to believe that our allies would accept this solution quickly and they would stop to take the measures claimed by their war safety. Lord Maniu speaks of the situation which would ensure a country emerging from war and

being able to defend better its future. If we do this action, her chances we could not foresee. But the sequel? We are told that the Anglo-Saxon powers could mediate Romania's cause to the Russian and find suitable arrangements regarding us. Marshal Antonescu does not find that these convenient arrangements could consist of cede Bessarabia, Bukovina and "other parts." We are told again that this time, the opposition factors would have the leisure and the possibility of a diplomatic action by the other belligerent group. But what did so far Mr. Maniu than this? What are the results?

- We are also suggesting that, before attempting to review relations with Germans, to proclaim general mobilization, because in this case the Reich would not hesitate to pass to retaliatory measures. Marshal Antonescu reckons it would be a dangerous solution; it would mean war with the Germans, when the cannon thundering towards Bessarabia, because we are facilitating the Russians to get at us when we have no security in the country and in Europe! Beautiful view!
- Marshal Antonescu asked Mr. Maniu to reflect seriously at the entire situation and take into account all realities, as they are and not as we would imagine them to us.
- Marshal Antonescu made wide and significant concessions to Mr. Maniu, but this does mean that it should be asked to do what no one, in the circumstances in which we find ourselves and that will come, could not do. Leadership's liability of national destinies, in circumstances that the country has not lived up today - consequences of which Marshal Antonescu is not guilty - requires the statesman a serious and decisive action based solely on politico- military realities, to ensure Romania to come out with a better fate of the great international conflagration.

**1944 August 17**

Note received by SSI in connection with the political activities of democratic groups towards the possibilities of withdrawing Romania from war<sup>11</sup>

NOTE regarding the activity of democratic opposition camp regarding Romania's exit from the war Latest military events hastened the activity carried by the factors of democratic opposition related to our exit from the war.

Iuliu Maniu - who leads this action - realizes that, while the movements of a similar nature in other countries, can make real contributions to the Allied cause as military operations expand, the anglophile movement in Romania fails to meet the hopes which they awoke in the upper circles of the other belligerent group. Plans which Maniu has made and which sought an immediate blow - were examined after the return of Mr. Marshal Antonescu from the Fuehrer, in a new light. Important differences have arisen in opposition management. For some communist group and some radical elements, from the two democratic groups, planning a decisive gesture although the risks it would attract; on the other hand Dinu Brătianu, Gh. Brătianu, Mihalache, Dr. Lupu etc. which were making reservations about the possibility and success of such an action, but give Maniu the whole initiative and responsibility.

Meanwhile, the lack of reliable information about German intentions and changes in the strategic plans of the allies, have raised new difficulties. Divergences between Maniu and Mihalache From the story below, you will see that Maniu has difficulty in his own group. Between Ion Mihalache and Iuliu Maniu arose again important differences of views. Attitude of Mihalache, observed from a long time, has accentuated in recent times and it is explained, inter alia, Mihalache's distrust in the results of collaboration between the National Peasant Party and the Liberal Party. Thursday, August 10 this year, Maniu sent a letter to Ion Mihalache, through which

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<sup>11</sup> ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 17-25;

invited him to come to Bucharest before or after will have fulfilled the mandate stated in the letter - meaning after having seen Mr. Marshal Antonescu; Mihalache refused to come to Bucharest, sending to Maniu a written answer. On receipt of the reply, Saturday, August 12, Maniu instructed the Popescu-Mehedinți to bring to Mihalache, at Dobrești, a written reply. We cannot talk of dissension that would lead, for now, to very serious consequences. In any case, with full powers of the party to proceed as they see fit to lead oppositionist action, Maniu is actually devoid of competition of Mr. N. Lupu, because he's sick, no longer moving from Dobrești, and of Mihalache, who prefer to leave the entire responsibility to Maniu.

Clarifying the relationship between Maniu, Russian and American Maniu is concerned with tightening contact with foreign and clarify relations with the Americans and the Russians. Maniu thinks he can count on the support of the government, but he does not yet know quite clear U.S. government attitude also of Russian government towards his policy and the democratic coalition which he presides. An illustration of this confusion is that at "Gazette de Lausanne" appeared recently an article-reportage in which shows that G. Tătăărăscu occupy a dominant role in organizing democratic coalition in Romania. Maniu sent to the Lausanne newspaper a telegram of aligning; on this occasion, made the finding, towards his intimates, that they must take into account the possibility that the Russians and Americans - or possibly that only the Russians - try to work in Romania with other political leaders than those present in the "Democratic Union". Meeting Dr. Angelescu with Maniu Saturday 12 August a.c., afternoon, Dr. C. Angelescu returning from the Stălpuestatem after a lack from the capital for nearly a week, he visited Iuliu Maniu, and they had a conversation for almost an hour. Between Maniu and Dr. Angelescu - as a representative of the liberal faction that believes in the possibilities and the role of Maniu - there is a complete identity of views. Dr. Angelescu and Maniu believe that King should replace the current regime with a democratic government that signed the armistice and to proceed to restore a constitutional political life. Maniu and Dr. Angelescu hopes that, having the king's contest and the

military commanders, the regime will be replaced very peered time, for Romania to emerge from the war with Bulgaria, if not before.

