


Geopolitical
Perspectives and Development
EUBSR 2013 International Conference, Volume 1

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Geopolitical Perspectives and Development

**Geopolitical
Perspectives and Development**
EUBSR 2013 International Conference, Volume 1

Edited by:
Constantin HLIHOR
Peter KOPECKÝ

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The Russian Black Sea Fleet in Istanbul (1798)

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Abstract: Upon the Ottoman government's appeal to the Russians and the British following Napoleon's embarkment in Egypt in 1798, a squadron of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was sent to Istanbul under the command of Vice Admiral Ushakov. The squadron, after arriving in the Bosphorus in August, was joined by the Ottoman fleet at the Dardanelles in September. This exceptional joint fleet sailed into the Mediterranean Sea in a coalition against the French. This paper shall focus on the role played by Alexander Ipsilanti, ex-hospodar of Wallachia and his son Constantin Ipsilanti, Grand Dragoman of the Porte in the alliance treaty signed between the Porte and the Russian Empire towards the achievement of a sustainable peace.

Keywords: Ottoman-Russian Treaty, Napoleon, Ipsilanti family.

1. The Triggering Event: Napoleon's Invasion of Egypt

The arrival of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Istanbul in 1798 marks one of the rare moments in the history of the Ottoman Empire. The transitory alliance between the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and the Russian Empire was triggered by Napoleon's embarkment in Egypt, which had come as a shocking surprise to Selim III. Ottomans' suspicions of Napoleon's movements had been relieved by Moralı Esseyid Ali Efendi, the first resident Ottoman ambassador to Paris, who had informed the Porte that Napoleon had no intentions of occupying Egypt. The ambassador had, seemingly been convinced by Talleyrand himself. About 8 days after the arrival of Esseyid Ali Efendi's letter to Istanbul, (Selim III's famous remark was "What a jackass!" - "Ne eşek herifmiş") the Ottoman government was to declare war on France (September 12, 1798). (An exhaustive account of Moralı Esseyid Efendi can be found in Maurice Herbert's "Moralı Esseyid Ali Efendi: Fransa'da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi").[1]

The preceding period had witnessed warming relations between the Ottomans and the French, affirmed and reaffirmed through bilateral

military and cultural relations. One important consequence of these relations had been the arrival of French engineers and officers in the company of General Albert Dubayet, the French Ambassador to the Porte in 1796 to aid Selim's efforts towards the establishment of a new military force, the Nizam-ı Cedid. The cumulative influence of these experts was far reaching. The experts served to broaden the scope of the Imperial School of Naval Engineering, formerly founded by Mustafa III in 1773 to train technical staff. [2]

On the other hand, there also seems to be a softening of relations with the Russians before the arrival of Aubert Dubayet. In 1796, both the pro-French Reis-ül Küttab Ebubekir Ratip Efendi and Grand Dragoman Gheorghe Moruzi were dismissed to be replaced by Mustafa Rasih Efendi and Constantine Ypsilanti, known for their Russian sympathies. Morkva mentions a secret meeting between the Russian Ambassador to the Porte, Kochubei and Reis Efendi (which meeting could not possibly have been held without the presence of the Grand Dragoman, Constantine Ipsilanti), when the ambassador warned the Ottoman Minister about the activities of Napoleon's agents in Albania and Greece. [3]

Following the arrival of the new Russian ambassador Tomara, who replaced Kochubei in 1797, the sessions with the Reis-ül Küttab continued, during which the Porte was informed of French actions and intentions. The Russians had promised the support of the Black Sea Fleet as early as May 1798. Some of these sessions were held between Fonton, the Dragoman of the Russian Embassy and Constantin Ipsilanti in secret, for fear of raising suspicion among other members of the diplomatic community in Istanbul.[4]

The official Ottoman appeal to the Russians was dated 24 July 1798. As promised, a squadron commanded by Vice Admiral Ushakov was despatched from Sevastopol and arrived in Istanbul on August 24 to be joined by a Turkish fleet on the Dardanelles in September.

2. Istanbul Treaty of 1799

The alliance was crystallized in a Treaty on January 3, 1799. The Treaty consisted of 13 main articles, supplemented by 13 secret ones. The respective contributions of the parties to the composition of the whole agreement remain ambiguous. The parties defined the aim of the Treaty as the protection of integrity of both Empires. The first section, confirming the Jassy Peace Treaty of 1792 provided mutual guarantees of border protection, military assistance, rights to enter allied ports for both parties and delineated the duration of the agreement as eight years.

The supplementary conditions, which were secret, covered an action plan in collaboration with the British Fleet against the French, granted free passage of Russian ships through the Straits, closed the Black Sea to other states and assured logistic services for the Russian Fleet.

Morkva, in his very comprehensive PhD Thesis refers to the most interesting secret article of the Treaty, namely clause 6, which detailed the possible use of the Russian land army in the event of a French aggression on Ottoman soil. Should this happen, the Russians were to send an army of 75-80 thousand men with artillery support. [5]

3. The Fate of the French Military Experts

The French team, composed of engineers and artillery officers faced a “reversal of fortune” following the Ottoman-Russian alliance. The French ambassador Ruffin was imprisoned in the Towers of Yedikule. Most of the experts were expelled to be imprisoned in Black Sea towns such as Amasra and Samsun. [6] Morkva provides a plausible explanation for this decision: the Russians could not tolerate the risk of the presence of French officers around, especially in the coastal fortresses around the Dardanelles.[7]

4. The Ipsilanti Contribution to the Treaty

What interests us particularly within the limits of this short paper is the extent of the contribution of the Ipsilantis to the formulation of the Istanbul

Treaty. As mentioned above, in his capacity as the Grand Dragoman of the Porte, Constantin Ipsilanti had been actively involved in the peace process between the Turks and the Russians for a long time. His father, Alexander Ipsilanti, the former hospodar of Wallachia was also present in Istanbul at the time the Treaty was prepared and concluded.

Constantin Ipsilanti had spent part of his youth in Russia and spoke fluent Russian. His pro-Russian stand seems to have been common knowledge. According to Akçura, Ipsilanti was an outspoken Russian sympathizer.[8] Iorga refers to Ipsilanti's close ties with the Russian dragomans Tomara, Fonton, and Barozzi. [9]

At the same time Ipsilanti was annoyed by Napoleon's intentions, in particular his interests in Greece after Napoleon had sent a message to Greece announcing the liberation of Malta as a "preliminary" to Greek liberation.[10] It is reasonable to assume that the Grand Dragoman would show considerable effort towards the conclusion of an agreement between the two Empires.

Nicolae Iorga, drawing on the work of Zinkeisen is silent on the matter. [11]According to Helene Ypsilanti, however, father and son strove to conclude a sustainable peace between the Porte and the Russian Empire:

"Im Jahre 1798 waren beide Ypsilanti, Vater und Sohn, bestrebt, zwischen Russland und der Pforte ein Dauerbündnis zu erreichen. Zu diesem Zwecke sollte zwischen diesen beiden Laendern ein Vertrag mit 14 Artikeln aufgesetzt werden, der die Giltigkeitsdauer von acht Jahren haben sollte und in welchem es von Russland und der Pforte hiess, qu'ils s'établissent entre eux une parfait intimate, qu'ils n'ayent plus a l'avenir que les memes amis le memes ennemis." [12]

We might find an intimation in a letter written by Constantin Ipsilanti to Prince Adam Czatoryski dated September 28, 1809:

"Après tant de services, après toutes les preuves de devouement que depuis douze ans je n'ai cesse de donner a la cour de Russie, et pour lesquelles je

m'en rapporte au témoignage des ministres et des employés de Sa Majesté Impériale en Turquie..."[13]

A powerful Grand Dragoman's leverage in an international settlement is not unprecedented, considering Alexander Mavrocordato's role in the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699. Yet the exact job descriptions of the Grand Dragoman within the Ottoman diplomatic organization remain obscure. The issue whether a Grand Dragoman's active interference in an international treaty constituted *ultra vires* intrusion on state sovereignty certainly deserves further research.

5. Conclusions

The Ottoman-Russian alliance, though brief, demonstrated that the so called "Russophobia" on the side of the Ottomans could be ameliorated or sacrificed for the establishment of a political balance, especially when the integrity of the Ottoman territories was at stake. This is, first of all, supported by the appointments of Mustafa Rasih Efendi and Constantin Ipsilanti as early as 1796. Moreover, Constantin Ipsilanti was allowed to attend secret meetings with either the Russian ambassador or the official dragoman of the Russian Embassy. Moreover, Ipsilanti was also present during the formulation of the secret articles of the Istanbul Treaty of 1799.

Most dragoman stories, however, have a sad ending and the Ipsilantis' story was no exception. What is more interesting, perhaps, is the behavior of the Ottoman administration, which sent confusing messages to its interpreters in a seemingly "trick or treat" parenting style.

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The Balkan Wars (1912–1913): Geopolitical and Military Issues

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Abstract: The Balkan wars of 1912-1913 had important geopolitical, military and territorial consequences over the balance of power in the European south-east. The origins of the Balkan wars were territorial rivalries between the great powers and the mixture Balkan states in the region. The military actions in the Balkan' area took place simultaneously with efforts political and diplomatic undertaken in London, St. Petersburg and Bucharest for to stop the conflict. The study aimed to demonstrate that the small states are able to find viable solutions at the rivalry one of them, and the Peace Conference held in Bucharest (July 16/29 - 28 July/10 August 1913) confirmed this hypothesis.

Keywords: Balkan wars, great power, diplomacy, Balkan states.

In the practice of the European diplomacy from the nineteenth and twentieth century organization of peace conferences that have succeeded the various conflicts was the exclusive privilege of the great powers, as a mean to promote and impose geopolitical interests. From this perspective, the Peace Conference held in Bucharest (July 16/29 - 28 July/10 August 1913) was an obvious exception. The peace treaty signed in Bucharest on 28 July/10 August 1913 was a response given by the small Balkan powers to the problems of peace and war in the Balkan Peninsula, considered as a real "powder keg" of Europe because of the increasing of the tensions in the region.

The negotiations held and the decisions which were made in the peace conference held in the Romanian capital highlighted the effort of the participating states to find viable solutions to the problem of security in an area where there was a conflict of interests of almost all European powers, especially those of the Ottoman, Russian and Austro-Hungarian, but also inter-regional rivalries. The "management" implemented by the great

powers to the Balkan problems envisaged their geopolitical interests and in a limited extent, took into account the ethnic, religious, historical and cultural specific the peoples which living in that area and the interests states within the south-east of the continent nations. Constant interference of the great powers contributed to the emergence and manifestation of tense relations between the south-eastern states.

The political and military evolutions, the territorial changes occurred in the Balkan region during 1912-1913 have influenced the balance of power in Europe and imposed a new diplomatic approach within the European geopolitical frame of those years. Geopolitical changes of the Balkan region in the years before the outbreak of First World War highlights the role of the particular factors that led to the solution organizing of a peace conference without the direct involvement of the great powers in the capital of a small power in the region, and, the most important thing, in making decisions that have contributed to keeping the balance of power and to achieve the goals pursued by most of the Balkan states.

At the beginning of the twentieth century rivalries between the great powers for the Balkan area have been intensified, actions that have resulted in an mixture increasingly evident in the political life and penetration in the economy of the states in the region, including disputes between these small countries. The external interference, existing rivalries "both among the Balkan states and the great powers" have made the sense of insecurity and the mistrust to reach a very high level¹.

Austro-Hungary developed a sustained political and economic offensive in the Balkans, and after the annexation of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1908, consolidated its position, exerting a significant influence over the policy of the states in the region.

¹ Charles și Barbara Jelavich, *Formarea statelor naționale balcanice.1804-1920* [*The Formations of the Balkan National States*], Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1999, p. 249.

Defeated in Asia (in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905), Russia resumed its expansion to Straits. Russian diplomacy has initiated a number of actions meant to restore St. Petersburg's influence in the Balkan region and to bring Balkan Christian states under its control. The Russian Minister in Belgrade, Hartwig² was the architect of an alliance between Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, alliance which was led and supported by Russia. Russian diplomacy succeeded, after great efforts to convince governments from Sofia, Belgrade and Athens to overcome the differences between them and to sign the political treaties and bilateral military conventions in the spring and summer of 1912³. The establishment of the Balkan alliance represented a success of Russian diplomacy. Russia acquired a dominant position in the region, the Balkan alliance being a useful tool for geopolitical the objectives pursued by it. The Balkan Alliance could be engaged, according to the St. Petersburg policy, against both Austro-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. The diplomacy in St. Petersburg underestimated the capacity of the states in Balkan Alliance to be independently. The governments of within the Allied Balkan states started without the consent of Russia the war with the Ottoman Empire, in October 1912. Russia's efforts to stop the war in the Balkans was determined by the fact that the Russian state was not able at that time to deal with a European conflict because it hadn't completed its fleet and military modernization program.⁴

² Nikolai Ghenrihovici Hartwig (1857-1914) - diplomat, representative of Russia in Belgrade between 1908-1914.

³ Serbia and Bulgaria signed a political treaty February 28 / March 13 1912 which led to the formation of the Balkan League. Greece and Montenegro have signed at May 16 /29, 1912, respectively September 12, 1912, joining the Balkan League. Subsequently, on June 29 /July 12 first three states have concluded a military convention which completed the political agreements.

⁴ Nicoleta Ciachir, *Istoriografia bulgară cu privire la relațiile politico-diplomatice româno-bulgare în perioada 1912-1940*, PhD thesis, Library of the University "Valahia" in Târgoviște, 2012, p. 38.

The establishment of the Balkan League between Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia has changed the balance of power in the Balkans. The total number of soldiers from the four allied Balkan states was over 630,000 people, a formidable force, almost double compared to the number of soldiers of the Ottoman armies which were deployed in Europe, estimated at about 350,000 people⁵. The geostrategic importance of the Balkan alliance was also amplified by the difficult strategic situation of the Ottoman Empire, which had most of its military forces deployed in Tripolitania, on the Italian-Turkish front⁶.

Allied Balkan states took advantage of the military defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Italy, of the unfavorable strategic situation in which its army was and decided to start the war being as its aim the liberation the countrymen which were under Ottoman rule. The attack of the military forces of allied Balkan states surprised the Ottoman army engaged on two fronts located very far one by another. The maneuver of forces and means carried by the Ottoman army on the front of Tripolitania to the front in the Balkans was made under difficult conditions and with great delay. The simultaneous offensive triggered by the Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek and Montenegrin armies was successful and led to the defeat, in a very short time of the Ottoman troops located in the Balkans theater of operations.

Less than two months after the onset of the conflict, the Ottoman Empire lost almost all European territories (except for the region Istanbul and the cities of Edirne, Iannina and Scutari). The intervention of the great powers saved the Ottoman Empire from disaster. The fights ceased due to pressures from the great powers on the states in The Balkan alliance, who

⁵ Gl V. Economu, mr.Gh. Gheorghiu, *Discuțiuni asupra războaielor balcanice*, București, 1926, pp. 52-53.

⁶ In September 1911, Italy attacked the Ottoman possessions in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea and conquered Tripolitania, Cyrenaica (Libya today), the Dodecanese Archipelago, and other territories. Peace was signed on 18 October 1912, the day that Ottoman Empire started war against the military forces of states of the Balkan League.

were forced to accept, in late November 1912, the armistice requested by the Ottoman government.

The quick victories obtained by the armies of the Balkan states against Ottoman military forces surprised the European world, but created new problems in the region. The territorial conquests achieved by the Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek and Montenegrin armies endangered the Ottoman possessions in Europe, but also the objectives pursued by other major powers in the Straits region. Russia was hostile to a possible occupation of Istanbul by the Greek and Bulgarian armies, because such a situation constitutes a many good excuse for the other European powers to deploy fleets of war in the Straits. An international squadron, consisting of 35 warships (4 British, 5 French, 6 German, 7 Italian, 4 Russian, 4 Austro-Hungarian, 2 American, 1 Spanish, 1 Romanian and 1 Dutch) was already concentrated at the end of October 1912, in the Straits⁷. Serbian territorial expansion to Adriatic coast represented an unacceptable situation for the government in Vienna because it was blocking its geopolitical project conducted under the slogan *Drang nach Salonik*. As a result, Austro-Hungary adopted a very aggressive attitude towards Serbia. While the Serbian armed forces were defeating the Ottoman armies in Albania, from Sangeacul Novi Pazar and were advancing towards the Adriatic, the Vienna government ordered the mobilization of army corps and concentrated some of its troops at the border with Serbia. Germany supported Austro-Hungary's actions, stating that they did not rule out the possibility of a war in Europe. France openly expressed its support for Russia, assuring it that in the event of a German aggression will keep its pledges towards its ally. England came in a steady position to block the tensions which appeared between the Franco-Russian bloc and the German-Austrian one. As regards the evolutions in the Balkans, English diplomacy did not adopt open action to support the Balkan alliance because it persisted to

⁷ Romanian Military Archives, fund Ministry of War, file 214/1913, f 20-21. (Romanian attaché Report in Turkey, Lieutenant Colonel Aristide Razu, of January 29, 1913).

strengthen its position in Istanbul and eliminate of the strong German influence⁸.

The crisis occurred between Belgrade and Vienna could lead to an extension of the Balkan conflict across the entire continent. Direct engagement of a great power such as Austro-Hungary, in the Balkan conflict would cause a dangerous situation for the European peace, given to keep also account of the continent the existing system of alliances between the great powers and the interests these in the south-east.

Political and diplomatic actions undertaken by Britain, France and Russia led to overcoming the crisis and prevented the onset of a generalized European war⁹. Edward Grey, Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, said that in case of a European war that will involve France and Germany, England would remain neutral. The position of the British official was its government's response to the statement of the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, on 2 December 1912 according to whom an "attack" against Austro-Hungary will force Germany to fulfill their "duties as ally". The English government warning changed the attitude of Germany. The government in Berlin urged authorities in Vienna to refrain from military action against Serbia and to accept to settle the dispute by means of an international conference. Austro-Hungary accepted to declare that gave up to solve the crisis with Serbia by diplomatic means, on condition that the small Serbian kingdom did not gain the access desired to the Adriatic Sea. In turn, Russia made great pressures a Belgrade and forced Serbia to waive its conquered territories in Albania and the Adriatic Sea output¹⁰.

The role of the UK in global politics, which by its industrial, financial and military force imposed a *British Pax* in the international system and the

⁸ *Histoire Universelle, De la Revolution au monde contemporain*, Larousse-Bordas, 1998, Paris, vol. 3, p. 282.

⁹ Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza, *Istoria secolului XX [The History of the XX Century]*, BIC ALL Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 64.

¹⁰ Robert Gildea, *Barricades and Borders. Europe 1800-1914*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987, pp. 415-417.

constant concern of British governments towards the issue of the Straits, have made London to become the venue of diplomatic negotiations aimed at resolving the Balkan issues. In the British capital were held simultaneously two international conferences with the same theme: the Balkan area, which highlights the particularly important role which this region had in continental geopolitics. Diplomatic envoys of the six great European powers: England, France, Germany, Russia, Italy and Austro-Hungary met in the Conference of Ambassadors whose works were carried out between 16/29 December 1912 and 12/25 August 1913. In the conference, the great powers have negotiated first their interest for the Balkans and then took into account the objectives pursued by the states in the region. The discussions focused on the problems resulting from the operation of the Balkan conflicts, such as: Serbian access to the Adriatic sea, the Albanian matter, the problem of Epirus, the situation of Macedo-Romanian population from Pind and Macedonia, the issue regarding the division of the Aegean islands, the territorial dispute between Romania and Bulgaria¹¹. Although the stated purpose of the Conference of Ambassadors in London was to establish an agreement between the major European countries regarding the issues from South-East, divergences between the great powers have canceled the possibility of reaching a consensus on the situation in the Balkans¹². The activity of Conference Ambassadors was marked by inefficiency, being perceived as a diplomatic event which will be recorded as an "original chapter in textbooks of international law"¹³.

¹¹ Gheorghe Zbucnea, *România și războaiele balcanice. 1912-1913. Pagini de istorie sud-est dunăreană* [Romania and the Balkan Wars. South-Eastern Danubian History Foles Pages. 1912-1913], Albatros Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, p. 59-60.

¹² Anastasie Iordache, *Criza politică din România și războaiele balcanice. 1911-1913* [The Political Crisis in Romania and the Balkan Wars. 1912-1913], Paideia Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 203.

¹³ Nicolae Ciachir, Gheorghe Bercan, *Diplomația europeană în epoca modernă* [The European Diplomacy in the modern Epoch], Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1984, pp. 441-442.

A day later, on 17/30 December 1912, started in London also the Peace Conference which was attended by the delegations of the States participating in the First Balkan War: Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Greece and the Ottoman Empire. The peace negotiations between the delegations of the belligerent states were conducted in several rounds, being influenced by the different opinions between the participating countries, by the changes in the theaters of military operations and, last but not least, by the constant interference of the great powers. A first round of negotiations took place between 17/30 December 1912 and 28 January/10 February 1913 and ended with no result due to the irreconcilable positions that were by the participating delegations. The military operations were resumed on 30 January/12 February 1913 and the Ottoman military forces registered new defeats. Meanwhile serious divergences emerged, including the military ones, between the allied states - between Greeks and Bulgarians in the Adrianople region and between Bulgarians and Serbs in Macedonia¹⁴. Subjected to a strong military pressure, the Ottoman Empire called truce in early April 1913. After the cessation of the military actions, on the 2nd/15th April 15, 1913 the peace negotiations were resumed. The peace treaty between belligerent states was signed on the 17th / 30th May, 1913, due to the imperative demand addressed by Edward Grey to the participating delegations¹⁵. In fact, the documents signed in London, were represented rather a postponement and not a solution to the disputes between the participating states. The Ottoman Empire experienced a drastic reduction of its in Europe possessions (while had included only the city of Istanbul and the surrounding region) but it was saved by the great powers concerned to maintain balance in the Straits region. The peace treaty did not provide a solution accepted by the parties involved to the numerous problems in

¹⁴ Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fund 71/1900-1919, vol 11, f 178-185, 205-207. (Further will be used AMAE logo)

¹⁵ Edward Grey asked the delegations to sign immediately a peace treaty, and those who do not want this, it would be better "to leave London." (Apud, MA Potemkin *The History of diplomacy*, vol II, 1947, p 268).

the Balkans region, especially in the territorial issues (sharing Dodecanese islands, setting boundaries of Albania, sharing Macedonia etc.).

The Treaty signed in London was not ratified by the parliaments of the belligerent states, the public opinion in those countries being disappointed by the results of the peace conference. The Governments from Sofia, Belgrade and Athens were charged internally that they had not accomplish the politico-territorial targets for which their countries were engaged in the conflict with the Ottoman Empire. The media of the Balkan countries, the parliamentary political debate reflected in extension the deep frustration felt by those people towards the Treaty of London¹⁶. Bulgaria demanded that its territorial expansion to be in accordance with the military successes achieved. Establishing an independent Albanian state (a success of Austro-Hungarian and Italian diplomacy) led Serbia to seek enhanced regional claims in Macedonia, action that caused great in satisfaction in Sofia. In Athens and Belgrade was considered that the Bulgarian territorial claims were excessive and jeopardize the principle of balance of power in the region. Within in the peace negotiations Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek governments had a completely different approach to the territorial problems order in comparison with the statements made since the outbreak of the war against the Ottoman Empire. Initially the Member States of Balkan Alliance said they did not search territorial for annexation in the triggered war, but only to improve the political, social situation and cultural life of their countrymen in the Ottoman Empire¹⁷. This meant that those states complied the territorial status quo in the Balkans established at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. At the peace conference in London become clear that none of the winning states did not take into account the reasons they entered the war, i.e. the introduction of reforms in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire in order to ensure the ethnic and cultural

¹⁶ A.M.A.E. fund 71/1900-1919, vol. 12, 27-77 f.

¹⁷ B. Stambler, *Les Roumains et les Bulgares. Le Traité de Bucharest (28 juillet - 10 Aout 1913)*, Paris, 1914, pp. 86;126.

individuality of their countrymen, but took into account the annexation of territories. The direct consequence of the military successes achieved by the allied Balkan states was the total cancellation of the pre-war status quo¹⁸. Through their military actions, the Balkan League states aimed, in fact, for a territorial extension, including through the annexation of territory less justified in terms of ethnic, historical, religious, linguistic, etc.. This transformation of the war goals generated great rivalries and led to the collapse of the Balkan League. The changes of borders resulting from territorial conquests made by Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro on in daune at the expense of the Ottoman Empire led to a new territorial architecture in Balkans. Under the pressure of events in the region, the great powers recognized the new territorial reality by the formula "The Balkans for the Balkan states"¹⁹."

The political and military evolutions in the south of Danube concerned in a particular the authorities in Bucharest as their consequences had a great importance for the future of Romania and of the way whole area southeast in Europe.

The involvement of the authorities in Bucharest with concern of the interests in the South Danube was determined by the objectives pursued by the Romanian state in the Balkans, namely: defending the political cultural and religious rights, of the Aromanian populations²⁰ from the south of Danube²¹, keeping the balance of power and preventing the occurrence of

¹⁸ In fact, the territorial status quo in the Balkans established at the Peace Congress in Berlin in 1878 was infringed by Austro-Hungary and Bulgaria in the autumn of 1908. Austria-Hungary annexed the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in early October 1908. Meanwhile, Bulgaria has incorporated Rumelia, proclaimed its independence, elected king the prince Ferdinand of Saxe Coburg, who received the title of tsar significant title through which Sofia is considered the heir of Byzantium.

¹⁹ B. Stambler, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

²⁰ Romanian-born populations in the Balkans were called in several ways: Macedo-Romanian, Cutout-Vlachs, Aromanians etc.

²¹ Protection of Aromanian population of the Balkans was a permanent objective of the Romanian foreign policy after obtaining the state independence. Ottoman government

a the hegemon State in the region²². Given the establishment of the Balkan alliance and of the new political and military evolutions in Balkans, the government in Bucharest acted to support the authorities in Istanbul, Sofia, Belgrade and Athens to protect religious and cultural rights of the Aromanian population living in the territory of countries of South Danube and prevent situations where Macedo-Romanians became victims of aggressive actions of nationalist Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs²³. Romania kept its freedom of action and did not sign any military commitment to the parties which were in conflict. Romania situated itself at the direct interference of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and German influence spheres, but also in the context of a strong diplomatic offensive to France, Italy and England to southeastern Europe. The attitude of the authorities in Bucharest was a reserved, one dictated by rivalries between the great powers, by the status of Romania as one ally of the Central Powers, by its ProGerman orientation constantly promoted by King Carol I, by the necessary caution to the actions of the Russian Empire, the main supporter of the Balkan States Alliance. Romania's neutrality was particularly beneficial for Balkan alliance in general and especially for Bulgaria, which

approved since 1878 certain measures on the free exercise of religion and education in the national language for the Romanian inhabitants of the empire. Legitimate rights of the Aromanian and cutout-Vlach populations from the Balkans to preserve the individuality of ethnic, cultural and spiritual were rejected by the authorities in Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. The authorities in those countries, civil and religious, acted very aggressively against the Aromanian and cutout-vlach populations encouraging terrorist acts, including the assassination of the Aromanians leaders. The attitude of governments in Athens and Sofia towards the Aromanian and cutout-Vlach populations had given rise to tensions and crises in bilateral relations with Bucharest. On a diametrically opposed position stood the Ottoman government in 1905 recognized all rights religious, ethnic and cultural of the Aromanian population within the Ottoman Empire (see widely *Românii de la sud de Dunăre. Documente [Romanians to south of the Danube. Documents]*, ed. Stelian Brezeanu, Gheorghe Zbucnea, Bucharest, 1997.)

²² Charles și Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

²³ *Românii de la Sud de Dunăre. Documente*, coord. Stelian Brezeanu, Gheorghe Zbucnea, Bucharest, 1997, pp. 222-238.

received with great satisfaction the Declaration of the government in Bucharest²⁴. The neutral position of the Romanian state was equally important and useful for Austro-Hungary, concerned to maintain its influence in Sofia as a counterweight to the alliance between Belgrade and St. Petersburg. When the conflict broke out, Romania declared its "strict" neutrality towards the war arose between the states of the Balkan alliance and the Ottoman Empire²⁵. The Romanian government declaration of neutrality was a conditional and temporary, one indicating that it kept the right to change their attitude in terms of occurrence of major territorial changes to south of the Danube. The sweeping victories obtained in a short time against the Ottoman troops surprised the whole European world, including the Romanian authorities.

Within the new geopolitical framework resulted from the defeating Ottoman troops and the major territorial changes occurred in the Balkans area, the government in Bucharest considered that the strict neutrality commitment taken by Romania was obsolete. As a result, on 27 October / November 9, 1912, the Romanian government considered it necessary to start the proceedings meant to lead to a modification of the border with Bulgaria in Dobrogea²⁶. The territorial dispute between Romania and Bulgaria in Dobrogea was the result of Russian policy, which adopted a position of obvious hostility towards Romania at the Peace Congress in Berlin in 1878 due to the fact that the government in Bucharest had protested strong against annexation of southern Bessarabia by Russian Empire. The original route of the Romanian-Bulgarian border in Berlin was changed in favour of the Bulgarian part by the representatives of the Russia.

²⁴ *Documentes diplomatiques, Les événements de la Péninsule Balkanique. L'action de la Roumanie*, Bucharest, Imprimerie de L'Etat, 1913, p. 4.

²⁵ "The Universe" from September 23 / October 3, 1912.

²⁶ *Documentes diplomatiques, op. cit.*, p. 7.

Romania was forced to accept the boundary changed in Dobrogea under pressure of the major powers and the Russian threat²⁷.

The major change of the territorial status quo in the Balkans after the war won by the Southern Danube states against the Ottoman Empire led the Romanian government to act in the sense of changing the border between Romania and Bulgaria in Dobrogea. Romania's territorial claims brought new complications in the Balkans affairs, and in the European journals appeared numerous articles, many of which were hostile towards the steps taken by the government in Bucharest²⁸. The Great powers pursued "with interest" the position adopted by the authorities in Bucharest. Romania was under the influence of Germany and Austro-Hungary and Bulgaria was in the Balkan League, a creation of Russian diplomacy. A conflict between Bulgaria and Romania had to be avoided "because the danger that would threaten the general situation in Europe would be even greater knowing that Romania's interference in the conflict would cause an inevitable rupture of neutrality from the part of any power" which could lead to serious complications "in Europe"²⁹. The Romanian authorities refused the offer of the Russian diplomacy as the Romanian-Bulgarian territorial dispute to be made in patronage of St. Petersburg. Romania had not forgotten the hostile behaviour of the Russia's representatives towards Romanian interests during the years 1878-1879. The Romanian-Bulgarian direct negotiations took place in Bucharest, London and Sofia. The most substantial negotiations were held in London in January 1913 and ended without any result. At the proposal of Great Britain, the governments in Bucharest and

²⁷ *Pari romani-bulgara Silistra. Un vecchio problema*, in „Corriere de la Sera” from 11/24 January 1913.

²⁸ View widely AMAE, fund 71/1900-1919, Special Folders, vol 12, f 1-3, 25-41 - 55-57 (*Les revendications roumaines* in "L'Etoile Belge" of December 25, 1912; *Que vent to Roumanie*, in the "Journal de Genève" of December 31, 1912; *Роль России в румыно-балгарских переговорах* in "ПЕЧИ" December 28, 1912).

²⁹ AMAE, fund 71/1900-1919, vol. 12, f. 34. (*Romania e Bulgaria nel conflitto dei Balcani* in "Il Giornale d'Italia" of January 16, 1913).

Sofia accepted the mediation by the great powers with regards to territorial dispute between the two countries. The Russian capital was chosen as the place of the diplomatic action intended to resolve the dispute between Romania and Bulgaria. Before the start of the conference in St. Petersburg, the government in Bucharest sent on February 15 / 28, 1913 a confidential memorandum to the governments of six major powers who presented its reasons for its request to change the border in Dobrogea³⁰. A similar document sent on February 18 / March 3, 1913 by the Bulgarian government to diplomatic representatives of the great powers accredited to St. Petersburg. The Ambassadors' Conference held in St. Petersburg took place February 18 / March 31 - April 26 / May 9, 1913 and ended with the final adoption of a Protocol meant to give a solution for the Dobrogean problem from the Romanian-Bulgarian border. The main intent of the document adopted by the representatives of the great powers who had been in the Russian capital issues were: Silistra and the area close nearby had to be returned to Romania, school and religious autonomy for the Macedo-Romanian population in Bulgaria and the right for the Romanian State to subsidize Macedo-Romanians schools and churches. Romanian-Bulgarian territorial dispute was peacefully resolved by means of the intervention and support of all the European powers, even if the final protocol signed in St. Petersburg displeased the government and the public opinion both in Bulgaria and in Romania.

The diplomatic efforts made by the great powers to order to end the conflict in the Balkans area – The Ambassadors' Conference in London, The Conference in St. Petersburg, the negotiations that led to the signing of the Peace Treaty in London in May 17/30, 1913 - did not lead to a decreasing reduction of interstate tensions and to restoration of peace in the region. The aggressive nationalism, the intolerance towards the neighbours, the conquering spirit manifested stronger and stronger in the political life, in the also public opinion and in the media within all Balkan

³⁰ Titu Maiorescu, *România, războaiele balcanice și Cadrilaterul*, [Romania, the Balkan Wars and the Qadrilater] volume edited by Stelian Neagoe, Machiavelli Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, p. 193-201.

states. Bulgarian society was dominated by deep resentment with regard to the requirements of the documents signed at London and St. Petersburg, which did not recognize the military victories achieved by the Bulgarian army and had undermined the objectives pursued by the Bulgarian state in the Balkans. The same atmosphere can be found in the internal politics of Serbia and Greece. Applying the provisions included in the Treaty signed in London led to a series of military clashes, constant harassment from Balkan allies.

On April 24 / May 7, 1913, Romanian military attaché in Sofia informed the War Office in Bucharest about the existence of a campaign plan the Bulgarian army against Serbia and Greece. The plan was presented by the generals Ficev and Savov to the King Ferdinand and stated that the main effort was to be made against Serbia. In the plan was stipulated that in the first phase to introduce in the Serbian territory about 5,000 fighters organized into "gangs" to terrorize Serbia and determine it to leave the regions desired by Bulgaria³¹. Restless because of the reactions of Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece conclude their military and political agreements between them to defend each other in case of a Bulgarian attack. Belgrade and Athens authorities appealed to the government in Bucharest to attract Romania in an alliance, hostile to Bulgaria. Romanian policymakers who decided the foreign policy of state - King Charles I and the prime minister, Titu Maiorescu - refused any alliance which might limit the freedom of action of Romania towards the future development of events.

The territorial disputes between the Balkan allies led restran to serious deterioration of relations between these countries. The establishment of conflictual relations between the Balkan allied states placed the Russian diplomacy in a very complicated situation. St. Petersburg made great efforts to prevent the breakup of the Balkan alliance, but the Bulgarian territorial ambitions affected a from part the Russia's interests in the Straits and endangered this great power relations with Serbia and Greece. On May 28

³¹ Romanian Military Archives, fund the Ministry of War, 169/1913, 491 f. (Confidential rapport of military attaché in Sofia of May 7, 1913)

/ June 8, 1913, Emperor Nicholas II wrote to King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and to King Peter I of Serbia asking them to prevent the onset of a "fratricidal war" between their countries and warned them that Russia kept the whole "freedom action" against the State which would start such a conflict³². Russia's mediation efforts were canceled by the rigid position of the Bulgarian authorities which set conditions deemed unacceptable by the Russian sovereign. Meanwhile, the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy took advantage of the deterioration of relations between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, and worked to destroy the Balkan League. As a result, the government in Vienna supported and encouraged Bulgarian position on territorial disputes with Serbia and Greece³³.

On a general level, political and military tension in Balkans continuously increased after the end of the Ambassadors Conference in St. Petersburg and signing the Treaty of London. Under the influence of public opinion, of the nationalist-extremist circles in Bulgaria and encouraged by the Viennese diplomacy³⁴, Sofia authorities ordered, during the night of 16/17-29/30 June 1913, the surprise attack of its former allies³⁵. The Russian diplomacy made great efforts to immediately end the war between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, conflict that was in total opposition to the purposes of the Balkan League. Bulgarian military action was a surprise for Europe, both in trigger mode (former allies attack without declaration of war) also severe consequences which the new conflict generated to the continent's peace. As a result to the fact that the government in Sofia has started a new war, Bulgaria was perceived as an aggressive state with hegemonic

³² *Documentes diplomatiques, op. cit.*, doc. 143, p. 108-109.

³³ Gheorghe Nicolae Căzan, Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *Romania și Tripla Alianță. 1878-1914* [*Romania and the Triple Alliance. 1878-1914*], Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1979, p. 327.

³⁴ Austria-Hungary was prepared to intervene militarily in the Balkan conflict to support Bulgaria. (Gheorghe Nicolae Căzan, Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *op. cit.*, p. 114, Apud K. M. von Lichnowski, *Vers L'abîme. Rapports, souvenirs et autres écrits*, Paris, Payot, 1929, p. 233).

³⁵ *The History of diplomacy*, vol. 3, *op. cit.*, p. 270-271, Gheorghe Zbucnea, *România și războaiele balcanice ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

ambitions towards all its neighbours, which might endanger the regional stability and the efforts of the European powers to put out the conflict in the Balkans.

The political, diplomatic and military evaluations of the Bulgarian government proved to be wrong. Starting the Second Balkan War in less than two months after signing the Peace Treaty of London, Bulgaria faced a serious international isolation process. Sofia „succeeded” in having conflictual relationships with all its neighbouring countries, and its military option to be condemned by all major European powers except Austro-Hungary. Under the pressure from other major powers, Austro-Hungary was not able to provide the support promised to Bulgaria.

From a military perspective, the Bulgarian government started the new war in a geopolitical and geostrategic context which was totally inappropriate. The major European powers, did not completed their military training and thus they were concerned with preventing widespread outbreak of the war on the continent. The Bulgarian army was forced to fight initialis on two fronts, then after Turkey and Romania's entry in the conflict, its strategic situation became catastrophic. It overestimated the support that Austro-Hungary could give³⁶ against the possible reactions of the authorities in Bucharest. It misjudged the position of Romania and did not ensure its benevolent neutrality. The war started between the former allies allowed the return of the Ottoman Empire in the war³⁷.

The political and military evolutions occurred to the south of the Danube created a favorable situation to Romania whose territorial demands on the expense of Bulgaria had increased in Silistra - Balchik line to the line Turtucaia - Balchik. The government in Bucharest declared that in the situation of restarting the hostilities to south of the Danube, the Romanian army would be mobilized, position that had been transmitted through a

³⁶ *Afirmarea statelor naționale independente unitare în central și sud-estul Europei (1821-1923)*, coordinators Viorica Moisuc, Ion Calafeteanu, Bucharest, 1979, p 65.

³⁷ Mustafa Ali Mehmed, *Istoria Turcilor*, [The Turkish History] Bucharest, 1976, p. 364.

circular all Romanian legations since May 23 / June 5, 1913³⁸. Following the declaration of the Romanian authorities, the Bulgarian government requested the intervention of Austro-Hungary and Russia to prevent a Romanian military involvement in to the political and military problems in the Balkans. Austro-Hungary exerted a strong pressure on the government in Bucharest to prevent a rapprochement of Romania with Serbia and Greece against Bulgaria, considering it to be inconsistent with Romanian - Austro-Hungary alliance. Despite the Austro-Hungarian pressures, the Romanian Government followed its own policy towards the Balkan problems, with the support of German diplomacy, according to which "the single point of support for the Triple Alliance in the Balkan chaos was Romania."³⁹

The crisis between Romania and Bulgaria led to some serious divergences between Romania and Austro-Hungary. In order to destroy the Balkan League and to ensure its influence over Bulgaria, the authorities in Vienna came into opposition with the governments in Berlin and Rome who had a different perspective on the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic actions. Vienna intended to achieve a rapprochement between Romania and Bulgaria and in order to accomplish this project, the Viennese diplomacy gave an ultimatum to Romania to avoid attacking Bulgaria and, meanwhile, was exerting pressure on Bulgaria to meet the required territorial claims by the government in Bucharest. Vienna's diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful nor in Bucharest or Sofia, which meant the failure of Count Berchtold's geopolitical project to bring Bulgaria along with Romania in the Triple Alliance⁴⁰.

In the same time Russia pressured the Balkan states to reduce the tensions between the former allies. Russia's relations with the Warring States were very difficult after the start of the second war in the Balkans, because it

³⁸ *Documentes diplomatiques...*, *op.cit.*, p. 154

³⁹ Gheorghe Nicolae Căzan, Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 345-349.

failed to prevent the broke between the allies because of conditions set by Bulgaria.

In the political-military situation generated by the Bulgarian attack over its former allies, the great powers considered that Romanian involvement in conflict was necessary and Romanian army was able to restore peace in the Balkans. The government from St. Petersburg considered that Romanian intervention was "the only means to avoid an overwhelming defeat of Serbia and breaking the balance of forces in Balkans"⁴¹. Romania's entrance in the war was made after the Russian diplomacy efforts to stop the war between the former allies failed. Romanian Government correctly assessed the existing balance of power and valued for its optimum time created by the failure of the Russian diplomacy, explaining to the public opinion that its military option was dictated by the necessity of restoring peace in the Balkans and not the territorial dispute with Bulgaria.

The positive attitude of Russia towards the Romanian military intervention may be explained by the fact that it offered the chance to the diplomacy of St. Petersburg to get out of the complicated option to choose between Sofia and Belgrade in the "fratricidal" conflict. The Romanian Minister in Berlin conveyed to Bucharest that in the opinion of German diplomacy Romanian military intervention to south of the Danube was an "decisively act called to accelerate the solution of the crisis on solid and durable foundations, ensuring balance in Balkans"⁴².

The Romanian government ordered the military mobilization on June 23 / July 6, 1913 - the operation ended in only eight days, and in June 27/July 10 Romania declared war on Bulgaria. Taking advantage of the very difficult situation in which Bulgaria was, the Ottoman Empire resumed the military action against the Bulgarian troops on July 3/20, 1913 the Ottoman forces conquering again Adrianople. The Bulgarian government sent a note of

⁴¹ N. Schebeko, *Essai historique sur les origines de la guerre 1914*, Bibliothèque Diplomatique, Paris, 1926, p. 161, <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5721034b/f185.image>.

⁴² *Documentes diplomatiques*, op. cit, doc. 199.

protest to the great powers claiming „l'acté injustifié de la Roumanie⁴³". Both Russia and Austro-Hungary were concerned that Bulgaria should not be "broken" and, in this respect put pressure in Bucharest and in the other Balkan capitals⁴⁴.

Meanwhile, Romania, along with other opposed countries Bulgaria, had an interest in ending the war as quickly as possible to avoid a possible involvement of the great powers in the conflict. The Bulgarian government tried to obtain a separate peace from Romania, but the request came from Sofia was rejected by the authorities in Bucharest. Under the pressure of the neighbour armies of four states, Bulgaria surrendered military. The peace negotiations were held in Bucharest. Germany proposed the Romanian capital as a venue to host peace negotiations solution which was agreed both by the Warring States and the great powers. The peace conference was held from July 17 / August 1 - July 28 / August 10 1913 under the chairmanship of Romanian Prime Minister, Titu Maiorescu. Romania assumed the role of ensuring the moderation among all stakeholders: the winning states, the great powers, the defeated state⁴⁵. The basic principle that dominated the peace spirit in Bucharest was to ensure the balance of power in region, considered "essential" factor to preserve peace in Balkans⁴⁶. The Peace Treaty was signed on July 28 / August 10 1913 and it established new frontiers in Balkans, observing the territorial provisions of the Treaty of London of May 17/30 1913 related to Albania. Macedonia was divided between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. Sangeakul Novi Pazar returned to Serbia and Montenegro. Greece received Western Thrace with the port of Kavala, and Bulgaria received exit to Aegean with the port of Dedeagaci. Quadrilateral was returned to Romania. The way in which was applied the principle of balance of power in the peace negotiations in Bucharest, took into account especially the spirit of this conferences that

⁴³ „L'Independence roumaine" of 4/17 iulie 1913.

⁴⁴ Gheorghe Zbucea, *op. cit.*, p. 266; *Documentes diplomatiques...*, doc. 208.

⁴⁵ B. Stambler, *op.cit.*, p. 161.

⁴⁶ "The Times" of July 28, 1913(*Interviul acordat de șeful delegației Greciei, M. Venizelos*).

led to a paradoxical situation, unprecedented in the practice of diplomatic events of this type. By its provisions, the Treaty of peace led to territorial expansion of all belligerent states, both the four winners, as well as the defeated one, a fact revealed in Table 1.

State	Surface		Population	
	Before Conflict	After Conflict	Before Conflict	After Conflict
Serbia	48.000 kmp	88.000 kmp	1.300.000	4.250.000
Greece	64.600 kmp	121.600 kmp	2.800.000	4,700.000
Bulgaria	96.300 kmp	110.800 kmp	4.300.000	4.250.000
Montenegro	9.000 kmp	15.000 kmp	255.000	530.000
Romania	131.300 kmp	138.800 kmp	7.260.000	7.567.000

Table 1. Territorial and demographic situation of the Balkan states after the Peace of Bucharest⁴⁷

The Balkan crisis during the years 1912-1913 was an undeniable impasse for European peace and ended following the signing of the Peace Treaty. Caused by the involvement of the great powers in the region, located throughout the crisis on different positions, without having a unified vision of Balkan issues, major European chancellors announced their intention to review the provisions of the Peace Treaty of Bucharest.

The geopolitical architecture of the Balkan Peninsula was completely changed after the political-military crisis carried out in 1912-1913. Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria acquired similar demographic and territorial

⁴⁷ Ștefan Pascu (coord.), *Istoria militară a poporului român* [*The Military History of Romanian People*], vol. 5, Militară Publishing House, Bucharest, 1988, p. 283-284; Gheorghe Zbucnea, *op. cit.*, p. 294-295, 304, Nicolae Ștefănescu Iacint, *Războiul româno-bulgar*, Bucharest, 1914, p. 140.

dimensions, which created a real balance of forces in the region. The Ottoman Empire was virtually eliminated from Europe and ceased to be a real power within the continental balance of power.

Initially Balkan wars started in order to free entirely the countrymen being still under Ottoman rule, but subsequent the actions of the states' Balkan League were dominated by a tendency to annex as many territories as possible. This trend became apparent in the second Balkan war, when ethnic and historical motives have passed in background, and the security reasons, to keep the balance of power dominated the political and military decisions. In this logic has entered the action of Romania to become militarily involved in the Second Balkan War and attach Quadrilateral.

Russia and Austro-Hungary's attempts to revise the provisions of the Peace of Bucharest in an international conference were rejected by the other great powers. Romanian Minister in Berlin, Alexandru Beldiman, informed the government in Bucharest about satisfaction of the German government towards "the conclusion of the Balkan conflict". In the view of Germany, France, Italy and Britain government they had no interest in reviewing the Peace Treaty signed on August 10 1913. Referring to Austro-Hungary, the German government gave assurances that „exerce en ce moment toute son influence pour calmer appréhension Vienne”⁴⁸. Russia gave up its revision project of the Treaty of Bucharest, as the insistence of the Russian Ministry in Paris, Count Izvolski, besides the French government „sont restes sans rezultat”⁴⁹, communicated in Bucharest the Romanian Minister from the French capital.

Balkan Wars changed the balance of power between states in the region, but also spheres of influence of the major groups of states over the Balkan area. Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Romania were concerned with preserving the territorial balance created by the provisions of the Peace of Bucharest, while Bulgaria and Turkey were acting for its revision.

⁴⁸ AMAE, fund 71, vol. 13/1914, f. 104.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, f. 109.(Telegram no. 33145 of August 8, 1913).

The new regional balance of power created by the Peace from Bucharest has meant a failure of the Austro-Hungarian and German diplomacy. The military defeat of Bulgaria and Turkey, together with the strengthening of Serbia and Austro-Hungary's deteriorating relations with Romania were just the many actions that weakened the international position of the Central Powers. At the same time, the influence of France and Russia grew in Serbia and Romania. Romania's support given by France during the Balkan crisis was part of the French diplomatic efforts to weaken the Triple Alliance. After the crisis, the French diplomacy, seconded by the Russian diplomacy, have persevered in their actions meant to alienate Romania from the Triple Alliance, success which would have had great importance in the Balkan power rate, but also in the Continental one.

The Other Eastern Partnership: East (中国) Meets East

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Abstract: In the context of a global analysis our conditioned reflexes let us sometimes oversee minor local factors, which can produce cumulative effects. Thus we have to examine thoroughly the quiet, but steady Chinese advance and occupation of strategic strongholds in the larger Black Sea region. In relation to the global map appear local road maps which dispel the innocence of the proposed and concluded win-win affairs by their continuous impacts on security.

Keywords: Larger Black Sea region, Chinese advance, impacts on security.

Motto

“...clever rising powers exploit the collective action problem facing its rivals to counter the balancing strategy with divide-and-conquer tactics...”¹

1. Introduction

Through Greek *mythology* and history the Black Sea and the larger Black Sea region has become a part of the *cultural European space*, but as we shall see later on we can't claim exclusivity. The land of Colchis (the modern Kolkhida Lowland of Georgia) attracted the Argonauts under their leader Jason, who sought and robbed the Golden Fleece in order to regain the throne of Iolcos. The “cultural hero” Prometheus (Forethinker), who stole fire and brought it to humankind, was punished by Zeus, who had him fastened to a *mountain in the Caucasus* and sent an eagle to eat his immortal liver, which constantly regenerated. As punishment for humankind Zeus created the woman *Pandora* and sent her to the brother of Prometheus,

¹ Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William C. Wohlforth (Editors), *The Balance of Power*, in: *World History* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) p.238

Epimetheus (Hindsight). Homer told us the legend of the Trojan War, the conflict between the early Greeks and the people of *Troy* in western Anatolia. Archaeological excavations have shown the historic existence of Troy, commanding once a *strategic point* at the southern entrance to the Dardanelles. Not far away from Troy, *Constantinople* (modern *Istanbul*), the capital of the Byzantine Empire, resisted till 1453 in a similar position.²

When Ivan III (1440-1505) married in 1472 Zoë Palaeologus, niece of the last emperor of Byzantium, Moscow could pretend to be the palladium of Orthodox Church and to be the Third Rome. Based on the strong foundations laid by Ivan his successors extended continuously the territory of their state (with no access to the Black Sea, the Caspian or the Baltic Sea) and in 1695 Peter I captured Azov from the Crimean Tatars, vassals of the Ottoman Empire.

The monopolistic position of the Ottomans and Arabs in oriental trade and the ongoing scarcity of gold had been a major reason for Portuguese and Spanish to find a seaway towards India. In 1510 Portuguese reached Goa in India and in 1557 Macao in China. Europeans had created a complete "silk seaway". Chinese, who discovered first Africa, abandoned this route after the death of Admiral Zheng He in 1435.

On the mainland silk roads had been carried for hundreds of years goods and ideas between China, India Asia Minor, North Africa, and Europe. With the decline of great empires they became routes of invasion.

Through the ages the larger Black Sea regions changed considerably under outside pressures. The result has been a largely fragmented area in tectonics landforms. Completely new and older recreated or reshaped Nation-states

² The diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople and the creation of the Latin Empire, commonly named Romania, in 1204, flanked by a great number of new Frankish (with western European feudal organization) and Greek states, the Bulgarian Empire and the Turkish Sultanate of Rum, had disastrous consequences. The absence of a strong political, economic, national, religious, and cultural centre led to further dissolution. It cemented the schism between the Catholic West and Orthodox East. A restored weak Byzantine Empire (1261) fell to the Turks in 1453 and entered into the Ottoman world.

have been confronted to the fabric of their past, have sometimes become entangled in conflictive situations and have then deeply entrenched mentally and materially along borderlines. The Greater Black Sea Region is plenty of imaginative mythical and historical maps collected and edited by its people. Strategic landmarks, points of temporary concentration and counterattack, are fixed on many of them. Modern intruders are nowadays shaping real and virtual spaces with their soft power and are in this way legitimizing their subsequent actions. But *the snobbish ignorance of the specific local geography can destabilize planned actions and cause further disintegration and decay.*

New contenders have appeared in this complicated neighbourhood: the United States of America and the European Union with their aggregate and collective structures and ultimately the People's Republic of China. All these contenders have different intentions and interests and their actions are impacting on the regional agendas.

Under US President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger³ long repudiated geopolitics had a spectacular comeback with the normalization of political relations between the Popular Republic of China and the United States. China and America wanted to counterbalance the U.S.S.R. From 1973 on the politician and strategist

³ Since their creation in 1776 the USA are continuously expanding with the help of different doctrines ("Monroe Doctrine", Roosevelt Corollary to the "Monroe Doctrine", "Truman Doctrine", "Eisenhower Doctrine", "Carter Doctrine", "Bush Doctrine"), with regional unified military commands for the entire world and an increasing number of bases in present times. When Henry Kissinger served as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under President Richard Nixon, he reshaped fundamentally U.S. foreign policy with his coherent and comprehensive perception of world politics and economy in times of globalization, where foreign policy must be built upon *America's permanent national interests*. He achieved the "détente" with the Soviet Union, the opening to China, the penetration of the Middle East and the creation of a special relationship with Saudi Arabia (US military protection for Saudi Arabia's oil fields). The Bretton Wood system ("dollars for gold") was replaced by the *petrodollar system* ("dollars for oil") in 1973. Saudi Arabia and subsequently all OPEC countries agreed to sell their oil exclusively in U.S. dollars.

Deng Xiaoping, who always bounced back, re-entered definitively on stage and he initiated the "Second Long March" to establish China as a Great Power in the most favourable period of globalisation.

After the end of the Cold War the President of the United States declared as fifth objective of the first Iraq war a "New World Order"⁴, which I would characterise the beginning of "*Hot Peace*" and not of Cold Peace, an expression used by former Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1994. The Cold War was a de facto long peace. Nowadays the credibility of institutionalized peace (UNO) is eroding. The only lonely⁵ superpower has proofed that it goes into action anyway. With the "war on terrorism"⁶ the only super power has created an instrument to control the global agenda,⁷ the regional and even national agendas. The continual rise of China has provoked a shift of American attention to the Asia-Pacific region. The successful extraction of unconventional hydrocarbons and the subsequent diminishing of foreign oil imports has nourished American hopes to become in a near future a net energy (oil) exporter.⁸ The Mediterranean, the Middle East the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Eurasian corridor have henceforth a relative reduced importance in American eyes and the Obama administration, preoccupied by domestic affairs, can delegate

⁴ New World Order, Public Papers - 1990 - September. Accessed May 7, 2013. http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2217&year=1990&month=9, Accessed May 7, 2013.

⁵ America has allies, but all actions are taken according to US national interests, thus it's lonely in its decisions.

⁶ On August 18, 2006, French "Le Figaro" published in its online edition a critical article of the financial predator Georges Soros with the title "War on terrorism, an aberrant and noxious concept". Accessed May 7, 2013. http://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/20060818.FIG000000061_la_guerre_contre_le_terrorisme_une_notion_aberrante_et_nefaste.html

⁷ "...Globalization is in part a product of American leadership and the ingenuity of the American people. We are uniquely suited to seize its promise..." In: U.S. National Security Strategy 2010, p.5.

⁸ The American hopes are bolstered by new technologies for removing oil from shale sand. On March 14, 2013, a patent application for "Removal of Hydrocarbons from Particulate Solids" (A process and composition for removing heavy oil and bitumen from oil sands) has been published in the United States. See: <http://patents.com/us-20130062258.html>

interventionist actions in regions of lower importance (Libya) to allies. Nevertheless the perverse processes, consequences of the triggered so-called "Arab Spring", are approaching the Black Sea Region and will force the regional power, Turkey, to take a clear and firm stance, otherwise it will risk to become a victim, too.

In order to decrypt geostrategy, underlying geopolitics, I'll introduce the so-called critical-paranoid analysis proposed by Salvador Dali for the interpretation of surrealist art. Since the times of Sun Tzu strategy has been considered art. The analyst ought to be permanently critical. He can't trust his senses. A surrealist painting defies traditional reason and physics (liquid, melting clocks). It unites conscious and unconscious fields in surreality. This provocative masterpiece (pedagogic action) engages us in investigative processes (responses). The painter-strategist used classical and personally devised techniques (mirror and stereoscopic painting) and integrated mathematics in his paintings. By his special techniques of indirect painting Dali exemplifies Plato's Allegory of the Cave ("The Republic"). In our reconstruction of strategy we follow the hints given by the artist-strategist: Along lines and symbols we discover the volumes of forms. Sometimes our artist will integrate in his painting an older well-known quite calm painting. In the context of the new painting the former innocence of the old painting will vanish and we'll get insights of the intentions of our artist.

2. General Background

The two approximately parallel implosions that of the U.S.S.R. and that of the third Yugoslavia have temporarily distracted attention from the Black Sea Region. The possible transition of *Russia* to democracy under President Boris Yeltsin and a future direct access to Russian resources mesmerized the West. But the chaotic presidency of Boris Yeltsin and the Chechen quagmire accelerated the seizure of power by Russian secret services, especially by FSB, under the leadership of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin

(1999-).⁹ The new strongman operated a pragmatic, non-ideological, selective system-restore, re-established a maximum of state control over the Russian Federation and concentrated Russian economy around the gas and oil sector. In this way Russia takes a great risk, but it has the great ambition to control energy production, distribution through different channels including pipelines and to some extent direct selling to end consumers through well-organized networks operated directly or indirectly by Gazprom and Lukoil.

In the past Soviet Russia retreated military from the territories of its *former satellite* states and relieved itself from an oppressing financial burden. The Russian Federation has returned far beyond the formerly imposed limits in the posture of a strategic NATO partner and is shaping the landscape with the network of its pipelines and related activities. It prefigures territories of countries supposed to be candidates or future candidates to the EU. The architecture of pipelines permits to leverage Poland, the Baltic States and ancient blackmailing countries like Belarus and Ukraine.¹⁰ Bulgaria depends largely on Russia in the energy sector: petrol (89%), natural gas (100%) and nuclear fuel for its two reactors. For Russia Bulgaria is a key country to realize its alternative pipeline projects, especially *South Stream*, which would permit to bypass all its neighbours and create an additional

⁹ By a secret agreement of cooperation the Russian foreign intelligence service (SVR - Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki Rossiiskoi federatscii), the Russian foreign military intelligence main directorate (GRU - Glavnoe Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie) and their Chinese counterparts Guoanbu and Qingbaobu have resumed their interrupted partnership.

¹⁰ Nord Stream (formerly the North European Gas Pipeline) has been realized with the help of Germany. Former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, *Gerhard Schröder*, is Chairman of the Shareholders' Committee of Nord Stream AG (OAO Gazprom 51%, German energy companies Wintershall Holding GmbH and E.ON Ruhrgas AG 15.5% each, and the Dutch N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie and French GDF SUEZ, each 9%), based in Zug, Switzerland. *Matthias Warnig*, a former officer of the Stasi, the East German Secret Police is Managing Director of Nord Stream AG. Gazprom, producing 75% of Russia's gas and supplying around 25% of gas through Europe, is facing an antitrust investigation launched by the European Commission alleging that it is using its dominant position in central and eastern Europe to restrict competition and imposing unfair prices (September 2012).

geopolitical lever. With falling gas prices the project is *economically irrational*.

Russia used its energy power to destabilize the orange Ukrainian government and to provoke a political change. The new Yanukovic government has extended the basing right of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from 2017 up to 2042 and has changed the military option towards NATO from integration to cooperation level. Landlocked Armenia (neighbours: Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran) is depending almost entirely on the Russian Federation, especially in security matters. It signed a long term military base agreement with Russia (Gyumri base up to 2044). Abkhazia and South Ossetia agreed to host Russian military bases for 49 years. Russia has deployed S300 missiles in *Abkhazia*, can adapt its old naval base in Ochamchire and eventually reuse the Bombora air base near Gudauta in flagrant violation of the ceasefire treaty with Georgia. Once again Russia uses its energy power to bow Georgia. Since 2006 Gazprom has doubled the gas price.

The Russian Federation has initiated important *territorial and military reforms* in the direct neighbourhood of the Black Sea:

By Presidential decree Medvedev created in January 19, 2010, North Caucasus Federal District (population in 2010: 9,032,300), which comprises the republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, *North Ossetia*, *Chechnya* and Stavropol Krai (Territory), headed by Aleksandr Khloponin as the president's plenipotentiary representative and with the rank of deputy prime minister. The new district, which has been split off from the Southern Federal District, has direct land borders with Abkhazia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and South Ossetia. The Southern Federal District remained with the Ciscaucasian constituencies of Adygea republic, Krasnodar Krai and Kalmykia republic. *The Southern Military District* comprises the territory and forces of the former North Caucasus District (United Strategic Command South) with headquarter in Rostov-on-Don. The Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and Caspian Flotilla will be reorganized into the Naval Forces Operational Command

within the Southern Military District. *For the social and political stabilization of this sensitive region Russia needs foreign investments.*

So far Russia could not peacefully convince its independent neighbours to participate in functional regional organizations. The Customs Union Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan remains for the moment reduced to its founding states. Through a multitude of bilateral agreements and treaties Russia maintained its military foothold in Central Asia. After the declaration of "War on Terrorism" and subsequent to the massive American and NATO advance in Eurasia Russia created on October 7, 2002, with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russia has the right to veto the establishment of new foreign military bases in the member states of CSTO. *Central Asia is no longer in Moscow's control but it remains in its sphere of influence.* Ultimately Russia can't rely on its allies. In the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) China outpaces Russia.

Turkey has completely changed since its accession to OEEC (today OECD) in 1948, to NATO in 1952 and since EU's recognition of its candidateship in 1999 (1959 first request for associate membership, 2005 opening of negotiations). It initiated in 2001 the *Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group* (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia Federation, Turkey and Ukraine), activated on a regular basis, with the following tasks: search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, mine counter measures, environmental protection, goodwill visits and any tasks agreed by all parties. But Turkey is now drifting away from Europe. NATO suffered a first affront in 1974, when Turkish troops occupied the northern part of Cyprus. Kemalism (Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Secularism, Statism, Revolutionism), once the backbone of the modern Turkish state, is outmoded. From the 60s we can observe the continuous islamization of

Turkey (Alparslan Türkeş Necmettin Erbakan¹¹, Recep Tayyip Erdogan).¹² Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, former mayor of Istanbul, the Muslim party AKP accessed to power in 2002 and won all elections until now (National electoral score 2002: 34,3%, 2004: 41,7%, 2007: 46,6%, 2011: 49.83%). The AK Party has achieved its transformation into a government party with Recep Tayyip Erdogan as Prime Minister and Abdullah Gül as President of the Republic. The Turkish Penal Code has been changed and the AKP now wants to force the drafting of a new constitution, which can be achieved curiously with the help of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party. In this way Erdogan will be able to get a new constitution and to resolve the Kurdish problem by making concessions to Turkish Muslim Kurds. The last pillar of Kemalism and regulator of Turkish politics - the army - has been neutralized by a massive purge of top ranks (accused of conspiring, retired, brought to trial, condemned).

Erdogan tried to continue the EU pre-accession process and supported an UN-launched unification plan for Cyprus. After the Greek Cypriote rejection of this plan and the entrance of Cyprus as a divided country to the EU (2004) Turkey revised gradually its priorities and concentrated on “Realpolitik”: profiting of its strategic geographic position and becoming a great regional actor relying on Islam as integrating factor. It renewed its politics of the early 90s with eastward concentration on states with large Turkic speaking population. Turkey wants to become an energy hub and

¹¹ Professor Necmettin Erbakan's father was one of the last Islamic judges of the Ottoman Empire. The son formed different Islamic parties, became the first Islamist prime minister of Turkey (1996-97). He favoured the heavy industry and an economy based on Islamic tradition. In 1969 he published "Milli Görüş" (National View) and founded the movement with the same name, promoting his views of a political Islam. He pleaded for a cooperation of Islamist states and founded in 1997 D-8 or The Developing 8, a group of developing countries with large Muslim populations that have formed an economic development alliance. Its member states are Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey. In 2006 these countries signed a Preferential Trade Agreement.

¹² We have to take into consideration the demographic factor. Population increase: 14 million (1927), 28 million (1960) and 74,72 million (2012).

not to remain a simple transit country for major markets. A strategic alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan will strengthen both Islamist countries.¹³

Turkey has refused to join the U.S. and EU sanctions against Iran. By the recent new five-year strategic defence plan Turkey wants to propel the national defence industry by fixing a timetable to arms projects (radar observation satellite, battle tank, destroyer, infantry rifle, training aircraft, UAV, anti-tank rocket systems, semi active laser guided missile, low and medium altitude air defence systems).

The country has reduced its energy dependency on Russia from 63% (2008) to 50-55% (2012), but its general energy dependency has reached 72.7% (2010 Eurostat).

Since 2004 the EU is losing influence on Turkey's agenda and consequently the democratic process suffered. Maybe Turkey has sent a message of his turnaround to Europe quite now: Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) decided not to participate in the Eurovision Song Contest 2013 and not to broadcast this event. The broadcaster's reasons for withdrawing from the event were the changes in the voting system of the contest and/or a possible lesbian kiss.¹⁴ Article 21 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights explicitly prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, while Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allows taking appropriate action to combat this type of discrimination. Finally Turkey, a NATO-member, has become on April 28, 2013, a "dialogue partner" with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the organization for security in Eurasia. The SCO does not set any

¹³ On December 24, 2011, the governments of Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a Memorandum of Understanding concerning Trans Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) Project. This core pipeline would transport natural gas to be produced in Shah Deniz 2 field and other fields of Azerbaijan (and other possible neighboring countries) through Turkey to Europe (Nabucco pipeline).

¹⁴ See: Turkey cancels Eurovision Song Contest over lesbian kiss. Accessed on May 22. <http://turkishpoliticsupdates.wordpress.com/2013/05/18/turkey-cancels-eurovision-song-contest-over-lesbian-kiss/>

conditions on candidate countries regarding democratization, human rights and the rule of law. Can we then say that Turkey has been shanghaied?

Due to the turmoil in the Middle East the *United States of America* began to turn to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia in order to diversify their oil supplies. The great US oil companies advised by national-security experts (Zbigniew Brzezinski, James Baker and so on) were the first to enter and explore the region and the *New Great Oil Game* began. In the first years of their transition the newly independent countries of the Larger Black Sea Region encountered a variety of problems and situations in their reconstruction processes. In some areas the region remains with frozen conflicts, which can be exploited nowadays. In the critical period of their reconstruction the different states could not profit of a special Marshall Plan designed to create stable conditions for the survival of democratic institutions. Without this foreign intervention the ancient "nomenklatura" falsified the liberalization of national economies and maintained its relative power in the system with local differences and thus severely damaged the possible implementation of later integration programs.¹⁵ After the EU-launched TRACECA program of 1993 for the development of transport initiatives including the establishment and development of a road corridor between the EU, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the United States created in 1999 the legal framework with the Silk Road Strategy Act to support US business interests and investments in the region, updated in 2006 to prevent "any other country from establishing a monopoly on energy resources or energy transport infrastructure in the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus that may restrict United States access to energy resources". The European countries that had been expected to support the regional EU-projects, Romania and Bulgaria, became only full members in 2007, just one year before the beginning of the financial crisis. The older EU-member Greece (1981) faced already in the past economic and

¹⁵ Daniel Labaronne, *Les privatisations à l'Est: une question de marchandage politico-économique*, in: *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, Volume 33, N°1 (2002) pp.205-226.

infrastructural problems and invested permanently in its armed forces due to the tensions with Turkey.

3. The People's Republic of China

When China decided to split off ideologically from Soviet Russia, it transferred the *centre of "world revolution"* from Moscow to Beijing. The *direct way* to achieve this objective has been given up.

China's outlook has completely changed since then. Its leaders have *renounced to revolutionary clothes* and are wearing today business suits. It seems that China has adopted the Olympic motto "*Citius, Altius, Fortius*" (Latin for "Faster, Higher, Stronger") since it integrated into world economy and has become the world factory.

China is now the world's second-largest economy, the world's largest energy consumer, the world's largest exporter and holder of the world's largest foreign exchange reserves (US\$3.5 trillion). China is the world's most important rising power and it overtook the United States in 2006 as the world's biggest CO₂ polluter.

In Chinese eyes these performances come as a corroboration of the right choice in the past and seem to substantiate the Marxist-Leninist historic determinism, when capitalism is staggering. After the Summer Olympic Games in 2008, known as the Games of the XXIX Olympiad in Beijing promoted as "*One World, One Dream*" the new chairman of the CPC Xi Jinping introduced in December 2012 before he took over the Chinese presidency "*The Chinese Dream*". The outer world is lured by the great Chinese market and China is in the meanwhile shaping this world to its needs. The actual economic and financial crisis is favouring the Chinese endeavour. In the European Union we have great centrifugal forces on all levels: supranational, regional and national. The recurring national egoism in its different forms endangers the Union and the member states, the new national states in the Balkans and in its greater neighbourhood. In this period of transition China rolls in former and newer areas of confluence,

raising great hopes. China is coming nearer to its great European consumers.

*"On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies."*¹⁶

3.1. Chinese Modern Strategy

Modern Chinese strategy can be considered as a never ending compendium of strategies. It is steadily evolving encompassing all spheres, domains and forces.

Strategic Evolution

China, being situated on the opposite side of the Eurasian plate with large coastal shores, achieved its first unification in 221 BC. During the long lasting warring periods preceding the unification Chinese strategy, which has become an integral part of Chinese culture, was developed. Chinese had been cut off from this strategic culture during the **foreign** Qing Dynasty (Manchu) from 1644-1911. Unlike Europe Imperial China gave up its maritime option and turned inwards.¹⁷ An aborted attempt to develop a maritime strategy was done by **Wei Yuan** (1794-1856) during the short Manchu reform period with his book "Illustrated Gazetteer of the Countries Overseas" (Haiguo tuzhi, 1844). Wei Yuan proposed to adopt superior foreign technology, to resume Chinese maritime tradition and to oppose foreign nations by foreign nations in conformity with the ancient *principle "to get the better of barbarians by barbarians"*. He underlined the importance of the fleet for national economy and geopolitics. He was furthermore convinced that *only China would have the power to secure regional stability and that Asian countries would unite against western enemies*.

Mao Zedong (1893-1976) has definitively bridged the gap to ancient Chinese strategy, has widened this strategy and his theoretical

¹⁶ Sun Tzu, *Arta războiului*, translated by Raluca Pârvu (Editura Samizdat, 2004) p.76.

¹⁷ After the death of Admiral Zheng He in 1435 the expensive overseas expeditions ceased. From 1639-1854 Chinese ports were closed.

contributions are referred to as "Mao Thought" in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Full text after amendment on March 14, 2004). Mao Tze Dong was a *nationalist*, a *marxist-leninist revolutionary* and a power «technician», basing himself on armed forces. "...«The political power grows from the barrels of the gun...Our principle is that the Party commands the gun and the gun will never be allowed to command the Party...The army is the principal element of state power...War can only be abolished be war...".¹⁸ For Mao Zedong China is "a key factor" towards World Revolution.¹⁹ He declared the *primacy of nationalism* over proletarian internationalism and the *primacy of national interest*²⁰over ideological differences.

Mao's comrade of arms **Deng Xiaoping** (1904-1997) has laid the practical and theoretical foundations for the transformation of China into a *comprehensive national power* in a globalized world with unprecedented challenges and opportunities. Under his leadership China is opening by creating vaults to operate economic and political changes (SEZs, Hong Kong until 2047). This concept of dualism is omnipresent in Chinese strategic thought.

In 1988 Deng Xiaoping unveiled his long-term strategic objectives during a state visit to India: "Two things have to be done *at the same time*. One is to establish a *new international political order*; the other is to establish a *new international economic order*."²¹

The young **strategists of the "New Age"** blatantly shocked the security community with their booklet "*Unrestricted Warfare*". But they developed

¹⁸ Stuart R. Schram, *Das Mao-System - Die Schriften von MaoTse-tung - Analyse und Entwicklung* (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1972) p.256.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.333.

²⁰ Henry A. Kissinger, *Memoiren 1973-1974*, Band 2, (München: Bertelsmann Verlag GmbH, 1982) p.82.

²¹ Talk with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on December 21, 1988. In: *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Volume III (1982-1992).

and adapted to present times what Sun Tzu declared more than two thousand years ago: "*In the art of war there are no fixed rules*".²² Their way of strategy is a response, mainly but not exclusively, to China's greatest contender, the United States of America, after the major shocks got by the so-called RMA and the Asian financial crisis (1998). They showed the lag between US military thinking and military technology and the futility of relying on expensive technology. They go now beyond all traditional thinking and show that the "new wars" can be fought with new methods of operation (addition-combination) without limits with new weapons eventually created by the transformation and combination of common objects.

Unrestricted Warfare is in their eyes "*the key...to open all the locks, if these locks are on the front door of war. And this key must be suited to all levels and dimensions, from war policy, strategy, and operational techniques to tactics; and it must fit the hands of individuals, from politicians and generals to the common soldiers*".²³

Since the writing of the booklet in 1999 the United States of America faced 9/11 and Boston.

3.2. The Constitutional Framework

The Chinese Constitution reveals us what China is, its convictions and future direction.

Preamble of the Constitution: "...*Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist road...develop the socialist market economy, develop socialist democracy, improve the*

²² Sun Tzu, *Arta războiului*, translated by Raluca Pârvu (Editura Samizdat, 2004) p.37

²³ See Conclusion: Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: Arts Publishing House, 1999)

socialist legal system...promote the coordinated development of the material, political and spiritual civilizations, to turn China into a socialist country that is prosperous, powerful, democratic and culturally advanced...*The Chinese people must fight against those forces and elements, both at home and abroad, that are hostile to China's socialist system and try to undermine it.*"

Article 1 "The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship..."

Article 6 "The basis of the socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the means of production..."

Article 29 "The armed forces of the People's Republic of China belong to the people. Their tasks are to strengthen national defense, resist aggression, defend the motherland, safeguard the people's peaceful labour, participate in national reconstruction and do their best to serve the people..."

Article 93 "The Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China directs the armed forces of the country..."

The former interventions of the PLA had been limited to the direct neighbourhood of China, but the recent Chinese White Paper on National Defence (April 2013) titled "*The diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*" defines the new role of the PLA and especially that of the navy as follows: "...*supporting the country's peaceful development*. This is the goal of China's efforts in strengthening its national defence and the sacred mission of its armed forces...China's armed forces unswervingly implement the military strategy of active defence, guard against and resist aggression, contain separatist forces, safeguard border, coastal and territorial air security, and protect national maritime rights and interests and national security interests in *outer space* and *cyber space*...*They actively participate in and assist China's economic and social development*, and resolutely accomplish urgent, difficult, hazardous, and arduous tasks involving emergency rescue and disaster relief...they strengthen *overseas*

operational capabilities such as emergency response and rescue, merchant vessel protection at sea and evacuation of Chinese nationals, and provide reliable security support for China's interests overseas."²⁴

"...Participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations...International Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Aid...Safeguarding the Security of International SLOCs...Joint Exercises and Training with Foreign Armed Forces..."²⁵

It is an illusion to believe that China will not use military force. Since the proclamation of the PRC in 1949 we have had numerous demonstrations: Korean War (1951-1953), "Peaceful Liberation" of Tibet (1950), Sino-India armed conflict concerning Aksai Chin region (1962), Sino-USSR armed conflict near Ussuri River (1968-1969), Sino-Vietnam war (1979). The latest but unsuccessful war was waged under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping for geopolitical reasons at the beginning of the great transformation of China. On the inner front, the new helmsman could not permit to endanger his Chinese "perestroika" and the leadership of the communist party by a foreign "glasnost" and so he bloodily suppressed the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square by the People's Liberation Army (PLA).²⁶ From there on it is clear who rules China and every Chinese who wants to make a career has to join the CCP.

²⁴ White Paper on National Defence: The diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces. Published by the Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on April 16, 2013. Accessed on April 30, 2013. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2013-04/16/content_28556792.htm

²⁵ Ibid http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7181425.htm

²⁶ In the aftermath of China's crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square the USA and the European Union imposed an embargo of arms sales to China. France, Germany and Great Britain want to lift the ban. "La crise oblige"?!

3.3. Chinese Advance in the Larger Black Sea Region and Hungary

3.3.1. Military Presence

As we'll now see the PLA has already arrived in the Larger Black Sea Region and on the periphery through joint exercises and training:

"..Joint maritime exercises and training are being expanded...Joint army training...'Friendship Operation-2010' joint military training of mountain troops with the **Romanian army**, and joint SOF unit training with the **Turkish army**...Joint air force training...China's airborne troops joined their **Belarusian** counterparts in the joint training code-named "Divine Eagle-2011" and "Divine Eagle-2012" respectively in July 2011 and November 2012..."²⁷

In February 2011, Major General Chao Liu (born on 6 March 1959) has been appointed as military leader to command the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. He is the second PLA officer to obtain a similar position in UN Peacekeeping Forces. This presence in a commanding position gives China prestige and insights that can be used in its relations with Turkey and Greece.

In the same month in 2011 China redeployed its missile frigate Xuzhou from the Gulf of Aden to the Mediterranean in order to assist in the evacuation of its 36.000 nationals from Libya.

3.3.2. Cultural Diplomacy

Based on the model of "Goethe Institute"²⁸, "Institut Français"²⁹ and Russian Pushkin Institutes, China has developed its own version of soft power named Confucius Institute. A pilot institute started in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) in June 2004 and the first Confucius Institute opened its doors

²⁷ See: White Paper on National Defence.

²⁸ 149 Goethe-Institutes and 10 Liaison Offices in 93 countries provide information on the culture, language and other general aspects of the Federal Republic of Germany.

²⁹ The network of French "Instituts Français" consists of 101 institutes, 125 annexes and 600 French Alliances in 161 countries. Total expense account in 2012: 40.204.057,15 Euros.

on 21 November 2004 in Seoul. The major objectives of the Confucius institutes are:

1. Language teaching, 2. to promote cultural exchange and friendly relations, 3. promotion of academic, scientific and technological links with China, 4. to contribute to foster bilateral economic relations.

This network has been launched by President Hu Jintao as the outer part of the national inner Chinese program to build a "harmonious society".³⁰ It is supposed to enhance the image of the peaceful rise of China and to facilitate communications in bilateral and multilateral relations with Chinese as a new "lingua franca". All Confucius institutes are established in partnership with a Chinese university in a foreign university. China obtains direct access to new technologies at source. It is obvious that China attaches a great importance to the strategic Silk Road corridor. Therefore it reopened the Confucius Institute in Kabul and will try to play an active role in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO troops in 2014.

Confucius institutes along the ancient Silk Road (<http://www.confucius-institutes.eu/institutes>):

- Afghanistan:

Since January 2008 Confucius Institute at Kabul University(Chinese Department), **Kabul** University Karte Sakhi Jamal Mina Dist 3, **Kabul**(closed from october 2010 to April 7, 2013, due to security problems)

³⁰ On 11 January 2011, a bronze statue of Confucius was erected outside the entrance to the newly renovated National Museum of China on the east side of Tiananmen Square. There was neither an official explanation nor any ceremony. The leftist website "Mao Flag" (maoflag.net) objected, and published an article calling for its removal. On April 21, the statue disappeared, again without any explanation in the media or from official sources. It reappeared in an internal courtyard of the National Museum. *This fact reveals the strong influence of the Maoist faction.*

- **Armenia:**

Since 2008 Confucius Institute at Yerevan State Linguistic University Bryusov, Yerevan, Tumanyan str. 42 (diplomatic relations between Armenia and China since 1992)

- **Azerbaijan:**

Since April 22, 2011 Confucius institute at Baku State University, **Baku**

Since April 17, 2013 Confucius Institute at Khazar University, **Baku**

- **Belarus:**

Since July 15, 2006 Confucius Institute at Belarusian State University, 15, Moskovskaya Street, **Minsk**

- **Bulgaria:**

Since June, 2007 Confucius Institute at Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski", 79 Todor Alexandrov Blvd, **Sofia**

- **Georgia:**

Since Nov. 26, 2010 Confucius Institute at the Free University of Tbilisi in **Tbilisi**

- **Greece:**

Since October 2009, Business Confucius Institute (BCI Athens) at the Athens University of Economics and Business (AUEB), 29, Evelpidon str., 5th floor, **Athens**

- **Hungary:**

Since 2006 ELTE Confucius Institute (ECI) at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), Múzeum krt. 4/F, **Budapest**

Since 2012 SZTE Confucius Institute at University of Szeged, Dugonics square 13, **Szeged**

- Moldova:

Since April 10, 2009 Confucius Institute at Free International University of Moldova, 52 Vlaicu Parcalab Street, Chişinău

- Romania:

Since October 14, 2009 Confucius Institute at Babeş Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, 59 Teodor Mihali St., **Cluj-Napoca** (one of the op 30 Confucius Institutes in 2011)

Since November 18, 2007 Confucius Institute at Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, 5-7, Victoriei Bd, **Sibiu**

- Tajikistan:

Since August 27, 2008 Confucius Institute at Tajikistan Nationality University, Sreet Rudaky 17, **Dushanbe City**

- Turkey:

ince April 2010 Confucius Institute at Boğaziçi University, **Istanbul**, North Campus, Kare Blok, Bebek Istanbul.

Since November 28, 2008 Confucius Institute at Middle East Technical University (METU), Informatics Institute Building (1st Floor), 06800 **Ankara**

- Ukraine:

Since December, 15, 2008 Confucius Institute at Kharkiv State University, 4, Svoboda Square, **Kharkiv**

Since Mai 30, 2007, Confucius Institute at Luhansk National Pedagogical University, No.4, Chervona Plosha, **Luhansk City**

Since November 28, 2008 Confucius Institute at National Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv, Office 24, 14, Shevchenka blvd, **Kyiv**

- Uzbekistan:


Since May 2005 Confucius Institute at Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies, **Tashkent**, Mirabad District, Chekhov Street,12

By the end of August 2011 353 Confucius Institutes and 473 Confucius Classrooms had been established in 104 countries and regions all around the world.


3.3.3. Chinese economic advance

Eastern Europe and the larger Black Sea Region have not been priority targets for Chinese economic expansion. The economic and financial crisis brought the regions immediately into Chinese focus. China has developed a rapid analytical and a shrewd tactical capacity to respond to new challenges. In the aftermath of the first EU-eastern enlargement in 2004 China directly raised the problem of possible losses for Chinese trade and engaged in negotiations over compensation with the EU according to WTO principles.

China's OFDI 2007-2010:
Percentage increase by continent



Geographic distribution
of China's outward FDI stock (2011)



Source: Antwerp Management School

Azerbaijan

1995-2011: Chinese companies invested US\$102.5 million in the non-oil sector of Azerbaijani economy, in oil and gas US\$598 million

2004-2011: About 40 companies with Chinese capital were registered in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has no direct access to the Black Sea. It is depending primarily on its neighbours Georgia and Turkey to export natural gas and oil, the backbone of its flourishing economy. A similar adversity towards Russia

links Azerbaijan to Georgia, the Turkic language and security supply links it to Turkey, the Shi'ite religion and ethnic origin links it to Iran.

Belarus

Oct. 2010: Signing of three loan agreements for a total of US\$3.5 billion to finance bilateral projects in energy, construction, industry, road and transport infrastructure

June 2011: \$1 billion Chinese loan to finance projects in Belarus

2011: Sino-Belarus trade amounts to US\$2.8 billion

Sept. 2011: Sino-Belarus agreement to launch first Belarusian communications satellite with Chinese help within the next 30 months

June 5, 2012: Edict of the President of the Republic of Belarus «On China-Belarus Industrial Park (authorized fund of the company US\$10 million; Chinese shares 60%, Belarusian shares 40%), a special economic zone

Jan. 23, 2013: Loan agreement with China Development Bank for a total of US\$1.5 billion to finance the above Chinese-Belarusian Industrial Park (Smolevichi, Minsk Region)

The authoritarian regime of its president isn't nowadays a major impediment for investments in the country. Through Belarus China has access to Russian military technology and equipment. With its Chinese relations Belarus can give the impression of having at its disposal a larger room for manoeuvre in foreign politics.

Bulgaria

October 4, 1949: Bulgaria and China establish diplomatic relations

Chinese telecommunications companies Huawei and ZTE signed an agreement to upgrade Bulgaria's network.

October 2010: The Great Wall Motor Co Ltd announces that it will launch operation of its car production plant in Bulgaria in February 2011, which is expected to have an initial annual output capacity of 1000 units.

Insignia Technology signs an agreement with Bulgaria's largest power plant, Marits East Two, to build de-sulfurization facilities.

Dec. 2009: A Hong Kong private equity fund, PineBridge Investments, owns Bulgaria's Vivacom.

Sept. 2010: Bulgarian PM meets with Wen Jiabao on the sidelines of a UN meeting in New York.

2010: Bulgaria establishes a memorandum of trade cooperation with Zhejiang province.

June 2010: Chinese investors are considering operating an airport in the country.

Sept. 2010: Investment groups travel to China to negotiate investment in the Bojurishte industrial zone.

Oct. 2010: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Simeon Djankov announces that Bulgaria wants China to become the largest foreign investor in the country by 2013.

Nov. 2010: Chinese companies Polar Photovoltaics and Wiscom System Co finish building a solar power plant.

A glass factory was built in Razgrad by Luoyang Float Glass Group.

Nov. 2010: Talks are ongoing regarding Bulgaria's involvement in an Asia-Europe rail line that China and Turkey are already discussing.

2011: Chinese investment in Bulgaria reached US\$70 million

2011: An investment of €10 million in Bulgarian farmland by Tianjin State Farms Agribusiness Group. This new farmland investment will see the lease and development of 2,000 hectares of arable land in Boynitsa Municipality, Vidin District, to cultivate corn, forage, and sunflower for export to China

Nov. 23, 2011: The first solar photovoltaic power station in Bulgaria built with Chinese investment near Ihtimans officially went into operation with an annual power generation capacity of 2.5 million kilowatts

2012: Completion of a 4.5MW pilot project using Chinese wind turbines by a joint venture between Ming

Yang and Bulgarian developer W Power

Bulgaria's poor infrastructure, inefficient courts and corruption have put off serious Western investors. But its relative fiscal stability and corporate taxes of 10% - the lowest in the European Union - can attract Chinese investors. Nevertheless even for Chinese firms investment risks are considerable. Ming Yang that signed contracts with Bulgaria's W Power and A1 Development for a total of 124.5MW projects has been shocked by the Bulgarian government's announcement of a 20% cut in subsidies.

Greece

2009: Cosco signs a lease to expand two of Piraeus' main container ports worth €3.4 billion

May 2010: The Greek transportation minister says that Chinese companies are interested in privatizing Greece's OSE railway

June 2010: Cosco takes on full control of the container port in Piraeus with a 35 year lease. The company promised US\$700 million in modernization

June 2010: Chinese Vice-Premier Zhang Dejiang to Greece. Fourteen agreements are signed, representing the largest investment package to any country in Europe from China, worth US\$ 900 million, including the MoU on Cooperation in the Fields of Ship and Maritime Technologies. These agreements include building 7 dry bulk cargo ships, a hotel, a shopping mall complex, olive oil export, and tech sharing, particularly in telecommunications

June 2010: The Chinese are considering buying a stake in the loss-making railway network OSE, which the socialist government has pledged to privatize, as well as building an airport on the island of Crete, a logistics center north of Athens and a marine theme park

Oct. 2010: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao promises to continue purchasing government bonds during his visit to Greece. Private Greek and Chinese

companies signed about a dozen deals in shipping, logistics, construction and tourism.

May 2013: Cooperation memorandum signed by Huawei and Greek Development, Competitiveness, Infrastructure, Transport and Networks Minister Kostis Hatzidakis. In the next three years, Huawei will create a logistics hub in Greece and a center for research and innovation.

May 2013: Cooperation memorandum signed by the Chinese company ZTE (leading manufacturer of telecommunications equipment and Greek Development, Competitiveness, Infrastructure, Transport and Networks Minister. ZTE will undertake to turn the port of Piraeus into a transit and logistics hub for its products in Europe and the greater Mediterranean region.

May 16, 2013: Chinese expressed an interest to invest in other Greek ports and regional airports

Greece is the new bridgehead for Chinese accession to European markets. China went alongside in the cradle of European culture and didn't need to force its entrance by opium. It is hailed as the ultimate saviour in times of great national depression.

Greek Fleet and Chinese Fleet in 2011. Greece: 202,388,152 deadweight ton (1), 3213 vessels (4), 16.17% of world. China: 37,182,839 deadweight ton (8), 3 651 vessels (3), 8.63% of world.³¹

Moldova

July 2009: the Chinese company COVEC offered a US\$1 billion loan for the implementation of infrastructural projects

2011: low-interest loan of US\$62 million from SinoHydro for the modernization of 50 km of roads

2011: Sino-Moldova trade amounts to US\$0.4 billion

³¹ UNCTAD, *Review of Maritime Transport 2011 - Chapter 2: Structure, Ownership and Registration of the World Fleet* (New York and Geneva: 2011) p.44.

Nowadays a direct neighbour of EU Moldova, a political and economic instable state, has become more vulnerable through its unilaterally declared neutrality.

Romania

October 5, 1949: Romania and China establish diplomatic relations

2003: Founding of Compania Dragonul Roșu SA, member of Niro Investment Group, which have developed and manage the "Dragonul Roșu" commercial zone with 9 shopping complexes in Bucharest (Fundeni-Colentina).

In 2008, trade volume reached US\$3.2 billion, ten times what it was in 2000.

2010: China National Electric Equipment Corp. wants to partner with one state energy holding to build a 500-megawatt plant worth 1 billion euros in Rovinari

May 2012: A Romanian consortium signed agreements with Chinese firm Sinovel Wind Group for supply and services of equipment

2011: The trade exchange between Romania and China amounts to US\$ 4.4 billion, with a 17% annual increase.

July 2011: Inauguration of the commercial complex China Town northeast of Bucharest, Strada Viitorului 98 (40 hectares)

2012: The Chinese investments in Romania have reached US\$ 400 million.

Dec. 21, 2012: China Huadian Engineering signed a memorandum of understanding on investing €1 milliard in the construction of a new energy group in Rovinari at the Oltenia Energy Complex

Russia

June 5, 2012: China's Dalian Wanda Group Corporation will invest up to US\$3 billion to develop Russia's *North Caucasus* resorts. The hotels will be able to host 83.500 tourists.

Russia needs Chinese capital to develop its Achilles heel in the Caucasus. As Putin choose not to support Crimean separatism to destabilize Ukraine,

he now wants to develop the only possible touristic resort in southwestern Russia. For the 2014 Winter Games in *Sochi* the Russian government, state-controlled companies and oligarchs are investing billions. After years of political and social unrest the projects will create jobs and new opportunities in these backward regions.

Ukraine

1998: China buys the unfinished Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag from Ukraine

2009: Sino-Ukraine deal totaling US\$315 million concerning four Zubr class hovercrafts, including technical documentation

2010: China offers Ukraine a credit line of US\$4 billion

2011: Sino-Ukraine trade amounts to US\$ 8.5 billion

June 2011: Framework agreement between Crimean Generating Systems and China National Machinery Industry Corporation (SINOMACH) for the construction of Scholkino combined cycle gas turbine power plant with an approximate capacity of 750-800 MW

July 2012: Ukrainian Energy and Coal Industry Ministry of Ukraine and the State Bank of China signed a protocol on cooperation in the substitution of natural gas with coal

April 4, 2013: The first of two ordered Zubr landing assault hovercrafts are handed over from Ukraine to China.

Through Ukraine China has access to Russian military technology and equipment. With its Chinese relations Ukraine insists having at its disposal a larger room for manoeuvre in foreign politics. Backed by Chinese financial and material help Ukraine intends to reduce its natural gas dependency on Russia.

Hungary

1949: Hungary and China establish diplomatic relations

1988-92: Visa-free travels of Chinese nationals to Hungary

The Budapest China Mart (BCM) is a platform for Chinese and Europeans, a conference center, a business center and a shopping center (Szent Mihály út 171)

Asia Center in Budapest is a shopping mall and a business park specifically for the needs of the growing Chinese community (Szent Mihályi út 167-169)

2003: First visit of an Hungarian Prime Minister to China after 44 years

2004: Opening of Hungarian Consulate in Shanghai

May 2009: Huawei has an assembly plant and logistics center in Hungary.

June 2010: Wanhua Industrial Group makes a US\$185 million investment in BorsodChem with an option to purchase the rest of the company within the next two years.

Trade turnover figures in 2007 was US\$6.22 billion, a 56% increase from 2006. Hungary receives information and communications technology and China receives machinery and electronic products from Hungary.

2011: HNA Group, China's fourth-largest airline group signs a strategic cooperation agreement with the Hungarian Capital Association Ltd.

2011: The Bank of China and BorsodChem sign a US\$1.56 billion financing agreement.

2011: Anhui BBCA Biochemical Co. Ltd. signs an agreement to build a citric acid factory in Hungary with an annual capacity of 60,000 tons

February 2011: Wanhua takes full control of BorsodChem and creates the third largest isocyanate maker in the world

May 2011: Huawei announces it would expand its distribution center by employing 3,000 people and export a total of US\$1.2 billion worth of products this year, making it Huawei's second-largest supply center in the world

May 2912: China Civil Engineering Construction Corp signed a memorandum worth US\$1 billion on building a 20-kilometer rail express linking the airport to the downtown Budapest

April 18, 2013: Wizz Air, the largest low-cost, low-fare airline in Central and Eastern Europe, signed a pre-delivery payment financing and sale and leaseback agreement with Chinese ICBC Financial Leasing Co., Ltd. (ICBC Leasing) for eight new Airbus A320 aircraft. The airplanes are planned for deliveries in 2013 and 2014 and at list price would be valued at over US\$ 700,000,000.

April 26, 2013: Conference “Trade with Asia” in Budapest


Hungary has become the preferred country for Chinese investments in Central Europe. Why? Like China Hungary clings to a specific narrative of the past: it was a victim of the West (Hungary: Treaty of Trianon. China: Unequal Treaties). In spite of its geographic anchorage in Central Europe Hungary has tried to go to its roots in Central Asia since the Middle Ages.³² The Chinese side cleverly takes up the Hungarian eastward quest: "...that some believe in the affinity of the two nationalities therefore Chinese usually treat Hungarians with special friendliness...".³³ Hungarian Turanism (refers to common origins of Hungarian and Asian peoples, Turkic and others; racist ideology in WW II) is sponsored by Hungarian government.

In April 2012 this government launched its new foreign economic strategy putting emphasis on geographical diversification of export: 1) ‘*Eastern Opening*,’ 2) becoming suppliers to big European exporters and 3) economic cooperation in the Carpathian Basin. In 2012 the trade with the different Asian regions was not important: imports at 13,7% and exports at 6.4%. The role of Northeast Asia is decisive in the Hungarian-Asian trade

³² Frisch, Pierrot. *Das Arpadische Königshaus in Ungarn und das Viandener Grafengeschlecht von 1205-1250 - Besiedlung Siebenbürgens*. In *Transilvania* 8-9 (2007): 31.

³³ Xiao Qian, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China in Hungary, on his visit to SZTE Confucius Institute in Szeged. Published on www.u-szeged.hu. Accessed on May 25, 2013. <http://www.u-szeged.hu/news/2013/xiao-qian-ambassador-of-objectParentFolderId=4768>

and China occupies the lead position. COSCO, the Chinese shipping conglomerate, is trying to get Rijeka, Croatia's main Adriatic harbour, in lease and to build a railway line from the Croatian shore to Hungary. The new Sino-Hungary relationship exemplifies what I introduced with the title "The other Eastern Partnership: East (中国) meets east".



(Source: 2011 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment)

China is concentrating its investments in telecommunications, traditional and new energy, infrastructure construction (railways, highways, bridges through public-private and build-operate and transfer partnerships), agriculture, natural resources development and technology. The OFDI don't reflect all Chinese investments, because they do not comprise direct loans between firms and investments from Chinese firms registered in financial offshore centres.

China enters the new markets as a state capitalist. It *does not ask for democratic and economic prerequisites*, but its counterparts have to accept only one political condition: "*One China*". The loans granted by China are tied to specific projects and the local country gives state guarantees. The apparently good conditions (low interest rate, grace period) vanish rapidly, when Chinese firms execute projects directly with Chinese labour force. Since the 2008 financial crisis China's annual GDP has fallen and the

country looked out for profitable compensations. China's GDP growth depends on export trade.

The regions offer China new markets for its cheaper products and the relative low local salaries allow the construction of distribution and production units (assembling imported Chinese pieces). The different national centres become springboards to the more lucrative markets of neighbouring countries and of the larger European Union and the Mediterranean. At the same time some great Chinese energy companies are investing in local green energy (wind, solar)³⁴ projects and others in traditional energy projects (coal, nuclear), competing with international firms.

The investments in the *telecommunication sector* and the growing part of Chinese mobile devices can become a security problem.

The Chinese investment in port management in Europe is a strategic option. Piraeus, so far the first concession in Europe, is close to the Suez Canal and is the main entry port into Southern and Eastern Europe, to the Black Sea and Russia. In 2011, more than 20 million passengers and 1.7 million containers passed through Piraeus according to the Piraeus Port Authority. In fact China is seeking to establish port facilities around the world to control geostrategic points in order to protect its trade interests (commercial fleet) and to build new doors to mainland China: Gwadar in Pakistan (new pipeline towards China), Piraeus (land roads-railways from Turkey to China). *All the roads lead to the Middle Kingdom.* Through further investments in railway construction towards Central Europe China will control the entire chain from production to end consumers in newly constructed Chinese trade centres near highways. At first hand a win-win affair between Greece and China, but not for Europe, when Chinese companies will obtain other leaseholds (Rijeka). China has copied the

³⁴ Chinese major wind energy producing companies with their *global* market share in 2010 (31,2-32,3%): Guodian United Power(4-4,2%), Dongfang(6,7-7%), Goldwind (9,5-10%) and Sinovel(11-11,1%)

European model of the 19th century to control China. Russia, India and the United States opposed Chinese bids to manage their ports.

With its growing economic influence China creates dependencies which it can transform in political capital.³⁵ Greece is for the moment the most vulnerable country in the region. Next year we'll face a critical constellation when Greece will take over the EU-presidency.

China is transforming the entire region through its bilateral approach by *finding convergent point of interests*: the Russian "nearer abroad", a part of the EU neighbourhood and EU-member countries (will) form "The other Eastern Partnership", *the community of mutual interest*. With falling gas prices Russia will depend more on China's investments. It has already opened its sensitive Caucasus Region to China.

China favours Turkish investments in Xinjiang to calm local Uighur Muslims. So we can see that security problems are tackled in a different way in the SCO.

3.3.4. Chinese Diaspora

China is already present in countries through its diaspora long before it is expanding its economic activities. It can rely on its diaspora for investments and all kind of information.