Dinu Brătianu's reserves, as well as other prominent liberals, however are not too optimistic. After the information that he owns from even general Sănătescu's source, Dinu Brătianu believes that the situation is not yet suitable to armistice because it could count for now on the support of the army commanders. Nor relationship between Anglo-Americans and Russians - still unclear about the fate of countries in the South East including Romania - do not encourage military commanders to support an armistice formula. Most elder's liberals do not believe, so, in likelihood of a quick regime change and sees the possibilities of an immediate ceasefire. However, Iuliu Maniu has the contest of Dinu and Gheorghe Brătianu, as well as the other liberal leader, as, passively, he was enjoying the support of prominent factors from the National Peasant group.

Tătărescu proposed formation of a Romanian government in Botoșani Regarding George Tătărescu the audience that had to the king circles to, close former Prime Minister shows that he suggested a solution that, in his opinion, would be only able to alleviate complaints allied and Soviets particularly grievances and lead to cooperation between Romanian political forces and the other belligerent group. George Tătărescu showed that, since the party may organize by agreement of the military and all political factors resistance action leading to Romania's exit from the war, the only solution left is that representatives of all political groups to go to Botoșani, take contact with the Soviet command and assemble there a Romanian government, which would conclude a formal armistice with the Allies, to assume the task of administration the territories occupied by the Russians and lead from there, on behalf of the Romanian people, the action against the Germans. According to Tătărescu, such an initiative would be welcomed by the Soviet government, which could show the world that the Romanian people made a gesture of dissociation of Germanophiles policy. The solution is discussed in initiated circles. Mihalache announced Maniu that he is not coming to Bucharest on August 16, Ion Mihalache announced Maniu that it decided not to come to Bucharest, because he is not interested

in political conversations which are brought there, either within or outside the group.

At the same time, however, Mihalache announced Maniu that he remains faithful soldier of the group, convinced that the social-economic and political turmoil after the Armistice, the National Peasant Party will play a very important role. Mihalache's bespeak is explained by the fact that he is waiting to see to what extent Iuliu Maniu will succeed in action on that he currently leads on behalf of "Democratic Union". Mihalache believes that the situation is very serious, as it might happen that the Russians, feeling the need for new military successes, to resume action on the front of the Prut and therefore seek occupation of the Balkans. In such a case, in Mihalache's opinion there will be no possibility of any kind of negotiations and the Russians will impose to Romania what regime will want without the taking into account previous commitments. Maniu does not share Mihalache's pessimism; he continued to believe that commitments from Tehran provide Anglo-American presence in Romania, regardless of battle sectors fluctuations. Who leads the negotiations between Maniu and legionnaires we talked, in a previous report, of Legionary delegation which has made contact with Maniu. The liaison between the group 'democrat Legionnaire "and Iuliu Maniu is the lawyer Nelu Pădureanu the current owner of the bread factory former "Muller".

Pădureanu aims to attract for the disappointed Legionnaires as many supporters with which, joining Maniu on behalf of the legionary movement, be able to obtain an important role in democratic youth organization. Meanwhile, the group that is represented by Pădureanu keep contact with other political figures, and now is looking for an approach also by the recognized leaders of the communist movement, to see if- eventually joining the communists, with whom then come to Maniu - would not gain important advantages.

Contact with the Palace suitable with its plan to try to replace the current regime - if it does not want to take measures to withdraw Romania from the war, in time - Maniu at the same time is working to prepare the second

formula: a government of armistice made of senior officials or military. This action, which is to be made under the king, encounters various difficulties:

- The senior army commanders are divided so that one day it is believed that it can count on the military contest, that the next day to see that the number of generals willing to give support is reduced;
- General Sănătescu appointed to the role of chair this government, seems to have declined such liability;
- News from the ally sources who oppose such formulas and require that a government comprising representatives of all parties in Romania. In view of this action, Maniu maintains however regular contact with the palace, either directly or indirectly. In the days of Sunday, August 13 and Monday, August 14 ac Maniu made in Sinaia new contacts with Palace circles. Informations on the progress of operations Allied military operations conduct has made some of Maniu's friends to hope that soon British and American troops will take action in order to occupy Bulgaria and Romania, so they will come on our territory before or even along with Soviet troops. Maniu said, however, that from the information that they received from abroad, five days ago, that the allies have not yet regard such an operation; All efforts would be submitted, both by the Russians and by the Anglo-Americans - said Maniu - that to get into Hungary. Maniu revealed that intentions of the High Allied Command should enjoy, because in this way it will avoid a big clash between the Germans and the Allies on our territory, collision which would result in bombing and fantastic destruction.

German intentions towards Romanian politicians .National Peasant group leadership is concerned about the intentions which the Gestapo leadership from Romania would have against Romanian politicians. Following information received Maniu Gestapo would have done in recent days to undertake intense training at a time to raise opposition leaders. Maniu was interested in what are the forces that the Gestapo would have to us, what German paramilitary groups exist and where they would find the offices and stores of weapons and ammunition for these formations. Head of

National Peasant group tasked different people from its proximity to provide, quickly, a documentary material in this regard.

New meeting Maniu - Brătianu On Thursday, August 17 ac Maniu and Dinu Brătianu jointly examined various internal and external information. Maniu stated that all rumors stating that Mr. Marshal Antonescu had decided to give the place to another ministerial formation, aiming to conclude an armistice, are unfounded. Maniu claims that Mr. Marshal Antonescu is not willing to such a gesture, and to prove it, the head of the National Peasant group reported a statement made by the Leader in Azuga's hospital inspection, led by Dr. Topa. Maniu said, however, that the most appropriate solution would be the task of removing Romania from war to be assumed still by Mr. Marshal Antonescu. The two party leaders then examined the situation in light of recent reports, coming from emissaries sent abroad.

What are the Allies really asking, after reports sent by Știrbey and Vișoianu, the situation would have changed compared to the opposition plans as allies are asking that the armistice government to be the expression of a national coalition - and thereby it is excluded a government besides parties or officials government. Soviets want this, because in reality they do not seek an armistice itself, but a peace, before to meet the World Conference with this mission. Vișoianu also said that it is impossible, in the present circumstances, to obtain from the Russian an improvement of the armistice conditions. Taking into consideration the explanations made by the alliance, Maniu and Dinu Brătianu took in research possibilities in order to the composition of a armistice government composed of all parties. Brătianu was however of the opinion that the opposition should remain on hold, until it will be seen:

- Watch new military action;
- It emerge from these actions, the Germans will withdraw from Romania, which will be the situation;
- What attitude will have Mr. Marshal Antonescu towards new military actions and his intentions? Maniu however, said that the opposition

must be prepared, as may occur at any time new situations and that towards the responsibilities which he has, all plans must be in place.

Maniu left on 17 August at Snagov, announcing that from there he will go in Transylvania, from where he will return next weekend.

### **1944 August 20**

Rumor from the NPP environments, picked up by the source "K-5", regarding a governmental formula with Iuliu Maniu premier and Marshal Ion Antonescu military commander<sup>12</sup>

Section CI [Rumor]

Circulating among the National Peasant Party, strongly, after which the old rumor of a Maniu government formula with Mr. Marshal Antonescu as supreme commander of the armies would be current this time being accepted by Mr. Marshall. It seems that this formula is much favored by party members because Mr. Maniu does not have the army and at present military force is even more necessary to preserve internal order. Military formula is - they say - even in such a position supported by Mr. Maniu that he suggest the formation of a democratic hue troops government but which, by its determination to counter any riot which, eventually, would try by the Communists party and whose troubles the party cannot cope, his peasant guards being just during their romantic phase.

### **1944 August 22**

Report of the Capital Police Prefecture, received by SSI, in relation to the supervision of the main political leaders<sup>13</sup>

Capital Police Prefecture

Politicians work in the day of August 21, 1944

1. Iuliu Maniu is at Brașov.

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<sup>12</sup> ANIC, Fond PCM/SSI, File 3/1944, Vol. II, 304 f.;

<sup>13</sup> ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 55-57;

2. Mihail Popovici arrived in the capital, going immediately to Buftea.
3. Av. N. Penescu is at Buda - Ilfov.
4. Ion Mihalache is at Dobrești.
5. Dinu Brătianu is at Florica.
6. George Tătărăscu is at Poiana-Gorj.
7. Mihail Ralea has not been returned from Sinaia.
8. Pandrea Peter on the day of August 21 a.c. was in Bucharest.
9. N.D. Cocea has not been returned from Sighișoara.
10. Laurențiu Pătrășcanu has not made an appearance in the Capital.

Communication:

Undersecretary of State of Internal Affairs  
General Directorate of Police  
General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie  
Special Intelligence Service

### **1944 August 22**

Note of the ISS about time established by the political groups to take action to save the country<sup>14</sup>

From the political circles

1. The new Soviet offensive on the front of Moldova has caused turmoil in political circles. Both in Sinaia and Bucharest Soviet offensive is seen as likely to clear up a number of internal problems which were found for months in direct or indirect dependence on the Red Army advance. The National Peasant is said that Maniu has solutions prepared in agreement with the other leaders of the democratic opposition and that these solutions will be implemented shortly. Circles mentioned reports that Maniu believes that the threat of the first German reaction in the country cannot be put now in question and that at the time when Soviet troops will be in front of the line Galati - Focsani the Germans will no longer might think to act vigorously within the country.