The Chinese diaspora ("huaqiao") is very heterogeneous, because of its different origins in time and space. The older emigration began with the opening of China in the 19th century. Some Chinese arrived as sailors in

³⁵ Australia reported the first Chinese use of economic power to influence its foreign politics. In 2007 China became Australia's main trading partner. But earlier in 2004, was "China's reaction regarding Australia's prospective position in any Sino-US conflict in the Taiwan Straits. By asserting that China could 'cease bilateral free trade talks and use its influence to lock Australia out of emerging regional bodies, economic groupings and political associations', should Australia support the US in any such conflict, Beijing evidenced a willingness to use economic pressure to secure China's interests". See: Major Tom McDermott, *The implications for Australia of the US Defense Review*, in: The Australian Defence Force Journal Issue No. 188 (2012) p.37

European ports, a few one by travelling along the Trans-Siberian Railway and others from the European colonies.

The *newest Chinese migration* started at the beginning of the 80s with China's economic reforms and reached all continents. A strong Chinese community established in Eastern Europe with different social backgrounds. These Chinese *transnationals* (peddlers, small businessmen) maintain a deeper cultural, economic, social and political attachment with their home country than Chinese established in Western Europe. Hungary and other countries of the communist bloc permitted immigration from China without visas. Chinese general motivation is to become prosperous and financially self-autonomous, but the limited business opportunities forced them to move to other countries. In Hungary their number reached 40.000 but decreased in our days to about 11.000 (legally living there). The Chinese community there has its own newspapers and a television channel. In *Romania* are living about 10.000 Chinese. The Romanian government encouraged Chinese workers to come to Romania in order to compensate the labour shortages caused by Romanian migration. In 2008 Romania gave a maximum of 4699 work permits, 1546 permanent residence permits to Chinese.

Bulgaria is the only Eastern European country that has not cancelled its agreement with China on relaxed visa requirements. It has an estimated population of 9000 (2011) Chinese people. Greece has an estimated population of 20.000 (2011). Turkey has a large community of Muslim Turkic speaking Uighurs from Chinese Xinjiang region.

The illegal migration of Chinese to Europe becomes a major security problem. Chinese gangs smuggle their fellow countrymen (mainly young men) via different routes (Russia, Eastern Europe and Middle East) into European countries. China could come to *dominate the global migration system* and change the character of destination societies.

We have to mention Chinese studying abroad as part of the diaspora. The Ministry of Education of the PRC released in 2011 statistics concerning Chinese students: From 1978 to 2010 1,9 million Chinese citizens studied

abroad, of which 632.200 returned home. In 2010 about 285.000 students went abroad for study. The number of foreign students in China exceeded 260.000 in the same year.

4. Conclusions

The continuous Chinese advance and the ongoing transformation processes, especially in the larger Black Sea Region, have not yet been perceived and understood by a larger public. The European Union's and NATO's overwhelming attitude towards the phenomenon looks like the description of Dino Buzatti in his book "Il deserto dei Tartari" (The Desert of the Tartars 1940): The garrison of an outpost at the periphery of the desert is gradually reduced and is easily conquered by the Tatars, who had continuously constructed a way towards the fortress.

The countries in the Black Sea Region are like Prometheus chained to their historic past and to their geographic space and don't have the power to change their future on their own. They depend on the will of greater powers, which can reduce or enlarge their dependencies. China, the newest actor on the regional stage, has not renounced to its revolutionary past (see Constitution), but has simply inversed priorities, by analysing its defeat in the nineteenth century and the rise of other great powers: economic power strengthens military power and political power, which will form after a time all comprehensive power.

The real danger is not China alone, but it consists of a possible alliance of three ancient empires - China, Russia and Turkey - controlling already Eurasia (heartland) and expanding from there. These allies mistrust each other, but all of them have strong nationalisms and they are united by a common will to wipe out the humiliations of the past. At the same time we need to take into account the frail roots of democracy (Hungary). The EU's transformation pressure on a country mostly occurs during the candidacy period. As soon as the candidate country becomes a full member, the EU effect on internal and foreign politics of that state diminishes considerably.

The proposed American pivot to Asia is in essence a correct move, but it needs to be completed by comprehensive tactical and strategic measures in Europe. The critical situation asks for immediate actions to be taken by the EU: giving up the privatization of strategic infrastructures, water, separation of production and distribution in energy sector or imposing stronger regulations; integrating Bulgaria and Romania in Schengen zone; integrating the security aspect in EU Port Services Directive and in national port policies.

In order to get a regional change we have to get first a move on the global level. In the meanwhile we can launch negotiations on banning cyber arms.

Since we have entered the *age of hot peace* all limits have fallen: physical and moral. Most confrontations are nowadays taking place on the nebulous secret front with specialized *low-cost tools*, downgrading if not making obsolete classical military and their arsenal. The change on Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is a temporary illusion. There have been sufficient demonstrations to show the possibilities of penetrating all kind of networks, civil and military equipment, power grids, nuclear facilities, banking and financial institutions, transportation, pipelines, even if not connected to the internet.³⁶ Therefore it is necessary to engage immediately in *international talks to purely ban cyber arms* and to finalize these talks by an international treaty, otherwise we won't be able to get out of the spiral of paranoid anticipation behaviour (fear-action-fear-counteraction and so on) and we'll risk the first big bang.

Cyberspace isn't really a virtual space. The actors are national citizens of a state working on their real computers and their actions are impacting on the real world in their own country or in other countries. Thus their acts can be a crime punishable by a state's law. But the different states have to agree on a common definition of cyber-crime, to harmonize their legislation, to grant better legal powers for investigation, to achieve cross-

³⁶ The Stuxnet computer virus, a cyber weapon, that attacked Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities from 2009-2010 and damaged the centrifuges; cyber attacks on Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), Lithuania (2008).

border law enforcement cooperation, to create common platforms for public-private partnership, to train all involved persons (investigators, prosecutors), to raise awareness among internet users. By combining the national and international level the cyberspace will be under the rule of law. With the rise of nationalism, new geopolitics and the enduring economic crisis, the different states, even democratic states, have mainly prosecuted acts of national hackers which have caused harms to nationals. This has been an incentive to the scene to eventually adopt a certain code of conduct (not to attack national targets), to concentrate their activities on foreign targets and to be considered "national heroes". So far this scene has been a large reservoir for state agencies to launch anonymous attacks against foreign targets.

In the eyes of Chinese officials the 21st century is the period of the "Warring States": The Kingdom of Qin, the hegemonic power, embodied by the United States, is opposed by China, which has chosen the "way of the wise man", and is the only one to become "Right King" according to the strategies of Sun Tzu and Xun Xi.

Thus the implication of China in the proposed process is necessary and China can prove that it really aspires to peaceful rising and that its concept of peaceful coexistence isn't identical to the soviet revolutionary concept of coexistence.³⁷

It is vital for the further peaceful development of Chinese politics that China and especially its leaders achieve a correct historical interpretation of the period of the Qing or Manchu dynasty.³⁸

³⁷ Boris Meissner, *Entspannungspolitik aus der Sicht der sowjetischen Ideologie und aussenpolitischen Praxis*, in: Dieter Blumenwiz, Horst Glassl, Jens Hacker, Boris Meissner, Paul Noack/Reiner Eger, Hans Raupach/Jiří Sláma, Lothar Ruehl, Ekkehard Wagner, Bernard Wilms and Franz-Christoph Zeitler, *Partnerschaft mit dem Osten, Staat und Gesellschaft*, Band 1 (München: Verlag Martin Lurz, 1976) pp.13-41

³⁸ Called for aid by Ming officials against the bandit leader Li Tzu-ch'eng in 1644 the Manchus, who lived outside the Great Wall, in Manchuria, nowadays Northeast China, took advantage

This partial interpretation of history is being diffused worldwide through the Chinese propaganda channels in order to legitimate specific actions declared as reactions, which is very popular among Third-World and other emerging countries with similar mantras.

Chinese State firms like other firms are profiting of the neo-liberalist politics (open markets and concurrence) forced by the European Union and the United States and will obtain in a near future in the larger Black Sea Region sufficient market shares in once strategic domains (transportation, energy production), so when combined with traditional domains (production, agriculture), they can considerably influence and change the political landscape. The unobserved introduction of strong preferential treatments along precise affinities can furthermore strengthen the nationalistic tendencies of emerging authoritarian states and endanger

of the opportunity to conquer the country and (Andrée Zerger Lindsay, *L'identité mandchoue et son rôle dans la construction identitaire chinoise: étude historiographique*, Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en Histoire (Montréal: 2009) pp.141-145. Accessed on May 3, 2013. <https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/4365/Zerger_Andree_2010_memoire.pdf?sequence=2> established their own dynasty in China. The Manchu continued to occupy Ming officials in the newly centralized government, officially continued Confucian culture and their army extended China to its greatest territorial size. They imposed a strict censorship on literary creation and concentrated all military strategic books in Beijing archives under Manchu control. All male Chinese were forced to adopt Manchu clothing and hair style (pigtail). Until the decay of the dynasty in the 19th century the Manchu emperors applied a strong cultural and ethnic segregation to preserve their domination. Thus quite a lot of Chinese hated the Manchu, calling them usurpers and an obstacle towards China's modernization. The Chinese nationalists under Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) exploited the anti-Manchu sentiments to gain power and when they reached power they completely dropped the Manchu subject and role in Chinese history. On the other hand only one part of the consequences of the foreign interventions in China in the 19th century resulting in the so-called Unequal Treaties with large concessions and extraterritorial rights, largely perceived as Chinese humiliations, are occupying from then on a paramount place in Chinese history studies. The positive aspects, the opening of China to foreign ideas and technologies, possibility of travelling abroad, accelerating of Chinese national identity construction and destruction of Manchu reign, are passing silently.

regional security by territorial claims in order to achieve national reunification.

I will conclude with a quotation of German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche:

"...O meine Brüder, nicht zurück soll euer Adel schauen, sondern hinaus! Vertriebene sollt ihr sein aus allen Vater- und Urväterländern! Eurer Kinder Land sollt ihr lieben: diese Liebe sei euer neuer Adel, - das unentdeckte, im fernsten Meere!... (*O my brothers, your nobility should not look backward but ahead! Exiles shall you be from all father- and forefather-lands! **Your children's land shall you love: this love shall be your new nobility-the undiscovered land in the most distant sea***)".³⁹

Abbreviations

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

CPC: Communist Party of China

CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States

CSTO: Collective Security Treaty Organization (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan)

EEA: European Economic Area

EU: European Union

EurAsEC: Eurasian Economic Community

GDP: gross domestic product

IMF: International Monetary Fund

METU: Middle East Technical University (Turkey)

MoU: Memorandum of Understanding

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

³⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Gesammelte Werke*, Also sprach Zarathustra, III, (Bindlach: Gondrom Verlag GmbH: 2005) p.710

OEEC: Organization for European Economic Cooperation

OFDI: Outward Foreign Direct Investment

PLA: People's Liberation Army

PRC: People's Republic of China

RMA: Revolution in Military Affairs

SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan)

SEZs: Special Economic Zones

SLOCs: (strategic) sea lines of communication

TRACECA: Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia

TRT: Turkish Radio and Television (Corporation)

UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

U.S.S.R.: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WTO: World Trade Organization

WWII: World War II or the Second World War

Turkish-Soviet Disputes during the Post-war Period. Security Implications for the Black Sea Region

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Abstract: Within the USSR security paradigm that regarded the relations with the western countries, it has been exaggerated the perception. In the postwar security plans in Europe, the vision of Moscow on achieving tangible and pragmatic security summarized to the old conception of the geographical security. In this respect, the USSR had preference for the traditional international system of the balance of power and the division into spheres of influence, which was proved otherwise in the Black Sea region.

Keywords: Black Sea, Truman Doctrine, NATO enlargement, border, security.

1. Introduction

The geopolitical and geo-strategic mutations happening on the European continent, including within the Black Sea region, after the end of the World War II, competed for the determinant role in the emergence of the bipolarity phenomenon at the global level. The western perception on the USSR, hostile or even aggressive at the end of the war, had its origins in Moscow's behavior in international relations of that time. The Red Army was present in the Central and Southeastern Europe and under its occupation a substantial change of the political and economic system of the states in those areas was foreseeable, according to the Soviet totalitarian communist model¹. Actually, Joseph V. Stalin was firmly convinced by the fact that, after the war, the winning armies would export their own political system in the conquered territories².

¹ Martin McCauley, *Rusia, America si Razboiul Rece 1949-1991 (Russia, America and the Cold War 1949-1991)*, Polirom Publishing House, Jassy, 1999, pp. 39-41.

² Milovan Djilas, *Intalniri cu Stalin (Meetings with Stalin)*, Europa Publishing House, Craiova, p. 48.

2. Debats

During the first period of the Cold War, in the security relations to the West, on the European continent, the Soviet foreign policy was dominated by the geopolitical approach, closely linked with the ideological one. The Marxist-Leninist approach had the defining role in forming the perceptions of the Soviet decision-makers towards the political action of the western countries.

In this respect, Vyacheslav M. Molotov recalled the fact that the expansion of communism removed the USSR's traditional isolation and the emergence of the "people's democracy" states on its western borders eliminated the dangerous possibility of the Westerners to create a new *cordon sanitaire* obviously directed against Moscow³.

Within the USSR's security paradigm, in its relations with the western states, the perception was exaggerated. In the postwar security plans on the European continent, Joseph V. Stalin's outlook concerning the achievement of a tangible and pragmatic security was confined to the old concept of geographic security⁴. The Soviet leader had a special preference for the traditional balance of power system and the division into the spheres of influence, a fact actually proven in the Balkans and the Black Sea region.

Concerning Turkey, the stakes of the crisis unleashed by Soviets in August 1946 was the issue of controlling the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits. During such a meeting with the US Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith, in April 1946, Joseph V. Stalin declared that "Turkey is weak and the USSR clearly realizes the danger that would result for it following a foreign control over the Straits, which Turkey is not strong enough to protect them. The Turkish Government is hostile to us. That is why the Soviet

³ Natalia I. Yegorova, *Soviet Perceptions of the Formation of NATO 1948-1953*, http://www.history.machaon.ru/number_02/analiti4/2/index.html

⁴ Ibidem

Government asked for a basis in the Dardanelles. It is a matter related to our own security”⁵.

Even from October 1944, on the occasion of Winston Churchill’s visit to Moscow, the Soviets spoke for the first time about a revision of the Straits’ regime. Joseph V. Stalin resumed talks around that issue in Yalta, but without openly stating his geo-strategic objectives. A month later, on March 19, 1945, Vyacheslav M. Molotov denounced the Turkish-Soviet pact of 1925 as obsolete, declaring that “the region from south of Batumi and Baku, towards the Persian Gulf, is the centre of USSR’s aspirations”⁶. The Turkish Ambassador was basing his judgment on the supposition that he can get Moscow’s availability for concluding a more encompassing agreement. Ankara would thus propose an alliance elaborated following all rules, resembling the treaties concluded by the USSR with the UK, Czechoslovakia or France. The Kremlin answered in June that such an agreement implied a revision of the Montreux Convention and the establishment of a permanent Soviet base in the Dardanelles, asking at the same time the restitution of Kars and Ardahan villayets (departments). Under such conditions, Ankara withdrew its proposal⁷.

In Potsdam, in July 1945, the Kremlin leader would come back regarding this issue. He would emphasize it was normal that Turkey could close the Straits during wartime or in case of war threats, as the Montreux Convention authorized it. He stated that he would not claim the Kars and Ardahan villayets, if Ankara agreed to conclude a Turkish-Soviet alliance. Instead, he firmly maintained his demand regarding a base at the Aegean Sea, clearly stating to Winston Churchill during a diner that it should be established at Dedeagach (Alexandroupoli), in Western Thrace. The Western Powers would strive to demonstrate to him that USSR’s security

⁵ André Fontaine, *Istoria Razboiului Rece (History of the Cold War)*, vol. 2, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1992, p. 42.

⁶ Apud Traian Atanasiu, Anatolie Zemba, Cornel Mihai, Vasile Grad, Gheorghe Marin, *Puterea maritima si diplomatia navala (Maritime Power and Naval Diplomacy)*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 199.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 43.

is going to be likewise ensured if an international agreement established, as they had previously proposed, the principle of complete freedom of the internal navigation routes. The Westerners' proposal was categorically rejected by the Soviet side.

On 7 August 1946, eleven days before the expiry of the term provided by the Montreux Convention, in order to be able to demand the revision, the Kremlin addressed to Turkey a note, sending at the same time copies to London and Washington, emphasizing the fact that the latter could not prevent, during the war, the use of the Straits against the riparian states. The argument raised at least bewilderment, as during hostilities the Soviets had not blamed Ankara for not having abided by the provisions of the Montreux Convention, mainly that of blocking the access of the belligerents' warships during wartime, if they were not Turkish allies. They also demanded for a revision of the Convention, rejecting the US proposals of November 1945, by adding a clause providing that Turkey and the USSR would ensure, by their common means, the defense of the Straits in order to prevent their use by other states for purposes hostile to Black Sea Powers, this demand being similar to the one presented to Adolf Hitler in November 1940. On August 19, Washington would advertise that, upon its opinion, Turkey had to continue to be "the main responsible for defending the Straits", adding that if they "became the object of an attack or threats of attack from an aggressor, the resulting situation would represent a threat for international security and would clearly constitute a reason of action for the UN Security Council"⁸.

Tensions manifested around the issue of the Straits, emphasized by the Soviet demands for a revision of the Caucasian border (in the Kars and Ardahan regions), had immediate consequences. President Harry S. Truman sent a naval forces group, made up of the *Franklin D. Roosevelt* carrier, four cruisers and a flotilla of torpedo boats in order to join the *Missouri* battleship in the Eastern Mediterranean, whose presence in the zone of Istanbul, in April 1946, marked the beginning of the US military

⁸ Ibidem, p. 45.

presence in the Black Sea area, the first step of the US commitment towards the Turkey's security necessities. This was the period when George F. Kennan, acting diplomat in Moscow, explained to the Department of State in the "Long Telegram" the fact that Russia had traditionally tried to get access to the "warm" sea by taking control of the Straits. As a result, the US Department of State, in its preparation for the "containment" strategy, identified Southeastern Europe and Turkey as areas in the proximity of Soviet borders that presented major security risks.

Finally, Ankara rejected the Soviet proposals and interrupted the diplomatic notes exchange when the Kremlin came back persistently. Only after the death of Joseph V. Stalin were the Soviet claims concerning the regions of Kars and Ardahan officially abandoned⁹.

The Turkish crisis was to play in the history of the Cold War a role that largely overran its immediate stake. Together with the Civil War in Greece, it directly influenced the setting up of the "Truman Doctrine", which was the first step of the US commitment in Europe, in terms of security.

The US elaborated, on basis of the own assessments, a coherent and prospective policy for countering what was perceived ever more obvious as being the Soviet/communism danger¹⁰. In this context, Washington started a lot of political and economic measures meant to cancel the subversive Soviet actions, both on the European continent and at global level.

The adoption of the "Truman Doctrine" in March 1947, when the US openly expressed their support for Greece and Turkey, under the threat of communist subversion and when they committed to offer assistance to any state that would oppose to it, actually represented the formal US

⁹ Ibidem, p. 46.

¹⁰ Peter Calvocoressi, *Politica mondiala dupa 1945 (World Politics Since 1945)*, Allfa Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, pp. 12-14.

involvement in the security issue on the European continent, but also in other parts of the world¹¹.

On June 5, 1947, the US Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, proposed to Europe the US economic and financial assistance (the Marshall Plan), by which the US launched a huge program of economic recovery of the European states, open in fact also to states from the Soviet sphere of influence, but rejected by Joseph V. Stalin that considered it an attempt to undermine the *strategic glacis* acquired by the Soviets in Central and Southeastern Europe¹². Under such circumstances, the Black Sea area got a new significance in the conditions of manifesting the world balance of power, the issue of security being related to aspects aiming at neighboring areas: Southeastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

In such situation, on February 27, 1947, the UK Government informed Washington of its incapacity to continue the financial support envisaged for the Greek and Turkish Governments, as well as the withdrawal of the UK troops from Greece, starting with the end of March. The US reaction was prompt, as President Harry S. Truman asked the US Congress aids for the Greek and Turkish Governments with the purpose of supporting them against the communist subversion/aggression. He financially detailed his demand, asking for 400 million US dollars (250 for Greece and 150 for Turkey) until June 30, 1948, as well as training for the Greek and Turkish personnel and sending US civilian and military staff in the two countries, finally resulting a consistent involvement for peace time.

The President's discourse of March 12, 1947, remained known as the "Truman Doctrine" and, concretized by a law on May 22, was a specific form of support for the two states until their NATO join. In fact, the US assistance allowed the Greek governmental army to eliminate communist

¹¹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomatia (Diplomacy)*, All Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, pp. 419-420.

¹² Michael Lynch, *Stalin si Hruscirov. URSS 1924-1964 (Stalin and Khrushchev, USSR 1924-1964)*, All Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, pp. 111-113.

forces until the autumn of 1949. On the other hand, the “Truman Doctrine”, apart from concrete assistance provided to Greece and Turkey, was also a form of support for all countries threatened by communism¹³. Practically, presenting the assistance for Greece and Turkey as part of a worldwide struggle between democracy and communism was the way in which President Harry S. Truman, the Secretary of State George C. Marshall and the Under Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson convinced the US Congress of the necessity to provide this concrete assistance. The “Truman Doctrine” was the first US step towards the security commitments concerning the Europeans, although, rather paradoxically, Greece and Turkey were not then included in the first formula of NATO, on April 4, 1949.

The integration of Turkey and Greece into NATO was the occasion of the first reorganization of the Alliance, on the basis of the decision of the Lisbon North Atlantic Council, which was also attended by the new members. Thus, on September 8, 1952, a separate land command for this area was established (LANDSOUTHEAST), with the headquarters in Izmir (Turkey), whose responsibility consisted of the defense of Southern Europe, including the south of Balkan Peninsula, Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. At the same time, an Advanced Command Centre was established in Thessalonica, subordinated to the general headquarters in Izmir. During the next year, on October 14, the air command of the southern flank (AIRSOUTH), with the headquarters in Izmir, extended its structures to the territories of the new allies, including Turkish and Greek air units, the strategic mission being similar to that of the land forces command from this area of responsibility. Regarding the naval forces from Southern Europe, the Mediterranean and Black Sea, although initially the Greek and Turkish naval forces remained under the national command, NATO began organizing the future integrated naval structure of its southern flank.

¹³ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1984*, fifth edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1985, pp. 51-53.

The first NATO enlargement, on February 16, 1952, by the simultaneous accession of Greece and Turkey, generated a new geopolitical and geo-strategic environment in the southeastern side of the continent and in the Black Sea region. The setting up of a common land and sea border of the USSR with NATO's southern European flank, represented by Turkey, generated unrest among leading structures from Moscow, interested in an increase of the military institution importance, the basic factor upon which USSR's superpower status was based¹⁴.

Turkey's accession to NATO had as its basic reason the threat represented by the USSR, being one of the three Alliance countries, together with the US and Norway, which shared a common border with the communist superpower. In fact, the postwar geopolitical realities made impossible an alliance with the USSR, which was ready to offer economic assistance only in the perspective of neutralizing the Straits, a possibility strongly rejected by the Turkish authorities. Among the elements that contributed to Turkey's accession to NATO were its army's dimensions, one of the largest within the Alliance, and the availability manifested for stationing the US nuclear missiles on its national territory, one of the few member countries accepting this at the time. As a result, Turkey received a sustained military assistance, as the US military advisors assisted the Turkish armed forces in the process of preparation/training and contributed for implementing the modernization, endowment and integration program¹⁵.

After Turkey's accession to NATO, in December 1952, the responsibility of defending the Straits was attributed to the Turkish Navy Command. On December 28, 1952, the Naval Command of Istanbul was submitted to reorganization, receiving the designation of Command of the Straits and Sea of Marmara. In 1953, this structure was renamed the Command of Straits and Marmara Sea Army Corps. In 1961, a new restructuring of

¹⁴ André Fontaine, *op.cit.*, vol. 3, 1993, p. 170.

¹⁵ Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War. Strategy and System in the Western Alliance*, Palgrave, New York, 2000, pp. 93-95.

Turkish Navy took place. The Command of Straits and Marmara Sea Army Corps was reorganized in the Command of the Northern Naval Zone and the Izmir Naval Command was reorganized into the Command of the Southern Naval Zone¹⁶. Following this process, the Turkish Navy acquired a regional conceived organization, including naval bases and the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, being subordinated, according to the zone, to the Command of the Northern Naval Zone (Black Sea) and to the Command of the Southern Naval Zone (Eastern Mediterranean)¹⁷.

After Joseph V. Stalin's death, the climate of international relations on the European continent, but also globally, witnessed a relative *détente*. USSR's foreign policy initiatives, based on the promotion of the peaceful coexistence principle, led to new approaches determined by the conduct of Soviet leaders in the international arena.

The establishment of the Warsaw Pact, on May 14, 1955, marked, from the military point of view, the entry of the Black Sea region into the imperturbable logic of the balance of power, specific to the Cold War. In this area, the geopolitical and geo-strategy reality opposed the two military-political blocs that were in direct contact, from this situation devolving the approaches of foreign and security policy subsequently undertaken by them. In this context, the Black Sea acquired the character of a "closed sea" between the two opposing military alliances dominated by the USSR and its riparian "allies" (Romania and Bulgaria), without becoming a "Soviet lake", being obvious that the southern shores and the Straits were under the NATO control, through Turkey¹⁸.

¹⁶ Marius Hanganu, Nicolae Valsan, *Puterea maritima in Marea Neagra (Maritime Power in the Black Sea)*, National Defense University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, pp. 191-192.

¹⁷ Traian Atanasiu, Anatolie Zemba, Cornel Mihai, Vasile Grad, Gheorghe Marin, *op.cit.*, p. 214.

¹⁸ Laurențiu-Cristian Dumitru, Serban Pavelescu, „Marea Neagra in timpul Razboiului Rece 1945-1990” (“Black Sea During the Cold War 1945-1990”), in Mihail E. Ionescu (coord.), *Marea Neagra de la „lacul bizantin” la provocarile secolului XXI (Black Sea from the “Byzantine Lake” to the Challenges of 21st Century)*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 331-332.

In August and September 1957, on the background of the ever more emphasized Soviet involvement in the Middle East issue, tension emerged in the Turkish-Syrian relations, a fact which induced, by the afterward evolution of events, tensions in the Turkish-Soviet bilateral relations, and implicitly in the Black Sea region.

On September 10, 1957, Andrei A. Gromyko, having become in February the Head of Soviet diplomacy instead of Dmitri T. Shepilov, accused, on the occasion of a press conference taking place in Moscow, the US, UK and Turkish “instigations” against Syria, its new ally in the Arab world. During the same day, Nikolai A. Bulganin addressed to the Head of Government from Ankara a message in order to warn him against any Turkish participation to an eventual aggression against Syria, on a tone which reminded the approach during the Suez Crisis of 1956.

On September 19, the US Secretary of State, John F. Dulles, declared at the United Nations that Turkey “is confronted with a rising military danger following the arrival of massive amount of Soviet weapons in Syria”. The crisis seemed to be averted when, on October 9, the Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev accused John F. Dulles that he pushes Turkey at war against Syria, adding a serious threat to this statement: “If the war is declared we are in the immediate neighborhood of Turkey, while you (the Americans – our note) are not. When cannons will start roaring, rockets can start flying and it will be too late to deliberate”¹⁹. For three weeks, the Kremlin continued to have the same behavior. Marshall Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, returning to the USSR after the end of the 1956 Polish crisis, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces from the Caucasus region, where military maneuvers took place, as well as in Bulgaria.

This reactivation of the Soviet force positions had several explanations, starting from the approaching Turkish legislative elections until the launch of the first *Sputnik* satellite, which contributed to an increase of intimidation initiatives practiced by Nikita S. Khrushchev.

¹⁹ Apud André Fontaine, *op.cit.*, p. 369.

While the UN General Assembly debates acquired increasingly virulent accents and the US sent the warships of the 6th Fleet deployed in the Mediterranean to the Turkish territorial waters, the Head of diplomacy from Ankara, Selim R. Sarper, multiplied his backstage negotiations with his Syrian counterpart, which he succeeded to convince about the good intentions of his Government. He exercised the same moderating influence also over the President of Turkey's Council of Ministers, Adnan E. Menderes, whose electoral victory, obtained on October 27, restored his optimism and self-confidence.

Nikita S. Khrushchev brought about sensation among the diplomats when, on October 29, he attended the reception offered by the Turkish Ambassador on the occasion of his country's national day. Displaying an extremely relaxed figure, full of joy, he declared: "Cursed the one who speaks about war! Let him fight alone! But, in fact, why do we talk about war? The more we talk about war, the less chance are that it breaks out"²⁰.

After averting the crisis, Nikita S. Khrushchev put the whole blame around the issue upon the Marshal Georgy K. Zhukov. A month later, Nikolai A. Bulganin addressed to the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan E. Menderes a note in which it stated that the USSR sincerely wished for establishing the best and friendliest relations with Turkey. After some years, the Heads of Government of the two countries made mutual official visits, the USSR expressing its availability to financially participate to Turkey's economic development, and the bilateral relations witnessed an improvement.

Internal evolutions from Turkey and its involvement in the Cypriot Crisis in 1974, in parallel with the signing of the nuclear arms reduction agreements, generated a tensioned state between Ankara and Washington, tensioned state that translated, among others, in the embargo concerning

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 370.

the weapons deliveries that Washington imposed to Turkey following its role played in the Cypriot Crisis²¹.

Under such conditions, Turkey fully accused a security deficit in its relation with the USSR and with countries of the communist bloc riparian to the Black Sea, deficit that materialized, among others, in 1976, in the incident concerning the access of the Soviet *Kiev* aircraft carrying cruiser through the Straits²². Happened on July 18, 1976, the incident gave birth to an important international controversy around the interpretation that could be attributed both to the classification of the Soviet warship as such (to be noticed that the Soviets followed the formalities provided by the Montreux Convention, but they classified *Kiev* as anti-submarine cruiser), and to the interpretations that the Montreux Convention could have.

Beyond interpretations and controversies, the incident proved the changes taking place in the Soviet military strategy and the growing importance it attributed to the naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as being a test over the solidity of NATO's southern flank. Ankara's decision to accept the Soviet interpretation regarding the warship *Kiev* and its agreement for the warship's transit through the Straits indicated the limits of the US influence in the region and questioned the solidity of NATO's southern flank. The reasons for erosions witnessed by the US alliances system in the region (Greece, Turkey) were multiple and related to the evolutions accumulated in time, among which one can enumerate the decline, in what concerned the perceptions of the immediate security risks, of the Soviet threat, the *détente* present in the aggregate East-West relations at that time, the new importance of energy issues and the increase of share within the US global security strategy of some adjacent regions to the Black Sea area, especially the Persian Gulf.

²¹ Glen D. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus", in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 95, No. 1, Spring 1980, pp. 53-55.

²² H. Gary Knight, "The Kiev and the Turkish Straits", in *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 71, No. 1, January 1977, pp. 125-129.

Additionally, the solidity of this flank and the representation of US interests in the Black Sea region witnessed an increasing fragility, also in the context of the growing deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey. The coup d'état in Cyprus, supported by the Colonels' junta, together with the military intervention and occupation of the northern side of island by the Turkish armed forces, brought the relations between the two countries at one of their lowest levels. Turkish tribulations were also accompanied by evolutions induced to its foreign policy action by Greece, who promotes in the same period an active policy of increasing Balkan cooperation. The expression of those evolutions was the Inter-Balkan Conference of January 1976, in Athens, where the discussions regarded the ways of growing co-operation and collaboration among the states of southeastern European space in the fields of energy, transports, culture etc.

3. Conclusions

Completing the picture of evolutions shown in the region during the eighth decade of the 20th century, it is worth to mention the fact that Turkey reconsidered its relations with the USSR. These initiatives began during the mid 1960s, the climax being marked by the visit in Moscow of the Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman G. Demirel, in 1967. During the 1970s, Turkey established several economic co-operation agreements with the USSR, in 1975 and 1977, but only the beginning of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's period, during the mid 1980s, really recorded an authentic détente in the bilateral relations.

The Relationship between the United States and Russia regarding the Black Sea Region (2001–2013)

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Abstract: This paper is going to analyse the relation between the United States and Russia regarding the Black Sea Region. We consider that this relation is very important for the present and future situation of the Black Sea Region. The enlargements of NATO but also the direct contacts between the two countries are very important for the continental Europe.

Keywords: The United States, Russia, the European Union, Interests, Relations.

1. Introduction

We consider that this relation is very important for the present and future situation of the Black Sea Region. The enlargements of NATO marked an important point for the continental Europe (including the ex-soviet space) for the European Union but also for the United States. We consider that there are several periods of the relationship between the United States and Russia regarding the Black Sea Region defined by the interests of the main players, their capabilities and the international medium. The trends of this relationship's evolution are very important to understand because they help us understand the present and future situation of the Black Sea Region.

We consider that the Black Sea region space is a disputed place between the United States and Russia but also a cooperation space between the two countries. At the same time the relationship between the United States and Russia regarding the Black Sea Region can be defined directly but also in an indirect manner regarding the two countries relationship with the Black Sea Region.

2. The Interests of the Players

In the opinion of the author Irina Kobrinskaya from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow, the relationship of Russia with the Black Sea region has at least four stages:

- 1991-1994 the emergence of armed conflicts in the post-Soviet states, “their Freezing” and the formation of a new status quo
- the Chechen phase between 1995-2002 when Russia regarded this region from the Chechen problem/conflict point of view
- the phase of recovery 2002-2008, when president Putin declared the Black Sea Region and the Azov Sea region as primary zones of strategic interests (regarding the commerce)
- the phase in which the Black Sea region is regarded as an active zone of great strategic interest (starting with the conflict with Georgia from 2008)¹

We consider that the Russian change in policy towards the Black Sea is connected to the change of political visions of the Kremlin leaders. At the same time from the capabilities point of view Russia has witnessed an important economic growth in the years after 2002². From the military point of view Russia is on the second place, only after the United States.³

Kobrinskaya considers that Russia has consolidated its political place in the Black Sea Region after winning the war with Georgia. From this point of view Russia can encourage:

- the cooperation with the West

¹ Irina Kobrinskaya, 2008, *The Black Sea Region In Russia's Current Foreign Policy Paradigm, Ponars Eurasia Policy Memo No.4, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow* December 2008, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pepm_041.pdf, accessed on 20.05.2013, 9.23 2013, p.1

² Russia GDP, Trading Economics, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp>, accessed on 20.05.2013, 9.36 a.m.

³ Global Fire Power, Russia Military Strength, http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=Russia, accessed on 20.05.2013, 9.40 a.m.

– or the competition with the West in a zero-sum game⁴

We consider that the United States has important interests regarding the Black Sea Region both directly and indirectly. Directly, because it is in its interests to have Black Sea Region in which peace, security, democracy and free market competition are dominating.⁵ On the other hand the Black Sea Region is a zone of access to the Middle East and the Central Asia regions.⁶ Indirectly because the United States have an important relationship with Turkey (a major player in the region)⁷ and even a more important one with the European Union. We consider that the wellbeing of the European Union is essential for the United States because between the two there is an essential partnership at the economic, political and military level. It is interesting that one author considers that Russia accepts the European Union's involvement in the Black Sea Region because it considers the EU as a competing player of the United States.⁸ The wellbeing of the EU is depending for now on the energy fuelling and transportation given by Russia but also on the alternative routes and suppliers given by Central Asia, the Southern Caucasus, Antalya and the Balkans.⁹ At this point we consider that another serious problem appears both for the European Union and the United States in the future. Countries like Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Great Britain want the reduction of the European Union's dependence of Russian energy.

⁴ Irina Kobrinskaya., cited work, p.2

⁵ Ross Wilson, 2007 U.S. Policy in the Black Sea Region, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_58.pdf, accessed on 20.05.2013 9.57 a.m.

⁶ George Khelashvili, 2008, St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, Towards A Strategic Respite In The Black Sea Area, *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No.42, December 2008 in PONARS Eurasia Policies Memos no. 41-54*, Washington D.C., Transformations in the Black Sea Regions, <http://www.harvard-bssp.org/static/files/379/Transformations%20Black%20Sea%20Region%20PONARS.pdf>, accessed on 18.05.2013 9.57 a.m., pp.7,8

⁷ *Ibid.* pp.7,8

⁸ Irina Kobrinskaya, cited work, p.3

⁹ George Khelashvili, cited work,

On the other hand Germany, France and the Benelux countries want to keep a good relation with Russia. (In this sense Germany especially, opposed giving Membership Action Plan to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 in order not to upset Russia, and it was followed by France and the Benelux countries.)¹⁰ In this sense we are witnessing two visions connected with two different perceptions of national interests and maybe with two different historical records. From the security point of view the European Union has the interest of a peaceful, democratic, opened marked Black Sea Region.¹¹

The relationship between the United States and Russia is also reflected by the later relationship with NATO. There have been numerous talks between Russia and NATO since 1991. Russia entered the Partnership for Peace in 1994 and in 2002 the NATO-Russia Council was created. NATO expanded adding to its group members of the former Warsaw Treaty and the Former Soviet Union. NATO reached the Black Sea in 2004 when Romania and Bulgaria joined. There is an important question: has Russia willingly accepted the enlargement of NATO or it had to accept the fait accompli?

The Black Sea Region can be a region of dispute or one of cooperation between the United States (and the European Union) and Russia. For the West the region is important from several points of view:

- An economical one (energy resources and transportation) and commerce
- A security and democratic one (the region can be a safe and democratic one or can be dominated by conflicts).

The interests of the countries of the Black Sea are not unitary ones. Turkey, the biggest country after Russia with borders at the Black Sea has a

¹⁰ Niklas Nilsson, 2008, EU and Russia In The Black Sea Region: Increasingly Competing Interests?, *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* Vol.8, 2008, http://www.ier.ro/documente/rjea_vol8_no2/RJEA_Vol8_No2_EU_and_Russia_in_the_Black_Sea_Region_Increasingly_Competing_Interests.pdf, accessed on 20.05.2013 11.18 a.m., p.32

¹¹ Ibid. pp.29,30,31

multitude of interests. In 2008 it allowed the army ships of the United States to pass through the Dardanelles Straits in order to support Georgia which in the opinion of Irina Kobrinskaya questions the Montreux Agreement from 1936 which restricted the access of battle ships.¹² On the other hand Niklas Nilsson considers that there is a certain partnership between Russia and Turkey regarding the Black Sea Region.¹³ To this we add the fact that in 2003 Turkey declined to implicate its armed forces along with the United States in Iraq. Turkey has a pro-Islamic government which adopted a more independent stance regarding the policies of the United States.¹⁴ Turkey is also an important part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and of the future Nabucco pipeline.¹⁵ From a realist point of view, giving its capabilities (in 2011 had a Gross Domestic Product of 774,983, 417,981 dollars)¹⁶, Turkey could play the role of the balancer between the United States and Russia regarding the Black Sea Region. At the same time, Turkey a long standing NATO member could lead to a more successful collaboration between the United States and Russia regarding the Black Sea Region.

Romania has the interests of a powerful western presence on its state and in the Black Sea Region. It adhered to NATO in 2004 and to the European Union in 2007. Its interests are connected to the peace and prosperity of the region and for that reason it wants a strong western presence in the region.¹⁷ On Romania's territory the United States constructed an

¹² Irina Kobrinskaya., cited work, p.2

¹³ Niklas Nilsson, cited work, p.29

¹⁴ Irina Kobrinskaya., cited work, p.2

¹⁵ S. Frederich Starr and Svante E. Cornell (Eds.), "The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West", *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program*, 2005. In Niklas Nilsson, cited work, p.27 and Niklas Nilsson, cited work, p.29

¹⁶ The World Bank, GDP (Current US\$), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>, accessed on 29.05.2013 9.02 p.m.

¹⁷ National Security Strategy of Romania, Bucharest, 2001 in Colonel Ion Coscodaru, NATO a Guarantee to Stability and Peace, p.17, Romania-Nato, coordinator Col. Dr Constantin Mostoflei, the National Defence Ministry, General Major Staff, *The Academy of High Military*

antimissile shield (will become operational in 2015)¹⁸ and has a military presence. Romania's leaders do not want an accentuated dependence on the Russian gas and because of that they supported the Nabucco¹⁹ project and more recent the shale research program.²⁰ The closeness between Romania and US was reflected also by the participation of the Romanian troops in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. Bulgaria seems also to have the interest of a powerful western presence. In this sense in 2012 Bulgaria asked for a permanent American military presence on its territory.²¹ Bulgaria adhered to NATO in 2004 and to the EU in 2007. At the moment of joining NATO in 2004, the Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated: "The accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia demonstrates the principle that freedom is irrepressible".²² He added "From now on, 26 Allies will be joined in a commitment to defend each others's security and territorial integrity. This is the strongest, most solemn commitment nations can undertake."²³ In this sense NATO is defined by the principle of freedom (in the domestic and foreign policy of a member, or candidate state and of its citizens) and by the principle of territorial integrity. If for now there is not a threat to

Studies, The Center of Security Strategic Studies, 2002, http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_carti/romania-nato_ro.pdf, accessed on 31 of May 2013, 16.57 p.m.

¹⁸ Sette Giorni, Nine O'Clock, Romanian authorities say US antimissile shield project will not be affected, <http://www.nineoclock.ro/romanian-authorities-say-us-antimissile-shield-project-will-not-be-affected/>, accessed on 31 of May 2013, 17.04 p.m

¹⁹ Niklas Nilsson, cited work, p.32

²⁰ See Comparison of shale gas in the US and CEE, <http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/shale-gas/Documents/cee-shale-gas-2.pdf>, 31.05.2013 17.11 p.m.

²¹ RT Bulgaria asks for permanent US-troops presence, <http://rt.com/news/bulgaria-nato-us-troops-257/>, accessed on the 31 of May 2012, 17.18 p.m.

²² NATO Update, 2.04.2004, NATO welcomes seven new members, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/04-april/e0402a.htm>, accessed on 28.05.2013 9.43 a.m.

²³ Ibid.

Romania and Bulgaria history has shown that in a relative short period of time things can change (the interwar period)

Moldova wants to be orientated towards the two western organizations. Its economy has improved but there is the Transnistrian problem. As a NATO report showed in 2009: "Although the 1992 ceasefire has held, the political status of Transnistria's territory remains 'frozen'. Moldovan authorities are unable in practice to exercise sovereignty over the left bank of the Dniestr."²⁴ In 2009 the NATO report showed that Moldova wanted to be partner but not a member of NATO."²⁵

Ukraine, on the other hand it appears to be divided between two currents of thought which are reflected at the political level but also at the level of the society. The first is given by the pro- western attitude which is supported by the 2006 gas crises, when it was realized in practice that the dependence of the Russian gas can be counterproductive. On the other hand it appears to be a pro-Russian faction which wants more close relations with Russia. But in fact things are not that simple.²⁶ According to Arkady Moshes the majority of Ukraine's population does not want to be in NATO.²⁷ This author considers that dividing Ukraine's politicians into pro-Western and pro-Russian is wrong. In fact Ukraine would like to adhere to the European Union but not to NATO. At the same time one important problem of Ukraine is the energetic dependence to Russia especially regarding the Russian prices for energy.

²⁴ NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Committee Reports, 171 CDS 09 E rev 1 - The Republic of Moldova: Internal Challenges; Prospects for Euro-Atlantic Integration, <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1784>, accessed on 29-05-2013, 9.24 a.m.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Arkady Moshes, 2006, Ukraine Between a Multivector Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Has It Made Its Choice?, *PONARS Policy Memo No. 426, Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/pm_0426.pdf, accessed on 29.05.2013, 9.41 a.m., p.4

²⁷ Ibidem. P.4

Georgia was clearly pursuing a pro-western policy. It wants to adhere to NATO²⁸ but its internal problems strongly connected with the Russian interests and with its own actions in 2008 prohibited it joining NATO.²⁹

The third major player, behind the United States and Russia in the Black Sea Region could be the European Union. The problem with this is that at least for now the European Union does not have a unitary policy (or a unitary interest in the short term) regarding its own energy sources and transportation.³⁰ Because of that we consider that it does not have a unitary energetic policy regarding Black Sea and Russia. On the other hand Niklas Nilsson considers that the European Union has acted for the peacefully solving of the frozen conflicts. From this point of view, Russia has a very different interest in keeping the frozen conflicts as leverage upon the states in which it exists. (Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan).³¹ On the other hand Irina Kobrinskaya considers that Russia sees the European Union in a positive way as counter balancing the United States.³² The peace and democracy can be established very hard if the European Union has a passive relation with Russia, related to this region.³³ The European Union has started by realizing it interest in an ad hoc manner trying not to upset Russia. But admitting Romania and Bulgaria as members created a new important geopolitical reality for the European security.³⁴ From this point of view we consider that the security and welfare of the European Union means also the security and welfare of US-? There are contradictory

²⁸ Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, pp.14,15 http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf, accessed on 11-04-2012, 9.45 a.m.

²⁹ Ioan Dragoş Mateescu, 2012 Another Frozen Conflict On The Political Map Of the Black Sea? Georgia and Russia, *First International Conference on EU and Black Sea Regions*, Mineo Giovanni Editore, 2012

³⁰ Niklas Nilsson, cited work, p.25

³¹ Ibid.

³² Irina Kobrinskaya, cited work, p.4

³³ Niklas Nilsson, cited work, p.25

³⁴ Ibid.

interests between Russia and the EU at the military, political and economic levels.³⁵ In the region, the growing implication of the EU will lead to competition with Russia for obtaining soft power related to the regional states.³⁶ The competition is going to be at the level of influence and energetic transportation.

The interests of the European Union in the Black Sea Region are given by the energy transportation route, energy resources, the ignition and flooding of the frozen conflicts, fighting organized crime, terrorism, building a stable, democratic and peaceful region and the integration of that region in the cooperation structures both European and Euro-Atlantic.³⁷ The way of implementing them was given by three ways: the cooptation of Romania and Bulgaria (maybe of Turkey in the future), the partnership with Russia, the vicinity programme with Ukraine, Moldova, Azerybaijan, Armenia, bilateral connections but also a geopolitical programme: The Black Sea Sinergy 2007, which included regional cooperation, in the fields of energy, environment, transport, security.³⁸

The European Union did not have a common position related to the Georgian conflict in 2008. Before that Germany, especially, opposed giving the Membership Action Plan to Georgia at NATO's summit from Bucharest. However, before that in a paper entitled 'German-British Relations and the Spirit of Cadenabbia' Angela Merkel pointed out that the partnership of the European Union with the United States must be

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Bruce P. Jackson, "The Soft War for Europe's East", in Ronald D. Asmus (Ed.), *Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea*, *German Marshall Fund of the United States*, 2006, in Niklas Nilsson, cited work, note 1 p.25

³⁷ Ibid. p.26

³⁸ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, "Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative", Brussels, 11 April 2007, p 2. in Niklas Nilsson, cited work, note 1 p.25

keped.³⁹ Further more the German politician thought that the European defence must be connected to NATO.⁴⁰ At the first glance one could think that Germany has an ambivalent attitude. We think that German leaders consider that the European Union must have an active defence policy but strongly connected with NATO, and implicitly with the United States. At the same time as Alexander Rahr states , 'Germany is Russia's most important foreign trading partner'. The Russian elites tend to see Germany as a partner rather than a , 'geopolitical competitor' as they see the United States.⁴¹ The author states that the German elites play an important role as mediator between the European Union and Russia's economic relationship and between the United States and Russia.⁴² On the other hand, , 'another school of thought' in Germany sees the last developments in Russia with great skepticism. The stability in the Caucasus is seen as being linked with the stability of the European Union itself.⁴³ According to the author , 'German policymakers are struggling to strike a balanced policy that can successfully promote business ties, engage Russia on liberal reform, and foster the growth of the post-Soviet states'. The problem is that France, Italy and Spain are concentrated especially on the development of the Mediterranean Sea region, and the Scandinavian countries on the Northern part of Europe.⁴⁴(but as we have seen the last ones want to reduce EU's

³⁹ Hartmut Mayer / Thomas Bernd Stehling (Eds.), German-British Relations and "the Spirit of Cadenabbia", 2005, *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V., Sankt Augustin / Berlin*, <http://www.kas.de/upload/Publikationen/german-british-relations.pdf>, accessed on 28.05.2013 10.08 a.m p.18

⁴⁰ Ibid. p.14

⁴¹ Alexander Rahr, 2007, Germany and Russia, A Special Relationship, published by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *The Washington Quarterly* • 30:2 pp. 137-145., THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, SPRING 2007, <http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-02312.pdf>, accessed on 28.05.2013, 11.21 a.m., p.137

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid. p.138

⁴⁴ ibid.

dependence on Russian gas). In the 90's Germany has helped Russia to rebuild its economy and from 1997 representatives from Germany, France and Russia are meeting once a year.⁴⁵ A very interesting point is that while Russia has good economic relations with the European Union it did not joined its liberal values.⁴⁶ On the other hand in 2005 Germany was to became the main gas distributor from Russia. The German foreign minister in 2007 Frank Steinmeier proposed a three pillar approach to Germany's and EU's relationship with Russia: ' energy cooperation, democracy transfer, and possible solutions for frozen conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh.'⁴⁷ Anssgela Markel had a more pragmatic approach cooperating economically with Russia but without having to much hope for the resemblance of the Russia's internal politica resemblance with that of the European Union.⁴⁸

3. The Capacity of Acting

The two most important players in the Black Sea region are Russia and the United States. (Russia because of its interests, its history, its geographic proximity and not last because of its capabilities, The United States because of its capabilities, of its interests and of its involvement in Nato and its connection with the European Union-the European Union which does not have a unitary policy towards Russia, and the Black Sea Region). The two countries own 90-95% of the nuclears weapons of the world.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Ibid. pp.138, 139

⁴⁶ Ibid. p.139

⁴⁷ Ibid. p.141

⁴⁸ Ibid. pp.141,142

⁴⁹ Madeleine Albright and Igor Ivanov, 30 December 2012, A New Agenda for U.S.-Russia Cooperation, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/31/opinion/31iht-edalbright31.html?_r=0, accessed on 28.05.2013, 12.16 p.m.

At the same time Russia has very much improved its economy (it has the third largest foreign reserve currency in the world).⁵⁰

First of all we should note that the economic relations between the United States and Russia are generally at a low level (compared for example with the relations between the United States and China).⁵¹ Russia is dependent on its export of energy supplies⁵² so we could say that Russia is dependent of the European Union's imports of energy.

For studying the capacity of action we are using the terms of power-nota and influence. In 2008 Russia exercised its military power in order to punish Georgia for attacking South Ossetia. It occupied the country and at least postponed the admission of Georgia in NATO. Russia recognized the two separatist Republic of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.⁵³ So we could say that Russia used its military power to fulfill at least on the short term its interests. At the same time Russia used its influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to have a leverage upon Georgian foreign politics. In this sense the former president of Russia, declared in 2008 that the war in Georgia stopped NATO's expansion in the post-Soviet states. Time goes by fast – more than three years have already passed, but what is the most important our approaches towards and our assessments of those events have not changed. We of course consider that it was absolutely necessary action by our army to save large number of our citizens and, if not to remove totally, to curb the threat which was coming at the time from the

⁵⁰ F. Joseph Dresden, Rethinking Russia and U.S.-Russian Relations: Russia's Role in the Global Economy, *Kennan Institute, Wilson Center*, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/rethinking-russia-and-us-russian-relations-russias-role-the-global-economy>, accessed on 28.05.2013, 12.27 p.m.,

⁵¹ Deutsche Bank Research, 6 July 2009, US-Russia economic relations, Room for improvement-but do not expect too much, http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD/PROD000000000243816.PDF, accessed at 29th April 2013, 10.46 p.m.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ioan Dragoş Mateescu, cited work,

territory of Georgia,” “If we had faltered in 2008, geopolitical arrangement would be different now and number of countries in respect of which attempts were made to artificially drag them into the North Atlantic Alliance, would have probably been there [in NATO] now,”⁵⁴

Another way could be showing the military force of Russia like the naval military exercise from 2013. Professor Kandemir considers that through this exercise Russia wanted to show its military strength to the other countries from the Black Sea Region. Presiden Putin has declared that the Russian army must be reorganized in order to stop tipping of the balance of power of the West in its favor and against Russia.⁵⁵ From this point of view we can notice that Russia sees its relationship with The West, regarding the Black Sea Region as a zero sum game. Any NATO advancement is seen at least partially as a defeat for Russia. From this point of view we consider that the cooperation between the United States and Russia regarding the Black Sea Region can win over the competition if the political and economical interests of the two powers are converging.

So Russia can use and used its military power, the frozen conflict leverage, and the energy supply leverage. Russia's interests in the region are political, economical and possibly military. From the economical point of view Russia benefits from being a supplier of energy but also a tranzit route (from Turkmenistan).⁵⁶ The gas crisis in 2006 was parially announced by problems in 2005 when Gas Prom dicovered that the gas it

⁵⁴ Medvedev: August War Stopped Georgia's NATO Membership, *Civil Georgia*, Tbilis, 21 November 2011, <http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=24168>, accessed on the 29th May 2013, 11.56 p.m.

⁵⁵ Aydin Albayrak, 2013, Russia's naval exercise is message both to Syria and Black Sea region, Today's Zaman, Ankara 29 March, <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-311131-russias-naval-exercise-is-message-both-to-syria-and-black-sea-region.html>, accessed on the 29th May 2013

⁵⁶ See at large Jonathan Stern, 2006, The Russian-Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January, 2006, *Oxford Institute For Energy Studies*, <http://www.avim.org.tr/icerik/energy-gas.pdf>, accessed on the 30th May 2013, 11.20 a.m.

had deposited in Ukraine had disappeared.⁵⁷ We consider that one of the biggest problems for the European was that it paid three or four times the sum paid to Russia by the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.⁵⁸ Without entering the complicating problems of the distribution-Ukraine was partially considered as a distributor⁵⁹ In December 2005 Russia purchased all the gas from Turkmenistan for the first quarter of 2006, and increased the prices for Ukraine. Ukraine was given a possibility of borrowing from Gazprom for three months, after that the prices rising again to the Russia established level.⁶⁰ Ukraine declined this offer and Gazprom cut the supplies gas to Ukraine on January the first 2006.⁶¹ The cause of the energy crises from the European continent are not clear-nota but the fact is that Europe was experiencing an energy crises.

According to Ross Wilson, the former ambassador of the United States in Turkey the policy of the US towards the Black Sea Region derives from its policy towards Europe that is: "To promote a region that is free, prosperous, peaceful, secure, and whole."⁶² According to him NATO is the principle pillar of security in the Euro-Atlantic region which includes the Black Sea, security realized through the collaboration with allies and friends. The United States is not going to charge into the Black Sea but it is going to work with allies and friends.⁶³ In this way we can see a possible US

⁵⁷ Gazprom insists on export price for vanished gas, Interfax Oil and Gas Report, June 9-15, 2005, pp. 8-9. In Jonathan Stern, cited work, p.4

⁵⁸ Jonathan Stern, cited work, p.6

⁵⁹ Ibid. p.7

⁶⁰ Russia offers delay on gas hike, BBC News, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world.europe/4571726.stm> In Jonathan Stern, cited work, p.7

⁶¹ Jonathan Stern, cited work, p.7

⁶² Ross Wilson, 2007, U.S. Policy in the Black Sea Region, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_58.pdf, accessed on the 29th May 2013, p.1

⁶³ Ibid.

strategy: a slow advancement without risking a direct confrontation with Russia?

The speech of the former ambassador is of liberal internationalist type with realist and constructivist touches. According to him Turkey and Greece are and have been strong democracies, now joined by Romania and Bulgaria. Ukraine and Georgia had started a powerful process of democratization pointed out by the revolutions in 2003, respectively 2004-2005.⁶⁴ Ross Wilson states that U.S. strongly encourages the further development of the Black Sea's democratic community of nations. At the heart of freedom lie open political systems, free and fair elections, a vibrant and independent media, strong civil society, and mutual respect among the players – that government will act predictably and honestly, and that citizens and their free institutions will obey the law.”⁶⁵ The former ambassador encouraged the appearance of the Black Sea Forum in June 2007 and mentions that the United States, Romania and other countries are going to support financially this organization. So we can notice also an institutional approach. On the other hand the United States are encouraging the competition regarding Europe energy supplies and transit routes.⁶⁶ In a way we can notice that the United States is in favor of bypassing some of the energy resources provided by Russia.

The Frozen Conflicts are considered as subverting the democracy, liberty, security, prosperity and harboring organized crime, drugs and arms trafficking, smuggling.⁶⁷ Till now this is also a point in which Russia and the United States opinions differ. On the other hand it is said that the United States are applying the principle of compromise and collaboration – see Georgia (we have to observe that after the Georgian War the United States reaction was moderate, and it let France, and other European powers

⁶⁴ Ibid. p.2

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibidem.p.3

⁶⁷ Ibid.

to negotiate the peace⁶⁸-it was not involved directly avoiding a direct confrontation or a direct compromise)

The American institutional and collaboration approach is emphasised by the support given to the NATO-Russia Council, NATO-Ukraine Commission, the Partnership for Peace Programme. The United States want a military collaboration with the countries from the Black Sea Region.⁶⁹ To this there are added Blackseafor, Blackseaharmony, Romania Black Sea Forum. In 2007 the United States congratulated the Russian presidency of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization for its initiatives regarding: building highways, energy transportation, telecommunication, science, contagious diseases, organized crime.⁷⁰ In his conclusion the former ambassador points out the institutional collaborative approach which he considers as being the best option for the Black Sea Region, showing that America will play 'its full part'⁷¹

George Khelashvili makes some interesting remarks regarding the Black Sea Region. He considers the region as being without an economic and strategic global potential.⁷² We think that it has a global potential and not only the energy resources and transportation are defining it as an important zone both regionally and globally –especially for the European Union (we add the potential of the population, military force and agriculture). The author states that there is a lack of challenging the status quo and for that, on the short term the Black Sea Region can become one of cooperation.⁷³ But from 1991, if not 1989 the status quo has changed, Romania and

⁶⁸ Irina Kobrinskaya., cited work, p.2

⁶⁹ Ross Wilson, cited work, pp.3,4

⁷⁰ Ibid. p.4

⁷¹ Ibidem.pp.4,5

⁷² George Khelashvili,2008, St Anne's College, University of Oxford Respite In The Black Sea Area, *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No.42, Transformations in the Black Sea Region*, <http://www.harvard-bssp.org/static/files/379/Transformations%20Black%20Sea%20Region%20PONARS.pdf> accessed on the 29th of May 2013, 16.09 p.m., p.6

⁷³ Ibid.

Bulgaria have become NATO members, Georgia wants to become a member (and it was quite close), Ukraine has collaborated with NATO, and also Russia has collaborated with NATO. The author is saying that there is no hegemonic power to assure the cooperation structures, the cultural and ideological connections are lacking, that BSCE is not focused, the relations between Turkey and the United States are not so good after the Georgian war.⁷⁴

Is the Black Sea a competing region between R and US? This author is confident in the multilateral approach giving some facts: all the players from the region and the United States and the European Union are interested in their security and the security of the Black Sea Region,⁷⁵ Georgia and Russia could negotiate a political pact in which to put aside their differences and to solve the problem of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁷⁶ In fact it is considered that for Georgia the Euro-Atlantic structures are “elusive” and Georgia should try to settle with Russia but also Armenia and Azerbaijan.⁷⁷ It is considered that the United States did not have a clear policy towards the Black Sea Region; the American discourse during the Clinton administration emphasized its energy transportation importance, in the later years of the Bush administration it was emphasized the importance of the democratization of the region.⁷⁸ We consider that we can analyze the United States policy towards the Black Sea from two points of view; a realist one and an idealistic one both realized. From a realist point of view the United States through NATO extended its influence in Romania and Bulgaria, at a lesser degree in Georgia and perhaps (but at a much lesser degree in Ukraine). From the idealist point of view the United States policies helped (along with the European Union) the mentioned countries

⁷⁴ Ibid. pp. 6,7

⁷⁵ Ibid. p.7

⁷⁶ Ibid. p.9

⁷⁷ Ibid. p.10

⁷⁸ Ibid. p.7

to become democracies. Also from a realist point of view the United States did not risked a direct confrontation with Russia in the case of Georgia.

4. The Direct Relations between the United States and Russia

In an interview, Jack F. Matlock, a former US ambassador to Moscow, underlined the need to resuming collaboration between Russia and the United States. He stated that "On issues that are extremely important to the United States, like dealing with North Korea, dealing with Afghanistan, and dealing with Iran, our policies are very close and tend to be mutually supportive,"⁷⁹. Interestingly enough the Black Sea Region is not mentioned.

We analyzed the meetings at the high level between the presidents of the United States and of Russia.

The relationship between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin started well given the common interests of the two countries: fighting against terrorism, transforming the rogue states but ended up with President Bush criticizing in an indirect manner the appearance of an authoritarian regime in Moscow. In a meeting on the 16th of June 2001 in Ljubljana president George W. Bush and president Vladimir Putin established good or very good personal ties.⁸⁰ At the same time the problems/differences between the two countries regarding NATO enlargement and the American missile defense plans remained.⁸¹ After the 9/11 attacks Putin gave its support to the United States and to the West.⁸² In 2002 the United States and Russia

⁷⁹ Bernard Gwertzman, 8 April 2013, Interview with Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Repairing U.S.-Russia Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/russian-fed/repairing-us-russia-relations/p30484>, accessed on the 30th May 2013, 12.24 p.m.

⁸⁰ Caroline Wyatt, 2001, Bush and Putin, Best of Friends, *BBC News*, 16 June 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1392791.stm>, accessed on the 31 May 2013, 9.16 p.m.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*.

⁸² Tony Blair, 2010, *A Journey*, Hutchinson, London p.351

signed the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship of May 24, 2002 on September 26 and 27⁸³ in which the two countries were committed to have relations based on “friendship, cooperation, common values, trust, openness, and predictability”.⁸⁴ The text mentioned that the two countries do not see each other as enemies, that the new world problems must be contained through a partnership of the two and through the collaboration with the world institutions (UN/Security Council, G8 and OSCE). It was mentioned that they “will respect the essential values of democracy, human rights, free speech and free media, tolerance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity.”⁸⁵ The common interest was given by the danger of terrorism, solving the problems in Afghanistan but also by the stability and territorial integrity in Central Asia. The system of great power rivalry was regarded as being negative and the common actions consisted in fighting terrorism, fighting narcotics trade and building a humanitarian cooperation system.

It was said that: “The United States and Russia will cooperate to resolve regional conflicts, including those in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Transnistrian issue in Moldova. We strongly encourage the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to exhibit flexibility and a constructive approach to resolving the conflict concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. As two of the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE's Minsk Group, the United States and Russia stand ready to assist in these efforts.”⁸⁶ The new NATO-Russia Council was welcomed as a forum of negotiation, of talking decisions in the spirit of the common interests. Further it was said that

⁸³ The Acronym Institute, 2003, Meeting Between US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Camp David, Maryland, September 27, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0309/doc31.htm>, accessed on the 31 May 2013, 9.36 p.m.

⁸⁴ The Guardian, 24 May, 2002, Text: Bush and Putin's joint declaration Text of the Joint Declaration by President George Bush and President Vladimir Putin on the New Strategic Relationship between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/may/24/usa.russia>, accessed on the 31 of May 2013, 9.42 p.m.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

there will be a cooperation process between the two states regarding the missile defense system in Europe and regarding the reduction of the nuclear arms.⁸⁷

In a Joint Press Conference held on 27 September 2003 President George W. Bush talked about the common interests of the two countries: fighting terrorism (including Chechnya, the proliferation of the nuclear weapons underlining the case of North Korea and Iran). President Putin agreed with his American counterpart pointing out that the United States and Russia must be allies in the fight against terrorism, and that Iran must collaborate with IAEA. In the case of North Korea the two countries had to participate in building a process of collaboration and a security environment. The common interests of the two states were fighting against terrorism, nonproliferation (Iran) and creating a strong stable state in Iraq.⁸⁸ It appeared to be a level of trust between the two countries.⁸⁹ At the same time the author Irina Kobrinskaya states that: “The expansion and utilization of military bases by the United States in Romania and Bulgaria was perceived by Russia as an exploitation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and a violation of the Russia-NATO agreements of 2002.”⁹⁰ Furthermore the tone of the relations between the two countries changed gradually after 2002. In 2007 the problems between the two countries were the undemocratic reforms in Russia, the deployment of the United States missile defence system and handling the Iranian nuclear proliferation problem.⁹¹ Already in 2005, at the meeting in Bratislava there were some

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ The Acronym Institute, 2003, Meeting Between US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Camp David, Maryland, September 27, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0309/doc31.htm>, accessed on the 31 May 2013, 9.36 p.m.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Irina Kobrinskaya, cited work., p. 3

⁹¹ Don Gonyea, 2007 Meetings Between Bush, Putin Underscore Tensions, *npr*, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11640132> accessed on the 31 May 2013, 11.13 a.m.

problems between the two countries. The Bush administration was worried about the internal political evolutions in Russia, Russia's attitude towards the internal policies of Ukraine, and its attitude towards Iran (Russia considered that Iran would use its future nuclear capabilities for non military purposes). Putin adopted a somehow defensive attitude regarding democracy by saying that "Russia has made its choice in favor of democracy. This is our final choice and there is no way back, there can be no return to what we used to have."⁹² Charles Hawley points that in 2005 president Bush addressed the problems of democracy and of Russia's dealing with Iran.⁹³

In 2008 Yuri Zarakhovich made some interesting commentaries about the Sochi meeting between President Bush and president Putin and about the relations of the two countries. From the economic point of view in 2000 the United States invested 33 billions of dollars in Russia being the top investor in that country. In 2007 US invested just 8 billions of dollars a fact that can be explained by Russia's willingness to control its economy by having an aggressive behavior towards the foreign companies.⁹⁴ From the security point of view at that time Putin said that NATO was encircling Russia, although the two cooperated in Afghanistan, Putin agreed that NATO can use Russian territory for logistic reasons, and Central Asian Countries as air bases. From the domestic politics point of view the author is pointing out that the democracy in Russia is under question.⁹⁵ In 2008 the two

⁹² Fairfax Media, 25 February 2005, Meeting between Putin, Bush reveals divisions, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/Meeting-between-Bush-Putin-reveals-divisions/2005/02/25/1109180101473.html>, accessed on the 31 May 2013, 11.13 a.m.

⁹³ Charles Hawley, 25 February 2005, Bush and Putin, Could Bush be Right-Take Two, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1351282/posts>, accessed on 31 May 2013, 18.39 p.m.

⁹⁴ Yuri Zarakhovich/Sochi Monday, Apr. 07, 2008 Sunset for the Bush-Putin Era, Time World, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1728451,00.html>, accessed on the 31 May 2013, 12.09 p.m.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

countries still did not agree on the missile defense system but Putin declared that now (then) a Cuban missile crisis would be impossible.⁹⁶

We consider that the substance of relations between the United States and Russia continued during the Obama-Medvedev administrations. International security analyst Dex Torricke-Barton considered in 2010 that the relations between the two countries are improving. Economic relations were improving and Russia was going to adhere in the World Trade Organization.⁹⁷ (Russia adhered in 2012; Georgia stopped opposing Russia entering the WTO).⁹⁸ Charles Kupchan states that there is a good momentum in the two countries relations regarding the START treaty, Collaboration in Afghanistan and regarding Iran even though there are problems regarding the missile defense system, probably the NATO enlargement and Georgia.⁹⁹

In 2012 at a press conference presidents Medvedev and Obama underlined the main features of the US-Russia relations: signing a new START treaty, the ascension of Russia supported by the United States to the World Trade Organization. The problem of the missile defense system which is strongly connected to the Black Sea region was considered still unsolved but solvable in the future.¹⁰⁰ The American president pointed out the collaboration on

⁹⁶ Steven Myers, 7 April 2008, Bush and Putin, At Last Meeting, agree to disagree, <http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Russia-United-States/Myers-Steven/Bush-and-Putin-at-last-meeting-agree-to-disagree>, accessed on the 31 May 2013, 12.09 p.m.

⁹⁷ Medvedev, Obama meet in New York, RT, <http://rt.com/usa/medvedev-obama-meet-washington/>, accessed on the 31 May 2013, 12.58 p.m.

⁹⁸ Catherine Belton August 22, 2012, Russia joins WTO after 19 years of talks, Financial Times, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/113bd1be-ec6c-11e1-81f4-00144feab49a.html#axzz2UrX4PXFq>, accessed on the 31 May 2013, 13.03 p.m.

⁹⁹ Medvedev, Obama meet in New York, RT, <http://rt.com/usa/medvedev-obama-meet-washington/>, accessed on the 31 May 2013, 12.58 p.m.

¹⁰⁰ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia After Bilateral Meeting Millennium Seoul Hilton Hotel Seoul, Republic of Korea, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-and-president-medvedev-russia-after-bilateral-me>

economic issues and also on issues related to Iran and Syria.¹⁰¹ We can notice that the Black Sea Region was not mentioned directly. In 2009 there were some talks about putting a defense missile system in the Caucasus. Russia reacted by engaging in bilateral talks with the United States.¹⁰²

In 2008, regarding the possible extension of NATO in Georgia and Ukraine, Putin declared that the NATO expansion is a direct threat. At the summit in Bucharest he declared that the appearance of a powerful military neighbor near Russia's borders will be regarded by Russia as a direct security threat. On the other hand, pressured by President Bush, NATO leaders promised that Ukraine and Georgia will be integrated "someday".¹⁰³ Putin also declared that Russia is a very important country for any state which has to take important decisions (for example the fight against terrorism or weapons of mass destruction: "Nothing can be done without Russia)."¹⁰⁴ Sebastian Alison and James G. Neuger continue by showing that Ukraine is divided between pro-Russian feelings and pro-Western ones, and that Georgia has its problems with the two separatist republics. Alexander Rahr is cited sustaining that the West cannot lose a powerful Russia for two fragile states like Ukraine and Georgia.¹⁰⁵ Putin said that since the Cold War Russia has retreated from Eastern Europe, Vietnam and the West advanced (temporary antimissiles bases in Romania and Bulgaria, planned future antimissiles bases in Poland and the Czech Republic) but he ended by calling for collaboration and friendship with the West.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*

¹⁰² E.Tariverdiyeva, 2009, 23 September, Meeting between presidents Obama and Medvedev to also focus on deployment of U.S. missile defense system in Caucasus: Russia's permanent representative to NATO, Trend, <http://en.trend.az/news/politics/1545681.html>

¹⁰³ *Sebastian Alison and James G. Neuger, April 4, 2008, Putin Says NATO Expansion Is Direct Threat to Russia, Bloomberg, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aq34xuTFCvx0>, accessed on the 31 May 2013, 15.20 p.m.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

5. Conclusions

We consider that the future of the Black Sea Region depends on the future of the United States and Russia. That being said we think that those relations from 2001 till now have developed somewhere in the middle between two concepts: a zero sum game on the one hand and collaboration. A zero sum game because all NATO advancements have been perceived by Russia as a threat (if not a defeat), and sometimes the Russian leaders reacted harshly in a diplomatic way (the Summit of Bucharest), or in a military way (the Georgian war, although we may add there were also other important causes for the war). And lastly the United States and Russia did not reach an agreement about the American antimissile defense system. Collaboration because the United States and Russia agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals and have collaborated in Afghanistan and Iran.

The interests regarding the Black Sea are different as stated before. Not only the United States and Russia, but also the European Union is divided regarding the Black Sea. Germany, France and the Benelux countries seem to have on the short term at least different interests as compared with Romania, Poland, the Baltic States, the Scandinavian states and perhaps Great Britain.

The United States has the interest of influencing the Black Sea Region for creating democracy, free trade and partially succeeded (Romania and Bulgaria are NATO and EU members). One very possible interest for Russia is to have an influence upon the countries of the Black Sea Region

The collaboration between the two countries can prevail if the economic relations are strong and if (at a higher degree) the political interests are convergent. If not, probably there is going to be a competition for influence.

The European Union could have a unitary policy towards the Black Sea Region if:

- there are common short term interests
- there is a consistent European security policy

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The Energetic Resources Disputes among the Global Players at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Case Study: Venezuela

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Abstract: The 21st century promises to be a century of economic warfare, in which the energetic resources will be both a security element and an insecurity one for those who own, control or use them. The common point which links the major geopolitical players worldwide (USA, EU, Japan, China, India) is the dependence, particularly the energetic resources dependence. Venezuela became a state that due to the internal evolution is in the "spotlight". This article examines the competition of the global actors for energy resources and particularly the case of Venezuela which due to hydrocarbon resources has become an important regional player in Latin America.

Keywords: security, energetic security, global actors, Venezuela.

1. The Energetic Resources – “Weapons” for International Relations?

The 21st century promises to be a century of economic war, in which the energetic resources are both a security element and an insecurity one for those who own, control and use them. The increasing number of population and the economic development that all world states aim to achieve are inevitably accompanied by increased energy consumption. Energy resources competition remains a generating source of crises and conflicts as long as its demand increases faster than its supply, and major oil reserves are located in areas characterized by political and economic imbalances.

Manifestation of power in the current security environment does no longer mean military force, but economic, technological and informational potential and the access to energy resources required for development purpose.

Energy resources, especially oil and natural gases, still hold a decisive role: they can cause cooperation or disputes in relations between state and non-state international scene actors. Differential access to resources affects relations between states of the world. The world's great powers seek to gain control of major energy resources of the planet and implicitly on their prices.

Under the conditions of globalization, each country's energy policy is made in the context of worldwide changes and developments. The Russian Federation became the largest oil producer of the world in 2005, surpassing the U.S., a number of countries, such as Germany, Hungary, Poland, United Kingdom, etc. being dependent on Russian oil. Two years later, the Russian Federation became the largest natural gas producer in the world, three-fifths of its exports going to the EU countries. Rightly the Russian economy is an economy dependent on its exports of oil and natural gas, price decrease of this resources causing large holes in the economy.

The price fluctuations in oil and natural gas and the threat of terrorist attacks against major infrastructure elements have made energy security to gain strategic importance. And it all starts with the states interests: "The interest of the state is sometimes used as a strong argument, even as a supreme one, to justify some actions... There are as many interests as many realities, entities, structures and functions." [1]

It is not a novelty that the black gold (oil) dominated the geopolitics in the twentieth century, and it is still dominating at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This reality can not be ignored, as well as the premise that industrialized economies can at any time enter the race for necessary energy resources, which would trigger a high conflict potential competition for existing energy reserves. It is clear that oil and gas generate power and political influence around the globe and can easily become "weapons" in relations between the world actors. Oil is the ``nourishment`` of modern civilization; it replaced coal as an energy resource with privileged position

in the middle of the twentieth century and, so far, there is no sign that it will be dethroned from the position.

The global energy actors are both state actors and non-state actors (such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, The World Trade Organization, the European Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, etc.). Along with rich energy state actors (eg Russian Federation, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, USA, Canada, Venezuela, etc.) other state actors join in this worldwide games of power because of various advantages: hydrocarbon exports (Libya, Angola, Kazakhstan, Australia, Oman), imports (Spain, Taiwan, the Netherlands, Singapore, Turkey, Belgium, Belarus) or the control over transit and energy routes (Russian Federation through its complex system of transport and distribution; Turkey through the straits Bosphorus and Dardanelles; Iran through Hormuz Strait; Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia through pipelines transiting their territory to the West, etc.).

In history, oil has proven to own a primary role. Let us remember the lessons learned in World War I regarding the strategic importance of insuring petroleum: oil had become "a necessary condition of any strategy and therefore the necessary condition of victory." [2]

Providing 40% of the world energy needs, the influence of oil and its price over the global and national economies is high. All components of the economy are under the influence of oil prices, from inflation to unemployment and gross domestic product. The violent events from Egypt in 2011, followed by the tensions in Tunisia, all triggered at a time when the world economy showed signs of recovery, have caused the collapse of regional markets, the increase of oil prices, damages in some economic areas, etc.

International moments of tension caused by oil did not take much to occur. In the book "The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power", Daniel Yergin identified six postwar oil crisis: the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Company (1951), the Suez crisis (1956), The Six Days War (1967), the oil embargo crisis in 1973, the panic created by the revolution in Iran and the events that followed (1979-1981) and the first Gulf War (1990). [3]

Decrease and depletion of oil reserves would cause a series of negative effects on humanity: disappearance of the intensive agriculture as a result of cessation of fertilizers, pesticides, fungicides, agro-machinery production (the outcome - a global food crisis); the end of activity in the industry of automobiles, air transport, refineries, etc. Oil is essential for today's world; without it there would be worldwide chaos. According to University of California researchers, "oil death" would take place around 2041, and 100 years after the oil depletion, in 2141, there will be a sufficient supply of renewable energy; in these circumstances, the use of vehicles will be an issue that will last a century. [4]

According to the UBS report published in 2012, based on information gathered in 2011, the world oil reserves are counting 1.38 trillion barrels and will last for about 46.2 years. The same report ranked the top 15 countries with the largest oil reserves. In descending order those are: Brazil (14 Billion barrels (1%)), China (15 Billion barrels (1.1%)), Qatar (26 Billion barrels (1.9%)), U.S. (31 Billion barrels (2.2%)); Canada (32 Billion barrels (2.3%)), Nigeria (37 Billion barrels (2.7%)), Kazakhstan (40 Billion barrels (2.9%)), Libya (46 Billion barrels (3.4%)) Russian Federation (77 Billion barrels (5.6%)), United Arab Emirates (98 Billion barrels (7.1%)), Kuwait (102 Billion barrels (7.3%)), Iraq (115 Billion barrels (8.3%)), Iran (137 Billion barrels (9.9%)) Venezuela (211 Billion barrels (15.3%)), Saudi Arabia (265 Billion barrels (19.1%)). [5]

Many developed nations want energy independence. For example: in the early 70s, the U.S. sought to secure its entire energy needs from domestic resources and not to rely on oil or gas imports. The increase of oil price by member states of The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), as a result of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, shattered this American desire. At that time, American political leaders felt that energy security is more important than energy independence. Recently, the American dream of energy independence has resumed: according to the International Energy Agency estimates, U.S. will become the largest oil producer worldwide by 2017, exceeding the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia and turning the dream into reality will take shape, according to the

experts, around 2035; the key to success is the development of shale gas exploitation. [6]

To reduce the cost of transporting oil from Africa and the Middle East, China began constructing pipelines through Myanmar (Burma), from the Bengal Bay to the south-west of the Yunnan province, thus reducing the distance traveled by tankers. This led to sabotaging Washington campaign aimed to isolate Myanmar. China's oil diplomacy has seen other successes, for example, Chinese oil companies have competed their Western counterparts, by getting access to hydrocarbon reserves in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Increased oil revenues led to financing some TV news channels in the Russian Federation, Qatar and Venezuela, factor that led to U.S. hegemony in the world being emptied of substance.

Oil and natural gas are the most important energy resources and, in many cases, "weapons" in imposing hegemony in a region or between states.

History reveals cases of crises and conflicts arisen from energy resources disputes. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in the morning of 7th December 1941 was, in part, a consequence of the U.S. decision to limit oil exports to the Japanese islands, as a consequence of Japan's invasion of China. The operations in Angola and Chechnya are based on strong economic motivations, knowing that they hold significant high quality energy reserves. The intervention of U.S and its allies in Kuwait 1991 was motivated primarily by the need to secure oil in the area and prevent Saddam Hussein to expand control over it. [7]

Russian Federation, the country that owns a large proportion of the global energy resources and transmission lines, has often been accused of using energy to increase its influence in dealing with different actors. Actions that took place after the Cold War strengthened the claim that energy can be a "weapon" in international relations in order to promote or defend interests. For example, during 1993-1994, Moscow reduced the flows of gas supply to Ukraine in order to determine the Ukrainian authorities to give in the energy infrastructure and the Black Sea fleet control; in 2004, Belarus, Poland and Lithuania were victims of gas supplies reduction - an action motivated largely by politics; the gas dispute between Ukraine and the

Russian Federation in the winter of 2008-2009 (Moscow cut off gas supplies with negative consequences for Europe); the "gas war" between Ukraine and Russia resumed in 2011; Ukraine, depending heavily on Russian gas, received, in 2012, a \$ 3.7 billion loan from China in order to substitute natural gas consumption with coal in power stations and construction of coal gasification facilities [8]. EU is dependent on the oil and natural gas energy; EU energetic dependency has increased significantly in 2012, therefore imports from Russia and Norway increased each with 7% compared to 2011, while cumulative imports of energy products of the 27 Member States increased by 11.6% (56.7 million), from 489.2 to 545,900,000,000 euros. [9]

After the arrest of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's son in Geneva, Libya carried out threats against Switzerland by stopping ships loaded with petroleum products, by the refusal of loading others and ban their entry into Libyan ports.

The recently discovered oil and gas resources at North Pole attracted the attention of the economically developed countries (USA, China, Russia, Japan, Canada) in order to conquer the Arctic which houses 20% of the worlds oil and gas reserves.

The economic stakes of US-Venezuela dispute are also the energy resources. Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez threatened on several occasions with suspending oil exports to the U.S., which took this as a serious threat. Therefore, in 2012, U.S. imports of crude oil and petroleum products from Venezuela fell down to the lowest level of the last 30 years, which made possible a dramatic decrease in U.S. energy dependence on Venezuelan resources.

2. Venezuela

Venezuela was among the countries that emerged from the collapse of Gran Colombia in 1830 (a federation that is currently represented by Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and Ecuador). For the most part of XX century's first half, this country was ruled by the military, who promoted the oil industry and allowed some social reforms to occur. Among the main concerns of the

XXI century's beginning for Venezuela are petroleum industry over dependence with its price fluctuations, together with the weakening of democratic institutions, political polarization, politicization of the military system, increasing violence, etc.

According to studies, Latin America holds 8.6% of the Earth's reserves particularly concentrated on Venezuelan territory. This country imposes itself by oil reserves and oil production, petroleum being its main resource and export product. The most important oil extraction areas are: Maracaibo, which ensures 80% of the national production (exploited in Mene Grande, Cabimas, Lagunillas, Mara, Tra Juana) and Oriente, located on the middle course of the river Orinoco (Oficina, Jusepin He Templador). [10] In addition to oil, Venezuela possesses significant resources of gold, iron, bauxite and coal.

The Energy variable was a constant in Venezuela's state policy agenda, so that oil strategies of governments were oriented externally through projecting Venezuela as a state with an important role at regional and international level. Throughout the modern history of Venezuela's international relations, oil was used as the primary instrument for international positioning. [11]

First concessions for exploitation of the Venezuelan oil began during 1907-1912, and oil exports began in 1912. The next six decades are characterized by debates on rent and dues that the Venezuelan government would receive from the companies exploiting hydrocarbons, but also discussions on nationalization opportunities for the oil extraction industry. The concessions Act from 1943 renewed the concessions and stated that new fees and taxes for oil exploration activities would be determined by the Venezuelan state and companies must accept them. In the period 1945-1948 the Venezuelan government adopted a policy that discouraged new concessions in favor of the old ones in order to limit the amount of oil produced and to maintain a higher price.

Subsequently, the policy regarding oil exploitation focuses on its takeover by state. The First state oil company, called Corporación Venezolana de Petróleo, was created in 1960, and in 1970 a law was approved in which the base price of oil taxation was established in a sovereign manner by the state;

by the resuming law of concessions from 1971 were provided favorable conditions in order of resuming state concessions, and in 1975 the whole oil industry nationalization was completed.

The Hugo Chavez regime imposed a program of nationalization of hydrocarbon resources and oil production by issuing a set of new rules for foreign companies. Through this political movement, the Venezuelan President intensified the fight with imperialism and the big multinational oil companies, maintaining and exploiting oil and gas resources for the benefit of the state and not of the big multinational companies benefit. Notable is the fact that a significant part of the resources from oil exploitation was redirected to social programs initiated by the government. In a statement made in 2005, Chavez said that "nearly 4 billion dollars were directed to health, education, housing construction or micro-loans". [12] The Venezuelan leader has used oil and of state enterprises revenues to reduce poverty by half and extreme poverty by 70%, massively expanding the access to health and education, increasing the minimum wage and pensions, halving the unemployment and giving communities from poor neighborhoods the direct control over social programs. [13]

After his re-election as president in 2012, Chavez has supported the idea of forming an anti-imperialist alliance in Latin America and worldwide. He strengthened Venezuela's ties with Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Argentina, but also with other countries such as Iran and Belarus.

Chavez's nationalization process was completed in May 2007 by taking over the last private oil deposit in the Orinoco River basin. Among the energy companies that transferred the control over Venezuelan oilfields to the state were: ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil Corp. and Chevron. (USA); BP p.l.c. (United Kingdom) Total S.A. (France), Statoil ASA (Norway) etc.. [14] This was presented in 2007, by the Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, as a historic victory for the country after years of U.S supported corporate exploitation. He also announced then the withdrawal of the country from international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which he described as "mechanisms of imperialism" designed to exploit poor countries. [15]

Oil was the key element of Chavez's domestic victories and it was used as a major instrument in the country's foreign policy, the petroleum diplomacy contributing to the leader Chavez's objectives. In 2005, in order to prove that he was not an U.S. enemy, Hugo Chavez gave support to the poor population from American metropolis, using oil as a tool. His speech entitled "I love the American people today, and I will love it more" presented a series of aid programs by delivering oil at subsidized prices for a number of American poor communities: "In Boston, Chicago and New York we have three projects for delivering heating fuel and power generation in churches, hospitals, orphanages." [16]

The economy of Venezuela is an oil based economy; it has the largest proven oil reserves - the third country in the world (297.570 million barrels in the Official Journal No. 39885 31/12/11 as of 19/03/12 Gasetta) and the sixth country in the world for natural gas reserves (195 billion cubic feet). [17]

The country's economy is highly dependent on oil revenues, those representing approximately 95% of the export earnings, about 45% of the federal budget revenues, and around 12% of the GDP. [18]

The efforts of the former leader, Hugo Chavez, to increase government control over the economy by nationalizing firms in various sectors such as agriculture, finance, construction, oil and steel, decreased the non-oil exports. In the first part of 2010, Venezuela has faced the prospect of long term power outages at national level, where the main Hydro power station that provided over 35% of the country's electricity needs, was almost closed. Despite the higher oil exports and its high price, Venezuela is facing a series of economic issues such as: increased inflation, housing crisis, electricity crisis, shortages of food and goods, etc., the country's budget deficit reaching 17% of GDP and the public debt being at 49% in 2012. [19]

To achieve the objective meaning the referendum that aimed amending the Constitution in order to establish a socialist state (from which Chavez could have gained power over the expropriation of private property, new federal territories could have been created and the control of the central bank could have been obtained), Hugo Chavez used oil as an instrument, threatening U.S. to stop oil deliveries.

According to statistics, the U.S. was until three years ago the largest recipient of Venezuelan oil exports, but in recent years the oil exports to the U.S. have decreased. By contrast, exports to China increased, China becoming the main customer of the Venezuelan oil industry. (Figure 1). [20]




Figure 1. The oil exports dynamic from Venezuela to USA și China

According to 2008-present estimates, China Development Bank has lent Venezuela 46.5 billion, representing nearly half of the country's foreign loans. Another reason for China's interest in Venezuela is the Las Cristinas mining project, for which, at the end of 2012, the cooperation agreement for the exploitation of gold and copper deposits was signed.

The assigned successor of the former Venezuelan leader, killed by cancer in 5th of March, Nicholas Maduro, supports further cooperation with China, a country which gives evidence of emotional response through the President of the National Reform and Development Commission, Zhang Peng's expressed words: "We must unite our efforts towards the continuous developing relations between China and Venezuela. It is the only way to appease the soul of President Hugo Chavez." [21] In the U.S., the death of the Venezuelan leader, Hugo Chavez, has caused a number of questions about the potential impact on the production of Venezuelan oil and on the

global oil markets. The Obama administration hopes, however, for a positive change in the relation with post-Chavez Venezuela.

3. Conclusions

The problem of energy resources can become a security issue for many states. In the current international context, energy security has chain synergistic effects on all areas of security.

The decrease of energy resources and the competition generated by them redistribute the spheres of influence regionally and globally. The presumed "death of oil" imposed finding new forms of energy (solar, photovoltaic, wind, wave, hydro, biogas, biomass, hydrogen from water, etc..), which are currently either in a research stage or very little used, or at exorbitant prices. Shale gas seems to be another version that the EU takes into account in order to reduce dependence on fuel supplies from the Russian Federation. But according to forecasts from the International Energy Agency first shale gas will be extracted next year and increased resource extraction in the EU will be possible not earlier than 2030-2040 years. [22] The exploitation and extraction of these resources has several aspects: it is expensive and environmentally harmful.

Oil and natural gas remain for this century too in the attention of the great powers for securing economic development and achieving various interests. Thus, for instance, Russian Federation energy business proves a tendency to keep its influence in the region and the world.

The presence of energy resources (especially oil and gas) in some regions brings these regions into the attention of the great powers on a background of energy and regional security issues. For example, Central Asia is an area of major strategic interest for the U.S., Turkey, China, Russia, India, Iran, Japan, European Union; Mongolia (which holds oil deposits on the border with China) to China and the U.S.; South China Sea for China (which holds the necessary technology to operate at great depths) and India; the North Pole for Canada, Denmark, Russian Federation, USA, China; Venezuela is very important for China, the U.S., Cuba and other Latin American countries, etc..

Venezuela has an oil based economy, basically uni-exporter, whose development is linked to global oil prices. Regional and international visibility of Venezuela can be explained by the unique personality of its former leader, Hugo Chavez who has promoted a new model of society called "the socialism of the XXI century" and the role that oil had and still has in the external policy. After the death of their beloved leader series of questions arisen about the role that oil will play in Venezuelan politics: Will Cuba receive the 100,000 barrels of oil per day, representing an annual subsidy of 3-4 billion per year?, How will the trade with the U.S. evolve, regarding this resource?, Will Nicaragua and other nations of the Caribbean still receive subsidized oil? [23] These are answers that only time can give.

Certainly the proposed theme can take different approaches. But a certain fact is this: the great powers will use their influence and available means to access the petroleum and natural gas reserves.

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The Energy Security in the Wider Black Sea Region: The Geopolitical Implications to Romania's Energy Strategy

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Abstract: The competition among great powers over energy resources and pathways has gotten increasingly intense in recent years, not least in the Wider Black Sea Region (WBSR). This paper will explore the evolution of energy security that has taken place lately and the accompanying political, economic, and geopolitical factors that improve or impede international energy cooperation in the Wider Black Sea Region (WBSR). It will also make an assessment of Romania's geopolitical understandings of energy security in WBSR, its implications for Romania's energy strategy, and the future of EU energy geopolitics.

Keywords: energy security, Romania energy security, geopolitics, EU, WBSR.

1. Introduction

Since the beginning of the 21st century competition among great powers over energy resources and pathways have gotten remarkably intense, promoting rapid growth in energy prices and geopolitical considerations involving energy security. The Wider Black Sea Region has become a competition area both for energy producers, who would like to ensure security of transport routes, but also for energy consumers, who would like not to depend only of a single energy supplier who would impose its conditions and, in certain political and geostrategic contexts, to use oil and natural gas as a “weapon” in energy diplomacy. Political and geopolitical evolutions from this post Cold War area were different according to orientations towards various power poles, have initiated cooperation processes but also conflicts which made the area unstable. It is difficult to say if during these years the area has become a region and even a wider

one¹. Some experts challenge the geopolitical unity of the pontic space and affirm that the Black Sea Region is a western invention². It would be a “‘bridge or buffer zone’, a ‘pivot’ that lies at the centre of a Mackinder-type ‘geopolitical heartland’³

Geopolitically, the area is perceived differently both by riparian states, as well as by those that are interested in this space. Some countries, such as Turkey and Russia, perceive the space in the most restrained possible manner and define the area according to the territory belonging to countries with direct access to the Black Sea⁴, while others, such as the EU and the US, perceive it as more extended towards the South Caucasus and the Balkans⁵. From the point of view of geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the area, though, all actors consider that the pontic space has become a very important one in regional and global politics. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his addresses to the participants to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, in St. Petersburg, Russia, on 21 June 2012, underlines that “the role of the Black Sea region in global politics has been steadily increasing. This tendency is also driven by the region’s unique geopolitical location and its considerable economic and investment

¹ Felix Ciuta, “Region? Why Region? Security, Hermeneutics, and the Making of the Black Sea Region”, in *Geopolitics*, 13, no. 1, 2008, p. 128-144

² Ivan Krastev strongly doubts Black Sea Region’s competing capacities with Russia’s concept of a Near Abroad. See, 134th Bergedorf Round Table. “The Black Sea Between the EU and the Russia: Security, Energy, Democracy”, June 23-25, 2006, Odessa; Korber-Stiftung, Hamburg, 2007, p. 26.

³ Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, “The Uncertain Times of Black Sea Regional Security”, in *Euxeinos, Online Journal of the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe*, 6, 2012, p. 4, online http://www.gce.unisg.ch/~media/Internet/Content/Dateien/InstituteUndCenters/GCE/Euxeinos%20Folder/Euxeinos%206_2012.ashx?fl=en

⁴ *Ibidem*, p.5

⁵ Ronald D. Asmus, “Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea”, in Ronald D. Asmus (ed.), *Next Steps in Forging a Euroatlantic Strategy for the Wider Black Sea, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington, D.C., 2006, p. 15-33.*

potential”⁶. The Russian president is right because the Wider Black Sea region has become a new strategic frontier for Europe, Russia and the United States in terms of energy security. Two aspects of this conclusion are worthy to be mentioned. First of all, the main transport and pipeline routes for oil and gas from the Caspian basin and Russia to the West have become a key test of several types of relationship. In the pontic space there is an intersection of three axes’ interests: the producers – Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan; the transit countries – Russia, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine and the consumers – EU countries, Turkey and others. The ability to strike a rational balance between the respective interests of all players, meaning security of supply for consumers, security of demand for producers and security of steady revenue for transit countries, will be a make-or-break issue for the development of successful models of cooperation between the Black Sea states⁷. The second aspect is related to the recent discoveries of important gas layers in the Wider Black Sea Area, but also of sulphur dioxide gas within the sea’s continental shelf.

As such, any study on energy can no longer be limited solely to a discussion of supply and demand in the energy world market, but must also seek to examine international energy security from geopolitical and geo-economic perspectives. Here, major powers and great oil and gas companies have invested a lot of money and effort together with diplomatic and military muscle to win control over major foreign stockpiles and transits of energy. In this context, major oil and gas importers like the European Union, Turkey, and others states are paying close attention to the WBSR, particularly riparian states, whereas other regional powers like the EU are striving to retain influence over these strategic resources.

⁶ “Role of the Black Sea region in international politics increases”, in *Hurriyet Daily News*, on line, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/role-of-the-black-sea-region-in-international-politics-increases.aspx?pageID=238&nid=24055>

⁷ “A 2020 Vision for the Black Sea Region. A Report by the Commission on the Black Sea”, on line <http://www.blackseacom.eu/a-2020-vision-for-the-black-sea/>, downloaded on 20 May 2013

This paper will explore the evolution of energy security that has taken place in recent years and the accompanying political, economic and even military factors⁸ that improve or impede international energy cooperation in the Wider Black Sea Region. It also strives to make an assessment of Romania's geopolitical understandings of energy security in WBSR, its implications for Romania's energy strategy, and the future of Southern Europe energy geopolitics.

2. The Geopolitical Competition over Energy and Security in the Wider Black Sea Region

The competition for energy in the WBSR emerged also due to the fact that the EU is in the situation of a net energy exporter. The 27 EU Member States hold only 0.6% of world oil reserves and about 2% of natural gas reserves. The situation is not much different in what regards the coal reserves, the EU holding only 4% of reserves identified at world level and the energy production capacity is barely 18% of the global one. EU's energy consumption is approximately 18% of the world total, compared to the US consumption of 23%⁹. Oil remains the main energy resource consumed by the European Union. In 2010, approximately 580 million tons of crude oil were imported. The Russian Federation was one of the main suppliers, ensuring 32% of consumption and Norway exported towards the EU¹⁰ about 60 million tons of crude oil accounting for a little over 10% of the necessary, 45% of oil necessary being imported from the Gulf Area and the Middle East. EU gas imports are thus structured: 41% come from the Russian Federation, 30% come from Algeria and 25% come from Norway.

⁸ Alexei Anishchuk, "President Vladimir Putin ordered large-scale military exercises in the Black Sea on Thursday, projecting Russian power towards Europe and the Middle East in a move that may vex neighbors", on line <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/28/us-russia-military-exercises-idUSBRE92R0K320130328>,

⁹ *EU Energy Outlook by 2020*

¹⁰ *IEA Annual Report 2011*, IEA

It is estimated that due to the tendencies of decreasing extraction from the North Sea and to the more reduced costs, in 2030 almost 60% of gas imports could come from the Russian Federation¹¹.

From this perspective, competition concerns two main components. On one hand, energy transport from the producers in Central Asia, Caspian Area and the South Caucasus towards consumers from Europe and, on the other hand, the gas production in this space. In the mid- and late 2000s, many European countries suffered several unexpected energy cut-offs due to confrontations between Russia and the key pipeline transit states of Ukraine and Belarus over natural gas supply and transit issues. In 2009, Gazprom halted all natural gas supplies transiting Ukraine for nearly three weeks after the two sides failed to reach agreement on several issues, including a debt allegedly owed by Ukraine to Gazprom and the price that Ukraine would pay for natural gas supplies. Prior to the opening of Nord Stream, about 80% of Europe's natural gas imports from Russia transited Ukrainian pipelines. A similar Russian-Ukrainian dispute had led to a natural gas cut-off to Europe at the beginning of 2006. In 2010 and 2011, disputes between Russia and Belarus over a variety of issues, including energy prices, debts owed by Belarus, and transit fees paid by Russia for the use of Belarusian pipelines, led to temporary reductions of oil and natural gas supplies to Belarus and neighbouring countries¹². Russian gas supplies are under the quasi-monopoly of Gazprom, the oil giant controlling over 70% of the Russian Federation's production and delivery of natural gas¹³.