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<sup>14</sup> ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 67;

This time - say the Peasant members - can be used, safely, by Democratic groups to take action. In the same way see the things also the Liberals. Liberals also said that the opposition is preparing a request besides Mr. Marshal Antonescu, to find sooner the solution regarding the lives of the soldiers on the front who are scattered with no chance of success. United opposition will propose that at the eleventh hour to let to the political groups the task of saving what can be saved. Communists consider the situation in another way, claiming that we are not in front of a large offensive, but it's a situation of reassessment of the front, with a limited purpose, which is, however, also a political character. Pătrășcanu, who for some time has resumed contact with some partisans, claims that it is about occupying parts of Moldova including Iasi, in order to may constitute the democratic government of the elements that are currently in Moscow.

It also claims that the game is not precluded the entry into of the senior officers, prisoners in the USSR and won by Moscow. Concerning the right circles, they think that eventually the situation will improve and that the last word will have the Germans. Gigurtu, Cuza and the others claim that Romania's attitude to the new events must be of waiting, while continuing to respect commitments to Germany. German Legation in Bucharest - Gigurtu states-is very attentive to all the tortures of the democratic groups in Romania, and the Reich is strong enough to react promptly if it would attempt anything. German Legation in Bucharest - Gigurtu-states is very close to all the tortures democratic groups in Romania, and Reich is strong enough to react promptly if they would try something.

In February. Romanian democratic circles were informed that the Secretary of the Swedish Legation in Ankara wrote to a relative of his in Bucharest last week, a letter, which was also shown to Maniu. The letter states inter alia that the mission of Barbu Știrbey would be about to fail and that Romania is currently isolated. However, the Swedish diplomat advises his kinsman, that if the Soviet occupation occur in Bucharest, to remain in Romania, because it will be better here than elsewhere. The text of this letter, counted by the mentioned circles is authentic, produced a deep impression among those around Maniu and the other who have taken note

of it. Soviet offensive beginning towards Romania is explained by these circles as follows:

- or is it a general offensive along the whole front from the North to the Black Sea, which must be decisive against the Germans;
- or is it declaration of the offensive in this region because of the difficulties of the rest of the front, where the Germans would try a staunch resistance;
- or is it an attempt to obtain the decisive political results, given the delay in taking a decision by policy makers in Romania. In any case, the current week is counted as exceptionally important for the events unfolding.

### **August 1944 [22]**

Note of the SSI on the edge of a rumor about an alleged appeal of democratic opposition leaders, Iuliu Maniu and CIC [Dinu] Brătianu to Marshal Ion Antonescu<sup>15</sup>

A letter signed by Messrs. Maniu and Dinu Brătianu was sent Tuesday evening to Mr. Marshall. The letter states that:

1. Mr. Marshal, ignoring the advices that were given has loaded himself of liability.
2. Germany was defeated and Romania sacrifices were in vain.
3. Romania will not be able to change the situation helping again Germany instead it will bear the consequences of the Bolshevik victory. Accordingly, Messrs. Maniu and Brătianu ask Mr. Marshall: "Since no one can take responsibility of the situation today, Mr. Marshall is invited to break ties with Germany and declare Romania a non-belligerent state, sharing it also to American - England allies. If he won't do this, he is invited to communicate M.S.Regelui the situation and to leave the place to another government, to resolve what it can be saved."

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<sup>15</sup> ASRI, Fond Y., File no. 40 010, Vol. 34, f. 83-84;

The letter was sent this morning, 10 am, to Mr. Churchill, through Swedish Legation.

- This letter was personally communicated also to Tanrioer.
- The anti-German posters manufactured with the warning to resignation on Mr. Marshall. Attention to printing houses.

It projects two things:

If in 8 days will not occurred any gesture of marshal, in the sense of the letter sent, he and Dinu Brătianu will approach the king to take the initiative of the situation. Parallel, is working on bullying the situation with the help of some generals. Is expected the completion of the callings under arms. Is not about prominent generals, but about some that inspires today confidence to Marshal. Mr. Maniu does not want generals who have personal ambitions, but people who actually exerting an order, have the force and share its ideas. I think that in 4-5 days we will know one of them.

- Mr. Marshall and M. Antonescu were to leave today at the Führer, they will leave tomorrow.

Legionnaires were arrested in the province.

- It is believed that Marshal will strengthen the government with a few Germanophiles General.