¹¹ *EU Energy Outlook by 2020*

¹² Michael Ratner (coordinator), "Europe's Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification", CRS Report for Congress, *Congressional Research Service*, on line, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf>

¹³ *Ibidem*

The energy routes and infrastructure built in this area is synthesized in the following table:¹⁴

Pipeline	Source of energy and main provider	Main sponsors	Capacity	Status
Baku–Novorossiysk pipeline	Oil, Azerbaijan	Socar (Azerbaijan), Transneft (Russia)	Current supply: 80,000 bpd	In use since 1997
Baku–Supsa Pipeline	Oil, Azerbaijan	Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kværner (Norway)	145,000 bpd	In use since 1999
Baku-Batumi (Georgia) Railway	Oil, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan	Russian Empire-USSR	Variable, around 120,000 bpd	Operative at non-regular basis
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan BTC	Oil, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan	Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, US, consortium led by British Petroleum	1 million bpd	Linefill started in 2005
South Caucasus Gas Pipeline, (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) BTE	Gas, Azerbaijan	Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, US, consortium led by British Petroleum	20bcm/year	In use since 2006, supplying Turkish market

¹⁴ Also see Emil Souleimanov, Filip Černý, “The Southern Caucasus Pipelines and the Caspian ‘Oil Diplomacy’. The issue of transporting Caspian oil and natural gas to world markets”, in *La Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas* (RIPS), Vol. 11, núm. 4, 2012, 77-105; Ronald Soligo, Amy Myers Jaffe, “The Economics of Pipeline Routes: The Conundrum of Oil Exports from the Caspian Basin, Prepared in Conjunction With an Energy”, Study by the Center for International Political Economy and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, April 1998; Jim Nichol, “Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests”, online, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33407.pdf>

Pipeline	Source of energy and main provider	Main sponsors	Capacity	Status
Blue Stream	Gas, Russia	Gazprom (Russia), ENI (Italy); Offshore Botas (Turkey) and Gazprom	16bcm/year	In use since 2003, supplying Turkish market
Nabucco	Gas, Azerbaijan and potentially Turkmenistan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt	EU, consortium of 6 companies ¹⁵	31bcm/year max.	Feasibility study finished
South Stream	Gas, Russia, Central Asia	Gazprom, ENI: Offshore (and GDF-Suez 10%). Plus transit countries companies	63bcm/year max.	Feasibility/ environmental studies in process
White Stream GUEU (Georgia-Ukraine-EU pipeline)	First stage: Gas, Azerbaijan and potentially Turkmenistan and Iran	Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine. EU and US (but no financial commitment)	32bcm/year	Feasibility/ environmental studies in process

Source: BP webpage: www.bp.com

These web pipelines illustrate the importance of the WBSR in terms of energy transit and the geopolitical struggle around it¹⁶. It can be seen that Russia aims to control energy supplies and transit routes driven by a mix of economic and geopolitical interests; the US is mainly driven by the political aim of preventing other great powers from monopolising Caspian energy

¹⁵ BOTAS (Turkey), EAD (Bulgaria), MOL, (Hungary), OMV (Austria), RWE (Germany), Transgaz (Romania).

¹⁶ “ЕС огласил "стратегию" по завоеванию лидерства в Черноморском регионе. В: Военное обозрение”, online, <http://topwar.ru/5419-es-oglasil-strategiyu-po-zavoevaniyu-liderstva-v-chernomorskom-regione.html>.

supplies as well as transit routes¹⁷. It is the possible reason why the Clinton administration promoted the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, despite it running through the turbulent Georgia of the early 2000s which at that moment was close to becoming a failed state¹⁸. In order to protect their economic interests some countries in the area, but not only, tried to find alternative energy transport sources in order not to be dependent on Russia. Thus was born the competition between Nabucco and South Stream. This is just another tense file in the relations between the EU and the Russian Federation and the launching ceremony of the project supported by Russians, in the context of difficulties concerning the progress of the European project, creates yet another hurdle between the two entities. Turkey signed two significant energy agreements at the end of 2011. As a consequence, these accords set off a new competition for natural gas-centred energy projects around Turkey. Russia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Iran and the European Union are the main actors in this contest. The first one was the agreement signed on 27 December for the construction of the Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline (TANAP) which will transport Azeri natural gas from Shah Deniz II across Turkey to Europe. The second agreement, signed in Moscow on 29 December, calls for cooperation in the field of natural gas with regards to the construction of South Stream¹⁹.

The first half of 2012 saw rapid developments in the accomplishment of both projects. Turkish and Azeri authorities signed an intergovernmental agreement on 26 June and agreed to finance the construction of TANAP. After the intergovernmental agreement was signed, the Turkish and Azeri Energy Ministers and the EU Energy Commissioner visited Turkmenistan to meet with the President and other officials. The aim of the visit was to

¹⁷ Jim Nichol, *op. cit.* in *loc. cit.*

¹⁸ Mamuka Tsereteli, "The Impact of Russia Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation Corridor", The Jamestown Foundation, 2009, p. 27-35, on line, http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Full_Mamuka_RussiaGeorgia.pdf

¹⁹ Mitat Çelikpala, "Turkey and the new energy politics of the Black Sea region", online, <http://www.blackseanews.net/en/read/57572>

present a united front by all three key players of the Southern Corridor and to reconfirm Turkmenistan's commitment to supplying gas to Europe²⁰. In addition, the United States also declared its full support to this project. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that "*The United States has been an active partner to all those participants to help move this project to fruition*".²¹ In what concerns oil production, but especially the gas production of countries from the Black Sea area, it is based on estimates of future oil and natural gas reserves. One must notice that countries from the Black Sea region perceive a significant increase of Caspian gas production volume as a major deterrence factor and insurance of their energy security²².

Exploiting WBSR energy resources, as well as the efficient functioning of all energy transport networks that link Europe with the exporting countries implies reaching a common denominator among all competitors that make up a perfect interests triangle: *EU – main consumer; energy producers; transit countries*. This implies an extremely well tuned oil and gas diplomacy, as not always the interests from this triangle converge towards the same purpose. On the other hand, within this triangle we can find an emphasized symmetry from the balance of power perspective. We find strategic players, such as the EU, NATO, USA, the Russian Federation, on one hand, and on the other hand, actors from the category of those called *geopolitical pawns* by Z. Brzezinski²³, such as Moldova, Ukraine, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, Armenia and Georgia. Competition among these actors in order to get the oil or gas pipeline transit country status dominates sub-regional integration and cooperation projects.

²⁰ Ibidem

²¹ Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Energy Diplomacy in the 21st Century", U.S. Department of State, 18 October 2012, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/10/199330.htm>

²² See, Оляны Киндыбалюк, "Черное море: энергетический мост", on line <http://www.warandpeace.ru/ru/analysis/view/75167/>; Сергей Глебов, "Энергетическая безопасность Европы: Черноморский транзитный контекст", online <http://nomos.com.ua/content/view/425/86/>

²³ Z. Brzezinski, *Marea tabla de sah. Suprematia americana si imperativele sale geostrategice*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, Bucharest, 2012, p. 73

3. Strategic Players and Great-Power Rivalry in WBSR

The EU is a very important actor in the Black Sea area and, at the same time, the region has also become a natural new Eastern neighbourhood. EU aspirations reflect the same objectives that lay at the source of the transitions in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe – to extend the European space of peace, stability and prosperity based on democracy, human rights and rule of law. This vision is an integral part of the European Security Strategy that was adopted well before the EU reached the shores of Black Sea²⁴. The strategic importance of the Black Sea region for the EU was recognized in 1995 when the Black Sea Regional Energy Centre was inaugurated. This Centre was a joint initiative of the European Commission, under its SYNERGY Programme, and the countries of the Black Sea region: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine; since 1999, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, since 2001, Serbia have become members of the BSREC as well²⁵. The strategic importance of this region was recognized once more in 2007²⁶, especially after the accession of the new member states to the EU. From this perspective, the EU has supported the intensification of commercial exchanges between the Caucasus and central Asian countries, on one hand, and Europe, on the other hand, and also the development of energy infrastructure, especially in the context of intensive

²⁴ Sergey Konoplyov, “Black Sea Region: Challenges in regional cooperation”, in Valeska Esch Juliane Kabus Charles King Mallory IV (eds.), *A Future Security Architecture for Southeast Europe. Report of the Aspen Institute Deutschland*. The report includes papers and proceedings of three Aspen Institute Germany conferences convened in 2012 as part of the “A Future Security Architecture for Southeast Europe” p. 65, online, <http://aspeninstitute.de/en/publication/download/32/A+Future+Security+Architecture+for+Southeast+Europe.pdf>

²⁵ EPSON, “European Seas and Territorial Development, Opportunities and Risks”, Annex 11 to the Scientific Report *Governance Case Studies: Black Sea*, online, http://www.espon.eu/export/sites/default/Documents/Projects/AppliedResearch/ESaTDOR/FR_160413/20130417_annexes/ESaTDOR_FR_Annex_11_Black_Sea_CS.pdf

²⁶ Bogdan Aurescu, *The role of the European Union in the Wider Black Sea Region*, in *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, vol.10, no. 1, 2009, p. 36

exploitation of the Caspian Sea resources. Besides, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership in 2009²⁷. Four of the Black Sea countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria and Romania) have also been targets of the EU Strategy for the Danube launched in 2010. When fully implemented in April 2011, the fourteen targets of the Danube region will benefit from the projects on transport and energy connections, a better environment, socio-economic development, improvements in the tourism sector as well as security around this region. The EU appears to have two major interests in the region: To secure energy supply lines from the east and to prevent various security risks developing to a level that directly threatens Europe's own security. In order to materialize these interests, the EU also adopted a framework document – the “EU Strategy for the Black Sea”²⁸. In line with these objectives the EU has launched some programs in energy transport:

- **TRACECA**²⁹ (Transport System Europe-Caucasus-Asia) in 1994, having as objective building a new transport infrastructure through deeper economic integration of the 12 member states (among which Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Romania, Turkey and Uzbekistan), as well as by promoting stability and trust in the region;
- **INOGATE**³⁰ (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe), for the purpose of facilitating and commercial exploitation of oil and natural gas resources in the Caspian Sea area and making their transport towards energy markets in Europe and, generally, to the West, more efficient, The INOGATE foundation act, the so called *Umbrella*

²⁷ Mustafa Aydın, Sinem A. Acııkmeşe, “EU Engagement in the Black Sea: The Views from the Region”, in Adam Balcer, *The Eastern Partnership in the Black Sea Region: towards a New Synergy*, Warsaw, 2011, p. 13

²⁸ See, *Report on an EU Strategy for the Black Sea* (2010/2087 (INI), 16.12.2010, on line <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2010-0378&language=EN>.

²⁹ History of TRACECA, online, <http://www.traceca-org.org/en/traceca/history-of-traceca/>

³⁰ INOGATE Projects, online, http://www.inogate.org/index.php?option=com_inogate&view=projects&Itemid=75&lang=en

Agreement, was signed in July 1999, in Kiev, and entered into force, as international treaty, in February 2001.

- ***The Baku Initiative 2004 Policy dialogue on Energy and Transport***³¹. The main aim is to integrate energy markets of the participating countries, in order to guarantee transparency and to also give an impulse to Trans-European transport cooperation on the basis of the mutual interest for the progressive integration of their respective transport networks and markets in accordance with EU and international legal and regulatory frameworks.

In case the EU intends to capitalize on the position of actor having direct access to the Black Sea, which it acquired through Romania's and Bulgaria's integration, it will have to compete with Russia, which traditionally considers the area as a vital interest space. EU's capacity to accomplish its agenda in energy issues in relation to the Wider Black Sea Area may be hampered by some regional-level factors. One of these can be geopolitical tensions which obstruct EU attempts to establish a coherent and accepted external energy policy for all the EU Member States. A secondary factor refers to the EU, which followed the US policies in the region. Both factors show us that the EU action has mainly been limited to reacting to the regional dynamics from this region. EU mostly deals with the region on a bilateral basis, with limited recourse to dynamics of regionalism³². EU policies are often too slow, incoherent, uncoordinated, with a limited diplomatic presence in the region and a lack of strategic vision on the ground, beside its declarations.

Its favourite approach in principle, such as human rights, must be redefined in manners "which are realistically operational in this difficult

³¹ See Baku Initiative online, http://www.inogate.org/attachments/article/92/Final_Strategic_Vision_Engl.pdf

³² Mustafa Aydın, Sinem A. Acikmeşe, loc. cit., p. 17

environment”³³. As a result, some analysts consider that “neither should we expect in the Black Sea area the emergence of a coherent strategy of the communitarian Europe, but more probably a relatively unitary action of the ‘flank countries’ – Romania and Bulgaria – or conjectural approaches guided by local, not unional, sensitivities, of the Danube Strategy kind”³⁴. These assertions seem to be supported by the bilateral agreements concluded by Germany and Italy with the Russian Federation for building two gas pipelines – Nord Stream and South Stream – that would avoid Ukraine as transit country. South Stream allows Russia to revive its Balkan policy of the 19th and 20th centuries³⁵. The EU is an actor on the energy market more in academic studies than within the economic and political reality. This is determined by at least two factors. One of them is related to the Union’s lack of capability to elaborate a coherent security strategy in which the security interests of all its members can be found. On the other hand, the dependence of some European great powers on Russian gas is different and hence the nature and especially the intensity of their relations with Moscow differ.

After the end of the Cold War, the USA have also assumed for this region the quality of “policeman”, taking into account both their global strategic interests and also the dangerous geopolitical evolutions after the fall of the Soviet Union. The United States want to consider this region not the Black Sea area, but the Wider Black Sea Area. It is already a part of the interest of considering this region not just one of eastern seaside, which would also include the Caucasus and countries as Azerbaijan and Moldova, without

³³ Frank Umbach, “The Black Sea Region and the Great Energy Game in Eurasia”, in Adam Balcer, *The Eastern Partnership in the Black Sea Region: towards a New Synergy*, Warsaw, 2011, p. 66

³⁴ Dr. Serban F. Cioculescu, „Viziunea Turciei si Rusiei asupra Regiunii extinse a Marii Negre: rolul si influenta actorilor locali” (“The vision of Turkey and Russia upon the Wider Black Sea Region: the role and influence of local actors”) in *Monitor Strategic*, no. 3-4, 2012, p. 72

³⁵ Dimitri Trenin, “Russia’s Perspective on the Wider Black Sea Region”, in Daniel Hamilton, Mangott, Gerhard (eds.), *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives*, Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 113

direct access to the sea. In some countries, especially Turkey, almost every time when we are starting a discussion regarding the Wider Black Sea Area, someone would try to correct us immediately and would say that such a region does not exist, but only the Black Sea area. And this is precisely the reason for which countries with direct access to the sea, especially Turkey, do not want a too consistent presence of the United States in the region. Thus, once more, the term chosen by the United States shows that the Americans are interested in playing an important role in an extended area, without being hindered by some countries, in this case by Turkey³⁶. The motivation of USA to create a climate of security in the Black Sea region by supporting cooperation and dialog in the this area emerged after September 11, 2001, when it became important for the USA to be closer to the Middle East and Afghanistan. As well, it was crucial that the Black Sea countries, which the energy resources of the Caspian Sea transited, were governed in the spirit of democratic values, often poorly understood in these post-communist countries³⁷. Taking into account these security considerations, the USA have encouraged the emergence of some organizations and institutions that would cooperate in the field of the area's security and stability. Federal funds were used to finance the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative for Combating Trans-border Crime (SECI Centre)³⁸, the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Centre (BSBIC)³⁹, the Black Sea Strategy of Defence Threat Reduction Agency

³⁶ "The Wider Black Sea Area, its present and future strategic importance", interview with Dr. Sergey Konoplyov, in *Pulsul Strategic*, Supplement nr. 109, 5 November 2011, online <http://www.ingepo.ro/download-materiale/485/SuplimentBuletin109Ro051111.pdf>,

³⁷ Sergey Konoplyov, "New Security Dynamics in the Black Sea region", online <http://www.bscsif.ro/new-security-dynamics-in-the-black-sea-region/>

³⁸ See *Southeast European Cooperative Initiative for Combating Trans-border Crime* (SECI Center), online, <http://www.secicenter.org/m105/Home>

³⁹ See, *Borderline The EU's New Border Surveillance Initiatives*, online http://www.boell.de/downloads/DRV_120523_BORDERLINE_-_Border_Surveillance.pdf

(DTRA), the Black Sea Civil Military Emergency Preparedness programme etc

Sergey Konoplyov, director of *Harvard Black Sea Security Program* and *US-Russia Security Program*, within the debate “New Security Dynamics in the Black Sea Region”, organized in Bucharest by the International Fund for Cooperation and Partnership Black Sea-Caspian Sea, in November 2011, claimed that the “*US strategic reorientation towards Asia-Pacific changed the dynamics of American involvement at the Black Sea. There remain the frozen conflicts and a Russia which opposes any resolution in order to preserve its influence in the region*”⁴⁰. The Ukrainian expert considers that presently China, India and Pakistan are more important for the USA than the WBSR, due to China’s quick economic growth and to the economic and military competition between it and America. Following undertaken analyses, he reached the conclusion that “*the USA want to protect themselves, and the biggest threat now comes from South Asia and not from the Wider Black Sea Area. Romania and Bulgaria are no threats, while countries like India and Pakistan, with their nuclear arsenals and the issues related to terrorism, are problematic. This explains the change of the American foreign policy focus*”.⁴¹

The Russian Federation sees WBSR as part of its “near abroad” and fears the access of western powers in this area. The time of Vladimir Putin’s presidency (first two mandates) marked the increase of Russian assertiveness in foreign policy. In general, the 2001-2008 years were a period of Russian successes and military and economic power growth, but also emphasized the fact that the Russian state faces serious challenges that can question the statute and the geopolitical “irradiation” towards the Balkans and the Middle East. Russia demonstrated more “aggressiveness”

⁴⁰ „Ce s-a schimbat in regiunea Marii Negre dupa reorientarea SUA” (“What happened in the Black Sea area after the US reorientation”), in *The Epoch Times*, online <http://epochtimes-romania.com/news/ce-s-a-schimbat-in-regiunea-marii-negre-dupa-reorientarea-sua--187181>

⁴¹ Ibidem

towards other power poles, especially in claiming a tighter and more efficient control over the area in the “near abroad”, but has never violated the rules of the games imposed by the use of soft power in the hegemony dispute specific to the 21st century. The way in which Moscow reacted towards the geopolitical pawns from the WBSR, otherwise treated with severity and brutality, suggests that Russia entered a post-imperial phase in its historical evolution. Analyst Dimitri Trenin considers that “Russian leaders have quickly learned the rules to play on the new chessboard, with new pieces, according to the new norms. They are oriented towards business and very pragmatic approaches, they do not use traditional methods to solve the everlasting oriental affair”⁴². In WBSR, Russia is not momentarily preoccupied with strengthening the military arsenal as its naval forces stationed in Sevastopol, by the agreements prolonged until after 2017 by Ukraine, have the possibility of controlling and ensuring security of gas and oil pipelines transiting this area. In terms of military power, in the opinion of Moscow analysts, Russia has a five to one superiority compared to NATO and four-five times lower than Turkey’s maritime forces⁴³, but it does not want to control militarily, only geopolitically and economically, a part of the Black Sea area, being interested in preserving Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova in its influence and security sphere. The reasons are related to the perception of risks coming from West and East, of economic calculations but also of prestige reasons specific to great powers⁴⁴. Russia essentially changed its policy towards Turkey by developing mutually advantageous partnerships and renouncing a useless geopolitical confrontation, as had happened during the Cold War. It seems to be at peace with the idea of Turkish domination over a half of the Black Sea area⁴⁵. Moscow tries to increase its influence in

⁴² Ibidem, p. 116

⁴³ „Кирилл ГУБА, Черноморский флот: модернизация и «газофлотский» тупик”, on line, <http://odnarodyna.com.ua/node/13528>

⁴⁴ Dr. Serban F. Cioculescu, *op. cit.*, p. 73

⁴⁵ Сергей Глебов, *op. cit.*, in *loc. cit.*

the WBSR not only through energy diplomacy but also through its economic agents, especially energy giants such as Gazprom and Lukoil, who won important positions in Serbia's and Montenegro's economies, but also in the ones of some NATO and EU Member States, such as Romania and Bulgaria⁴⁶.

According to von Eugene Kogan, Russia's approach to the Black Sea region appears to be guided by two principal considerations. First, the continued instability in the North Caucasus provinces of Russia had pushed the Kremlin to seek stability on its southern border. This situation could potentially encourage co-operation, but for now, it had mostly resulted in tensions, particularly with Western-leaning Georgia. Second, Russia seeks to secure its pre-eminent economic position in the region. This relates mostly to the control over energy resources and their transportation. Hence, any competing energy projects sponsored by the Western powers are regarded by Moscow with displeasure. To sum up, Russia's strategic thinking is still largely dominated by a zero-sum approach, in which the advancement of Euro-Atlantic interests in the Black Sea region are systematically considered as an unacceptable erosion of Russian interests.⁴⁷ Russia has a privileged position in the WBSR, both due to the means it possesses in order to exercise its influence, as well as due to the alternatives it has to exploit for its own benefit this resource which is energy. Analyzing Russia's behaviour during the last years, it is preparing for a reduction of exports towards the EU, confirming the European Commission's wish to uncouple from the monopoly of Russian gas. This can be deduced from Vladimir Putin's visit to China in 2006, where a contract was concluded for two gas pipelines routes (avoiding Mongolia), a parallel corridor to the Pacific coast and a corridor which crosses Turkmenistan and which will

⁴⁶ Александр Бовдунов, „Петрополитика России и Юго-Восточная Европа (на примере Сербии и Румынии)“, online <http://www.geopolitica.ru/article/petropolitika-rossii-i-yugo-vostochnaya-evropa-na-primere-serbii-i-rumynii#.UaMX6UAWrk>

⁴⁷ von Eugene Kogan, „Military and Energy. Security Situation Around the Black Sea Area“, *Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe Reihe Studien*, Wien, November 2008, p. 6

transport over 80 billion cubic metres per year. Taking into account that these two new routes need more time and more money in order to be completed, we notice that during the last years Russia continues its policy of dividing EU countries by offering significant advantages to Germany⁴⁸.

After the end of the cold war Turkey is unmistakably a key regional player. During the post-bipolar period, Turkey consolidated its geopolitical, economic and military position in the Black Sea area and, more importantly, successfully solved the energy interests from the Caspian region for themselves. The Turkish state represents an essential actor for the whole WBSR, for several reasons. First of all, it is the one controlling the only access path towards the basin of this sea, through the two straits, Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Second of all, it benefits from a “pivotal” position, as it connects the Balkans to the Middle East and Central Asia, ensuring communication, exchanges and interactions. That is why Turkey is not only a part of one regional security sub-complexes, but of several. Also, Turkey ensures the land connection between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea⁴⁹. In the conditions of the world economic and financial crisis which began at the end of 2008, Turkey recorded a rate of industrial production increase of 9.2%, having the biggest economic growth in Europe in 2010 and in the world in 2011. When the economic crisis was at its peak, Turkey had an economic growth rate of 3.2%, thus exceeding all estimates for 2012. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced Turkey’s intention to fully pay its debt towards the IMF (869 million USD), thus entering in a new era of its evolution⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ Cosmin Pacurariu, „Europa si imposibilitatea managementului securitatii energetice” (“Europe and the impossibility of energy security management”) online, http://www.academia.edu/1592048/Europa_si_imposibilitatea_managementului_securitatii_energetice

⁴⁹ Dr. Serban F. Cioculescu, *op. cit.*, p. 74

⁵⁰ Luiza Popa, „Optiuni pentru zona extinsa a Marii Negre” (“Options for the wider Black Sea area”), on line, <http://www.balcanii.ro/2013/04/optiuni-pentru-regiunea-extinsa-a-marii-negre/>

The importance of the Turkish state in this region also derives from its geostrategic position. Currently, Turkey has five existing pipelines carrying gas or oil to or across its territory. The oil pipelines are built so that the oil ends up at the Mediterranean harbour of Ceyhan and can thus be exported, while the gas pipelines connect with the domestic grid, supplying Turkish consumers. In addition, Turkey is involved in three planned pipeline projects. From this perspective, Turkey cannot perceive this region as a competition arena, but as a cooperation agora. Therefore, the statement of the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan that Nabucco and South Stream are not business competitors but ensure a diversity specific to market economy does not come as a surprise⁵¹. This perception over the importance of the two pipelines is different for several political leaders, even within the EU. On 16 September 2011, on the eve of signing the agreement to build the “South Stream” pipeline, the European Commissioner for Energy Guenther Oettinger, declared that South Stream is an attempt to block the EU alternative of the Nabucco pipeline. South Stream will force the EU to abandon Nabucco, which has the purpose of diversifying gas supplies on the European market⁵². Moreover, Bogdan Aurescu believes “that this is in full conformity with the ‘zero problems with neighbours’ concept promoted by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. For these reasons, we plead for Turkey to be more involved in cooperating with EU on issues related to the region, under the current circumstances and in the Black Sea Synergy format”⁵³.

Is there going to be a place for NATO in a bipolar international political composition of the Black Sea area? If we are considering the strategic documents launched by NATO in the field of energy security, the

⁵¹ Apud, Mert Gökırmak, “From Foe to Friend: Turkish-Russian Relations in the 21st Century”, in *International Journal of Social Inquiry*, Volume 5, Number 1-2, 2012, p. 95

⁵² “Actionarii s-au inteles” (“The shareholders agreed”), commentary at the the *Voice of Russia*, online <http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2011/09/16/56268742.html>,

⁵³ Bogdan Aurescu, *op. cit.*, p. 37

transatlantic organization will have an enhanced role⁵⁴. In November 2012, during an international conference organized in Azerbaijan, NATO's representative for the Caucasus, William Lahue, said that "the security infrastructure in the Caspian region is in the interests of the members and partners of NATO. The Alliance is interested in helping its allies and partners in the protection of energy infrastructure for sustainable energy supplies. At the same time, he pointed to the cooperation of individual members of NATO and Azerbaijan in this direction and on a bilateral basis. In particular, the United States is cooperating with Azerbaijan in the protection from the threats of offshore platforms". In the opinion of Russian analysts, it becomes much more obvious the fact that the common responsibility for the cause of peace in the region will be designated as present and future cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the energy field⁵⁵. The role of the North Atlantic Organization in the area will depend to a great extent on the interests of strategic players and on the capacity of its members of harmonizing their interests in the energy field.

Another problem is that NATO is not a powerful and united alliance anymore that would take quick attitude towards conflicts such as the Russian-Georgian one. Likewise, the collective defence and security guarantees are not so reliable anymore, as proven by Poland, which insisted for deploying the missile theatre defence on its territory, in order to have an additional and more concrete security warranty⁵⁶. Turkey, which hosts in Izmir the command of NATO troops' south-eastern contingent has become a very important pivot of the whole area securization. The Black Sea and the Sea of Azov are in NATO's direct responsibility area, a fact

⁵⁴ *NATO and Energy Security:6/5/12-Transcript*, on line <http://www.acus.org/event/nato-and-energy-security-readout-chicago/transcript>,

⁵⁵ Сергей Глебов, *Энергетическая безопасность Европы: Черноморский транзитный контекст*, online <http://nomos.com.ua/content/view/425/86/>

⁵⁶ „Ce s-a schimbat in regiunea Marii Negre dupa reorientarea SUA” (“What has changed in the Black Sea region after the US reorientation”) in *The Epoch Times*, online <http://epochtimes-romania.com/news/ce-s-a-schimbata-in-regiunea-marii-negre-dupa-reorientarea-sua---187181>

which imposed the necessity of creating around the Black Sea an area of stability. There is a project of creating a sustainable alliance between Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Georgia, which Moldova could eventually join. The presence of Georgia and Azerbaijan in the composition of the alliance would facilitate the accomplishment of energy projects and Turkey would exercise, on its turn, the function of binder of this structure. In a certain sense this alliance would be similar to the French-German-Polish-Ukrainian one, which has the purpose of becoming the core of the European security construction. Turkey could become, by building the Istanbul Canal, the centre of attraction both for Russia and for the USA and, implicitly, also for NATO, taking into account the fact that the access of fleets through this canal in the pontic area would not be subject to international notifications anymore, as happens in the case of the Bosphorus strait. The new project is called the Istanbul Canal and was announced by the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, two years ago, during the electoral campaign. Recently, the project was approved by the Turkish Government⁵⁷. According to the Montreux Convention, countries without direct access to the Black Sea have the right to transport through the Bosphorus to the Black Sea only easy military vessels and auxiliary vessels, forbidding the navigation of carriers and submarines. The total tonnage of the fighting vessels squadron of non-riparian countries must not exceed 45,000 tons. Viktor Nadein-Raevski, analyst at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations from Moscow, referring to this aspect, considers that “It is unlikely that a canal made by humans would be under the Convention’s jurisdiction. Thus, the transit of vessels and military transports will be possible. This will strengthen Turkey’s position”⁵⁸.

⁵⁷ „Noul Bosfor, cheia hegemoniei americane in Marea Neagra” (“The new Bosphorus, kez to the American hegemonz in the Black Sea”), emission at the *Voice of Russia*, online, http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2013_04_27/Noul-Bosfor-cheia-hegemoniei-americane-in-Marea-Neagra/

⁵⁸ Ibidem

The WBSR is far from being predictable in what concerns geopolitical and geostrategic evolutions in the field of energy security. The strategic player actors, EU, NATO and the US, although their influence in the area is not at all negligible, seem to have a minor impact on future geopolitical evolutions compared to the new actors who wish to become strategic players: Turkey and the Russian Federation. One cannot also exclude a triad, which today can be qualified as phantasm: Berlin – Moscow – Ankara. Some Russian analysts do not exclude such an axis; moreover, they consider such a geopolitical configuration as a guarantee of peace in the Black Sea⁵⁹ and the well-known analyst George Friedman considers that “only an alliance between Germany (who would provide the technical expertise) and Russia (resources and weapons) can threaten the US status of superpower on the long term”⁶⁰. In these conditions, security strategies of actors considered to be minor powers in these times must be based on the weighted optimism of strategic players concerning evolutions from the WBSR, but each of them also has to have a *plan B*.

4. Romania’s Energy Security and the Geopolitical Evolutions in the WBSR

Romania, as EU eastern border country situated at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, energetically depends on geopolitical and geostrategic evolutions which arise with an astonishing dynamics on the energy producers-consumers axis from the WBSR, although it possesses important soil and subsoil resources. Acknowledging the importance of energy for its future, the Romanian state provided strategic objectives in the field of energy

⁵⁹ Владимир Дергачев, “Новая геополитическая архитектура черноморского региона и безопасность восточной европы”, <http://dergachev.ru/analit/chernomor.html>

⁶⁰ The interview performed by Ion M. Ionita was broadcasted on Friday, 17 May 2013, in a special edition of the show „*Jocuri de putere*” (“*Power games*”), online, <http://www.razbointruconvant.ro/recomandari/2013/05/20/george-friedman-interviu-realitatea-pregatire-invazie-terestra-rusia/>

security⁶¹, both within its governing programmes and within programmatic documents, such as the *National Energy Security Strategy for 2007-2020*, adopted by Governmental Decision nr. 1069/2007, completed through an environment report that questioned the coherence of this strategy from the perspective of the environmental impact. This energy strategy lacks, though, practical elements especially in what concerns concrete actions and steps that must be followed in order to fulfil its objectives. Inspired by various such programmatic documents, especially by the EU strategy in the field of energy, the declared *Purpose* of the Energy Strategy consists in ensuring the so-called energy independence, in the context of Romania's and EU's sustainable development⁶². The established objective is generous, but the strategy does not specify "how" and "by whom" and "until when" the established action lines must be fulfilled⁶³. Defining energy security is, for the authors of this document, a problem. Dealing with the energy security issue, Daniel Yergin⁶⁴ establishes four components of the energy security concept: diversification of resource / supply sources (a principle launched by Winston Churchill), insurance of a "security margin" or "resilience" (to be able to face, by "buffer" resources, the shocks that are cutting the supplies), fully recognized integration into a global energy market and the importance of high quality information. Sebastian Mallaby (Council on Foreign Relations) also adds another element (related to global interdependencies, recognized also by Yergin),

⁶¹ Governing Programme for 2013-2016, p. 47-55, on line, <http://www.drp.gov.ro/download.php?6b3a2e12faf92184a320aeeaa3f853cf>

⁶² Presidency of Romania, *Strategia de Securitate Nationala a Romaniei (National Security Strategy of Romania)*, Bucharest, 2007, p. 46.

⁶³ Laurentiu Pachiu, „Romania si problema strategiei energetice: intre pasiunea pentru strategii si inconsecventa strtegica” (“Romania and the issue of energy security: between passion for strategies and strategic inconstancy”), online, <http://www.contributors.ro/administratie/romania-si-problema-strategiei-energetice-intre-pasiunea-pentru-strategii-si-inconsecventa-strategica/>

⁶⁴ Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security”, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2, March/April, 2006, p. 70–82

namely the global energy market stability for all participants. In other words, Romania has to understand, too (probably we do it intuitively, but we must also conceptualize) what S. Mallaby claims, that “*a state’s energy security is a component part of other states’ energy security*”⁶⁵. Romania has limited oil and gas resources, although during the last years a new resource was discovered, the shale gas. From this perspective, our country continues to be vulnerable from an energy point of view. Thus, energy dependence concerning oil increased from 51.1% in 2006 to 55.6% in 2008 and even to 55.9% in 2009. On the contrary, dependence on external natural gas resources decreased from 34.3% in 2006 to 27.5% in 2008 and 19.8% in 2009. In this context, Romania can be included in the category of countries possessing limited energy resources, which are completing the consumption needs from external sources. In our opinion, Romania will also depend in the following years on the Russian oil and gas shipments and on its transport networks. What answers does Romania have if the main gas supplier, the Russian Federation, reorients its shipment priorities towards the Asian area? Can we confront both with a resource scarcity and with a payment balance that will not allow us to get supplies from other areas? Or, if we ensure the so-called “energy independence” and the Russian Federation (the main supplier for Europe) is confronted with an energy satisfied global market (lower margins), isn’t there a risk (while revenues from hydrocarbons exports account for 50% of the Federation’s budget) of developing an ark of instability at the EU and NATO eastern border, with hard-to-foresee implications also for Romania?⁶⁶

Romania has to take major decisions in the near future in what concerns its energy security. The decline of the domestic production of hydrocarbons must be stopped, which requires considerable technological investments. Then, massive investments are necessary in order to increase the capacity

⁶⁵ Sebastian Mallaby, “What ‘Energy Security’ Really Means?” in *The Washington Post*, July 3, 2006, online <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/02/AR2006070200675.html>

⁶⁶ Laurentiu Pachiu, op., cit., in loc., cit.

of the national energy system for taking over the growing contribution of regenerating energies. “Intelligent grids” and the required balancing capacities are, nevertheless, very costly⁶⁷. Further on, its necessary to develop new oil and gas fields, including non-conventional ones. We need lucid and informed debates concerning the potential shale gas production and about the possible commercial exploitation of gas layers from the Black Sea continental shelf. Starting with 2005, the US production of shale gas caused an authentic revolution on the global energy markets⁶⁸. From 2009, the US gas production is year by year greater than Russia’s. Great quantities of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) initially destined to the American market were re-directed during the last years towards Western Europe, with the effect of an oversupply of gas and of a decreasing gas price in the spot type stock exchange transactions. This fact seriously affected the mutually advantageous relations consolidated for decades between *Gazprom* and great German, Italian and French energy companies, based on long-term contracts (20-25-30 years), while spot type transactions were preserved for many years at about half the price by this kind of contracts.

The Romanian society will have to prudently exploit the possibility of using some technologies that proved to be so productive in North America⁶⁹. The social acceptability and the ecologic sustainability of some potential shale

⁶⁷ Radu Dudau, “Nabucco Vest si securitatea energetica a Romaniei” (“West Nabucco and Romania’s energy security”), in *Revista 22*, paper edition, 7 August 2012

⁶⁸ See Paul Stevens, “The ‘Shale Gas Revolution’: Developments and Changes”, online http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/bp0812_stevens.pdf; Amy M. Jaffe, Hayes, Mark H., Victor, David G. *Gas Geopolitics: Visions to 2040*. Program on Energy and Sustainable Development at the Center for Environmental Science and Policy. Stanford University, Revised August 2005, on line, <http://pesd.stanford.edu>;

⁶⁹ Stefan Marincea, director of the Geological Institute about exploiting shale gas (interview), on line <http://epochtimes-romania.com/news/stefan-marincea-directorul-institutului-geologic-din-romania-despre-exploatarea-gazelor-de-sist-in-romania-interviu---188402>; “Academia Romana fracturata de discutiile despre gazele de sist” (“The Romanian Academy fractured by discussions on shale gas”), online <http://epochtimes-romania.com/news/academia-romana-fracturata-de-discutiile-despre-gazele-de-sist---186525>

gas exploitations will remain decisive conditions – assuming that Romania really has such resources, whose presence is currently only presumed. Recent German and British studies show that the extraction industry acquired some good practices, which can ensure the social and ecological security of shale gas exploitation by fracking, within a rigorous regulating and monitoring framework, but we do not have serious studies undertaken at the level of technical, environmental and social conditions from Romania.

In what concerns Romania's foreign energy policy in the Black Sea area, we have situations when solutions advanced by the energy diplomacy of the Romanian state are rather academic debates than practical solutions. The *AGRI* (*Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Inter-connecter*) project was transformed in an unjustified manner into a priority of the national energy strategy. There are a few reasons that make it theoretically possible but too fancy at the level of economic reality. First of all, the *AGRI* concept also counts on the available production of the *Shah Deniz II* field; now we know that the latter will be transported through *TANAP*. Second of all, the necessary liquefying equipments (from the Georgian port of Kulevi) and regasification (in the port of Constanta) would have a prohibitive price. Thirdly, Romania's capacity of using a regasification terminal in Constanta in order to benefit from the growing international trade with liquefied gas is dramatically reduced by Turkey's opposition towards any initiative of increasing the already crowded traffic through the Bosphorus by LNG cargos. Finally, from a strategic perspective, Romanian economic diplomacy must elaborate a plan by which the enormous discoveries of natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean, close to Israeli and Cypriot coasts, could become an alternative import source for Romania. Anyway, Turkey has the ambition of developing the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan into a world level energy hub and crossing Anatolia with a pipeline from north to south is easier than from east to west⁷⁰.

⁷⁰ Radu Dudau, *op. cit.* in *loc. cit.*

In terms of energy security, the most pressing problem of the European Union, but also of the five Black Sea riparian states, remains the safety of energy resources supply, taking into account their dependence on hydrocarbons and on Russian transport networks. They become ever more vulnerable in front of certain energy games under the form of reducing/cutting supplies, increasing prices or developing alternative transport routes. That is why, at EU level, an inter-connection of internal energy systems, networks and markets is necessary, which would allow the mutual support and distribution of resources among Member States, diversifying the offer, making demand and storing capacity more flexible. At the level of pontic countries, it is envisaged to reduce dependence on imports, to increase energy efficiency, to raise the importance of that country in the regional energy complex, as well as an energy intermediary between East and West etc.

5. Conclusion

Any discussion about ensuring Romania's energy security must start from a simple reality, namely that national energy reserves and resources are steadily decreasing and that Russia represents the main source of covering the energy deficit. Under these conditions, governmental authorities have proposed bold objectives within the National Energy Strategy, which if they would be achieved could maximize the special energy potential that our country possesses and could succeed in satisfying energy needs at the lowest possible price, in conditions of supply quality and certainty. Although the state continues to remain the owner of some relatively important energy resources, Romania cannot satisfy, in the context of the economic and financial crisis, of globalization and increasing competition on regional and international markets, its domestic consumption needs. As a result, we believe that the energy security of our country can be mainly achieved within European energy interdependences, but also by a mutually advantageous partnership between the EU and Russia. Romania's energy security can mean greater security at European level and the increase of EU energy security can translate into greater energy security for our country.

From Classical Geopolitics to Contemporary Geopolitics. Statutory Elements of a Strong Grounded Science in Reality and Actuality

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Abstract: Geopolitics, a science relatively new and controversial enough, a full-fledged science with indubitable practical meanings, evolves all together with the new developments carried out in all areas of human activity. Geopolitics statutory approaches are essential for its judicious transposition into practice through geopolitical analysis. Therefore, differences are clearly felt between classical geopolitics and contemporary geopolitics. This paper aims to emphasize these differences, focusing on key concepts in geopolitics, such as: the role of geographical environment, space, power, geopolitical actors, power factors and threats. In this respect the approach will refer especially to the post-Decembrist geopolitical Romanian literature which can reflect these differences, especially in the light of a science with a strong need for reaffirmation after a long period of scientific repression, of harsh criticisms, of calling into question and even of repudiation suffered during the communist regime.

Keywords: geopolitics, power, geopolitical actors, space, boundary, threats.

1. Worldwide Societal Transformations in the Contemporary Reality

The classical geopolitics began to develop in the last decade of the 19th century (debuting with Friedrich Ratzel's work: „*Politische Geographie*”-1897) and went up until the first half of the 20th century with K. E. Hausofer, A. T. Mahan,, H. J. MacKinder, etc.

Since the end of the 20th century's first half until present days a series of societal changes have been occurring worldwide at an unprecedented rate in human history. In general terms these changes are generated by technological advances, the evolution of communication and transport means, acceleration of international trade. These major changes are not left without repercussions at geopolitical science level. Geopolitical theory had

to evolve along with them not only in the sphere of international relations, but in all areas of international society as a whole.

Perhaps one of the most obvious and discussed processes that redefine the world at the beginig of the 3rd milenium is globalization. Silviu Negut, paraphrasing Mark Twain, said: *"Everyone is talking about globalization¹, but nobody knows anything about it!"*² Although it often tends to become a *"cliché ... that includes absolutely everything that happens around us and that can not be explained coherently, or the cause of all problems that global economy and modern society are facing"*³ it is, above all, a reality.

In an attempt to reduce the risk approaching globalization as a cliché, we will bring into attention some of the main conceptual elements of this process, essential to understanding the geopolitical evolution.

In an Oxford University Press volume, David Armstrong emphasizes that: *„contemporary globalization is a multidimensional, uneven and asymmetrical process"*⁴ which is based on: *„informatics technologies and infrastructures of communication and transportation"*⁵ and continues due to three tipes of interdependent factors: *"technics (technological change and social organization), economics (markets and capitalism) and politics (power, interests, and institutional)."*⁶

Some of the most important and geopolitically relevant carachteristics of globalization are:

- the distinction between interdependences and globalization. While interdependences imply increasing links between countries as separate

¹ Mark Twain was referring to weather

² Silviu Neguț, 2009, *Geopolitica –universul puterii*, Ed Meteor Press, București p. 310.

³ Teodor Frunzeti, „Globalizare sau regionalizare”, în *Impact Strategic nr. 2/ 2011*, p. 8.

⁴ John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, 2010, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 23.

⁵ Idem, p 18.

⁶ Idem, p. 22

- units, in case of globalization "the very distinction between the domestic and the external breaks down" and "Distance and time are collapsed"⁷
- „time-space compression": Deterritorialization of the social, political, economical activities both as effects and as decisions.⁸ Globalization succeeds in penetrating "even the most remote and peripheral regions and localities on Earth"⁹
 - geography and distances still matter¹⁰, we are not facing the end of geography: the space specificities (the particular "histories, societies and environments") in which globalization acts, but also the interaction with local places, institutions and people creates "uneven geographies"¹¹
 - the necessity to adapt to strategies as "Think global, act local" and "Think local and apply on a global scale."¹²

According to S. Neguț the globalization realities are: "the global nature of science and technology, the global marketing, the global financial system, the communication infrastructure, the international institutional framework."¹³ Sean Kay asserts it „is measured as the acceleration of trans-boundary communication, international networks, the diffusion of power, reciprocity

⁷ Idem, p 19.

⁸ Idem, p 18.

⁹ Warwick E. Murray, 2006, *Geographies of Globalization*, Published by Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York, p. 9.

¹⁰ John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, 2010, *op. cit.*, p 18.

¹¹ Warwick E. Murray, 2006, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹²***, *Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century: a reader*, edited by Patrick O'Meara, Howard D. Mehlinger, Matthew Krain, Indiana University Press, 2000, p. 309. http://www.google.ro/books?hl=en&lr=&id=VLwlnhq01RIC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=Globalization+and+the+Challenges+of+a+New+Century&ots=BFrPSOHDVW&sig=BAAd50NLmldERu3ViL-GkQ1WIs8&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false

¹³ Silviu Neguț, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 310-311.

and mutual dependence, and the expansion of universal norms and principles."¹⁴

Thus we will approach globalization as: "A historical process involving a fundamental shift or transformation in the spatial scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents"¹⁵ and as to what Eugen Siteanu considers one of the most appreciated and used definitions of globalization: "globalization represents the process by which the geographical distance becomes a decreasingly important factor in establishing and developing economic, politic and socio-cultural transborder relations. Networks of relations and dependencies acquire a growing potential to become international and global."¹⁶

The effects of globalization are both positive, translated in opportunities, and negative, taking the form of threats and risks for the geopolitical actors. From this perspective Sergiu Tămaș notes that "the geopolitical analysis provides the ground for an interpretation that can underlie adequate strategies in relation with oportunities and threats that regard a state."¹⁷ Therefore in this context the geopolitics cannot evade this reality of the geopolitical environment changes - and therefore the necessity of adapting itself to the actuality. In this effect notable changes can be observed by analyzing the process of defining geopolitics, in the first instance.

¹⁴ Sean KAY, "Globalization, Power and Security", *Security Dialogue*, vol 35, no. 1/ 2004, SAGE Publications, p. 11

¹⁵ John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, 2010, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁶ Eugen SITEANU, „Globalizare și Decizie Politică și Militară”, în *Impact Strategic 1/ 2006*, p. 24.

¹⁷ Sergiu Tămaș, 1995, *Geopolitica – o abordare prospectivă-*, Ed. Noua Alternativă, București, p. 61.

2. Defining Geopolitics. From Classical To Contemporary Approach

As a result of the global international changes, the evolution from classical to contemporary geopolitics is reflected even in the definition of this science.

Although F. Ratzel has never pronounced the term "geopolitics" he considered that: "*political geography will have to deal with the state. And the state is not a cartographic friction, but a biological reality too. It is a part of the earth and humanity, differenced by some natural circumstances that must be studied. The state, as any other organism, is born, grows, declines and perishes according to some physical circumstances: race, plastic forms of the shell, climate, etc. ... The scientist must follow all this social forms in order to reduce them to geographical categories.*"¹⁸ His ideas were "at the same time a link and a starting point both for political geography and geopolitics, even though the two sciences didn't succede coexisting in harmony as time passed by."¹⁹ According to his geopolitical concepts, the state is a living organism that after the "*cell structure model*"²⁰ has the following main "*spatial characteristics*"²¹: the *mittelpunkt* (the nucleus²² or even the embryo from which the state arises²³), the space (the cytoplasm), the

¹⁸ Paul Dobrescu, Alina Bărgăoanu *Geopolitica*, Ed Comunicare.ro, București 2001, p. 25-26, apud S. Mehedinți *Antropogeografia și întemeietorul ei, Friedrich Ratzel*, Atelierele grafice I. V. Socecu, București, 1904.

¹⁹ Voicu Bodocan, 1997, *Geografie politică*, Ed. Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, p. 13.

²⁰ Vasile Simileanu, 2011, *Geopolitică și centre de putere*, Ed. Top Forum, Colecția GeoPolitică, București, p. 198.

²¹ Ilie Bădescu, 2004, *Tratat de Geopolitică*, Volum I, Ed „Mica Valahie”, București, p. 20

²² Vasile Simileanu, 2011, *op.cit.*, p. 198.

²³ Ilie Bădescu, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 20

borders (the peripheral organ, the cell membrane) and the position (which decides the value of the space).²⁴

Rudolf Kjellen, the first author to use the term "geopolitics" in this context, defined it as „*the science that studies the state, as a geographical organism, as this manifest itself in the space.*”²⁵ Constantin Hlihor asserts that in the kjellenistic vision this science consists in: „*geopolitics, echopolitics, demopolitics, sociopolitics and cratopolitics. Geopolitics studies the state as theritory (location and form), echopolitics analyzes it as husbandry, demopolitics regards it as a race, sociopolitics as a society, and cartopolitics deals with it from the guvernamental perspective.*”²⁶ Even since Kjellen we can observe the geopolitical science's inclination towards interdisciplinarity.

Later on, Karl Est Hausofer, „*traumatised... by the humiliation imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty*”, becomes the first professor of geopolitics in the world²⁷ and defines it as „*the science regarding the political forms of life in the natural spaces of life, that endeavours to understand their geographical dependence and conditionality along the historical movements.*”²⁸ Hausofer also perceives geopolitics as interdisciplinary by „*considering geopolitics as a combination between «geography, history, political economy and sociology», which can acquire in its evolution the status of science*”²⁹ ... „*being convinced that geopolitics must study the issue of states' dynamics, by their ethnical, political, social, economical*

²⁴ Vasile Simileanu, *op. cit.*, p. 201, apud I. N. Sava, *Geopolitică. Teorii și paradigme clasiceale. Școala geopolitică germană*, Ed. Info-Team, București, 1997, p. 47.

²⁵ Silviu Neguț, 2009, *op. cit.*, pag. 27.

²⁶ Constantin Hlihor, 2005, *Geopolitica și geostrategia în analiza relațiilor internaționale contemporane – Considerații teoretice și metodologice-*, Ed Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, p. 42.

²⁷ Silviu Neguț, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

²⁸ Silviu Neguț, 2009, *op. cit.* p. 29, apud K. Hausofer, E. Obst, H. Lautensach, O. Maull, 1928, *Bausteine zur Geopolitik*, Berlin, Griinwald, p. 49.

²⁹ Constantin Hlihor, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

geographies."³⁰ Like Ratzel, Hausofer too admits and relies on "*the organic relation between territory and population.*"³¹

As for A.T. Mahan, K.E. Hausofer, H. Makinder, N. Spykman, A. Seversky, we can assert they were some of the most important thinkers in terms of applied geopolitics: Mahan's sea power theory, Makinder's pivot area theory, Spykman's rimland theory and Seversky's air power theory.³²

Regarding the approaches of the Romanian school, we can appeal to Ion Conea's perspective: "*geopolitics will not study each state separately, but the political game between states... the science of realtions...pressures between states*"³³... "*the scence of the planetary political environment... it must present and explain us the political map.*"³⁴ Anton Golopenția "*by contrast to Ion Conea, ... emphasizes that the geopolitical research should regard the state no matter of its size.*"³⁵ Practically he consideres that "*the geopolitical reflection is based on ... the dynamics between states at regional, continental or planetar level, and that it has as a starting point the potential of each state. The potential is given by the size of its territory, population and economy, by the social structure, the nature of the political regime, the culture of a state.*"³⁶ He states that: "*the geopolitical research is, thus, not only geographical nor only economical, nor only political, but geographical, demographical, economical, social, cultural, political at the same time.*"³⁷

³⁰ Ibidem

³¹ Silviu Negut, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

³² Paul Dobrescu, Alina Bărgăoanu, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 45- 60.