### **1944 August 22**

Note of the SSI about steps taken by the leaders of the political groups to save the country<sup>16</sup>

#### NOTE

The last two days (20 and August 21), I drew the following: The onset of the Soviet offensive on the front of the Siret and Dniester gave certain indication to the opposition that the final phase began. In the discussions that took place between Iuliu Maniu, Dinu Brătianu and other leaders of

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<sup>16</sup> ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 65-66;

the democratic bloc, was taken into account the impetuous need to move without delay to the implementation of desiderata underlying political democratic parties approach to save the country. It was decided keeping a permanent contact with the crown, in which scopis-apropus M.S. King coming to Bucharest. His Majesty came to the capital on the night of August 20-21 for today, August 22, convened a council of democratic cartel, to adopt some final decisions. There is Maniu strong belief that will waive all claims for the truce to be signed by the military, to accept to sign the clause regarding Bessarabia. The way in which the fighting on the front Iasi, German on the front attitude and mood of our military personnel, justifies opposition leaders in believing that they are in the consent of the Romanian people, demanding sooner cessation of war with Russia. German attitude to the front, where their armies would find in the railway wagons, after some to be transported to the battle field, after others to leave the front line. Opinions in the opposition camp can be divided:

- Some political leaders claim that, once the front will approach Milcov, should be announced an armistice with the Russians, by appointing a government in Bucharest, with a mandate from the M.S. King Michael - this under the assumption that the Marshal had not until then agreed to proclaim himself this;
- Other political leaders think that will last at least on the front lines of Vaslui and at Nămolosa - Braila, where the Germans will try a resistance. Then it might repeat the situation of Finland, where Soviet armies could not advance and were stopped, where they can be found now;
- Finally, there are some political leaders who believe that Soviet military action is with a clear political character, following events precipitation in Bucharest, in their majority, but, opposition political leaders agree that the military events will take in a few days at a rate which will not allow any delay, unless it will be adopted the last chance to save the country, through an benevolent agreement with the Russians. There are very few politicians and even military that believes in resistance. For

today, August 22, 1944, are announced various secret meetings between democratic politicians, who are likely to make final decisions.

### **1944 August 23**

Note of SSI Maniu's political activity<sup>17</sup>

NOTE From political

1. Among National Peasant leadership approach group is discussed that Maniu, during his last trip to Ardeal, made contact at Sibiu with General H. Cihosky, with whom he discussed for three hours in a room at Hotel Boulevard. On the discussions not even his close ones to Maniu does not have details, but is revealed at National Peasant that whenever the President of this group deems that the situation of the front is likely to influence the political tide, accustomed to consult with superior military, especially those who held high positions in the army. After this meeting, Maniu went to Brașov, from where he continued on to Sinaia, reaching there in the afternoon of August 21, with Leucuția and preceded by Ilie Lazar, who had arrived a few hours before. Maniu descended at Dr. Jovin's villa where he was immediately visited by the lawyer Virgil Venianin and Titel Petrescu. On the morning of August 22 a.c. Maniu arrived at Snagov with Leucuția, and after a quarter of an hour has arrived and Dr. Jovin. By noon arrived at Snagov also Mircea Cancicov, and in the afternoon Maniu went to Bucharest, where he was visited at his home by many politicians. Among those who visited him were Mihalache with Virgil Solomon, Dr. N. Lupu, Vasile Serle Relu Măldărăscu, Ciudin, Copsu with count of Gatterburg, Penescu with MihaiPopovici, Emil Socor, Ghiță Popp, General Iliescu ing. Mironescu with Domocos, Romulus Boilă M. Sturza, R. Cioeulescu and R. Xenopol. By evening Maniu visited of three quarters of an hour at the residence of Barbu Știrbey then has visited nearly half an hour ing. Vasilescu. He took dinner to Mrs. Madgearu, and at night slept at Romulus Pop. In addition to these conferences of Maniu, General

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<sup>17</sup> ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 71-73;

Rădescu convened, also, a number of reserve officers and Tătărescu group also was called, being invited those in Ralea's.

2. Among the opposition, there is no full agreement on the Soviet offensive its meaning and development opportunities on the Romanian territory. Left circles expresses the belief that is not about the decisive offensive against Romania, but an action with limited objectives to conquer Iasi, security positions to the south, and the conquest of some starting positions on the front lines, more advantageous.

Left circles believe that the Soviet action tends to create the necessary environment for political solution to Bucharest, which is still pending. In the event, however, that the expected events will not occur in a short time, those circles which announce actions pretend to be exceptionally important from the Soviets. First is to be expected formation of a "release" Romanian government at Iasi, with political elements, intellectual, labor and military who are in the USSR. Secondly, in the case of delay of some decisions which are to take by the political world in Bucharest, claiming that it will unleash a rapid and decisive offensive on a large scale through a landing in Constanta and surround Bucharest.

In this second case, also announced that will enter into action in Constanta the Romanian troops trained in the USSR and put under the command of senior Romanian officers. Leftist political circles express their conviction that the time to decide in Bucharest arrived and will not have to be lost without the risk of jeopardizing the agreement with the USSR.

3. The National Peasant Secretariat expressed the fear that the Soviet governments do not establish a provisional government in Iasi, whose role will be to recognize to Soviet concessions required of them, to recruit troops to fight alongside the USSR and to monopolize in the future Romanian political life control during the occupation. These Informations have upstart Turkish Legation secretariat and have produced a deep concern, as it sees the Soviet desire to respond to democratic group's passivity in the country. Although some leaders see

this information a Soviet "blackmail" to boost an action, it is still possible to influence democratic attitudes in the coming days.

### **1944 August 23**

Note received by Group Policy of the SSI, from the Capital Police Prefecture, about the work of the previous day politicians<sup>18</sup>

Capital Police Prefecture Politicians activity on the day of August 22, 1944:

1. Iuliu Maniu came to the capital from Snagov at 16.30 accompanied by Aurel Leucuția. In his absence from home was visited in the morning by: Vasile Serdici and Virgil Solomon and Mrs. Alice Sturza. Afternoon he was visited at 16.30 by Ion Mihalache and Virgil Solomon, who left at 17. Between the hours of 16.40 to 17.25 Iuliu Maniu was visited by Dr. N. Lupu, Ciudin, Count of Kattenbourg, GhițăPop, Coposu gen. Ilescu in Gendarmes, Commander Coșoveanu, engineer and DomocoșBoilaMironescu Jr., MihailSturza, Cioculescu and RaduRaduXenopol. At 19.20 IuliuManiu accompanied by engineer left to the residence of MironescuBarbuȘtirbey in CaleaVictoriei, where they remained until 20.20 when they went to ing. Vasilescu in Mica Palace. At 20.45 str. VasileConta have gone to to Mrs. Virgil Madgaru, which is believed to have 22 hour the dining and Iuliu Maniu a went to Splai Union, No. 5, where he slept overnight.
2. Mihail Popovici came to the capital at 8.40 descended at his home in str. Sofia, No. 22, from where he immediately went out, returning at 10.20 accompanied by av. Măldărescu. At 18:30 he was visited by journalist Ganea.
3. Ion Mihalache and Dr. Lupu came to from Topoloveni the capital in the afternoon. Between the hours of 16.25 to 16.55 Ion Mihalache visited Iuliu Maniu, at 17 he was at the Palace, at 17.45 he returned Iuliu Maniu to the residence of, from where after a half hour he left with Dr. N. Lupu. They went to the home of Barbu Știrbey in Calea Victoriei and at 19.20 they left the capital in Snagov direction. From the information we

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<sup>18</sup> ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 77-79;

have, appears that Ion Mihalache returned to the capital, at 20.40 and was received in audience by Mr. Marshal - leading at Presidency of the Council of Ministers. After this he returned at Snagov, from where he is expected to return to the capital in the morning of August 23

4. Av. Penescu was not visited by any political figure both in his home and at matches company. At 17.15 accompanied by Mihail Popovici they visited Iuliu Maniu, where they remained until 18. At 22 he left away at Buftea.
5. Dinu Brătianu is at Florica. It was expected to arrive in the capital on the evening of August 22 18 o'clock, being called by Iuliu Maniu still he did not come.
6. June. Gh. is at Glade - Gorj and is expected to come to the capital in the day of August 23
7. Mihail Ralea is at Sinaia.
8. Pandrea Peter in August 22 a.c. was in Bucharest.
9. N.D. Coceanu has returned from Sighisoara.
10. Laurențiu Pătrășcanu on 22 August has not appeared at any of the known address in the Capital.

Communication:

Under secretariat of State Internal Affairs  
General Direction of Police  
General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie  
Special Intelligence Service

### **1944 August 26**

Note of SSI aired to the Council of Ministers and the Internal Affairs Ministry about: the meeting between Gheorghe Tătărescu and Mihail Ralea; trying to coagulation of a single block of the right, the mission received by Istrate Micescu to draft a new constitution<sup>19</sup>

NOTE domestic political information

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<sup>19</sup> ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 80-81;

1. Tătărescu recently had a meeting with Ralea, with which occasion they established the following: I deem it imperative the existence of strong leftist political groups, both in terms of internal and external point of view. Both want a sincere collaboration with the Social Democrats and the Communists, to whom will give all moral and material competition. Because they have information that the National Peasants and liberals want to exploit the current international situation, the two groups left, following to withdraw their cooperation in peace time, Ralea and Tătărescu provides from now a basis for accurate collaboration and a number of important portfolios in a common cabinet. Want to share information with the two groups of left and collaborate in collecting this information, both at home and abroad. Commit themselves of a political truce for five years after the signing of peace, during which time none of the groups not to attack, agreement which may be extended indefinitely by tacit renewal. In the circles around him Tătărescu states that it would have taken a domestic general offensive, trying to get past the Liberals and National Peasant temporary counted their allies.
2. On the evening of August 21, was held a conference of several leaders of the right, which also examined the internal situation in the light of recent information. The conference took place outside the capital, to Dr. Ilie Rădulescu property, near Snagov, without the participation of Guard elements. At this conference has shown, among other things, and dissatisfaction for the difficulties arising at the creation of united internal block of right.
3. Micescu Istrate said that he received a mandate to work on drafting a Constitution in place of the 1938 one of the former King Carol II. Constitution to Micescu recommended is to be inspired by the one given to the country in 1923 by Brătianu. Also Micescu said that he received a mandate to work on a decree of annulment of all decrees given from 1940 until now. Micescu declined to say from whom he received this mandate.