³³ Idem, p. 14.

³⁴ Paul Dobrescu, Alina Bărgăoanu, 2001, *op. cit.*, apud Ion. Conea, "*Geopolitica. O știință nouă*", extras din nr 9-10, an III, sept/oct 1937, Institutul Social Român, București, 1938.

³⁵ Constantin Hlihor, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 57, apud Anton Golopența, *Însemnare cu privire la definirea preocupării ce poartă numele de geopolitică*, în E. I. Emandi, Gh. Buzatu, V.C Cucu, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

³⁶ Idem, pag 58.

³⁷ Paul Dobrescu, Alina Bărgăoanu, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

Returning to actuality and leaving behind the classical zone, by pertaining to the Romanian geopolitical school we can assert that from defining geopolitics prospective a great part of the fundamental elements stated by the classical approach as the interdisciplinary approach - the spatial characteristics (space, border, position) - have been preserved. But under the global evolutions influence since the end of 20th century's first half until present, those elements are redefined by other coordinates.

Sergiu Tămaș claims that contemporary geopolitics *"deals with the numerous correlations between the power manifestations and their territorial projection at different levels on local, regional, social or international plan."* He remarks *"a diversification of geopolitical action plans"* manifested by evolving from the "unidimensional" vision of the classical period to the "multidimensional" one by its existence of multiple power forms within a space in the actuality.³⁸

Silviu Neguț consideres geopolitic as *"a discipline... at the boundary between geography, history, political science and social science, which studies/establishes the relation between political events and geographical space, as well as the power distribution on the Globe."*³⁹ Meanwhile, Constantin Hlihor brings its strategical side into the equation even since the definition, asserting that *"geopolitics is a discipline at the border between history, economy, demography, political science, geostrategy and political geography."*⁴⁰ Thus we can observe that interdisciplinarity remains constant, while the uniqueness of state as an geopolitical actor is reconsidered. If in classical geopolitics the actor is the state, in contemporary geopolitics the actors have multimplicated and diversified, Ilie Bădescu claiming that *"geopolitics is the science of relation between the ethnical organization of space and the economic, politic, cultural, religious organizations imprinted in the spatial, territorial structures and sistems."*⁴¹

³⁸ Sergiu Tămaș, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 61-62.

³⁹ Silviu Neguț, 2009, *op. cit.*, p.16.

⁴⁰ Constantin Hlihor, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

⁴¹ Ilie Bădescu, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

From here we can identify them as geopolitical actors of economic, political, cultural, etc. nature.

From Paul Dobrescu's definition we can extract the power factors valencies in geopolitics and the relation to natural frame "geopolitics concerns and analyzes politics from the natural frame perspective in which it takes place, aiming to explain the political measures and orientations based on the natural dates of a state: geographical position, surface, natural riches, population, etc."⁴² Here we can add Sergiu Tămaș's assertions which make the clear distinction between classical geopolitics and contemporary one from the angle of the "environment" role in geopolitics: "Unlike Ratzel's and Haushofer's epoch explanations, today's geopolitics is no longer the study of «environment» influence over politics. In contemporary vision the space is a pylon, a stake, but by no means an «actor» of history (Michel Foucher, 1991). In the contemporary geopolitical analysis, the emphasis lies on the way human factors are implied in the making of domestic and international politics of states as a whole and on how they represent the issues faced in the process of affirming their state- or national existence. Consequently, what matters are the ways politicians or the military use the geographical realities and the relation between states in order to achieve their goals. In this process of articulating the politics with the geographical space, the «actors» are the political forces in the game or in a space and by no means the geographical environment itself."⁴³

Another specificity is shaped very clear in Matei Șimandan's definition: geopolitics "studies the influence of geographical and sociological factors on domestic and external politics of states... the applied study of the relation between political science and the natural dates of a state: geographical position, area, relief, natural resources, climate, population, etc."⁴⁴ Here we can observe that the actual geopolitics studies some very complex evolutions, from the micro-dimension (the internal one of a territory) to

⁴² Paul Dobrescu, Alina Bărgăoanu, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁴³ Sergiu Tămaș, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁴⁴ Matei Șimandan, 2008, *Elemente de Geopolitică*, Ed. MIRTON, Timișoara, p. 7.

the macro one (the one external to the territory: neighborhood, regional, international and global).

From temporal point of view we can consider Dragoș Frăsineanu's statement as one of a great importance: "*geopolitics as a scientific discipline whose study object is interpreting the past, present and future international relation, from the perspective of geographical factors influence on the world politics, in their systemical complexity.*"⁴⁵ In actuality the geopolitical analyses can interpret both past and present, but can also formulate some predictions of future developments.

Thereby the evolution of geopolitics from classical to contemporary brings to attention a science eminently multidisciplinary, at the border between the geographical, historical, economical, demographic, cultural, social, politic and strategic science, which, based on certain power factors (tangible and intangible), studies the power exercise of the existent geopolitical actors in a space, for past, present or even future moment evolutions.⁴⁶ Therefore, geopolitics, being a science with practical and applicative valencies, has evolved in terms of the modern societal changes, which have imposed the reconsidering of the power paradigm as a geopolitical display, of the notion of geopolitical actor and of its spatial characteristics: space, border, position.

⁴⁵ Dragoș Frăsineanu, *Geopolitică*, Ediția a II-a, revizuită și adăugată, Ed. Fundației România de Măine, București 2007, p. 15.

⁴⁶ Cătălina Todor, The demographic coordinates approach in the Romanian Geopolitical school after 1989, *Strategic changes in the security and international relations in the early 21st century April 18-19, 2013*, Proceedings of the 9th International Conference "Strategies XXI", "Carol I" National Defense University, Bucharest.

3. Geopolitics and the Exercise of Power

3.1. The Power

We will refer to the concept of power according to the one decided by Constantin Hlihor: *"in geopolitical theory the power must be understood both as a relation between actors – the capacity of A to persuade/constrain B to act in a way in which he either doesn't have interest, or does not wish to-, but also as potential (powermeans) and will to act (powercapacity)."*⁴⁷

If traditionally the power has been measured in terms „of military capabilities, economic strength and natural resources, and the capacity to transform these assets into the exertion of influence”, at the beginning of the 3rd millennium the present would attribute power the transformation generated by globalization, this being an extremely complex concept having *"in structure geographical, industrial, military, demographic, national, moral, linguistic, juridical, cultural, religious, diplomatic and governmental components."*⁴⁸ From all these, the most important refer to: *„asymmetric power; state power; and the role of people, ideas, and media power"*⁴⁹ Consequently to power are been added new coordinates such as: human race, the informational resource and the technological advance.⁵⁰

By contrast to the classical power in which the "hard" power prevails, today's power is the object of a more shaded analysis.⁵¹ The literature indicates two components of today's power:

⁴⁷ Constantin Hlihor, 2005, *op. cit.*, p.202.

⁴⁸ Vasile Simileanu, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

⁴⁹ Sean Kay, 2004, *op. cit.*, p. 13 –14.

⁵⁰ *Idem* p. 14.

⁵¹ Sergiu Tămaș, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

- hard power⁵² identified also with *tangible sources*⁵³, *quantitative indicators*⁵⁴ or *quantifiable power*⁵⁵ (geographical position, territory, natural resources, economic capacities, demographic ones – population, military force, technology, etc.)
- soft power⁵⁶ – *intangible sources*⁵⁷, *qualitative indicators*⁵⁸ or *unquantifiable power*⁵⁹ (immaterial forces: national cohesion, world perception, the will and political stability, institutions, political leaders, the capacity of organizing and leading the society effectively, ideology, level of culture and civilization, the power of tradition, the determination of a people to achieve a goal, national pride, education and professional training, music, etc.)

In this context, Silviu Neguț appeals to the importance of using the term of "intelligent power/ smart power" in actuality: „ *the combination of hard power, of coercion and payement, with soft power, of persuasiveness and attraction.*”⁶⁰ A similar idea is seen by Sergiu Tămaș: ”*The contemporary geopolitics deals with tangible and measurable factors ... but also with imponderable factors that can modify the equation of power in a surprising manner... Therefore the main factors that interfere are: the geographical size and localization on the Globe, topography and climate, natural resources,*

⁵² Ibidem.

⁵³ Vasile Simileanu, 2010, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁵⁴ Dorel Bușe, 2012, *Geopolitică și geostrategie*, Ed. Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2012, p.74.

⁵⁵ Paul Dobrescu, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁵⁶ Sergiu Tămaș, 1995, *Geopolitica – o abordare prospectivă-*”, Ed. Noua Alternativă, București, pag 163.

⁵⁷ Vasile Simileanu, 2010, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁵⁸ Dorel Bușe, 2012, *op. cit.*, p.74.

⁵⁹ Paul Dobrescu, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁶⁰ Silviu Neguț, Marius-Cristian Neacșu, From hard power to soft power. The intelligent power, *International Conference Strategii XXI – The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment*, București, 2012, p. 216- 226.

population number and level of training, economic productivity, military capacity, efficacy of the political social organization, diplomatic «know-how» degree”. (Richard W Sterling, 1974).⁶¹

The contemporary geopoliticians see in the soft coordinate of power a coordinate which present and future should focus more and more on. Paul Dobrescu highlights the changing weights of power factors and asserts that *“if geopolitics wants to be actual, it must recompose the parallelogram of forces which feed the state politics and the evolution of the international political environment... Geopolitics can no longer be only «the geographical awareness of a state»; it must be the awareness of «states potentials» that the governance puts forward.”*⁶² Practically he refers to the natural data of states, namely the *“hard”* elements of power, which - although retaining their meaning - no longer can explain the geopolitical evolutions by themselves. Regarding the transformation of the power paradigm from classical to contemporary, we can assert that the tendency is the transition from the prevalence of *hard power* to *intelligent power*, focusing more and more on its soft component.

3.2. The Threats

The exercise of power in geopolitics manifests by means of two coordinates: the dispersion and diffusion of power inside a territory and outside of it at regional, international and worldwide level, and the protection coordinate of power represented by security.

Regarding protection, the contemporaneousness, by contrast to the classical period, brings to attention fundamental changes of the *“threat”* concept. Even since 1998, Ignacio Ramonet remarked the fact that the most profound effect of globalization are found in the complication of the *“threat”* concept itself, *“the main enemy is no longer univocal; it is, from now on, a monster with a thousand faces that in turn may assume the appearance of the demographic boom, drugs, the Mafias, nuclear proliferation, ethnic*

⁶¹ Sergiu Tămaș, 1995, *op. cit.*, pag 159.

⁶² Paul Dobrescu, Alina Bărgăoanu, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

fanaticism, AIDS, the Ebola virus, organized crime, Islamic fundamentalists, the greenhouse effect, desertification, population migrations, radioactive clouds, etc. All these are threats without borders and planetary in scale; they are propagated all across the Earth and cannot be fought against by means of the traditional weapons of war."⁶³

The globalization process contributes to multiplying the "faces" of threats and implicitly to complicate the concept of security. We are already living in the era of multiple securities from military security, food security to the human, cultural, economic, social, political, etc. one. As the threats diversify, they gain a global character; it becomes increasingly difficult to counter them by the actors responsible with local, national, regional, international and worldwide security.

*"Which nation can protect its frontiers against diseases, ballistic missiles, drug trafficking or against transmission of subversive images? Which nation can protect its air and water against the acid rain carried across Canada or against the radioactive cloud which are heading from Chernobyl towards the West? Which nation can protect its currency against the the damaging speculation on the money markets of the world? (Lewis H. Lapham, 1988)"*⁶⁴

4. The Geopolitical Actors

*"Undoubtedly, the actors are the noticeable element, but also the most dynamic one of the international politics"*⁶⁵ and here we can observe that one of the most visible geopolitical transformations is: while the classical period nominated the state as actor, meanwhile modernity emphasizes the multitude and diversity of pawns on the geopolitics chessboard.⁶⁶

⁶³ Ignacio RAMONET, 1998, *The Geopolitics of Chaos*, Algora publishing, New York, p. 18.

⁶⁴ Constantin Hlihor, 2005, *op. cit.*, p 132.

⁶⁵ Dorel Bușe, 2012, *op. cit.* p. 130.

⁶⁶ The concept of "chessboard" is retrieved and extrapolated from Z. Brzezinski's ideas.

According to the classical approach, the assertions made by geopolitics' „parents” are essential: F. Ratzel: *”geopolitics will have to deal with the state”*⁶⁷ and Rudolf Kjellen: about geopolitics - *”the science which studies the state”*⁶⁸, conceived as *”the unity and interdependence in the political field of five fundamental elements: geographic, ethnic, economic, social and juridical, naming ”the five faces of a state’s existence»: country (Reich), race (Volk), country’s economy (Reichshaushalt), social structure (Gesellschaft) and government (Staatsregiment). The interdependence of those five factors... ensures the organical aspect and the integrality of the state”*⁶⁹ This is confirmed at practical level, Constantin Hlihor asserting that: *”in the geopolitical action, up until the end of the 19th century, states - no matter of their size - were the main actors which in international realtion disputed or harmonized their interest in a space or in another ”*⁷⁰

In contemporary period we can no longer claim the unicity of the state as a geopolitical actor, not even from national perspective. The interdependences and interconnections, the change in the power paradigm and diversification of threats all generated by the complex process of globalization make the actors acting on the geopolitic scene to be no longer of statal nature alone, but also parastatal (international organizations: UN, IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organization, etc; regional blocks: EU, NATO, OSCE, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, etc) and non-statal one (transnational corporations, NGOs⁷¹, global media) for the most diverse geopolitical areas. Those actors can play locally, internationally, transnationally and globally, according to Michael Mann⁷², and in diferent

⁶⁷ Paul Dobrescu, Alina Bărgăoanu, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 25-26., apud din S. Mehedinti *Antropogeografia și întemeietorul ei, Friedrich Ratzel*, Atelierele grafice I. V. Socecu, București, 1904.

⁶⁸ Silviu Neguț, 2009, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁶⁹ Ibidem

⁷⁰ Constantin Hlihor, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

⁷¹ NGO -Non-governmental organizations

⁷² D Bușe, 2012, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

areas of geopolitical action from economy to military, ecology or public opinion.

From this perspective the role of states changes in the geopolitical architecture. Silviu Neguț even claims that the state would no longer be the main actor and goes on the hypothesis of "weakening of government authorities"⁷³ thereby resulting "an evident reduction in the State's autonomy even though this fact is not that visible right now."⁷⁴ On the other hand, Teodor Frunzeti asserts that "the state remains in terms of economy, society and culture the main actor even in a globalized and regionalized frame, its position being more and more charged with interdependence processes which allow it to achieve its goals only by cooperation with third parties"⁷⁵

It must be noted that, along with classical actors, which are States, the non-classical ones⁷⁶ begin to gain increasing importance in the new geopolitic architecture, and that sovereignty becomes relative, as Gheorghe Nicolaescu remarks. He sustains the idea according to which "the fundamental issue each state is confronting remains the identification of a new balance between international competitiveness and preserving national cohesion, between the new economical demands and those of traditional geopolitics and geostrategies". Gheorghe Nicolaescu, considering the impossibility of the state to avoid the globalization path, regardless of size, economic development level, political regime, military power⁷⁷, finds as the only solution "to substitute the state concept understood as a unitary whole sovereign with the state understood as a place in which the networks and influence relations are concentrated."⁷⁸

⁷³ Silviu Neguț, *op. cit.*, p. 317

⁷⁴ Idem p. 311.

⁷⁵ Teodor Frunzeti, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁷⁶ Constantin Hlihor, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁷⁷ C. Panait, A. Pasol et al, 2007, *Dimensiunea de securitate a globalizării*, Ed. A.N.I, București *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁷⁸ Gheorghe NICOLAESCU, „Globalizare, regionalizare și stat”, în *Impact Strategic* nr. 4-5 / 2002, p. 59.

Therefore from the geopolitical actors perspective we must observe esential transformations from classical to contemporary period: first of all the multiplication and diversification of actors and then the change of the very state concept as a geopolitical valency.

5. The Spatial Characteristics of Geopolitics

5.1. The Space

If we refer to space as one of geopolitics' study object, especially from the perspective of geographical determinism, we can clearly assert that space "*land, sea, cosmos ... is determinant for the conquest of world supremacy.*"⁷⁹

In Ratzel's perspective, space "*is not equivalent with the territory of state, but designates the natural limits in which the expansion of nations can be produced, the area which these thend to occupy, considering that it is naturally theirs.*"⁸⁰ This conceptual delimitation between space and territory is valid also for the actuality, with the observation that space has gained new coordinates besides the classical ones.

Ion Conea makes an assertion extremely valid for the actuality: "*The Earth becomes every day smaller and there is almost no frozen corner or minuscule island lost in the wide ocean left unoccupied ... The times in which states aforded to let between one and another, as boundaries, true uninhabited areas are now gone.*"⁸¹ The globalization process, characterised by time-space compression by means of technic, communications and transportation infrastructure evolution, the intensification of interdependences

⁷⁹ Constantin Hlihor, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 146

⁸⁰ Vasile Simileanu, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

⁸¹ Constantin Hlihor, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 55, apud Ion Conea, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

emphasizes the transition from the geographical space, to which Ion Conea refers, to cyberspace.⁸²

From the classical theories of maritime power - Alfred T. Mahan, to "terrestrial power theory" of Halford Mackinder's "heartland"⁸³, Nicolas Spykman's rimland theory or even to the aerial power of Alexander de Seversky⁸⁴, which are pointing out especially the terrestrial and maritime space and later on the aerial one, in the post classical geopolitics up until now the importance of the cosmic space arises, and maybe the most actual space "disputed" is cyberspace.

Therefore we can observe a shift at perception level of the space notion from the classical terrestrial and maritime and even aerial space, even though this last one is less developed in the classical period, to the cosmic and cyberspace in contemporary period.

5.2. The Border

From a classical perspective, maybe the most relevant position is the Ratzelian one. In his vision the border is "*a product of movements ... of the stata, economic and people territory periphery*" and "*the most sensible organ where the health status of a state can be detected. The intensity of the economic, cultural, communicationa pulsars emitted by the mittelpunkt can be measured the best at the borders.*"⁸⁵ Paul Dobrescu identifies in the Ratzelian work the border's geopolitical significance: "*the border is no longer the screed that marks the separation between states; it is a peripheral organ of state, as an indicator of its growth and weakness, a sensor of great finesse of its the changes that occur in its interior.*"⁸⁶

⁸² Gheorghe Nicolaescu, „Globalizare, regionalizare și stat”, in *Impact Strategic*, nr 4-5/2002, p. 75.

⁸³ Silviu Negut, 2009, *op. cit.* p. 35.

⁸⁴ Paul Dobrescu, Alina Bărgăoanu, 2001, *op. cit.* p. 58.

⁸⁵ Vasile Simileanu, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

⁸⁶ Paul Dobrescu Alina Bărgăoanu, 2001, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

From the statutory perspective the contemporary geopolitics makes a clear distinction between the concept of border and frontier: *"if the frontier represents a reality, a strip of ethnic, demographic, social, economic intermission between states, the border is a compromise reached after negotiations and often those negotiation followed some armed conflicts"*⁸⁷; the frontier is *"a coridor situated at the state's extremity - but being an integrated part of it ... and the border is a component element of the frontier ... resulted by intersecting a vertical plan that unites the meridian points of the landstones located in the frontier zone's interior."*⁸⁸

The repercussions of globalization on the state but also on space as previously discussed affect the borders: as the state is having less control *"a post-sovereign space, whose spectrum is situated from non-statal, to sub-statal and transstatal arrangement"*⁸⁹, globalization acts in two ways: *"enlarging borders, but also weakening them."*⁹⁰ From the arising of some vague spaces perspective, such the cosmic space and cyberspace, *"globalization increasingly fissures the geographical borders"*, focusing on the transfer of influence from the geographical space to cyberspace.⁹¹

5.3. The Position

I.N. Sava asserts that *"position, in Ratzel's geopolitical vision, is the one that decides the value of the space. «position mend, supersize and undersize space."*⁹² On the other hand *"Kjellen did not referd only to cartographical placement, determined by geographical coordinates, nor the positioning next*

⁸⁷ Vasile Simileanu, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

⁸⁸ Silviu Neguț, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

⁸⁹ Teodor Frunzeti, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁹⁰ Ibidem

⁹¹ Liviu Bogdan Vlad, Gheorghe Hurduzeu, Andrei Josan, „Geopolitică și globalizare - Statul în lumea postmodernă”, în *Impact Strategic* nr. 1/ 2009, p. 75.

⁹² Vasile Simileanu, *op. cit.*, p. 201, Apud I. N. Sava, *Geopolitică. Teorii și paradigme clasicele. Școala geopolitică germană*, Ed. Info-Team, București, 1997, p. 47.

to the sea nor in the heart of a continent, but to its placement in the architecture of the international relations."⁹³ As for Mackinder and Mahan, they pertain to the power given by the domination of some particular spaces: terrestrial and maritime and from here the relevance of dominance exercise over "the heartland" - Mackinder - and over the seas and oceans - Mahan.

Back to actuality, Vasile Simileanu specifies from the position perspective: *"it is about the strategical position of a space, a very complex concept which refers to the interdependences between the natural factor and the politic and demographic one; as a pluralism of natural, political and social position."*⁹⁴ Therefore we can observe an evolution of geographical pertaining from the classical period to one more complex based on geographical coordinates, but also on the human ones, political and social ones, the new spaces, and nevertheless pertaining position to global, international, regional conjunctures, connections and interdependences brought to attention by globalization.

6. Conclusions

From classical to contemporary period geopolitics as a science has known natural evolutions for a discipline that aims to transcend from pure philosophy to applicative area

Since the end of the 19th century until present, geopolitics had to evolve according to the worldwide societal developments, those being covered in general lines under the globalization process characteristics.

A synthesis of the main geopolitical transformations from classical to contemporary period identified by this research is:

⁹³ Constantin Hlihor, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 42

⁹⁴ Vasile Simileanu, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 201 – 202.

- The way of perceiving the geographical environment: in the actual vision the geographical environment is a "ground, a stake" whom actors can use in order to accomplish their goal. It stops being an "actor of history"
- The geopolitical actors are redefining: from the classical state to the multitude and diversity of contemporary geopolitical actors.
- The exercise of power is transforming, the soft power factors being of great importance today. Also the paradigm of power evolved from the prevalence of hard power to the importance of using in actuality "intelligent/smart power"
- The evolution of the geopolitics' spatial characteristics: redefining the concept of "space" and the arising of new spaces (cosmic space and cyberspace); enlarging and weakening of borders; considering position as a multidimensional cumulation of natural, political, social position.

Thus, understanding the geopolitical transformation at a scientific level from classical to actuality is crucial and must contribute to the development of a geopolitical theory, not a geopolitical doctrine, which should be useful in creating a sustainable international environment in this highly cooperative and organized, but also highly chaotic present reality.

Considerations on Diplomatic Blackmail in the International Contemporary Community

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Abstract: Diplomacy means negotiation. And negotiation means a very good knowledge of the involved partners. Therefore, knowing the partner means to find his vulnerabilities for using them for your benefit. Blackmail is a form of manipulation which aims to achieve subjecting a person or entity for the performance of an act or omission or to force the person or entity to give something. This article aims to demonstrate that some certain diplomatic actions of some states may be classified as blackmail. Thus, we can talk about the concept of diplomatic blackmail.

Keywords: diplomacy, blackmail, international community, diplomatic blackmail, manipulation.

1. Blackmail in National Legislation

Blackmail exists as a crime in internal criminal legislation from almost the entire international community. Lately blackmail began to correspond "to a high level of latency, and among this type of crime is included the multiplying of organized forms of blackmail, and also the implementation in criminal mechanism's background of new means of influencing the victim in order to defeat his will, for the person to execute the patrimonial requirements of the offender. These means, often does not have a juridical and criminal coverage determined, such as the threat of vehicle kidnapping, the threat with the disclosure of confidential data, but which are not defamatory, the threatening of removal the assets, etc. Moreover, the existence of lack of fighting means, efficiently with this crime, straining errors in the juridical classification of this injury and the application of penalties which are due to certain defaults of the criminal law, but not least, the appearance of "critical" phenomena in the social-economic area, have

led to some criminal professionalism of the extorting and also the development of their dexterities to exploit the vulnerability of the victims¹.”

Thus, the blackmail represents a serious obstacle in the progress of social relations, particularly in the area of economic activities development by reducing the specific competitive surroundings of market economy and creating a spirit of distrust for any Romanian or foreign investor.

According to art. 194 of the current Romanian Criminal Code, blackmail is the *compulsion of a person by violence or threat, to give, to do, not to do or suffer anything, if the offense is committed in order to obtain in unjust way a gain for self or for another*, and shall be punished with imprisonment from 6 months to 5 years.

When *compulsion is the threat of uncovering a real or imaginary fact, compromising for threatened person, for her husband or a close relative*, the punishment is imprisonment from 2 to 7 years.

The article 194 of the Romanian Criminal Code, contained in the head. II "*Crimes against personal freedom*" regulates the blackmail infraction, which consists in the damage caused, primarily, to the mental freedom of the person, by the constraint exerted on it by the offender in order to acquire an unjust gain for self or for another. The law text does not require that infraction blackmail subjects have some special qualities and does not foresee specific criteria for identifying victims, but, according to art. 194 of the Criminal Code, the passive subject of infraction blackmail can be any person against whom action is exercised compulsion, violence or threats, for it to give, to do, not to do or suffer something (Constitutional Court Decision no. 73 of 7 March 2002, published in Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 257 of 17 April 2002).²

The article 207 of the new criminal code represents blackmail as:

¹ http://www.cnaa.md/files/theses/2012/21500/sergiu_crijanovschi_thesis.pdf

² See also <http://dorin.ciuncan.com/documentare/santajul-2/>

(1) *The compulsion of a person to give, to do, not to do or suffer anything in order to acquire in an unjust manner a non-economic gain, for self or for another, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to five years.*

(2) *With the same punishment is sanctioned the threat of uncovering real or imaginary facts, compromising for the person or for a family member, for the purpose specified in par. (1)*

(3) *If the acts foreseen in par. (1) and par. (2) have been committed with the purpose to acquire a patrimonial gain unjustly, for self or for another person, the penalty is the imprisonment from 2 to 7 years.*

The blackmail infraction is foreseen by current Romanian Criminal Code, in art. 194, in the section dealing with treats *the offence against personal freedom*, because harms or may harm a person's right to manifest his will and have his skills, or the constraint of a person by violence or threat to give, do not to do or suffer anything if the fact is committed in order to gain an unjust gain for self or for another. Special legal object is a complex one, being made up of social relationships on psychological freedom of the person and in related manner the social relations concerning private property or those threatened by the action of the felon to track without a gain right³.

By criminalizing blackmail, criminal law reacts against susceptible facts to restrict the freedom of blackmailed person to make decisions without constraint of his will, of his actions, of the goods that forms his patrimony. *Blackmail, although has as mainly legal object the social relations which are protected and by incrimination the threats, namely those relating to moral freedom of the person, is distinguished from the offence of threat in that the felon follows the obtaining a benefit unjustly.*⁴

Also, blackmail may be committed by the felon both on violent actions on the victim and threats, while the threat not involves the exercise on the

³ TOADER, TUDOREL- *Criminal Law. The Special Part* - Ed All Beck, Bucharest, 2002, p 116

⁴ See also <http://www.infolegal.ro/infractiunea-de-santaj-art-194-cod-penal/2008/08/08/>

active subject of violence acts on the victim, but only the threat action with the production of a future harm, threat that produce to passive subject a state of fear. Constraint must be effective and must be intended to determine the victim to give, to do, not to do or suffer anything⁵.

It must be noted that the offense of blackmail exists unconcerned if the constrained person satisfies whether or not the felon claims.

Blackmail has no material object, because the mental freedom, the moral, the honor and the dignity of a person represents moral values. To be violated the moral freedom, and the act forms the offence of blackmail is considered necessary to produce to the victim a state of fear which persists for an interval of time, between the time of exercise of compulsion and the moment when the victim regains its moral freedom.⁶

2. Diplomacy – A Method to Promote National Interests

2.1. Concept

Diplomacy is the art and practice to carry negotiations between authorized representatives of different nations or groups. Usually, this concept refers to international diplomacy, the conduct of international relations through professional diplomats in the problem of establishing peace, the issue of culture, the economy issue, of exchanging and war. The International treaties are usually negotiated by diplomats before and then submitted for approval to the nation's politicians.

Generally, diplomacy sanctions "the alignment of some mutual interests and the differences adaptation". When the parts agree to act in diplomatic partnership, have certainly "common general values to promote and defend." In the decision of partnership framework report, the two sides

⁵ TOADER, TUDOREL – op.cit.-p. 117-118

⁶ Ibidem, p. 118-119

resort to diplomatic means for "the alignment of mutual interests" and "differences adaptation."⁷

What could be more natural - in a world of reason- only the firm respect of the right of every people, every man on the planet "to live and grow in peace and tranquility"⁸? This is a major contemporary imperative that could be guaranteed in its achieving only on a set of legal rules, among which an important place is occupied by the rules of diplomatic and consular law.⁹

The legal foundation of diplomacy is becoming more powerful, the execution of diplomatic functions being inseparably linked to "promoting the norms and principles of international law."¹⁰

The natural law, human fundamental, of people to live in peace is done nowadays through open diplomacy, based on revealing sincerely the causes of existing disputes and searching for the best solutions for exceeding the conflicts and restore peace.¹¹ An effective diplomacy involves negotiations, carried with patience and perseverance by diplomats able to skillfully use the legal instruments conferred by international law. A good negotiator does not have to base the success of negotiations on false promises and lack of sincerity.¹²

⁷ MAZILU, DUMITRU, *Diplomacy. Diplomatic and Consular Law*, Edition II, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 413.

⁸ MAZILU, DUMITRU, *Treaty of Law of Peace*, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 17.

⁹ View MAZILU, DUMITRU, *Diplomacy. Diplomatic and Consular Law*, Edition II, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, pp. IV.

¹⁰ DUCULESCU, VICTOR, *Peace diplomacy*, Albatros Publishing House, București, 1985, pp. 49

¹¹ View MAZILU, DUMITRU, *Treaty of Law of Peace*, Lumina Lex Publishing House, București, 2006, pp. 17.

¹² View MAZILU, DUMITRU, *Diplomacy. Diplomatic and Consular Law*, Edition II, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, pp IV-V.

2.2. Diplomacy at the Beginning of the Century and Millennium

The new century and beginning of the millennium marks major changes not only in the political and economic life, due to the process of European integration and globalization, but also to diplomatic and consular relations. Diplomacy, consular and diplomatic law have developed and adapted to the requirements of current evolutions. Bipolar system has been exceeded, the URSS dissolved, its nuclear power was divided and diminished, the Russian Federation inherited the most of the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union, but "does not have nearly the economic strength, the political and military superpower which represented the URSS in the '70s"¹³, conditions in which the U.S. has assumed the single world power, trying to exercise this role in an own vision, after the wishes and interests of some political leaders in Washington. "Exercising this role has an impact on the global diplomatic developments, influencing the configuration of Diplomatic and Consular Law."¹⁴

In the years of "cold war" there have been numerous cases where the embassies of some countries, acting in contrast with the rules of diplomatic right, supported elements which were trying to act against some elected governments through free consent of the people. Thus, in the present, the diplomatic law practices and consular law, far from being abandoned, have been improved, observing such grave interventions in the internal affairs of other countries, whose people "have allowed" to choose on their countries administration, leaders unauthorized to some leaders of today's world. If in the past, diplomatic representatives of large states claimed a privileged place and threatened with retaliation if " the rights" of privileged powers which they represents will not be recognized, today the ambassadors of certain powers are acting as "government of colonies", in smaller countries,

¹³ MAZILU, DUMITRU, *Public International Law*, Volume I, Issue II, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 5

¹⁴ View MAZILU, DUMITRU, *Diplomacy. Diplomatic and Consular Law*, Edition II, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, pp. IV.

where are accredited, allowing themselves to put in public discussion the decisions of elected parliaments of those countries.¹⁵

And in this beginning of the present world there are still serious disputes and conflicts in different parts of the world. Samuel P. Huntington argues that there is a "clash of civilizations" (*The Clash of Civilizations*) and states that "the emerging of central and most dangerous dimension of global policy will be the conflict between groups belonging to different civilizations"¹⁶. He notes that "scientists have analyzed the world in terms of East and West, North and South, center and periphery" and Muslims "have traditionally divided the world into Dar-al Islam and Dar-al Harb, the house of peace and war".¹⁷ This distinction was reflected and, in a meaning, "reversed at the end of the Cold War by American scientists have divided the world into <<peace zone>> and <<turbulence zone>>. The first included the West and Japan, with almost 15% of the world population, and the last - the rest".¹⁸ The most common division is between rich countries (modern, developed) and poor countries (traditional, undeveloped or under developing). Cultural division between East and West is correlated with economic division, and the emphasis is less on differences in economic welfare and more on the philosophy that they are supporting, values and lifestyle. These differences can lead to conflicts between companies, but this only happens when rich and prosperous societies are trying to "conquer" and "colonize" the poorest and most traditional companies. West has done this for four hundred years and then some colonies rebelled and started wars of liberation against colonial powers which had lost the will to be empires. Economic development in Asia and Latin America has dimmed the simple dichotomy between those who have and those who do not. Rich countries can fight trade wars with any other state, the poor cannot fight violent wars with each other, but an

¹⁵ View MAZILU, DUMITRU, op. cit., pp. II.

¹⁶ HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the restoration of world order*, XX Header Publishing Press, Prahova, 1997.

¹⁷ Ibidem, pp. 43.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

international class war between the rich North and the poor South is almost as utopian as a happy and harmonious world. On some levels, the West is an entity. The unity of non-Western societies and the East-West dichotomy are myths created by the West. In any case there is no single cultural spectrum. Cultural polarization "East" and "West" is another consequence of the universal practice to appoint European civilization as Western civilization. The world is too complex to be divided into North and South (in economic terms), or East and West (in cultural terms).¹⁹

3. Diplomatic Blackmail – Negotiation Technique?

3.1. Introductory Remarks

The advised researchers of diplomatic relations in different historical stages indicated that the major powers have had a decisive role in world diplomacy, developing concepts, defining new institutions, **imposing the diplomatic conduct most proper to their interests**. A careful analysis of the evolution of the international system allows us to see that diplomacy of great powers is characterized by several tendencies and options, including:

- a) promoting, often a policy of subordination of other peoples, weaker economically and militarily;
- b) supporting - through their own methods and diplomacy - a policy of domination of other nations;
- c) confusing the interests of other powers with their own interests
- d) building alliances in which their interests are more easily imposed;
- e) alignment the positions of political alliances at the positions of dominant power.

In literature of speciality was pointed out that "the progress of diplomatic relations has long been prejudiced by the fact that representatives of major countries have prevailed of the circumstances that represents some powers

¹⁹ See HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL P, op. cit., pp. 43-45.

in order to claim a privileged role, denying the rights of other countries, threatening with retaliation if their <<rights>> will not be recognized²⁰".

3.2. Can We Talk about Blackmail in Diplomacy?

Diplomacy is a "*dynamic institution designed to facilitate relations between states, to promote national and international goals of nations - whether fundamental goals, vital interests, or concrete political objectives*"²¹". It is estimated that "*Diplomacy operates ipso facto in the international epicenter of the cosmos as a means of aligning of some correlative interests and accommodation of differences*"²²". Diplomacy is also considered "*an interrelated method in a competitive, inevitable environment and sometimes characterized by adversity and not conceived as a purpose itself*"²³". It cannot be claimed to diplomacy to realize the impossible²⁴". It was concluded that the success rate of diplomacy "*necessarily varies in direct proportion with the ability of political negotiation founded in competition and with the rationality of national goals*"²⁵".

It should be noted, however, an important issue: **promoting national interests must be made in accordance with international regulations**, which have binding force through the fact that it was adopted by agreement.

Unfortunately, it is more often observed the violating the principle of noninterference in internal affairs – international law principle of great value and great interest. This is achieved by assessments which resemble

²⁰ View MAZILU, DUMITRU, *Diplomatic bag - Diplomacy of great powers*, in "World - Magazine", No. 1 (166), 2007, pp. 70.

²¹ PLISCHKE, ELMER, *Modern Diplomacy. The art and the Artisans*, Washington D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1979, pp. 71-72.

²² Ibidem.

²³ Ibidem.

²⁴ Ibidem.

²⁵ Ibidem.

increasingly the offense of blackmail - convicted in domestic criminal law of most states.

We do not refer here to blackmail applied actually to diplomat and which fits in the national legislations, but to a form of behavior that harms international relations by violating the rules and principles of international law. Due to the fact that international law has a character of coordination, not one of subordination – as national legislation, at the level of international community there is no institutions which punish the violation of these rules, but only states that, due to financial potency, more or less - need to know their role – also too large or small - on “the great stage of the world”.

3.3. Energetic Blackmail...

Oil and gas are essential to any developed country. This fact significantly increases the importance of oil exporting states. The control on rich resources and deposits gives to a state a great power even that of exercising this power using similar methods of blackmail.

But not all states have the potential to achieve an energetic "blackmail". But when we are dealing with a cartel of exporting states or with a superpower that has vast natural resources, the situation changes dramatically. Thus, it is fulfilled the conditions of energetic blackmail. OPEC and the Russian Federation are the two forces in the use of this weapon.²⁶

The organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a structure that has lost much of its cohesion, making it less dangerous. A few years ago, the Kremlin ordered a master stroke announcing his willingness to join OPEC. In this way, it would become the most important country in OPEC. In this way, it would have become the most important state from OPEC and, consequently, it could have control this international body, gaining a huge the influence at global level. We can say, without exaggeration that Russia would have dictated global energy policy. Of

²⁶ To see GHEȚĂU GH. FLORIN – *Energetic Blackmail* - article available on the website: <http://www.geostrategic.eu/santajul-energetic.html>

course, the OPEC countries and superpowers affected by such a measure were not agreed to the plan of Moscow. Therefore, Russia and OPEC remain on distinct positions, although sometimes it is noted that there is a certain card between the two sides.²⁷

OPEC's power became clear after the 1973 and 1979 oil crisis. **U.S. was punished for attachment towards the Israeli cause.** Since the planetary resources of oil and gas are steadily diminishing and the demand is rapidly increasing, OPEC and Russia are becoming very important elements in global economic and political game. Between Russia and Europe exists an interrelation, because the first is dependent in some wise of currency which comes from the West, and Europeans are dependent on Russian gas. Thus, it is difficult to impose a long-term blackmail, because both sides would lose. But a localized blackmail against a state or group of states to achieve political objectives is something easy, or it will be possible soon²⁸.

In 2009, Russia used Ukraine for giving a lesson to this country and therefore to Europe. President Putin wanted to strike to Kiev, mainly, but managed to annoy customers and good payers of west and some less important as Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovakia. In Eastern Europe, there is a group of countries that are not exactly friendly to Moscow because of the historical experience. In this respect, the Baltic countries, Poland, Ukraine and Romania are nourishing numerous and justified resentment towards Russia. For example, Germany, sincerely regrets Nazi crimes, but not the same can be said about Russia, which does not regret any of its imperialist past. Moreover, the concern exists for the energetic domain for achieving trough the South and North Stream to a better supply for southern and western European customers and avoiding the hostile group states from Eastern Europe, shows us that the pipeline will make the state bove mentioned prisoners of Kremlin. Thus, at a time, Russia may decide to stop deliveries, only to Romania or Ukraine without affecting the deliveries to the West. In that moment, the Eastern Europe countries will

²⁷ Ibidem

²⁸ Ibidem

become prisoners of Russia, while the Nabucco project has proved to be an illusion in the absence of viable funding sources. However, when the two pipelines will be fully functional, energetic blackmail will not only be a veiled threat launched by President Vladimir Putin and Romanian diplomacy should be aware that our country is in a big and imminent danger.²⁹

3.4. Diplomatic Blackmail between Your Own Nation and Economic Interest

Alexis de Tocqueville observed that people who had been imprisoned for a long time have major difficulties to use their freedom gained unexpectedly. He performed of the analysis of developments in the different regions of the planet, after the collapse of classic colonial empires. His conclusions were established on the “negative effects” without the necessary analysis of the causes of the difficulties faced by people who have regained their freedom³⁰.

The new century and millennium has not marked the abandonment of the past mentality. A priority place continues to have “the cult of the powerful master.” In the behavior of several diplomats and in the approaches of diplomatic services of some states the “cult of the powerful master” gained even new dimensions, dishonoring those who promote it. Of these individuals, “is recruiting agents, informants, intermediates of the great powers³¹”. Such servant behavior is characterized as despicable³², but it is used for blackmailing the states which have not so great financial power. Not incidentally appeared those who support “the disappearance of nations” thus giving expression of “wishes and interests of the new masters

²⁹ Ibidem

³⁰ View MAZILU, DUMITRU, *Diplomacy. Diplomatic and Consular Law*, Edition II, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 26-27

³¹ Ibidem

³² Ibidem

of the world” who have concentrated economic power in large structures - multinational companies (ex. Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Shell, General-Motors, etc.) or organizations like the International Monetary Fund which they build and strengthen with the support of politicians found in their service and with the support of some diplomats.” The world continues to be led by the same seven or eight states as at the end of the nineteenth century³³.” Among the dozens of countries “*born from the disruption of colonial empires, only three (South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) reached levels of development comparable to the largest states. Others remain stuck in chronic underdevelopment*”³⁴ “.

The violence and conflicts of today are no longer just military. These take place on the entire planet, other “wars”, there “where inequalities are widening continuously and new global players (transnational major groups) continually expand their spheres of influence”³⁵.

In the extensive diplomatic debates of the United Nations were adopted the Decades Development Programs, which sanctioned the gap reduction between “the rich and the poor of world”. After applying these programs, the gaps have not reduced, but were deepened, and in subsequent years, the evolutions will be in the same direction. “*The poor are poorer and the rich will be richer*”³⁶.

The most worrying thing is that their own people are starving. Professor Amartya Sen - Nobel Prize for economics in 1998 - drew attention that the policies of some governments “can lead to hunger even when food is abundant.” “*Man is the one who starves a man*” - in countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, North Korea, Burma, Afghanistan, politicians or heads guerrillas take innocent “hostages”, starving them to achieve their political objectives. Sylvie Brunel noted that “the enemy people are no

³³ RAMONET, IGNACIO, *Other wars* in “Le Monde Diplomatique”, 1999, pp. 54.

³⁴ Ibidem

³⁵ See RAMONET, IGNACIO, op. cit., pp. 54

³⁶ See MAZILU, DUMITRU, op.cit., pp. 30-31.

longer starving, those who must be conquered, but their populations of those who want to profit from conflicts by unleashing the international compassion³⁷”.

“The surest ways of <<nation’s subordination represent their poverty, bringing them into misery>>. Those nations are poor, brought into total dependency towards contemporary transnational giants, that trough economic and financial mechanism such as the FMI, dictate in the economy and politics of those nations³⁸”. Romania is in this situation. Recall that, following discussions with the FMI (who later said he did some calculations ... wrong)³⁹, the government cut public sector wages by a giant rate: 25% and raised the TVA an alarming quota: 24%.

Also, the Romanian political crisis from July 2012 demonstrates once again that the political interests of the party, coupled with significant economic interests make not to matter the true interests of the people. The imposition from abroad to some false results of a people who clearly said their point of view in an electoral process proves us the violation of the non-interference principle in internal affairs.

4. Instead of Conclusions...

In international relations, blackmail is not punished, he is a part of ... negotiations. Not incidentally one of the stages of international negotiations, but not only is "preliminary information", namely the search and the gather of information, more or less formal about both people involved in this process and about the country with its problems and needs.

But what role has the diplomacy?

In his speech on 18 January 2006, the U.S. State Secretary, Mrs. Condoleezza Rice, has launched a new concept – “Transformational

³⁷ Ibidem, pp. 31.

³⁸ MAZILU, DUMITRU, op. cit., pp. 33

³⁹ See, for example: <http://www.cotidianul.ro/austeritatea-a-fost-o-greseala-203721/>

Diplomacy” at the Diplomatic School Georgetown in Washington DC, defining the American diplomatic mission as “a bold diplomacy”, a “transformational diplomacy”. In arguing this concept was evoked the point of view of President George W. Bush, who showed that, U.S. policy seeks to support the increasing of diplomatic movements and diplomatic institutions in every country and culture of the world in order to overcome tyranny in our world ". This thesis is found in the speech of the President William Jefferson Clinton - *Confronting the Challenges of Boarder World* – speech taken in the United Nation General Assembly on 27 September 1993 in New York, which was saying that "a new era of danger and opportunity, our main objective (U.S. - prev. ns) must be broadening and strengthening international community of democracies based on the market economy. The U.S. State Secretary defines the objective of transformational diplomacy, “working with our partners in the world to build and maintain well-governed democratic states” which is responding to people's needs and which “is behaving responsibly in the international system⁴⁰”.

From 2006 and until today are obvious the “changes” proposed by transformational. But it is equally obvious that we are still talking about conflicts that mark the people who suffer and decisions that are taken in response to threats and blackmail. Also, there are obvious violations of international law, but especially of human rights.

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European Union's Challenge: Turkey

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Abstract: Concerning the cultural and religious resistance, although I can somehow understand it, I have less sympathy for it because for me the EU is not a Christian club. Rather it is a community of common values, democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms. If a country meets those conditions, it should be able to join the EU – if it is a European country and it has a European vocation.

Keywords: Black Sea, cultural mosaic, irregular migration, Romanian coast.

Motto

“Concerning the cultural and religious resistance, although I can somehow understand it, I have less sympathy for it because for me the EU is not a Christian club. Rather it is a community of common values, democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms. If a country meets those conditions, it should be able to join the EU – if it is a European country and it has a European vocation.”¹

Turkey is the remaining present candidate for membership². EU leaders established since 1999, during the EU Council decision at Helsinki, that Turkey “is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidates”. Accession negotiations started in October 2005 with the analytical examination of the EU legislation (the so-called screening process). Since then the EU closed provisionally one chapter out of 35: Science and Research (June 2006). In

¹ Olli Rehn, Enlargement Commissioner, Interview for Euractiv, 21 November 2008, available at: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/commissioner-rehn-am-just-factory-manager/article-177381> [accessed 22.03.2011]

² Prior to his first visit to Turkey on 15-16 March 2010, Ștefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, stated: “I am confident that at the end of the process it will be a new, modern and reformed Turkey whose accession to the EU will be to the benefit of both the EU and Turkey”.

addition the EU opened negotiations on seven chapters: Enterprise and Industry (March 2007) and Financial Control and Statistics (June 2007), Trans-European Networks and Consumer and health protection (December 2007), Intellectual property and Company law (June 2008). On 18 February 2008 the Council adopted a revised Accession Partnership with Turkey. The document constitutes the framework for Turkey's preparations and provides guidance for financial assistance. The revised Accession Partnership will serve as a basis for future political reforms and as a yardstick against which to measure future progress. The main priorities for Turkey relate in particular to its capacity to meet the political criteria set for EU accession by the European Council at Copenhagen in 1993 and the requirements of the negotiating framework adopted by the Council on 3 October 2005.

Short-term priorities relate to issues like: democracy and the rule of law; human rights, civil and political rights, economic and social rights, minority rights, cultural rights, and the protection of minorities; regional issues and international obligations; economic criteria, and the ability to assume the *acquis* in the different negotiating chapters. Medium-term priorities relate to economic criteria and the ability to assume the obligations of membership³.

According to the principles governing the Negotiating Framework for Turkey, adopted in Luxembourg, 3 October 2005, these negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that

³ Press release "Council adopts a revised Accession Partnership with Turkey", 19/02/2008, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/08/44&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> [accessed 20.03.2011].

Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond⁴.

The big bang enlargement of 2004 and 2007 was all about a reunification of the continent but it inevitably produced symptoms of complete exhaustion and indigestion in some corners of the European Union. If enlargement is to continue, “it will have to take recourse to a different paradigm, that of a global Europe. The possibility of extending the European Union’s membership further will only be contemplated if the EU itself decides to be an open and confident actor on international stage”⁵.

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The impact of Turkish identity on the accession process can be listed among the reasons why the EU takes on a hesitant approach towards Turkey. Member countries must realize that the significance of the influence of identity is not an official accession criterion, and cannot be measured or commented on with progress reports, and open to subjective evaluation.

The success of Turkey’s bid for membership will be a significant indicator of how much impact the conceptualized European identity has on the integration process and enlargement; and also to what extent Turkey has been willing and will continue to adopt EU norms. For Turkey, joining the EU will indicate a confirmation of her status as a modern Western democracy.

Turkey’s much debated membership reveals very important clues about Europe’s conception of its own core values and identity. As a matter of fact,

⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf [accessed 20.03.2011].

⁵ Paweł Świeboda “Options in dealing with potential members and other neighbours” in Tsoukalis, L. (ed.), (2009), *The EU in a world in transition: Fit for what purpose?*, Policy Network, London, p. 45.

Turkey “serves as a test case for determining the way European identity will take shape and influence European integration from now on”⁶

A country whose land mass is overwhelmingly in Asia, which has a population of Muslim faith, has prompted many Europeans to claim that Turkey is not a “European” country⁷. Most controversially, and perhaps significantly, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the Chairman of the European Convention and the former President of France, stated in an interview to *Le Monde* published on November 9, 2002 that “Turkey cannot be admitted as a member to the EU, simply because it is Asian.”⁸ According to Giscard, it would be “the end of the European Union, as we know it if Turkey were actually to get in.” Turkey’s so-called “Islamic” culture, accompanied by the fact that 95% of the country’s land mass being in Asia would and should hinder such entry⁹.