**1944 August 28**

Note of SSI aired to the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Staff, about the political activities conducted by Gheorghe Tătărescu, Mihail Ralea and Micaela Masts<sup>20</sup>

## NOTE

1. Gheorghe Tătărescu is not shown discouraged by the fact that he could not be a part of the current government. Spread His intimate that was convinced beforehand that Tătărescu will not the new contributes to \_ government party. Georghel Gheorghiu, one of His intimates, say to people whom he contact, that still has prepared formula Tătărescu a governmental and that it intends to submit to the Sovereign. Also, his friends discuss that Tătărescu is working on a memorandum that will send heads of parties and will serve in political circles.
2. Mihail Ralea, seeing that with all the efforts he cannot be accepted in the "National Democratic Bloc" he made a new attempt in addition to engineer Tudor Ionescu, one of the tutors former unionist factions, to rally to a common action. Ing T. Ionescu, besides that Ralea has recently made other approaches, has refused this approach, saying that he still remains on hold.
3. Micaela Catargi, known by its Carol-it orientation is currently in Sinaia, where his brother resides, Barbu Catargi, and where is working on a political memoir. The first part of his work deals with events before the Balkan War, the second refers to era up to the World War and restore the former King Carol II, the last part deals with its reign and ends with the regime of Marshal Antonescu. Micaela Catargi soon plans to publish his work, his entire manuscript to the events of 1944. The work - in some passages - will try a political justification of the former King Carol II.

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<sup>20</sup> ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 84-85;

**1944 August 30**

Note of SSI aired to the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the General Staff, regarding self-dissolution of the Legionary Movement and political actions of the liberal group led by Gheorghe Tătărescu<sup>21</sup>

## NOTE domestic political information

1. Legionary group self-dissolution and exchange of letters between Messrs. Ministers Iuliu Maniu and Comănicu held the attention of political circles. The grouping most affected by this manifestation of Legionnaires in the country was that of Gheorghe Tătărescu, which considers the particularly important fact. Georget Gheorghiu said on the evening of August 29 when it was known in political circles about the fact that "the National Peasant Party leader understands to organize in this way, by capturing former Legionary elements, a dynamic part to counterbalance the action so vivid of the Communist Party." Maniu - said Gheorghiu - would particularly appreciate the organizational dynamism and spirit that dominates legionary personnel and would like to use these skills for the benefit of political consolidation of the National Peasant Party." The chapter is reported by Tătărescu's group, which understands to reserves it for the campaign, deemed inevitable in fall. The rulers around Tătărescu declares that in assumption until last of the Democratic formula only to the four parties which are found today at the government Tătărescu will move to grouping of all other political parties and independent figures around him for elections to come. There are still hoping voices, however, still hoping who are in the grouping of Tătărescu to a reconciliation with the Liberal Party under the leadership of Mr. Dinu Brătianu or when moving of this heads to Costinescu Dr. or by a vehement campaign against Gheorghe Brătianu, considered one of obstacles most important to the realization of this union between liberal.

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<sup>21</sup> ASRI, Fond D., File no. 6119, f. 86-89;

2. Immediately after the change of regime Liberal group around Tătărescu decided not to involve, until overall government policy materialization of the National Democratic Bloc. Now, however, it means to sympathizers of Tătărescu a tendency to leave of these expectations. Explanation of attitude change, which coincided with the entry of Soviet troops in Bucharest, is given by intimate friends of Tătărescu, showing that the head of their group counts on the support of the Soviet factor in the continuation of its policy. On the morning of August 29 a.c. was held a conference of Tătărescu's intimate friends, which was attended by Georgel Gheorghiu, Costel Tătăranu, Petre Bejan, Ion Nistor etc. It was examined the situation of regime change and decided immediate appearance of a great liberal newspaper to support the view of the group under Tătărescu 's leadership and subsidization of one or more papers appearing or will appear in some time to support the organization of Tătărescu. In the event that there will not be obtained authorization of daily newspaper occurrence of party, intentionally, it will resort to editing it without authorization. It was also decided to launch a manifesto to the country, to explain the attitude of Tătărescu and liberal group around him etc.. There were two opinions regarding the text and tone of this manifesto, on which it has been completely agreed. A view expressed by former ministers, demanded to avoid some feedback to the government made by M.S. King Mihai I, and other opinion, of the group of young elements, demanded immediate passing to an action of opposition and criticism. In the final phase of discussions it was decided to proceed with this manifesto to "enlighten the country" on Tătărescu's position on the issue of ceasefire, insisting on its manifestations few months ago for conclusion of peace with the USSR and citation of demarches to Palace and abroad, to reach the result of termination of the war with Russia. Tătărescu claimed that its placing in finding government formula would have meant a large and fair union of all existing democratic forces would be due to the action of Gheorghe Brătianu addition the minister Iuliu Maniu." Gheorghe would lead otherwise, Brătianu said Tătărescu, all political affairs of the liberal faction of government attending the formula of the National

Democratic Bloc, although it is a convinced pro-German and the attitude has had known until now." It was decided to continue the meeting of liberal committee this week, to begin the battle of categorical affirmation of Tătărescu, group. To Georgel Has been given Petre Gheorghiu and Bejan mandate to treat hiring the pattern for officious groups and making contract with journalists in order to achieve the decisions taken.

3. Mihail Ralea was in the morning of August 30 to printing "Adevărul", where announced those from the newspaper "Libertatea" that Tătărescu, is about to release a newspaper, but that he encounters difficulties in recruiting editorial staff.
4. Sebastian Șerbescu decided reappearance of "Semnalului", for which purpose he signed a contract with typography "Dacia Traiana" The newspaper will reappear on 1st September, with the same title from the past. On the other hand, Ion Totu, former editor of "Viitorul" and founder of the newspaper "Semnalul", whereon then sold it to Șerbescu, seeing that the latter is in no hurry to resume his newspaper, he took the decision to use the title . Accordingly, on the morning of August 29 visited the General Constantinescu-claps leading typography "Curentul" by communicating to him that has the approval of ministers Maniu and Dinu Brătianu for the emergence of the newspaper "Semnalul" under its direction. General Constantinescu asked Totu to bring a letter from Mr. Maniu and Brătianu.

### **3. Conclusions**

As major intelligence services, who worked during the Second World War (the American OSS, the British SOE, the Soviet NKVD and the German Abwehr), Romanian SSI proceeded both to the exploitation of official-open

sources (newspapers, magazines, books, topographical maps, radio, etc..) and to collect information by clandestine means<sup>22</sup>.

Information material picked up by S.S.I. from official sources, by way of intelligence, by exchanging information with similar services in other countries (notably with German Abwehr) or other Romanian military and civilian institutions, it was processed by the Office of Studies and Documentation - department specialized in analysis, synthesis and prognosis of politico-strategic events and military - which operate under a deputy, but under the direct coordination of E. Cristescu. Here were drawn up information bulletins that went directly to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and, where appropriate, to other ministries, according to the issues of interest. An informative bulletin was usually presented every day at 12.30 and consists of two chapters: one on internal events and the second contained news in international affairs. Weekly or by events, it was inserted a chapter about the course of military operations, which develop together with Section II of M.St.Major the main body of the Romanian army. Over the course of 20-30 pages, sometimes 50, an information bulletin of SSI refers to the country's economic situation, at the mood of the working strata (workers, traders, farmers) or minorities (especially Jews, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians), the activity of political parties and organizations(National Liberal and National Peasant). In the right of each information was mentioned the credibility of the source through the following notes: "reliable source", "information verified" or "unverified", "official source", "from foreign press," "conclusions offered by experts" etc. If we add the fact that many of these information bulletins are handwritten resolution of Marshal Ion Antonescu, we realize the value of these documents.

Special information was presented directly by E. Cristescu in daily audience that he had at Marshal's office. In the days when the State Leader was

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<sup>22</sup> Cistian Troncotă, *Eugen Cristescu. Asul serviciilor secrete românești. Memorii (1916-1944), mărturii, documente*, with a foreword by Dr. Dan Zamfirescu. Publishing House "R.A.I. Bucharest ", Ed" Roza Vanturilor ", Bucharest, f.a., p. 40;

missing from Bucharest, general manager of SSI, avoid using special sealed envelopes sent by mail and move, depending on urgency, to where he knew that it may contact Ion Antonescu. Even in periods when E. Cristescu was gone on holiday for treatment, he also personally solves all more delicate problems of the Service<sup>23</sup>.

Marshal Ion Antonescu claimed daily information, comprehensive and accurate, and the range of the areas of interest was expanded. He was a relentless man; he did not admit any misconduct, errors or deviations from the orders given. E. Cristescu, along with its entire informational unit, had to respond qualified, documented and very operative at the request of the Head of State<sup>24</sup>.

All these elements that can be documented historically reveal that the Special Intelligence Service was an essential element in strategic decisions that the state leader has adopted.

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<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 41;

<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 42.