Samuel Huntington had defined Turkey as a “torn-country”¹⁰, meaning that Turkey is neither completely Western nor Eastern. “Turkey does not share the Judeo-Christian cultural tradition, but neither does it belong to the predominantly Arab Islamic culture.”¹¹ Moreover, the various and divergent identities and attributes that Turkey has confuse the EU and blur the image of Turkey. EU members evaluate Turkey based on these different traits from time to time and arrive at different conclusions. “Turkey’s accession to the EU adds a cultural angle to the debate. It forces the EU to

⁶ Günes Becerik, Turkey’s Accession to The EU: A Test Case For The Relevance Of Identity http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_78.pdf (accessed 15.02.2011)

⁷ Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, (1999), “The European Union and Turkey”, *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 44

⁸ *Le Monde*, (9 November 2002), “Pour ou contre l’adhésion de la Turquie à l’Union Européenne”.

⁹ *Idem*

¹⁰ Samuel Huntington, (Summer 1993), “The Clash of Civilizations?”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72, No.3 p. 42.

¹¹ Yucel Bozdaglioglu, (2003), *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach*, Routledge, N.Y., p.68.

distinguish between a Christian, geographically narrow Europe and a broader, multicultural Europe of values.”¹² This has become a source of tension for the decision-making mechanisms of the EU and the national governments of member states, as European people desire to maintain their boundaries and national priorities even within the EU. European politicians fear that the addition of Turkey to this club would further complicate its integrity.

Opponents to Turkish accession have come up with the privileged partnership model as a substitute for full membership. **Germany** is critical of Turkish EU-membership. **German Chancellor Angela Merkel** said "accession is not a one-way street" and Turkey must fulfill the criteria. During the 2009 EU election campaign, she said she would prefer Turkey to receive a privileged partnership from the EU, rather than full membership. **France** appears to have become increasingly skeptical on the issue of Turkish EU membership. While former President Jacques Chirac had been a vocal albeit lukewarm supporter of Ankara's ambitions, the referendum on the EU Constitution brought to the fore the French public's reservations. **French President Nicolas Sarkozy** is firmly opposed to Turkish membership of the EU, claiming that "Europe has been lying about its borders. Turkey is in Asia Minor and not in Europe". Sarkozy believes Europe should suspend accession talks with Turkey and instead work towards a "privileged partnership".

The logic behind the privileged partnership formula is that "Turkey is not seen as part of the broader European family or civilizational nexus but as an important non-member with which relations primarily of an economic nature need to be developed.”¹³

The **Independent Commission on Turkey**, headed by Peace Nobel Prize Laureate Martti Ahtisaari, found that "negative reactions since 2004 from

¹² Othon Anastasakis, (Summer/Fall 2005), "The Europeanization of the Balkans", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol.12, No.1, p.79.

¹³ Ziya Önis, (Summer 1999), "Turkey, Europe, and Paradoxes of Identity: Perspectives on the International Context of Democratization", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, p. 135.

European political leaders and growing hesitation by the European public about further enlargement have given Turkey the impression that it is not welcome, even if it were to fulfill all membership conditions. Moreover, the process itself has been hindered by the effective blockage of more than half of the negotiating chapters¹⁴. Conditions to be met for accession seem continually to be raised to more stringent levels than for other candidate countries. Psychologically this has been the most discouraging aspect of the way Europeans are behaving. Turks feel that the European Union has deliberately put the countries of the former Soviet bloc before a long-standing western ally and NATO member. This negative political attitude seems to have frustrated the commitment of reformers, the independent commission concluded.

The Turkish government has described the idea of a 'privileged partnership' as insulting, since this definition does not even have a legal basis and any formula besides full membership would indicate a second-class status and would therefore be unacceptable.

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Burak Erdenir, member of the Secretariat General for European Union Affairs, Turkish Prime Ministry¹⁵ sustains that the prospective European Union accession of Turkey with a Muslim population of over 70 million will be a great opportunity for Europe to question its limits of identity and diversity, taking into account that Turkey would become the EU's **most populous member state in the next 20-25 years**. The case of Euro-Turks contributes to the debate on the limits of European identity. Those who have been successfully integrated into the European societies demonstrate the fact that Europeanness is not a culturally defined holistic identity, but a

¹⁴ "Turkey in Europe: Breaking the vicious circle", report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, September 2009.

¹⁵ Burak Erdenir, LIMITS OF PAX EUROPA: MUSLIMOPHOBIA, Paper presented in Halki International Seminars, "Europe: Mind the Gaps", Spetses, 21-25 June 2006, http://central.radiopod.gr/en/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/edrenir_limits_pax_europea.pdf [accessed 20.03.2011].

dynamic process of being and becoming. The success in integration of those Turkish immigrants may be a forerunner for those marginalized Muslims in different European countries.

The future prospects of Turkey - EU relations will depend on the ability of the two sides to come to terms with concepts such as diversity and coherence. The perception of dangers deriving from differences and disparities should be replaced by the potential of dynamism and synergy presented by diversity. Turkey possesses the inner strength and capacity to transform sufficiently in order not to threaten the coherence and functioning of the European political process. The European Union, for its part, possesses the capacity and the mechanisms to accommodate Turkey, with all its diversity. The question is whether both parties have the political will.

The one single argument which resonates strongly with most supporters of Turkey's EU entry is "*the power of example it would generate in the Muslim world, the relations with which will be one of the defining challenges of the coming decades. In spite of its uneven record, Turkey's example of modernization has been observed closely across the Muslim world and serves today as one of the most convincing arguments for intercultural dialogue. Having Turkey among its members, the EU would be in the position to talk to Muslim countries from a position of confidence and credibility*"¹⁶.

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Considerations on the Geostrategic Position of Romania to the Black Sea

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Abstract: The particularities of its geographical position - river-sea state and continental - and the strategic position offers certain advantages of Romania in the international context in achieving its national interests as a Member State of the EU, but also of NATO. The location of a state on the maritime and fluvial territory contributes to the development of socio-economic particularities. It can be said that there is a development after several parameters: political, economic, social, cultural and military, which give the national security and defense policies certain values.

Keywords: geostrategic position, national interest, security policy, economic development.

1. Preliminary

The increasingly importance of concern for geostrategic requires to emphasize some differences between references to geostrategic often made so that suggest a synonym of geopolitics.

The development of a geostrategic components is made in relation to how it is organized its real or potential opponents and depending on its force. Depending on the situation, geopolitics include those concerns within their geography configurations considered a major note to obtain a stable and long-lasting domination or influence, such as oil fields or other resource-rich areas, some areas that allow control over some regions of the world and the main axis of planetary communication. From this point of view, the Suez Canal, the Bosphorus, the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and other regions of the world are paramount geostrategic stakes. Delimitation of each component depends on the main policy options and priorities for development opportunities and constraints imposed by the environment of action [1].

Geopolitics will always be a science of the present time that means of the phenomena that occur now. Ion Conea noted in this regard that "*geopolitics of today will be tomorrow's history as any history of past eras was geopolitics for and during the time when happened the facts that we look at as history*" [2]. So, history is not but a geopolitical flow in time.

The study of world history shows that access to the sea (ocean) favored since ancient times economic prosperity and political, military, economic, commercial and cultural expansion of states belonging to different civilizations and geographical meridians [3]. Accesses to the sea or ocean favored and still favor many commercial-economic and strategic opportunities for the small countries not striving for economic, political-military and cultural hegemony, among which Romania is counted too.

2. The Geostrategic Importance of the Black Sea

Geographically, Romania is located in the South-East of Central Europe, North of the Balkan Peninsula and the North-Western coast of the Black Sea. Almost the entire area of the Danube Delta is in Romania giving it a very important geo-strategic position in South East Europe.

Along the Carpathians and the Danube, the Black Sea is the third element of Romanian geopolitical system with underlying role in the past and present history of the Romanian people. Although the European countries and international organizations geopolitical find Black Sea of lower geopolitical importance than the Mediterranean, it has grown following the revolutionary events of the twentieth century. [4]

Historically, Black Sea has always been always at the confluence of the great empires (Ottoman and Russian) and, why not, at the confluence of Western and Eastern civilizations. However, it is difficult to talk about the influence of these cultures on the bordering states since the geopolitical structure of the Black Sea area was permanently changing.

The fate and history of Romania are connecting to its location in the Black Sea area and North of the Balkan Peninsula. After the fall of the communist

bloc, Romania had the opportunity to define new national geopolitical and geostrategic objectives in terms of constitutional democracy based on free market economy and respect for individual rights and freedoms of its citizens.

Black Sea area gradually became important after 1990, and both the United States and the representative countries of Western Europe rallied to integrate the countries of Central and South East in regional systems and alliances such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the EU (European Union), supporting the former communist states transitions to democracy and providing them financial political, social and humanitarian assistance,.

The Pontic geopolitical system is the oldest in Europe, of particular strategic significance for Romania and neighboring states. A state placed at seaside and river is a solid geographical unit, with great influence both on sea circumscribed area and the entire river course. Interference of sea, river and continental factors has to be capitalized by the state in domestic and foreign policy, especially in the design of the military dimension of national security. Key elements for river –sea and continental state are according the specialists in the field [5], the following:

1. The *space occupied* between conventionally and geographically defined area (area, opening to sea, national control of river, territorial maritime spaces and maritime-river borders location etc.).
2. *Position on sea/river* (length of coastline, territorial waters, the river as border, the part of river within the state, delta, the distance from the straits, sources of raw materials and economic areas, proximity/ distance to the ways of communication / trade routes, etc..)
3. *Relations with river-sea neighbors* (number of them, the economic and military potential common interests/divergence in progress and in future, etc.).

Geographically, Romania is privileged to have all possible forms of relief, but also a special position in Europe. Existence of access to the Black Sea

and Danube Delta on the national territory has of strategic importance. The interest of the world powers for Black Sea access is yet another argument in this regard. Somehow the Caucasian oil road, pass through the Black Sea. Besides, who has the mouth of the Danube and free access to the Black Sea is controlling access to important strategic corridors.

One can thus say that our country plays an important role due to the access to the Black Sea as a "*strategic synapse*" [6] between important strategic corridors that:

- Neighbors to West the Caucasus, which currently has many problems;
- Is part of the Eurasian energy corridor, namely at its connection with one of the largest consumers of energy in the world, EU;
- In this space come together, apart from the three major strategic corridors and the Eurasian, Asian and Near and Middle East ones: Galicia (Ukraine Poland) corridor; strategic corridor Volga-Don; Siberian strategic direction; migratory corridor (old r disruptive foyer between the North of Caspian and Manchuria) strategic corridor of Asia Minor, with finality, through the plain of Mesopotamia in the Persian Gulf.
- Is an area of the separation but also of junction between the great civilizations (European, Islamic and Asian);
- It is a zone of separation but of contact also and even a junction between two powerful monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam.

Among the relevant factors [7] supporting this approach are:

- geographical position, the Black Sea being at the confluence of three regions of great geopolitical importance: the Balkan Peninsula, Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, being also very close to the hot zone of the Middle East
- It is a segment of the Southern border of Russia and the Northern limit of the Southern flank of NATO - a possible area of confrontation of major nuclear powers,
- it is the output way to Planetary Ocean for Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and the Transcaucasia countries,

- it is placed on the proposed routes for the transport of Caspian oil and from Central Asia to Western customers
- it has a large number of ports and civil and military port facilities,
- it is a favorable environment for economic, scientific-technical, cultural and military cooperation.
- Should be noted that South-Eastern Europe, including the Wide area of Black Sea, is the only European region where there are still "frozen conflicts", the resolution of which is the subject of debate in various international security forums. First, all states in the region are united around certain core values and interests that govern the evolution of current international relations, namely: democracy, human rights, free market economy and the fight against terrorism. Secondly, all countries in this area are related in one way or another, the Euro-Atlantic security structure.[8]

The importance of the Black Sea should be seen in the broader context of international relations. Globally, there are two main elements that coordinates policies of strategic actors, be them states or international organizations: the need for energy and the threat of terrorist organizations. [9]

Energy stake is still an asset of great importance of the Black Sea. It is a transit area, through the Black Sea is accessed via the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia as in this space are important hydrocarbon resources and should be carried. The Black Sea has become a veritable "Eurasian bridge" vital space for oil supply to European economies.

Romania seeks solutions to develop a favorable economic geopolitical in the Pontic region. In this context, developing the relationship Caspian - Black Sea - Mediterranean Sea is vital from the economic and commercial point of view, this perspective may be of large weight in Romanian's state relations with the Western world through the development of maritime and river navigation.

In recent years, the Black Sea has become a reality for Euro-Atlantic community. Romania has the role of commercial South-Eastern gate [10],

comparable with the Netherlands, which is considered the North West gate of Europe, through the establishment of economic free zones Sulina on the Black Sea, Ungheni Giurgiulești at Galati, those set with Hungary, those of Siliștea Calarasi etc.; connecting Romania to international network transport of natural gas resources and oil pipelines (eg Caucasus – Central Europe); trade is done in principle along the West and North coast a: Burgas and Varna in Bulgaria, Constanta in Romania, Odessa and Crimea in Ukraine and Novorossiysk in Russia; commercial traffic in Bosphorus is a value close to the Panama and Suez, for Romania, development of Caspian - Black Sea - Mediterranean relationship is vital to the economy and commerce through development of maritime and inland navigation.

In a world where oil provides 40% of the world's energy and more than 90% of transport fuel, oil geopolitics dominates the concerns of governments of the world and manifests itself in many forms, from multilateral cooperation, investment in the sector, technical support, bids, financial and economic aid, privatization, preferential terms to forms reminiscent of geostrategy, being dominated by the military component, demonstrations of force, military presence and even armed violence. Political realities of today offer so unexpectedly political structures: antiterrorist coalition, where reasons keeping together the members are very fragile and everyone understands about the terrorism which concerns him. [11]

As international strategic security environment is constantly changing, due to the complexity of the phenomena and processes of social, economic, political, military, demographic and ecological interaction and interdependence in the world, states are constantly interested in their own defense and security [12].

Through its main support instrument, the Partnership for Peace, NATO's objectives are the political and military cooperation and expansion in Europe, increase stability, reduce threats to peace and to create consolidated relationships by promoting a spirit of cooperation and commitment to compliance with democratic principles that underpin the

Alliance. Romania joined NATO in 2004, and in 2007 became a full member of the EU.

However currently, NATO and the European Union do not have a common strategic vision on the Black Sea, as conceptual differences hinder a combined approach. Through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the EU aims to create a "ring of friends" around its periphery, including the Black Sea. Similarly, stressing that the region is also a bridge to the energy-rich region of the Caspian Sea and a barrier to transnational threats, NATO promotes a concept of "bridge/barrier" for this area [13].

On the expansion of operational cooperation with global partners situated geographically at far distance, NATO-EU cooperation should become the backbone of a strong Euro-Atlantic community. In these circumstances, Romania's membership to the EU and NATO acquires new dimensions and significance both regionally and globally.

Geopolitical and security developments in the Black Sea region, the geographical position of the region, the risks of existing threats and also the benefits of the political, economic and military cooperation have increasingly attracted the interest of European and transatlantic organizations, leading to a more careful approach to problems facing this space.

In the new geostrategic context, the influence of historical development is a factor to be taken into account in setting the region relationship with NATO and the European Union and to demonstrate the growing importance of this region. The Black Sea region has been shown worldwide as a transit zone between Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East and Central and Western Europe. And in the wider Black Sea area, NATO and the European Union should complement each other. Organizations have common goals in the area - maintaining stability, improve the image and economic prospects of the region, promoting security sector reform, reducing the arms, drugs and human trafficking, improvement and democratization of border management.

Many analysts [14] concerned about the Black Sea geopolitics considers this area is characterized by a number of vulnerabilities, among which the most important is the differences between the countries composing it. We are talking not only about cultural and political diversity that characterizes the Black Sea region, but especially about the different stages of development of the countries within analyzed area.

In general, the vulnerabilities of the region are those specific to states in transition from totalitarianism to democracy, with deep roots in their history [15]:

- Participation of most countries in the region in the communist bloc, whose collapse has thrown them in a geostrategic "vacuum", from which they tried to go out through the initiation of a difficult transition process both at internal and external level;
- Failure to complete this process in any of the spheres of society (economic, political, social). Economic analysis [16] shows that, at least in the Eastern Black Sea area, the quality of life of residents is well below the level reached during the existence of the Soviet Union;
- Great ethnic, cultural and religious variety in the region. For example, Turkey is vulnerable to instability in the region because of its ethnic connections with Georgians, Azeri and Abkhazia;
- Lack of a coherent legal framework necessary to combat corruption;
- Lack of a coherent legal framework to combat organized crime;
- Existence in the region of some countries which have not finalized their options on European and Euro-Atlantic integration (an important part of officials in Ukraine and Moldova made statements against potential accession to European and Euro-Atlantic organizations);
- Co-existence of interests aiming to establish Russian hegemony in the region and trends for the European and Euro-Atlantic of the states herein;
- Dependence of the country in region upon energy resources of the Russian Federation. There is danger that, while some states consolidate their democracy, others are managed poorly, so have crumbled or been

marginalized under the external pressure of European and Euro-Atlantic integration [17].

In a pessimistic scenario of regional development, these differences would potentiate the inability of states to cooperate, with negative effects on the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. From this point of view, it is clear that within the Black Sea region, governing is a delicate matter. Issues arising from this refer clearly to a lack of security concentrated on the Northern and Eastern shores of the Black Sea.

Incidentally, this is also indicated by the interest which the great powers and international security organizations show for the countries of the region. Romania and Bulgaria are NATO and EU member states, while in the case of Turkey, a NATO member, a candidacy to join the European Union was accepted only after vivid debates, and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are only halfway to the two organizations. Russia is a special case as it tries to restore the former politico-military and economic block and fight on all fronts to regain the status of an important partner of the world's great powers in this area. [18]

3. Conclusions

It can be argued, rightly, that the Black Sea region is a region of convergence of interests of global large players. Rational is that Romania does not get into the role of a "pawn" in the geopolitical games but continue to preserve the status of "major player" to remain "de jure and de facto beneficiary" of the position that it has to Black Sea [19]. Favorable geopolitical situation in which Romania is at the beginning of the millennium, as a member of NATO and the EU, dislocation of material bases on its territory, are elements that should be exploited as well to meet the fundamental interests of citizens. Romania actively supports NATO and EU involvement in the Black Sea area and wants to be more internationalized, predictable, stable, and economically credible and opened to democratic development.

Trends manifested in the BLACKSEAFOR are a good example of how the maritime power of the riparian states can be used to configure the relations

between them, as a maritime power of riparian states influence geopolitics of the region.

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EU and Balkan States without EU Membership: Agreement and Controversy on the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine

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Abstract: Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine was elaborated in the wake of NATO's 1999 air campaign against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and was embraced by UN at the 2005 World Summit. Since 2005, European Union (EU) strongly supported the R2P doctrine while advancing an uncritical reading of it, a perspective that, except for Serbia and Turkey, was shared by all Balkan states involved in the process of becoming EU members. The main objective of this paper is to suggest an explanation for the cautious endorsement of the R2P doctrine by Serbia and Turkey as well as for the espousal of the EU viewpoint on this issue by the other Balkan states heading towards EU membership. To this end are examined the context that determined the emergence of the R2P doctrine, its original formulation and the subsequent versions developed within the UN. Also, the positions expressed in 2005 and 2009 at the UN General Assembly by EU and the Balkan states non-EU members are analysed in the light of their strive for EU membership and of the newly developed field of history of humanitarian intervention. The paper concludes that the status of EU member was an important incentive for the Balkan states to uphold the EU understanding of the R2P doctrine and also that the reservations about it manifested by Serbia and Turkey are rooted in historical events that left deep marks on both countries.

Keywords: responsibility to protect, humanitarian intervention, Balkan states, Serbia, Turkey, Ottoman Empire.

1. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine – An Overview

In search of a solution to the dilemma of humanitarian intervention NATO's 1999 actions against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cod-named Operation Allied Force, triggered a virulent international dispute which called into question the very existence of the international order. On 24 March, the day Operation Allied Force began, Russian Federation, China

and India sharply criticized NATO's operation for trampling on key principles of the UN Charter. Thus, the then Russian president Boris Yeltsin maintained that "a dangerous precedent has been created regarding the policy of diktat and force, and the whole of the international rule of law has been threatened" [1]. At his turn, Qin Huasun, the then Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, argued that "this act amounts to a blatant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the accepted norms of international law" [2]. In the same vein, Kamalesh Sharma, the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, expressed the view that "no country, group of countries or regional arrangement, no matter how powerful, can arrogate to itself the right to take arbitrary and unilateral military action against others. That would be a return to anarchy, where might is right" [3]. As for Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, its Permanent Representative to the United Nations in that period, Vladislav Jovanović, depicted the same day a gloomy future for the United Nations "Sixty-five years ago, the Emperor Haile Selassie, whose country was subjected to aggression by Fascist Italy – as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is today by NATO and the United States of America – entered history with his prophetic outcry that the League of Nations and international peace would be fatally wounded if the aggression did not stop. The United Nations is at the crossroads today, as the League of Nations was then" [4].

On the other side, Javier Solana, the then NATO Secretary General, declared also on 24 March that the air campaign was necessary in order to "stop the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now taking place in Kosovo" [5]. For his part, Bill Clinton, at that time president of the United Nations, defended Operation Allied Force on grounds that it was designed "to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive" [6]. European Union was also favourable to the military actions against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at the Berlin European Council from 24-25 March being adopted a statement on the situation in Kosovo which mentioned that "it cannot be permitted that, in

the middle of Europe, the predominant population of Kosovo is collectively deprived of its rights and subjected to grave human rights abuses” [7].

Operation Allied Force concluded in June 1999 but the international community continued to face the serious challenge posed by what the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called in his address to the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in September 1999 the “the dilemma of what has been called humanitarian intervention: on one side, the question of the legitimacy of an action taken by a regional organization without a United Nations mandate; on the other, the universally recognized imperative of effectively halting gross and systematic violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences” [8]. Attempts to solve this dilemma had been made from an early stage of the conflict, a prominent one being putted forward in April 1999 by Tony Blair, the British prime minister at the time, in what became known as the Chicago speech [9]. In October the same year the Danish Institute of International Affairs advanced its own solution [10] and in 2000 two other attempts to reconcile humanitarian intervention with sovereignty have been made by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo [11] and jointly by two Dutch institutions, namely the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law and the Advisory Council on International Affairs [12]. The Canadian Government equally reacted to Annan’s call by establishing in September 2000 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) co-chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun which released its report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, in December 2011 [13]. The official launch of the report was organized in February the next year and Kofi Annan took the opportunity to express his appreciation for it: “the reactions to my speech ranged widely, but this report represents the most comprehensive and carefully thought-out response we have seen to date. I believe it marks an important step in the difficult process of building a new global consensus on intervention for human protection” [14].

2. The Original Formulation of the R2P Doctrine

In its 2001 report, ICISS argued that the longstanding right of humanitarian intervention language had to be abandoned in favor of the R2P terminology [15] and also that the traditional understanding of sovereignty as control must be replaced by the reading of sovereignty as a responsibility [16]. According to ICISS the R2P doctrine encompasses the following three dimensions: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild. The first dimension refers mainly to the prevention of internal armed conflicts and is connected to the concept of sovereignty as responsibility by the fact that each state has to assume this protective function. The responsibility to prevent is equally incumbent to the international community in the form of cooperation with those states unable to protect their population or as a coercion of those ones unwilling to do this [17]. The responsibility to react enters the scene when the preventive strategies fail and it is associated solely with the international community that could discharge it either with the help of coercive means short of the use of force, or by military action. The last option is justified in order to prevent or to put an end to imminent large-scale loss of life or/and ethnic cleansing and must be carried out in strict accordance with five criteria: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects [18]. The resort to force entails on the part of both international community and the newly constituted local authorities the responsibility to rebuild the targeted state on democratic foundations so that the conditions that triggered the intervention do not resurface [19].

ICISS mentioned that the recourse to coercive means under the R2P doctrine could be called, using a very popular term, humanitarian intervention [20] but that it preferred to employ in its place the phrase intervention for human protection purposes or, in case the coercive mean is force, the phrase military intervention for human protection purposes. In support of this substitution ICISS putted forward two arguments: 1) avoiding the term humanitarian intervention to acquire a military sense which could put at risk the lives of humanitarian workers; 2) limiting the

distorting effect of the approving sense of the term humanitarian on the assessment of the merits of the external military interventions on behalf of people in danger [21]. Preoccupied to establish a distinct conceptual space for the new R2P doctrine, Gareth Evans underlined that “the very core of the traditional meaning of “humanitarian intervention” is coercive military intervention for humanitarian purposes – nothing more or less. But “the responsibility to protect” is about much more than that” [22].

3. United Nations and the R2P Doctrine

As a result of Annan`s commitment to the ICISS findings, they have been largely embraced by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP) which devoted to R2P a section of its report entitled *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* that was released in December 2004 [23]. Further on, HLP recommendations albeit slightly amended, became part on Annan`s report *In Larger Freedom* presented to the UN General Assembly in March 2005 [24]. But the R2P doctrine gained political support by the UN at the 2005 World Summit which led to the adoption of the Outcome Document (WSOD) that displayed a new version of it in its paragraphs 138 - 139 [25]. According to this document each state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic and cleansing; at its turn the international community is obliged to assist those states experiencing difficulties in exercising this responsibility but, when confronted with the failure of a state to fulfill this responsibility, it has the responsibility to use coercive but peaceful means, consistent with the UN Charter, to protect the population of that state against the four mentioned acts. WSOD also stipulates in paragraph 139 that, in case a state manifestly fails to protect its population and the peaceful means are inadequate, the international community “is prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case bases and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate” in order to protect the population of the state in question in face of the four above

enumerated acts. WSOD assigned to the UN General Assembly the task to further consider the R2P doctrine.

UN General Assembly held its plenary meeting on the R2P doctrine on 21, 23, 24 and 28 July 2009 [26] in response to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's report *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* in which he argued that the R2P doctrine contained in the WSOD had a threefold structure which he described as pillar one – the protective responsibilities of the states – pillar two – international assistance and capacity building – and pillar three – timely and decisive response [27]. One could observe that there is a connection between the first pillar and what ICISS called responsibility to prevent, between the second pillar and the non-coercive dimension of the same responsibility incumbent to the international community and equally between the third pillar and both the coercive aspect of the ICISS responsibility to prevent and the whole of the ICISS responsibility to react. The responsibility to rebuild component of the R2P doctrine advanced by ICISS is absent from the WSOD related to R2P but it is addressed in its paragraphs 97 – 105 concerning the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission. Since 2009 Ban Ki-moon annually presents to the UN General Assembly a report on R2P [28] each one prompting an informal interactive dialogue in this UN organ [29].

4. Reactions of EU and Balkan States Non-EU Members to the R2P Doctrine

4.1. International response to the emergence of the R2P doctrine

At both academic and political level the R2P doctrine was met with both scepticism and enthusiasm by scholars and politicians. On the academic side, to give just a few examples, Mohammed Ayoob pointed out this new doctrine represented “the resurrection of the 'standard of civilization' assumptions” and “raises the spectre of a return to colonial habits and practices on the part of major Western powers. It also has the potential to divide the world once again into zones of civilized and uncivilized states

and legitimize predatory actions by the former against the latter” [30], a claim that was also favored by Lance Selfa [31] and Aidan Hehir [32]. At his turn, David Chandler argued that R2P is nothing but “a pragmatic response to changes in Realpolitik” that used morality to legitimate the interests of powerful states [33]. On the other hand Thomas G. Weiss [34] and Gareth Evans expressed their support for this doctrine, with Evans writing that after the 2005 World Summit “it seemed to be time at last to break out the champagne, or at least the sparkling brut (...) We have something in place which can properly be described as a new international norm” [35].

The negative political reactions to the R2P doctrine came largely from the part of non-Western countries and have been explained as resulting mainly from its misuse during the 2003 war against Iraq, the Russian-Georgian war from 2008 and also in the context of the 2008 humanitarian crisis triggered by Cyclone Nargis [36]. During the 2009 debate on R2P from the UN General Assembly, India, China, Pakistan, Iran, democratic Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Qatar, Cuba, Sudan, Peru and Nicaragua expressed concerns especially about military humanitarian intervention component of the R2P doctrine. For example Nicaragua pointed out that “the concept, which allows for the possibility of the use of force, could run counter the well-established principles in the Charter, such as non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and the non-use of force in international relations” [37], Iran argued that its reticence about the R2P doctrine “is centered on the implied authorization of the use of force that this notion entails” [38]. At the same 2009 debate a different stance was adopted among others by Canada, Australia, United States and European Union which firmly embraced the R2P doctrine and displayed no preoccupation for the potential for abuse associated with the military humanitarian intervention.

4.2. EU and Balkan States Approach to the R2P Doctrine

EU had been committed to an unconditional support for the R2P doctrine long before the 2009 UN General Assembly meeting on this issue. Thus, in April 2005 when the UN General Assembly considered, in advance of the

World Summit, Kofi Annan report In Larger Freedom, the representative of Luxembourg, ambassador Jean-Marc Hoscheit stated on behalf of the EU that “the European Union endorses the concept of the “responsibility to protect” (...) Flagrant human rights violations and acts of genocide call for a strong response from and resolute action by the international community” [39]. It is to be remarked that this statement was also delivered in the name of the following Balkan states without EU membership at that time: Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Croatia, Albania, (FYR) Macedonia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). During that meeting the only Balkan states to make separate statements were Turkey, Croatia, Romania, (FYR) Macedonia and Bulgaria but except for the latter which strongly backed Annan`s version of R2P doctrine, none of them referred to it [40].

Based on these statements and taken into consideration that Greece and Slovenia were already EU members, one could conclude that all Balkan states except for Bosnia & Herzegovina shared the EU confident and totally uncritical perspective on Annan`s view on R2P. This idea was further reinforced and extended at the World Summit that took place latter in September. Taking the flour on behalf of EU, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, then European Commissioner for External Relations, maintained that “another important outcome is our recognition of our collective responsibility to protect populations against atrocities. I have always strongly advocated that people must be at the heart of security concerns. The United Nations credibility is therefore much reinforced by adopting that concept” [41]. This time, the EU statement did not involve the Balkan states non - EU members but an examination of their statements, including that of Bosnia, reveals that the only such Balkan state to address the R2P issue was again Bulgaria which expressed its absolute support for the WSOD provisions related to it [42].

It thus could be reasoned that all Balkan states without EU membership in 2005, similar to EU member states, harbored no reservations about the R2P doctrine enshrined in the WSOD. But in July 2009 when the UN General Assembly organized its first debate on R2P, this unity of views proved to be

only an apparent one. With that occasion ambassador Anders Lidén expressed in the name of the EU which at that moment included also Romania and Bulgaria, the total support for this doctrine paying no attention to possible side effects of it [43]. His statement was equally made on behalf of Turkey, Croatia, (FYR) Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Montenegro so that, apart from Serbia [44], all Balkan states from outside EU were supposed to uphold this position. Given that EU view on R2P was the same as in 2005 when Federal Republic of Yugoslavia supported it one could also expect that the newly independent Serbia would not have a different approach. But a consideration of the separate statements delivered by 5 such Balkan states – Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Turkey, (FYR) Macedonia, Serbia – shows that Turkey was deeply concerned about the risk of misuse of this doctrine in its military dimension and moreover that Serbia shared this preoccupation.

Fazlı Çorman, Deputy Permanent Representative of Turkey to the UN, maintained that “we should also be able to further identify and clarify the elements of the concept in order to avoid misperceptions” given that “this concept has been misused on various occasions in the past” so that “many States perceive that they are faced with a new concept of neocolonialism” [45]. It is to be observed that Turkey not only asserted its reservations about R2P but also acted as a spokesman for all states that had doubts about it. As for Serbia, Boris Holovka, Counselor in the Permanent Mission of Serbia to the UN, stressed that there was “the greatest need for investing genuine effort and resolve in further elaborating the third pillar” for “We must remain aware of the ease with which noble goals and lofty ideas can be utilized for particular purposes and of how paths paved with good intentions can sometimes lead to unjustifiable actions” [46]. The reticence manifested by both Turkey and Serbia with respect to humanitarian intervention represented by no means a rejection of this element of the R2P doctrine or of the entire doctrine as Çorman and Holovka made abundantly clear on that occasion [47].

However, during the 3 informal interactive dialogues organized by the UN General Assembly since 2009 on Ban Ki-moon`s reports on R2P doctrine,

Turkey and Serbia, alongside with all other Balkan states non-EU members except for Bosnia in 2010 [48] made no statements despite the fact that EU voiced each time its unproblematic reading of this doctrine exclusively on behalf of its members [49]. The fact that Turkey and Serbia did not express their concerns about R2P in that context did not necessary mean that they abandoned their cautious attitude in favor on the uncritical one putted forward by EU. In what follows I shall ague that they did not change their position and are not going to do this in the near future because this one comes in a significant extent from historical events that took place before the emergence of the R2P doctrine and that left deep marks on both countries.

5. Explaining the Positions on R2P Doctrine of the Balkan States without EU Membership – A Possible Approach

As we have already seen, the EU and all Balkan states without EU membership accord in general terms on the importance of the R2P doctrine and are committed to its promotion worldwide. One could reasonably argue that this position of the Balkan states from outside EU borders was in part the result of their policy of becoming full EU members. Thus, Turkey applied for full membership into European Economic Community in 1987 but received the status of EU candidate country only in 1999 and started the accession negotiations in 2005. Romania and Bulgaria applied for EU membership in 1995, in 2000 began the accession negotiations which had been concluded in 2004 and were able to become EU members three years latter. Croatia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with EU in 2001, applied for EU membership in 2003 receiving the candidate country status next year and started the accession negotiations in 2005 which resulted in EU membership on 1 July 2013. (FYR) Macedonia also signed the SAA in 2001 but was granted the status of candidate country in 2005 without having yet started the accession negotiations. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) launched the negotiations on the SAA in 2005 but after the dissolution of their federation in 2006 each country followed its own path. Montenegro

signed the SAA in 2007 and in 2008 applied for EU membership succeeding to acquire the candidate country status in 2010 and to open the accession negotiations in 2012. As for Serbia, it signed the SAA in 2008b, applied for EU membership in 2009 receiving the status of candidate country in 2012 and is planned to open the accession negotiations in 2014. Bosnia & Herzegovina launched the negotiations on SAA in 2005 and signed it in 2008 but by now did not apply for EU membership. Finally, Albania started negotiations on SAA in 2003 to sign it in 2006 and apply for EU membership in 2009 without yet receiving the status of candidate country [50].

One could remark that in 2005, when the World Summit took place, all Balkan states without EU membership were seriously engaged in the process of joining the EU and latter on they constantly increase their efforts in that direction. It follows that rejecting the R2P doctrine so strongly supported by EU could not benefit their political agenda. Therefore, in the light of the EU membership objective, the reservations about R2P doctrine expressed in 2009 by both Serbia and Turkey become intriguing especially because in that year, as mentioned above, Serbia officially applied for EU membership and Turkey was deeply involved in accession negotiations. In search for an explanation of their position one has to revisit the statements delivered by their representatives during the 2009 debate on R2P from the UN General Assembly.

The Serbian diplomat Boris Holovka motivated his reticence by pointing out that there was a high risk of discrediting the R2P doctrine by turning the illegal use of force under the banner of humanitarian intervention into one of its components [51]. In support of this view he cited Martti Ahtisaari who declared in 2008 that situations like NATO's 1999 intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fell within the scope of the R2P doctrine. Holovka argued that in order to prevent the R2P doctrine being brought into disrepute, its third pillar (timely and decisive action) had to be refined in strict conformity with the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It follows that the hesitations of the Serbian authorities with respect to the

R2P doctrine were deeply grounded in the experience on NATO's 1999 air campaign.

If one turns to the address of the representative of Turkey, Fazlı Çorman, finds out that it is less explicit as for the reasons underpinning his cautious position on R2P doctrine. Çorman mentioned only its misuse "on various occasions in the past" by colonial powers without making any reference to events that influenced the history of his country [52]. But an examination of the recently developed field of history of humanitarian intervention [53] reveals that in the XIXth century the Ottoman Empire was subjected by European major powers to military interventions justified in terms of protection of the Christians at risk therein.

Tonny Brems Knudsen argues that there have been two such interventions, one in Greece (1827-1830) and the other one in Bulgaria (1877-1878) [54]. With respect to the first one, Knudsen mentions that in 1821 an uprising against the Ottoman rule ignited in Greece and was ruthlessly repressed by the Egyptian general Ibrahim Pacha who was reported to exterminate the Greek population. As a result of such information, Great Britain, France and Russia signed on 6 July 1827 the London Treaty which stipulated that "being animated with the desire of putting a stop to the effusion of blood" and "by sentiments of humanity" [55] the parties could resort to force in defense of the Greek people. The refuse of the Ottomans to resume the fighting prompted the naval forces of the signatories to the London Treaty to engage and destroy the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet in what became known as the Battle of Navarino (20 October 1827). Next year, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire and a French expeditionary force landed in Peloponnese forcing Ibrahim Pacha to withdraw his troops a year later and obliging Sultan Mahmud II to sign at Adrianople a peace treaty with Russia on 14 September 1829. The major outcome of the intervention was the independence of Greece statuated by the Protocol of London (3 February 1830).

With respect to the military intervention in Bulgaria, Knudsen points out that it was carried out by Russia with the consent of the Concert of Europe

in the wake of the news about the atrocities committed by the Ottoman forces in their attempt to suppress the rebellion of Bulgarians. Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 24 April 1877 stating that its aim was “to stop the inhumane treatment of the Christians in the Balkans’ [56]. The victory of Russia in 1878 led to the autonomy of Bulgaria and to the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania as well as to the occupation of Bosnia & Herzegovina by Austro-Hungarian Empire. Despite the altruistic claims advanced by the intervening countries, Knudsen maintains that an account of these events is incomplete without taking into account the geopolitical stakes in the Balkans.

In final analysis I consider that one could reasonably suppose that the two episodes from the history of the Ottoman Empire partly informed the reservations about R2P doctrine putted forward in 2009 by Ambassador Fazlı Çorman.

6. Conclusions

Balkan states without EU membership share the view of EU that R2P doctrine is highly relevant and therefore has to be constantly promoted worldwide while the political support for it is to be strengthened. This fundamental agreement is reinforced by their EU membership aspirations that materialized in a strong commitment to meet the needed conditions for this objective to be achieved. However, Serbia and Turkey, unlike the rest of Balkan states non-EU members, have reservations about the R2P doctrine on grounds that its military dimension could be abused, a position that partly results from either recent or old grievances that marked their history. Taking into consideration this motivation for their cautious support for R2P doctrine, it is highly improbable that Serbia and Turkey will renounce this attitude in the foreseeable future even if they could sometimes choose, on political grounds, not to openly express their skepticism. It is thus to be expected that a less uncritical position on R2P doctrine will be somehow formulated within EU once the two countries join it.

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- [16] *Ibid.*, paras. 2.14 – 2.15
- [17] *Ibid.*, paras. 3.1 – 3.43
- [18] *Ibid.*, paras. 4.1 – 4.43
- [19] *Ibid.*, paras. 5.1 – 5.31
- [20] Among definitions of humanitarian intervention advanced by international relations scholars one could mention the ones of Jennifer Welsh, J.L Holzgrefe, Adam Roberts and Aidan Hehir. Thus Jennifer Welsh conceives humanitarian intervention as “coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force,

with the purposes of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering” (Jennifer Welsh, 2004. *Humanitarian intervention and international relations*. Oxford University Press. Oxford. pp. 3) and J.L Holzgrefe maintains that humanitarian intervention is “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied” (J.L Holzgrefe, 2003. *The humanitarian intervention debate* in J. L. Holzgrefe, Robert O. Keohane (eds.) *Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. p. 18). Also Adam Roberts argues that humanitarian intervention represents “coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants” (Adam Roberts cited in Aidan Hehir, 2010. *Humanitarian Intervention. An Introduction*. Palgrave Macmillan. Basingstoke, Hampshire. p. 17) and Aidan Hehir understands humanitarian intervention as being a “military action taken by a state, group of states or non-state actor, in the territory of another state, without that state’s consent, which is justified, to some significant extent, by a humanitarian concern for the citizens of the host state” (Aidan Hehir, *idem*, p. 20)

- [21] ICISS, *op.cit.*, paras. 1.38 – 1.41
- [22] Gareth Evans, 2008. *The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come... and Gone?* *International Relations*. Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 283-298. p. 290
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Nicholas J. Wheeler, J. L. Holzgreve and Jennifer Welsh started to trace the origins of humanitarian intervention back to the XIXth century and well-known historians, like Garry Bass and Davide Rodogno, got involved in the study of this issue. However, according to Simms and Trim a comprehensive history of humanitarian intervention is yet to be written. See Garry Bass, 2008. *Freedom's Battle: Origins of Humanitarian Intervention*. Alfred Knopf. New York and Davide Rodogno, 2012. *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Intervention in the Ottoman Empire 1815-1914*. Princeton University Press. Princeton

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Western Balkans and the EU: Surpassing the Fatigue of Enlargement

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Abstract: The Western Balkans and the European Union are tied together in their mission to assure each other the so-called bright future. We are witnessing that the European Union has become involved in the formation of the “unfinished states” into new nation-states that aspire to become members of the Union. Until now the EU’s transformative power has proved effective in integrating established states; now it is confronted with the challenge of integrating contested states.

Keywords: Western Balkans, enlargement, Europeanization, European Union, Thessaloniki Agenda, SAP.

1. Introduction

The Balkan region constitutes today an inseparable part of the under formation ‘new’ European space. However, its incorporation into the new European architecture has proved particularly problematic with negative consequences for the whole of the European space and the evolution of European integration. In fact, the Balkans, and more specifically what the EU calls ‘Western Balkans’, remains the least integrated and most unstable region of the continent¹.

The states of the Western Balkans are on different trajectories in what concerns their EU accession. The Union has a large range of initiatives running for the Western Balkans. One key initiative is the regional approach through which the EU pushes the states of the Western Balkans towards forms of regional cooperation that must be attained as a condition

¹ Leeda Demetropoulou, *Europe and the Balkans: Membership Aspiration, EU Involvement and Europeanization Capacity in South Eastern Europe*, Southeast European Politics Vol. III, No. 2-3, November 2002 p. 87

to move forward with the contractual agreements with the EU. What connects the dots between these states are geographical proximity, a common and agitated history, a political and economic development in a post-communist society, and most importantly, the EU policy to bring and maintain together².

EU enlargement to the Balkans represents the pursuit of its most successful policy since the fall of the Berlin Wall. This is not called into question within the EU and remains, for the foreseeable future, the only plausible prospect for EU enlargement. The inclusion of the countries of the Western Balkans will represent an addition of some 20 million to the EU's a half a billion citizens. When considering the costs of enlargement in a context of budgetary restrictions one must not forget the costs of non-enlargement. The cost of the wars and subsequent recovery programmes has been estimated at \$100 billion for the 1990s alone. Without credible prospects of accession to the EU the latter's influence will recede among the political elites and more radical forms of nationalism are likely to resurface around the unresolved contentious issues pertaining to the 'unfinished states' of the Balkans³.

As long as a democratic polity incorporating a consensus on its territorial framework was not established in the aftermath of the break-up of Yugoslavia and as long as issues pertaining to borders and national minorities shaped the political agenda, the chances of democratic consolidation remained slim. Today Veton Surroi calls its successors 'unfinished states'⁴: Kosovo waiting to be recognized by Serbia and five

² Daniela Blaga and Mircea Brie, *Differentiated Integration - from Theory to Practice. Determiners in the Integration Process of the Western Balkans: Ethnicity*, Analele Universității din Oradea. Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene, Vol. V, 2013, p. 174

³ Jacques Rupnik, *The Balkans as a European Question*, in *The Western Balkans and the EU: 'the hour of Europe'*, Chaillot Paper, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2011, p. 30

⁴ V. Surroi, *The Unfinished State(s) in the Balkans and the EU: The Next Wave*, in J. Rupnik (ed.), *The Western Balkans and the EU: 'The Hour of Europe'*, Chaillot Papers, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2011, pp. 111–20.

remaining EU Member States; Bosnia and Herzegovina waiting for a constitution; Serbia trying to establish internationally acceptable borders (Kosovo, Republika Srpska); the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia waiting for recognition of its national identity and name.

In a new ECFR paper, “The periphery of the periphery: the Western Balkans and the euro crisis”, Dimitar Bechev⁵ argues that: After the obstacles in the Balkans there are those that exist in the EU. The crisis of the euro and the challenges it poses to the EU’s cohesion and leadership raise concerns about the EU’s ability at the same time to keep an eye on the enlargement ball. It is not easy to promote openness and generosity when the economy is in crisis and the politics of accountancy prevail. The result is mutual distrust or pretence: ‘We pretend we want you and you pretend you’re getting ready’.

Despite the euro crisis, the European Union continues to expand into the Western Balkans: in July 2013, Croatia became its 28th member. But beneath the surface, the EU’s relationship with the countries on its doorstep is changing as a result of the crisis and the way it is transforming the EU. Integration is a double-edged sword for the Western Balkans: in good times, the European core exported its prosperity towards its south-eastern periphery; but now, at a time of crisis, it is exporting instability. European policymakers and analysts still casually speak of the EU as the cure for Balkan pathologies – as if the crisis has never happened. But the truth is that a disintegrating EU could also be a curse for them⁶.

The development of more exacting conditionality, often accompanied by demands to meet conditions, coupled with commitments within the member states on the strategic prioritisation of enlargement, have made the enterprise more fragile and exposed to the domestic politics. These developments, however, have not altered the EU’s overall commitment, making the whole relationship between the EU and the Balkans a

⁵ Dimitar Bechev, *The periphery of the periphery: the Western Balkans and the euro crisis*, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), August 2012

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 1

challenging policy area in need of a new lease of life. The EU reinforced the regional approach by giving all the countries of the region a status and a date for the opening of negotiations. The pace and completion of the process will then depend on each country's capacity to deliver, thus making their respective responsibilities clear and the political costs involved more palatable to political elites in the region. But that, in turn, requires the EU to overcome its hesitation between containment and integration and to renew its commitment to the Balkans' European future in order to restore its credibility in the region and at international level⁷.

The past decade has seen peace take hold in the Balkans. The consequences of the breakup of Yugoslavia still hang over the region and destabilising events have taken place, but they have occurred peacefully. In 2006 Serbia and Montenegro divorced. In 2008 Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia, and despite the still unsolved statehood of both, the past five years have seen only sporadic and circumscribed episodes of violence. In spring 2013 the two sides reached a political agreement to normalise relations, under the auspices of EU facilitation. These experiences have undoubtedly been helped by the prospect of European integration. But within the EU, the constitutional process which started in 2003 to match expansion and external ambitions failed.

In 2005 the Dutch and French No votes turned the EU's Constitutional Treaty into yet another difficult process of intergovernmental reform. In 2004 and 2007 the EU increased its diversity by welcoming twelve new member states but without bringing political integration to a higher level. Then, the economic crisis came, and its unprecedented threat to deal a blow not just to the single currency project but to the European Union as a whole. The shorthand for capturing the impact of these developments on the Balkans is 'enlargement fatigue', although symptoms and consequences run deeper.

⁷ Rupnik, *op. cit.*, p. 30

During the past ten years the EU has lost its appetite for doing what it does best: expansion. Although the tools, methods and approaches of the enlargement process have been improved, also as a consequence of these developments, the 'unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries' expressed by the EU in Thessaloniki has been *fizzling out*.⁸

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On 21 June 2003, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union (EU) together with the leaders of the Western Balkan countries met in Thessaloniki and reached a consensus on a Joint statement, better known as the Thessaloniki Declaration. In this joint statement, the EU unequivocally confirmed the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries. The language was ambitious and clear: the Western Balkans were promised full membership of the EU once they had met the established criteria.

This statement paved the way for a wide range of concrete steps and initiatives aiming at integrating the Western Balkans – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo – in the EU. A decade later, the EU is dealing with three different categories of countries in the region. Whereas Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are still considered as 'potential' candidates for EU membership, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia have made a step forward in the enlargement process and have been officially granted candidate status by the European Council⁹. As the newest member, Croatia represents the

⁸ Rosa Balfour and Corina Stratulat, *Between engagement and cold feet: ten years of the EU in the Western Balkans*, in Eviola Prifti (ed.), *The European future of the Western Balkans: Thessaloniki@10 (2003-2013)*, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Paris, 2013, pp. 19-20

⁹ Eviola Prifti (ed.), *The European future of the Western Balkans: Thessaloniki@10 (2003-2013)*, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Paris, 2013, p. 13

latest example of the EU's transformative power in the region, becoming a symbolic bridge between the EU and the other Western Balkan countries.

The Thessaloniki Summit also marked a pivotal moment in the EU's approach towards the region, which shifted from post-conflict stabilisation (security) to European integration (enlargement). Indeed, the Thessaloniki Declaration highlights the values shared by both sides (democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, market economy, peaceful resolution of conflicts and regional cooperation) and reiterates unequivocally the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries, bound to become full members once the established criteria are fulfilled. On the basis of this political commitment, the Summit adopted also the *Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European integration*.

This Agenda stipulates that the accession dimension of the Stabilisation and Association Process—including both country-specific and regional aspects will be strengthened and enriched by new tools drawn from the experience of the Eastern enlargement (e.g. 'European Partnerships' for each country inspired by the Accession Partnerships, the twinning instrument and access to the Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office (TAIEX)). The enhanced Stabilisation and Accession Process, including the Stabilisation and Association Agreements, 'will constitute the overall framework for the European course of the Western Balkan countries, all the way to their future accession'¹⁰.

The pace of progress will depend on the political will and the performance of the Western Balkan countries in meeting the Copenhagen criteria and the criteria set by the SAP conditionality.¹¹

One important element of the Thessaloniki Agenda and the progress towards European integration concerns political and economic dialogue. It states that Western Balkans and its preparation for future integration is a

¹⁰ EU-Western Balkans Summit Declaration, 10229/03 (Presse 163), Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003.

¹¹ Prifti, *op. cit.*, p. 15

high priority for the EU. In order to further advance progress in the region, the EU should help in consolidating peace, promoting stability, democracy and the rule of law. Respect for human and minority rights, the peaceful resolution of conflicts as well as regional cooperation should be supported, while terrorism, violence and extremism need to be clearly condemned. In that context, the EU should promote political dialogue and cooperation in the area of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. It also needs to encourage social cohesion, ethnic and religious tolerance, multiculturalism and the return of refugees to their home countries.

As a big source of concern to the EU, organised crime and corruption are seen as the major obstacles to democratic stability as well as to the establishment of accountable institutions, rule of law and economic development.¹²

The issue of refugees and internally displaced persons is also mentioned in the Thessaloniki Agenda in terms of supporting their further return to their home countries and support for such regional activities as the Migration, Asylum and Refugee Regional Initiative.

The Thessaloniki Agenda also deals with the reconciliation of Western Balkans countries in conflict. This goal is to be promoted through education, social development and culture, because these social forces are crucial in overcoming the negative legacies of the past, changing mentalities and shaping modern democratic societies.

¹² Lucia Vesnic-Alujevic, *European Integration of Western Balkans: From Reconciliation To European Future*, Centre for European Studies, Brussels, 2012, p. 33

The initiative was followed by the Sarajevo Declaration 2005¹³, the Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MAARI) Forum 2007.¹⁴ The Brdo Process was held in 2010 in Slovenia and represents one of the most important initiatives in the region. The former Yugoslavian states gathered to bring mutual support to each other and resolve bilateral issues. The gathering was based on the successful experience of solving the border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia. For that occasion, the Slovenian prime minister stated that the EU should back the resolution of all outstanding political, economic and security issues between the countries of the region before they join the EU. The countries themselves should promote good neighbourly relations through projects of common interest and by resolving bilateral issues in the tolerant manner of 'the European spirit'. The Brdo Process concluded that the enhancement of regional cooperation was of extreme importance for the future development of the region. Another regional initiative was initiated by Turkey in 2010.

The Istanbul Declaration was signed between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2010 with the goal of overcoming historic differences and building a common future based on tolerance and mutual understanding that would be accomplished through political dialogue. The declaration envisions a strategic approach to the region which would maintain lasting peace and good neighbourly relations and the sustainable return of refugees and displaced people. It relies on a common vision of security issues, high level political dialogue, economic interdependence as well as mutual support for integration within the EU and international organisations. In

¹³ The conference gathered ministers responsible for refugees and internally displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro and stated that it would resolve the problem of the remaining displaced population by the end of 2006 and facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons. It also affirmed that those people, as well as the ones that had decided not to return, would be integrated into the local communities without discrimination on the basis of national legislation.

¹⁴ It included ministers from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. It deals with initiatives for combating irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling in human beings and visa facilitation.

addition to cross-border cooperation, the focus was put on the mutual protection of human rights as well as on the cultural heritage of the two states.¹⁵

According to many experts in the region, the Balkans represents the least integrated and the most unstable region in Europe. In this context, the intention of the European Union to integrate the region as soon as possible, and to make this a priority, is quite understandable and warranted. Many agree that political elites in the region of Western Balkans have appeared ineffective, corrupt or illegitimate. Another problem is seen in the limited reserves of human capital, especially because the phenomenon of brain drain continues even after the change of the parties in power in the majority of Western Balkans states. Public administrations are still very large and inept and civil society continues to fail to react properly to the changes that have place. This is why integration is needed been generated from abroad¹⁶

For the moment, accession to the EU is at the top of the agenda in all Western Balkans countries. That means that the governments of these respective states are in principle ready to accept the EU conditions, objectives and criteria. However, there are still many issues that need to be dealt with. Also, we have seen that the legacy of the Yugoslav wars, manifested above all in extreme nationalism, is still present in some countries if not all. The level of Europeanisation is different in different countries, which speaks in favour of the suggestion that they will not all be able to access the European Union at once.

Although the Balkan region has always been a part of Europe, the situation in the region is often described as complicated and controversial. Thus, the process of Europeanisation in the Balkans would mean the structural transformation, modernisation and adjustment to the advanced European models in the areas mentioned above as well as higher levels of security and prosperity. It also represents desirable modernising changes for the region. Europeanisation is a broad notion; it embraces the application of EU policy

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 36-37

¹⁶ Lucia Vesnic-Alujevic, *op. cit.*, p. 19

and politics and the repercussions this policy has on national systems. It represents the penetration of a European dimension into national arenas of politics and policy in every country. As such, the process of Europeanisation is much broader than the formation and integration of EU policy, although this is an integral part¹⁷.

The EU has developed a policy to support the gradual integration of the countries of the Western Balkans with the Union. On 1 July 2013, Croatia became the first of the seven countries to join, and Montenegro, Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are official candidates. Accession negotiations are underway with Montenegro, and the European Council decided in June 2013 to open negotiations with Serbia. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are also potential candidate countries.

In the 1990s, EU relations with the region focused on crisis management and reconstruction, reflecting the countries' pressing needs after the break-up of Yugoslavia. However, the need for a longer-term strategy quickly became apparent. In 1999, the EU launched the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), a framework for relations between the EU and countries in the region, as well as the Stability Pact, a broader initiative involving all key international players. In 2000, the European Council stated at its summit in Feira that all SAP countries were potential candidates for EU membership, a position reaffirmed at the 2003 European Council in Thessaloniki.

The Stabilisation and Association Process represents a comprehensive policy framework that was proposed by the European Commission in 1999. It draws upon the regional approach of the EU towards six countries of Western Balkans, namely: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo. Despite this broad approach, the speed and rate of success on the road to the European Union depends on every country individually. The EU maintains direct contract with each country and monitors the progress

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 21-23

made in the area of political stability, economic development and cooperation between the countries in the region, with neighbouring countries and with the EU.

Consequently, the EU proceeds with an individual approach to each country based on the situation in each of them. One important aspect for improving the conditions of a specific country is the willingness of every country to work towards consolidating peace, respecting human rights, the rights of minorities and democratic principles. Because of the legacy of past wars, the EU places particular emphasis on cooperation with neighbours. It consists of the free movements of goods and persons and the provision of common interest. However, it is important to emphasise that this project should not be seen as an attempt to reconstitute the former Yugoslavia.

The Stabilisation and Association Process, which consists of stabilisation and association agreements, EU financial assistance and autonomous trade measures represents a long-term commitment. Political effort as well as financial and human resources must be invested in the process. The central part of the process is the conclusion of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. It entails the establishment of a contractual relationship between the EU and a Western Balkans country, with mutual rights and obligations. The agreement has high political value and will lead to the establishment of a free trade area and to reforms for harmonising national standards with those of the EU. A signature on the agreement also means that a country has chosen to become a member of the EU.¹⁸

2. Current Status¹⁹

2.1. Albania

A potential candidate country, Albania applied for EU membership on 28 April 2009, a few days after the entry into force of the EU-Albania SAA. In

¹⁸ Lucia Vesnic-Alujevic, *op. cit.*, p. 27

¹⁹ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.2.html, [accessed 10.11.2013]

October 2010, the Commission recommended that accession negotiations be opened once the country meets the requirements for 12 'key priorities'. The Commission noted good progress in 2012, and recommended that the country be granted candidate status, subject to the adoption of some pending reforms. The June 2013 parliamentary elections were also closely watched by the EU, as a test of the country's capacity to overcome political divisions.

2.2. Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential candidate country, but has yet to submit its application for EU membership. An SAA was negotiated and signed in June 2008, although its entry into force has been frozen; only the interim agreement on trade and trade-related matters is currently in force. Embroiled in institutional deadlocks and inter-ethnic rivalries, the country clearly lags behind its neighbours on the EU integration path. In June 2012, a high-level dialogue was launched to help it advance and prepare for the submission of its EU application. The EU also provides support for the implementation of the 1995 Dayton peace agreement, notably through the EUFOR Althea mission. Since 2011, the EU's Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also Head of the EU Delegation to the country.

2.3. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia applied for EU membership in March 2004 and was granted EU candidate status in December 2005. In 2009, the Commission recommended opening accession negotiations with the country – a recommendation supported by Parliament and reiterated in every Commission progress report since. The Council, however, has yet to act on this recommendation, mostly owing to the unresolved dispute with Greece over the name 'Macedonia'.

2.4. Kosovo

Kosovo is a potential candidate for EU accession. After its unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, the EU stated that Kosovo

had a clear 'European perspective'. All but five Member States (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) have recognised its independence. The EU has appointed a Special Representative in Kosovo and has established the EULEX Rule of Law Mission. After issuing a Visa Liberalisation Roadmap in June 2012, the European Council decided in June 2013 to open negotiations on an SAA. Kosovo's future EU integration remains closely linked to the results of the EU-facilitated high-level dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia launched in October 2012.

2.5. Montenegro

Montenegro applied for EU membership in December 2008, more than two years after declaring its independence (which was recognised by all Member States). The country was given candidate status in December 2010, and accession negotiations were opened in June 2012, after the Council endorsed the Commission's assessment that the country had achieved the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria and had met the priorities outlined by the Commission. An SAA with Montenegro has been in force since May 2010.

2.6. Serbia

Serbia submitted its application for EU membership in December 2009 and was granted candidate status in March 2012 after Belgrade and Pristina reached an agreement on Kosovo's regional representation. Acknowledging Serbia's progress towards normalising relations with Kosovo, the European Council decided in June 2013 to open accession negotiations with Serbia. The EU-Serbia SAA will also soon enter into force. Signed in 2008, its ratification had been blocked until June 2010 because of Serbia's insufficient cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

3. Conclusions

The enlargement process supports the advocates of reform in the region, further entrenching its post-war democratic transition. It helps avoid the

potentially far higher costs of dealing with the consequences of instability. Strengthening stability and democracy in south-east Europe is also an investment in deep and sustainable democracy in the EU's wider neighbourhood. The renewed consensus on enlargement, agreed by the European Council, remains the basis for the EU's enlargement policy. This policy is based on the principles of consolidation of commitments, fair and rigorous conditionality and good communication with the public, combined with the EU's capacity to integrate new members.

Maintaining the credibility of the enlargement process is crucial to its success. This applies in terms of ensuring far reaching reforms are pursued in enlargement countries so that they meet the established criteria, in particular the Copenhagen criteria. It also applies in terms of ensuring the support of Member states and their citizens. It is essential to foster understanding and informed debate on the impact of enlargement policy, particularly at a time when the EU faces major challenges. In this context the principle of own merits is key. The pace at which each country advances towards membership depends on its performance in meeting the necessary conditions.

The Balkans need a new strategy if it is to translate Brussels' stated political aim to integrate the region into reality. Despite the commitment made at Thessaloniki, the dream of European integration has not yet proved powerful enough as a force for transforming the societies of the Balkans, especially if we agree that the basic indicator of success is the progress of each country on the road to the EU.

Of course, the EU itself faces a significant dilemma as it has the capacity to absorb only reasonably functioning and legitimate states. But now with Croatia's accession, there are no more of these left in the region. The classical enlargement model that worked for Central and Eastern Europe in 1990 simply does not fit the conditions prevailing in the Balkans. If this region is to become part of the EU it needs to undergo significant changes. But success also requires a concomitant shift in policy thinking towards the region in Brussels.

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It is fairly clear that the EU promoted idea and borders of Europe are very much related to specific politico-economic systems and that Europeanization is, more than anything else, a process of systemic transformation. This systemic transformation has reached the highest level within the EU, is realised quite rapidly within the associate members, and is still at a very low level in the Western Balkan states, which seem to be trapped in a 'vicious circle' of economic hardship, political instability and ethnic hatred. Keeping the Balkans outside the functional borders of Europe is dangerous as the longer it takes a country to join the EU, the greater the risks for the whole project to fail. Without an increased EU commitment, the outlook is poor for the Balkans; the vicious circle will remain, as well as the European border north of the Balkan Peninsula.²¹

The enlargement process appears discreet enough to make it acceptable to Western public opinion and allegedly stimulating enough for the political elites' reformist agenda in the Balkan countries concerned. But this is where 'enlargement fatigue' within the EU meets 'accession fatigue' in the Balkans.

²⁰ International Commission on the Balkans, *The Balkans in Europe's Future*, Robert Bosch Stiftung L King Baudouin Foundation German Marshall Fund Of The United States L Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, 2005, p. 8-9

²¹ Leeda Demetropoulou, *Europe and the Balkans: Membership Aspiration, EU Involvement and Europeanization Capacity in South Eastern Europe*, Southeast European Politics Vol. III, No. 2-3, November 2002 p. 104

To sum up the favourable trends: the EU has emerged as the unchallenged international actor in the Balkans; the region, exhausted by a decade of conflict, is recovering stability and the capacity to cooperate; the EU has no other plausible enlargement agenda in sight and could use the direct involvement of some of its member states in the region to facilitate the accession process.²²

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²² Rupnik, op. cit., p. 24

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Non-determined Events in the New Global Security Equation: A Challenge to Both the Academic and Intelligence Communities in Providing Decision-making Support

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Motto

(...) only military people deal with randomness with genuine, introspective intellectual honesty because military collected more genuine intellects and risk thinkers than most if not all other professions.

Nassim Nicholas Taleb

1. Vision and Illusion

One of the basic features of the current security environment is non-linearity, which frequently brings about a new threat pattern, generally unconventional, dynamic, and recurrently random/arbitrary, without restrictions or rules, in other words asymmetrical and characterized by high likelihood of non-determined events occurrence¹. The outcome is a permanently dynamic environment, whose physiognomy and physiology can only be decoded by the interrelation of two structural analysis approaches:

The approach of imbalance / instability which emphasizes its main causes – conflicts (including cultural), regional instability, economic frictions (determined by lack of resources and limitation of access to markets),

¹ Ionel Nițu, „Dificultățile prognozei de intelligence într-o eră a incertitudinii” (*Difficulties in Intelligence Prognosis in an Uncertain Era*), *Intelligence Review*, no.17/2010.

ecological instability, classic/ typical threats (terrorism, proliferation, organized crime) and also new/recent threats (growing strength of failed states, of renegades, of criminals to create unrest, personal and collective insecurity, political instability), and hybrid threats (generated by the capacity and ability of a potential adversary to simultaneously engage conventional and unconventional components), access to technologies etc. – this approach is endorsed, especially by the academic community;

The approach of interconnectivity, which emphasizes the fact that the main causes and components of instability have a dispersed confines / margins and catalyzed evolutions, frequently oriented to areas of emergence particular for great deviations /variations – this approach is endorsed, especially by the intelligence community.

The corroboration of these two approaches brings about a major confusion, between the cause of an event and the catalyser that speeds up its dynamic and effects (to those it adds up a misapprehension – the illusion of control, and a misjudgement – the preconception of action, in fact another illusion, through which it is presumed that action is always better than not taking action².

All the above considerations lead to the belief / idea that from the intelligence activity perspective, the main sources of uncertainty are associated to the cognitive and mental constraints of the intelligence providers, to the adversary action / non-action and, not the least, to the non-determined events³. Further on, the paper focuses on these type of events, relatively recently approached by the intelligence analysis. To note that the affix *non* is not an actual negative denominator, but a warning that

² Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Mark Blyth, “The Black Swan of Cairo – How Suppressing Volatility Makes the World Less Predictable and More Dangerous”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 3, May/ June, 2011.

³ Ionel Nițu, *quoted article*.

directs to events which are different from the known ones, the determined ones⁴.

Rara avis in terris nigroque simillima cygno (a rare bird in the lands, very much like a black swan)

This type of events, acknowledged by the academic community and intelligence community under the title of “black swan”, includes those events which were not anticipated, nor have they been registered by recent history, or they have been but post-factum.

Rara avis in terris nigroque simillima cygno (a rare bird and very like a black swan) is an expression that comprises in its content 2500 universal human experience, according to which all swans are white. This was an unquestionable truth until 1788, when the first explorers of Australia came across a black swan. Therefore, a simple perception cancelled an apparently absolute truth since it was confirmed through continuous observation, transmitted from a generation to another, for millenniums.

Less than 150 years after, in 1912, John Smith the captain of *Titanic*, was announcing, before the safest ever built ship departed in its sole and last sail: *“I have never been in any accident of any sort worth speaking about...I never saw a wreck and never been wrecked, nor have I been in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort....”* No one, in that moment anticipated one of the most dreadful maritime tragedies in all times, although, afterwards, hundreds of subsequent analyses identified numerous causes and circumstances that generated the event and catalysed its effects⁵.

In 1990, the Royal Science Academy in Sweden granted Harry Markowitz, Miller Merton and William Sharpe, the Nobel Prize for “their work in

⁴ Details on the use of denominator *non*: www.meriam.webster.dictionaty and www.dictionaty.reference.com.

⁵ Nassim Nicolas Taleb, *Lebăda neagră. Impactul foarte puțin probabilului*, (Black Swan – The Impact of the Highly Improbable), Curtea Veche Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010 – according to *The Times* one of the most influential 12 books published after the Second World War.

developing the diverse portofolio theory and the financial actives evaluation patterns”. (The Nobel committee recognized Harry Markowitz for developing portofolio theory, Miller for the theory of corporate finance, and Sharpe for the Capital Asset (stock market) Pricing Model also known as CAPM).

The patterns developed by the three experts, who underestimated risks, but were accredited by the Nobel Committee, “blinded” the analysts, who provided the decision-makers with predictive analysis packages that did not anticipated the 2008 emerged economic-financial crisis ⁶.

11 September 2001 (9/11) is significant for any line of reasoning referring to or associated with the non-typical events, and its standing does not allow too many comments. Certainly, the attacks were not anticipated (as well as it is certain that the astonishment /shock of their occurrence increased their impact, including in the line of symbolism), although the subsequent analysis of the causes that enabled these attacks pulled them out from the non-typical area, unfortunately too late.

The kind of events presented above, so diverse in origin, evolution and closing belong to the non-typical or non-linear class of events. They are more frequently referred to, by the representatives of academic and intelligence communities, under the heading of *black swans*.

The theory and metaphor *black swan*, approached by Taleb in his paper *The Black Swan*. In the paper *Impact of the Highly Improbable*, and in numerous articles published afterwards “*real examples of going against common sense*”⁷ he approaches this type of unforeseen events, which have not been anticipated, nor have they been registered by recent history, or they have been but *post-factum*.

⁶ Nassim Nicholas Taleb declared in 2010 that the investors who lost money during the financial crisis should take legal action against the Central Bank of Sweden for granting the Nobel Prize to economists, whose theories have brought global economy to collapse (www.contributors.ro)

⁷ Benjamin Pauker, *Foreign Policy*, Nov-Dec 2012, page 15.

In his view, the non-typical events can not be anticipated because one of their features is retrospective predictability, in other words, they occur and happen unexpectedly, similar to the first black swan. According to the theory build up by Taleb, the descriptive pattern of this type of event relates to three identity parameters:

- *Rarity*, which places the non-typical event beyond the habitual expectation horizon, since none of the prior happenings bring it closer to the likelihood area;
- *Major impact*, its significance increases since the event's unlikelihood corroborates with a gap in response / comeback means;
- *Retrospective predictability*, the non-typical events become reasonable and predictable after its occurrence.

One of the main ideas of his approach emphasizes that the mathematical models of probability distribution, based on Gauss theory, are restrictive. Taleb accepts that the events which have not been included in the general average are likely to occur, but since the likelihood is very reduced, it can definitely be ignored (in a certain extent this is another way of saying „*if the only tool you have is the hammer, everything looks like a nail*“)

Further on, the characteristic of these events is the fact that, in most of the cases, they bring about opposite conducts and response reactions: ignored before occurrence and overestimated after they happen. In Taleb's view, when in contact with reality, the human mind undergoes three disorders, which he entitles „*the opacity triplet*“:

- *The comprehension illusion* – everyone believes that they understand what happens in the world (most frequent in the academic circles);
- *Retrospective distortion / alteration/ misinterpretation* – one can only correctly assess some events, only after they happened;
- *Exaggerated assessment of factual information* (most frequent in intelligence circles).

2. Uncommon and Atypical... Meaning Non-typical

By the use of the intelligence analysis standpoint, our opinion, although not entirely different from the one presented by Taleb, is more restrained – it accepts the fact that the non-linear feature of the non-typical events does not cancel entirely their preventability/predictability.

Considering their complexity and dynamic character, and the limitations of our patterns in reading the reality it is obvious that in most cases, we do not act upon reality, but upon our own perception of a reality or another. Between us and the actual reality, as well as between us and our inner-selves there is the destructive and creative simultaneous interference of the “mental model”, “reading pattern”, “stereotype”, “psycho fixation”, or in another word, it is the *bias* that alters our perception, and although it allows randomness, and unpredictability, it does not inexorably comply with it.


This leads to the conclusion that *black swan* is a perception outcome generated by individual and collective epistemic limitations, given that, as Nicholas Taleb highlights the 9/11 events were a *black swan* event for the victims, but not for the terrorists. In other words, we should not go on the blink in thinking that the non-typical event is a given fact, independent of our perception, because it gets factuality only when connected to a recipient, a significance-creator item. In this line of thinking, the retrospective predictability claimed by Taleb is not consistent with the above-mentioned descriptive pattern, because it becomes obvious that the knowledge enablers progressively provide predictability features to those events, *which are different* from the prior determined.

Therefore, the non-determined event can be comprehended as an event that current thinking, knowledge, models and methods dismiss, ignore, overlook, or marginalize as something that will never happen, but which actually has a significant non-zero probability of occurring. In other words, the centre of gravity in the preparation process for this event may include

recognition, understanding, preparation/ prevention mandatorily followed by prediction and mitigation⁸.

In certain cases experience proved that intelligence analysts, due to knowledge gaps, frequently associated rare events to non-determined events, without considering that randomness does not imply non-determined character unless corroborated with the atypical feature⁹.

It is for this reason, that we consider that our point of view, related to non-typical events can be supported through the presentation of certain particularities of intelligence analysis, as well.



⁸ Thomas Fowler, Martin Fischer, "Rare Events the Unrecognized Threat", *Sigma*, vol X, no.1, September 2010 / <http://www.noblis.org/noblis-media/20f758e0-b3b9-4b76-8b81-4cde0d7341f9>.

⁹ See also Martin Fischer, John Shortle "Rare Events Simulation: Enhancing Efficiency", *Sigma*, vol. X, no.1 September 2010 / <http://www.noblis.org/noblis-media/20f758e0-b3b9-4b76-8b81-4cde0d7341f9>.

3. Meta-analysis and Non-determined Events

The high degree of non-determinedness that characterizes the current security environment is, paradoxically also a consequence of data and intelligence multiplication, which has been requiring a move of the centre of gravity in the intelligence activity from collection to analysis. In this way, intelligence analysis has overcome its primary condition of data/intelligence fusion and processing and has become a source of intelligence in a supplemental process – meta-analysis which, through its specific features can provide a perspective oriented not necessarily on non-determined events, but on understanding, and particularly on their inevitability.

The *meta-analysis* of the way in which intelligence analysts approach these events has highlighted the requirement of a new perspective in information analysis, to face events that are unlikely to occur or would have never occurred. Such suppositions are triggered by the fact that the progress in our predictive ability is cancelled by the complex reality in which these events may occur, as well as by the limitations in the analysis capacity (*opacity triplet*, for example).

Through the analysis of their effects, the non-determined events that occurred in the past in other regions, areas of responsibility, states, etc. can be considered when designing scenarios, courses of action or, better said, contingency planning. Such a plan automatically includes responsive reactions that placed in the evolution course of a certain parameter of the security system or environment may lead to the prediction, mitigation and / or control of a potential non-determined event.

An example in this respect is the following: after the Fukushima calamity, the analysis carried out not only by the intelligence community has taken into account a possible accident that may occur at Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant. Most of the designed scenarios, as well as the conducted drills, were based on the presupposition of an earthquake (bias induced by the *black swan event* Fukushima), and that the Plant would withhold an 8.0 magnitude (on Richter scale) earthquake. From this point forward courses

of action and contingency planning would have been developed, as well as responsive reactions which involved emergency specialized forces, approaching a relatively limited area of threat and consequences of a potential major nuclear accident.

There was no scenario (or maybe we are not aware of its existence) designed to approach the non-determined, *the black swan*, to consider, let's say, the possibility (or even probability) of a cosmic event (the power plant being hit by a meteorite), a major terrorist attack or other unknown causes that may cause a nuclear catastrophe that would require the population evacuation from a larger area than 20km, but of 200 km, i.e including the capital city.

In the intelligence analysis any scenario or contingency planning is the expression of a prediction that may influence the cause that triggered its outset. Let us imagine a *black swan event* that may vitally impact on the Armed Forces performance – the accidental / undeliberate blast of several ammunition depots. Beside the subsequent response reaction, the scenario would definitely highlight the main potential causes. Certainly, they would be analyzed by the responsible authorities, that would direct measures to avoid them, before they occur.

In the intelligence community activity this analysis and action method, called *self-denying prophecy* illustrates that a prediction, through its inner taming force, becomes false, particularly because all the necessary measures had been taken as to prevent its occurrence¹⁰.

In other words, we do not necessarily have to discover the non-determined, the *black swan events*, but we can construct and develop them, passing beyond positive scientific knowledge limitations and capitalizing on the fact that the non-determined frequently, brings about circumstances in which, although the security status is assessed as highly stable, the risk reaches the highest values.

¹⁰ Ionel Nitu, quoted article

The turkey paradox, emphasized by Taleb is illustrative in this respect: a turkey is daily fed in order for it to be sacrificed, every feeding day adds up to the feeling of safety. After three hundred days, when the feeling of safety reaches the highest level, the owner decides to sacrifice it. Therefore, although the safety perception is at the highest point, the risk reached its peak¹¹.

For the intelligence analysts this paradox is also the outcome of the fact that in their substantially specific activity, they simultaneously face two perspectives on reality: a *linear* one and another, *non-linear*.

The linear perspective is characterized by predictability and capitalizes on the fact that the analyzed events have a limited degree of interconnectivity – this allows for the mathematical taming of specific evolutions (engineering, architecture, astronomy, part of physics, and a great part of science, in general, are linear fields).

The non-linear perspective does not identify causative connections among events, and this fact blinds prediction. A non-linear evolution is mirrored by the image of a house of cards / tower of cards: cards are added up successively, the assembly is growing until when the house collapses as another a card is added up. It is obviously wrong to blame the last card for the collapse instead of the structure of the assembly. This mistake is constantly made by analysts, especially when approaching complex systems, especially social ones (political and economic events at the tails of statistic graphics are unpredictable)¹²

There is something worthwhile mentioning here. The instability in the evolution of a social system, its fluctuations are frequently considered as

¹¹ Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Lebăda neagră. Impactul foarte puțin probabilului*, (Black Swan – The Impact of the Highly Improbable), Curtea Veche Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010 p. 69-70

¹² Nassim Nicholas Taleb, quoted article.

main causes of *black swan* unpredictable evolutions, although the retrospective analysis of such evolutions proves exactly the opposite.

The effort to limit fluctuations frequently led to blinding the perception of exponential growth of instability level and inevitably to non-determined evolutions. This points out to the idea that in certain situations „*early failures*” generate effects that can be controlled and can make the system float but not sink „*fluctuant nec mergitur*”¹³.

The role of fluctuation control is concisely presented by Taleb; he asserts that „*Lebanon is the most stable place in the whole area*”, because „*risks are visible to the naked eye there*” and even though „*media says is chaos – but it is not*” particularly because „*it's stable because Hezbollah and the Shiites know that they have to live with the Sunnis and the Christians*.”

It can't fall apart because it's a perfectly controlled mess.”¹⁴

One should not overlook that many *black swan* events occurred not necessarily because of lack of information, but because of intelligence services not capitalizing correctly this information, or because decision makers did not reflect on the warnings of the intelligence services, or they tried to involve a service or another in politics¹⁵.

4. Predicting Rain Doesn't Count; Building Arks Does

Nowadays, when the fluctuations in the security environment are more obvious and more unpredictable, the joint effort of the representatives of both intelligence community and academic community may result in the knowledge advantage that can provide decisional support, at all levels, even the political one. It is even more relevant since the main challenge of any intelligence service is not necessarily the provision of a long-term analysis,

¹³ Idem.

¹⁴ Benjamin Pauker, quoted article.

¹⁵ Center for the Study of Intelligence, *Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship*, Roundtable Report.

but particularly the timely provision of relevant analyses useful in decision-making¹⁶.

Prognosis and analysis should reflect that the decision-making support needs to permanently capitalize on Warren Buffet saying: „*predicting rain doesn't count; building arks does*”. In this respect, it would be useful that in the first stage, analysts should consider **taming non-determined events through knowledge management** and subsequently, building probability distribution patterns on the occurrence of these events based on the *central limit theorem* or the heavy tail distribution models, which are better than typical Gauss classic distribution. The analysis patterns based on the central limit theorem, which states that the sum (and average) of a large number of independent, interacting observations from the same general group tends to have a normal distribution, may be one of the greatest challenges in the intelligence analysis.

Additionally, through the corroborated effort of the academic community and the intelligence community, the *clarity triplet* can be achieved, opposite to *opacity triplet*, stated by Taleb. A triplet that combines / integrates scientific knowledge (academic community), knowledge management (academic community and intelligence community) and intelligence analysis (intelligence community) and that can provide the decision-makers not necessarily, **solutions** to solve issues, but **alternatives** to approach real disequilibrium factors of the current security environment. Such an approach can catalyze the continuous transformation process of the defence intelligence structures – organizations that have taken great steps in transferring / repositioning from reliability-based management to resilience-based management. And a resilient organization is one able to respond to challenges brought about by non-determined events, meaning those events which are *different from the ones comprised in a category or another*, which have already been recognized, studied and are predictable.

¹⁶ Ionel Nitu, quoted article.

5. Instead of “The End”

„The world was so recent that many things lacked names, and in order to indicate them it was necessary to point.“ to quote Gabriel Garcia Marquez in his *“One Hundred Years of Solitude”*.

At the end, we can rephrase and state that non-determined events have so recently been approached by the intelligence services analysis and sometimes in order to indicate them, it is necessary to point ... in order to identify them...

Which is, in one way or another, ... what I have just done.

The Security of South-Eastern European States

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Abstract: Over the centuries, from geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic points of view, the importance of the Black Sea was based mainly on the role that the region was at the intersection of the former powers and empires (Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman and Russian). It was simultaneously a bridge and a border, a buffer zone and a transit area between West and East, between North and South. In addition, the Black Sea has represented and represents a connection point for marketing channels and regions rich in energy resources.

Keywords: Security, extended Black Sea region, South-Eastern Europe.

1. Introduction

Located at the junction of important flows of interest the extended Black Sea area is the main link between the three regions with a significant meaning on the political, economic and security: South-East Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. In this region of interests intersect major global actors with those of riparian States, especially in the economic and security sectors.

The last decade of the past century marked the beginning of new transformations in this region, with effects on the political, economic and social spectrum. Through the Soviet Union, the number of riparian States increased to six. The processes of transition to a market economy and political pluralism in the former ex-Soviet states have caused major political changes, with the irreversible implications in the economic and social plan.

Currently, the security environment within the extended area of the Black Sea is characterized by the existence of significant vulnerabilities. For example, Turkey is vulnerable to instability in the region due to its links with ethnic Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Abkhazians; the lack of a coherent legal framework necessary to combat corruption; the lack of a coherent

legal framework for combating organized crime, drug trafficking and human trafficking; existence in the region, some countries that have not completed the options vis-à-vis European integration and Euro-Atlantic (an important part of Ukraine and officials have made statements against potential accessions of European and Euro-Atlantic organizations); the concomitant existence of certain games of interest once the Russian hegemony in the region, the establishment and the trends of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the States here; the dependence of countries in the region of Russia's energy resources.

However, the main vulnerability of the region consists of the differences between the countries that compose it. It is here not only about the cultural and political diversity that characterizes the Black Sea region and the Balkans, but especially about the different stages of development in the countries of this region. The vulnerability is, broadly, the result of combining the existing risks to a country its capacity to cope with and survive situations of internal and external emergency.

In a pessimistic scenario of regional developments, these differences would enhance States' inability to cooperate, having negative effects on the process of European integration and Euro-Atlantic. In general, the vulnerabilities of specific States are in transition from totalitarianism to democracy: the majority of the region's countries belonging to the Soviet bloc, whose collapse he has thrown in a "vacuum" of geo-who tried to get out through the initiation of a difficult process of transition both internally and externally; by whether this process in any of the areas of social life. It considers that, at least in the eastern part of the area of the Black Sea and into the Balkans, the quality of life of residents is well below the level achieved during the former Soviet Union.

It appears, therefore, that the Black Sea region and the Balkans are not devoid of significant vulnerabilities. Most of them have their roots in history and, for this reason; their integration into the institutions of the European and Euro-Atlantic is proving to be an important test for the new geopolitical and geostrategic concept.

2. Debats

Politico-strategic developments in Central and Eastern Europe, in terms of the Division of the continent by the "iron curtain", favored largely risk-diversification and amplification, directly influencing the configuration and showing them. These conditions have caused the appearance of a new security environment characterized by: ▪ the radical transformation of the geopolitical and geostrategic configuration of the zone, as a result of the Treaty of Warsaw dissolution; ▪ outlining an area deficient in Central and southeastern Europe, the disappearance of a "protective umbrellas"; ▪ territorial and ethnic conflicts, thawing, embedded in the period immediately following the end of World War II, in the conservative Communist system; ▪ the difficulties of the transition to the rule of law and the market economy, vulnerability and risks of insecurity.

In the current international context, the security of South-East European States no longer is threatened by a military conflict; although still remain hotbeds of tension and crises – even in the vicinity of Romania – such as those in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region. Keep, so the possibility of local conflicts, of low intensity, for a period which may be extended in time, well above the forecasts of the parties involved.

It is expected that the short and medium term, the risks likely to prevail in the final agreement with respect to the military, and internal vulnerabilities and contingencies to potentiate greatly the ability of States and the international community as a whole to respond and counteract the risks and threats to national security and international crises. The South eastern European security is different from that of other regions of the world. Southeastern Europe has short and medium term chance-single can in history – to show that it is possible to achieve political and economic integration based on the assumption of responsibilities, ideals and values.

The fall of the Communist regimes and the relaxation of policy in the field of customs attracted attention of the mafia type organizations. The work of these organizations has increased considerably in the early 1990s, as the new democratic Governments in South-East Europe focused more on

political issues, social and economic. International criminal networks are known to seize immediate opportunities offered by the revolutionary changes that have taken place in the field of technological and political, business and media in communications. The complex situation in terms of social, economic, and ethnic and religious tensions have imposed extensive measures, which have included a broad spectrum: from economic development, border security, arms control and military cooperation to the broader sphere of social security. It must be stressed that stabilizing Southeast Europe – which, due to a series of ethnic conflicts with devastating effect, represent the most serious threat to the security of the region in the 1990s and continues to have a significant importance for the long-term security of the entire continent.

Despite shortcomings and dysfunction that is manifested in all areas of social life, it must be admitted that the situation in South-Eastern Europe has improved considerably. Although there are still a lot to be done in order for the region to sustain itself, the international community has achieved notable successes in recent years. All the resulting from the dismantling of Yugoslavia are now governed by democratically elected leaders, determined to resolve their differences peaceably left in contention. At the same time, the interests of the majority of the region's States to become members of NATO and of the European Union encouraged them to tackle substantive issues and to accept certain laws aimed at efficient management of asymmetric threats and risks in the region. However, a number of analysts believe it is a vision of the future, a plan for stabilization and long-term development of the region. This vision must start from an objective analysis of the facts. Provision should be made, too, the relationship between risks and security threats and economic growth. Many Western analysts believe that the integration of the countries of South-Eastern Europe into the Euro-Atlantic structures increase the predictability of their social, economic and political.

In South-Eastern Europe, conventional risks at the national and regional security are combined with new types of malicious threats, more difficult to define and countered. Cross-border crime, terrorism, illicit trade

networks combined with the paramilitary, drug trafficking, arms and human trafficking, environmental disasters continues to fuel a zone of instability and insecurity. It is worth noting that all global threats can be found at the regional level and as models of terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal trafficking and are replicated at regional level in South-East Europe.

Transformations in the global economy and in international politics after the cold war have given a strong impetus to the activities of organized crime. Relying on increasing international illegal traffic in money, goods and people, mafia type organizations and expanded their influence and power, have become even more rich compared to the Governments of the States faced. This has become a real threat to international security in general. In most former Communist countries, violence, corruption and unscrupulous looting of riches and wealth associated with national mafia type organizations in training and qualifying, threatening democratic reforms and wake up in disadvantaged circles, nostalgia for authoritarian regimes. In many cases, these organizations are governed by the rules of the management company or by any company, but the new model of organization tends to differentiate the classic model.

As a result of cross-border activity, the organizations those are accumulating wealth and power to such an extent that endanger the effectiveness and even the legitimacy of the State. Basically, no counties are outside the areas of interest of organized crime, illegal activities and greatly affect the regional stability and national security of the States in which it manifests itself. It is universally recognized that, increasingly, organized crime erodes and degrades the environment and threaten the strategic vision of what the company is a stable and desirable. The precise nature and the true dimensions of the phenomenon remain unclear. Belonging to organized crime groups differ significantly from each other in terms of size, wealth gained, internal structure and cohesion, illegal activities, connections and international and transnational connections. Many of the specific activities organized crime no longer requires major organizational

resources and hierarchical structures developed, nor upon the forces of order acquisition, like you did in the last 30-40 years.

The main threat to peace in the Balkans is represented by those who are trying to hinder vicinity region of the States of Western Europe. There are still serious risks to return to instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, as well as in some ex-Soviet countries (the Republic of Moldova – Transdnistria, Armenia and Azerbaijan – Nagorno-Karabakh), caused by small groups of extremists, nationalists who are opposed to the adoption of European standards of democracy and the rule of law. The values that support the existence of ethnic groups relate to culture, traditions and customs, language, religion, way of life and a certain psychology. All this forms the basis from which to start to define the identity of any given ethnic group. Such values cannot be removed or destroyed. They represent an objective reality, defining each ethnic group and its elements. To analyze the system of values that is based on ethnic groups is particularly important, because these can be known and the very spring's developments, especially considering the plethora of ethnic conflicts around the world, particularly in the areas of interference of different cultures and civilizations, as is South-Eastern Europe.

Ethnic clashes may constitute a real "Trojan horse" that some interested groups can use in order to hasten the end of the era of the primacy of nation States, without however taking into account the "boomerang effect" that could take these actions destabilizing. Emergence of these phenomena is not exclusive of the globalization effect: they have multiple connotations of historical, cultural and especially economic. You can easily find that where there are social and economic problems there is no ethnic conflicts. Conflict prevention requires a wider approach, going beyond cultural and economic, because ethnic conflicts have complex causes, historical, political and territorial causes what materializes in a much larger measure in the confrontation of interests than in the values. Ethnic interests are based on systems of values, but are not a direct result of them.

With regard to religious extremism, it can be asserted that militant religious extremist movements tend to have a universal character. Unlike ethnic movements, they tend to consider that the views which they express must be appropriated by all believers of religions. They tend to create an incentive for cross-border, thus transferring their own opinion about the legitimacy of insight from across the political action motivation. These extremist movements have an exclusive character: they reject any contrary to those options that they promote both the theological and the political or the social order. In practice, this means that in societies where such opinions are prevalent, any individual who is not a follower or a Christian is considered a citizen of "second class". In addition, they have an active campaigner, using coercive means easily.

Another threat to security and stability in South-Eastern Europe is terrorism that has grown beyond the boundaries of States, turning it into a global threat. In Europe, terrorism is active, both in developed States, such as Ireland and Spain, as well as in the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo) and in the former Soviet space (North Caucasus). Occasionally, terrorism is also present in Turkey and Greece. The existence and proliferation of terrorism has caused concern in the political environment and have raised the issue of strengthening and enhancing the fight against this scourge of the contemporary world. Terrorism is not fundamentally a military problem, but a political, social and economic situation. Therefore, trying to combat terrorism by military means is only a "mission impossible". Terrorism is a phenomenon that is more easily described than defined. There is still a clear and universally accepted definition of terrorism. However, it is recognized that, in general, the ultimate goal of terrorism involves political objectives. At the same time, however, what a given nation appears as a terrorist may be for another a freedom fighter.

Another risk factor in the increasingly evident in South-Eastern Europe is so-called "failed States" which can easily become nurseries for new "viruses". Conflict zones, stretching from the Balkans to the Caucasus, Central Asia and Africa, have become centers for the recruitment of terrorists and drug and weapons supply. These are places where the loss of State control may

mean loss of control over weapons of mass destruction, a threat which can be extended rapidly to the most distant corners of the world. The attacks of September 11, 2001 have demonstrated that "failed States" is more than a tragedy, they can be a major international security issue (the Taliban Government and the Al-Qaeda movement have risen as a result of civil war in Afghanistan, and Bin Laden had found refuge in these countries since 1995).

As a result, it is evident that, in order to support the recovery extended Black Sea area, the international community must remain engaged and to continue their efforts to coordinate these threats, by understanding through an integrated approach to the most important risks are asymmetric.

In this respect, it is noted that in southeastern Europe already operates a network of security cooperation supported by the presence of a large number of international organizations (UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE) and regional initiatives. NATO troops are working together with representatives of the UN, EU and OSCE, as well as with representatives of international humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations. For example, in Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO is responsible for ensuring the security and monitoring of borders. The UNITED NATIONS responsible for issues of civil administration. OSCE supports democratization and building the institutions of the rule of law, while the European Union leads the reconstruction efforts and economic development.

Without doubt, in terms of institutional mechanisms need to be created to remove the ad hoc measures to counter specific threats and crises. It highlights the need for an increasingly common strategy bringing together the international community's efforts, and those of Governments and the local population in areas exposed to these risks and threats. This strategy should set priorities, since resources are limited, and this "war" will certainly be one of lasting. Efforts to achieve a common approach must overcome a number of obstacles: different political interests of States in the

region, the lack of a generally accepted definition of terrorism, the lack of a common strategy with regard to the States that support terrorism, the existence of different legal systems, the lack of coordination between ministries and national agencies with responsibilities in the fight against organized crime, unequal economic development, bureaucracy etc.

Faced with an accentuation of risks and security threats, the States of South-Eastern Europe, including Romania, are unaware of the benefits of regional cooperation and coordination. At the same time, the extent of bureaucracy and highlights the need for responsibilities interdependence inter-agency cooperation to optimize national security programs.

Harmonization of national efforts with those at the regional and international level is a process in full swing, and the result of these efforts will be the measure of efficiency in the fight against the risks and security threats at the beginning of the 21st century.

3. Conclusions

Over the centuries, the strategic importance of the Black Sea region and the Balkans were based on the role he played, being simultaneously a bridge and a border, a buffer zone and a transit between Europe and Asia, at the intersection of the former powers and empires.

Extended Black Sea region reflects small-scale mutations, changes and trends in political, economic and social manifested at European level. In recent years we can observe a gradual concentration of forces for the security of the Black Sea, and the existence of local conflicts unresolved, purposely kept in an uncertain state, worsening and strategic exploitation of the effects that could result from this, it also represents a significant risk to the security of the States of the region. In addition, the proven existence of a surplus amount of weaponry and ammunition resulted from the disintegration of the Soviet forces is an important vector of risk and not just a source of concern, but also a proliferation of other risks, such as the trafficking of weapons or the use of such materials by terrorist organizations.

Certainly, the control and management of this space is, under present conditions, not only a challenge that will spark your egos and interests, in the fierce economic competition, but also the need for harmonization of efforts for development and materialization of cooperative projects and strengthening security. The elements that determine the growing interest for the extended area of the Black Sea include, as I already mentioned, the special geographical position at the crossroads of three geo-political zones and geo-strategic importance in Europe (Central, Southern and Eastern Europe), close to the Middle East; It is the gateway to the planetary Ocean output for Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Transcaucasian countries; lies on the route of the future energy lines, such as TRACECA and other planned routes for the transport of hydrocarbons from the Caspian region and Central Asia; includes a segment from the Department of organized crime, especially drug trafficking and illegal immigration of people from Central Asia and the Middle East to the West; has important natural resources, and as an extension of the strategic vision of the North-Atlantic Alliance, is a recognized for expanding military cooperation within the Partnership for Peace (PfP).

The corollary of those listed is to intensify and refocus strategic spectrum of this region, with a pronounced substrate, dictated by its energetic potential, being accompanied by an increase in the interest of the great powers in the region. The main actors of the new strategic scenario which is looming in the extended area of the borders of the Black Sea, the Caspian oil stake, are the US, EU and Russia.

Currently, this region through a historic stage characterized by long and painful separation of communism and of the Soviet sphere of influence, the transition from a closed economy and society to the values of democracy and the market economy. In this context, the nature of security risks tends to change in a direction in which conventional security forces can not counteract, the threat extends through both the scale and effects of the companies as a whole. This poses a serious challenge to the efficacy of already established structures.

Thus, it is obvious that you have dealt with a radical change in the traditional strategies and a more strong involvement of States moving the center of gravity of security on the classical military action on a more close and more effective inter-agency cooperation and inter-state, based on appropriate and comprehensive exchange of information, so that the risks and unpredictable threats we will face in the future security environment can be countered with the most suitable specialized and effective means.

Beyond the political and economic considerations of the collective security of Europe, as a geographical, political and economic unity, should be granted a formula too, that will ensure a common activity of intelligence. Culture should be expanded and integration at the level of a common policy for intelligence, given that, in the present context, bilateral relations existing between national information structures appear to be insufficient to support the finding adequate responses to the new security challenges. The development of such a policy and, within the framework provided by it, of a European structure of intelligence, is an actual problem very important, but especially of perspective. The phenomenon of cooperation in the field of intelligence records a visible progress, both in terms of quantity and quality of information. Very likely, cooperation at the European level will continue to intensify, even if there are a number of major difficulties such as issues related to sovereignty, lack of confidence, or even the privileged relations interoperability that some States have them with US, or even Russia.

At the same time, changes in the international security environment, financial constraints, but also the determination of EU Member States – as manifested, for example, through the approval of the European Security Strategy – turn out to be the driving force of integration. Thus, it can be said that the common assessments of intelligence facilitates a common perception of the threat of default views and common perspectives pertaining to actions and measures to be taken.

Last but not least, it is important to note that the very knowledge of strategic intelligence services will have to be understood and materialized in a

different way. Strategic knowledge is evolving knowledge and not static; the necessary information and indicators in the 20th century to define a security are no longer necessarily enough in the 21st century. Strategic knowledge also lacks a direct relevance for decision making and planning is not knowledge; Knowledge involves networks of interaction, cooperation, and even inventive imagination. A culture based on cooperation and interaction, decision-making relevance assumes development of linkages among the various more subtle levels of intelligence.

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The Bessarabia Affair: A Moment of Tension in the Soviet-Romanian Relations as Part of the Movement of Non-alignment with the Politics of the Economic Integration in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (C.M.E.A.)

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Abstract: On the background of damaging the Soviet-Romanian relations in the early '60s, Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet president, sets an action of repression towards the action initiated by the Bucharest government. Given that the movement of emancipation from Moscow Economic tutelage was focused on national requests, the Soviets used as means of pressure the Romanian citizens of Bessarabia (Moldavian SSR). Pro-Soviet leadership in Chisinau triggered a veritable media campaign against Romania who was accused of revisionist activities and, by order of Moscow, it initiated a heinous plan of denationalizing Moldova. This action, carried out in a “more modern” form than the previous movements developed within the 40s, sentenced to Gulag tens of thousands of Soviet citizens of Romanian descent, who were directed to emigrate to Kazakhstan and Siberia.

Keywords: RSS Moldavia, Soviet Union, C.M.E.A, denationalization.

The issue of October 27, 1961 of the Pravda newspaper presented an outstanding aspect from the life of the citizens of the RSS Moldavia. In the previously mentioned issue references to “the honest wish of the Moldavian people” to fully reintegrate among the” Russian people to whom they trace their roots” had been made. “The existence of the Moldavians as a distinct people from the Russians represents an error of history that estranged them from their origins and made them forget their Russian mother tongue”. As a consequence of it, during the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Prime Secretary of the RSS Moldavia, I.I. Bodiul, mentioned that the Moldavian people were completely prepared to reunite

their destinies with the co-inhabiting nationalities in order to generate the rebirth that everyone had been waiting¹.

This was to contribute to the generation of a new people, the Soviet nation, in which all nationalities living together in the Soviet Union, Moldavians included, were present. The international recognition of the new people is confirmed on January 27, 1964 when Bodiul visited Sofia and was welcomed by the Bulgarian president Jivkov himself. During the visit, the Moldavian Prime Secretary led the discussions towards another level underlining the brotherhood of blood between the two Slavic nations: the Bulgarian and the Soviet peoples². While delivering his speech, Bodiul adopted a stern attitude of condemning the withdrawal of the Albanians from the C.M.E.A. and, at the end of his discourse he "forgot" to name Romania among the "socialist friendly nations", possibly as a consequence of the boycott ordered by Khrushchev in order to penalize the position adopted by our country regarding its economic specialization³.

The public launch of this initiative was meant to justify the newly planned policy of denationalization which, on the grounds of the deteriorating situation between the Soviet Union and the RSS Moldavia was about to become a method of constraint towards the Romanian authorities. Prior to the Congress, the Soviets had taken measures to reduce the number of the Romanian periodicals in the RSS Moldavia. The number of books edited in Romanian had dropped from 75% to less than 49% between 1950 and 1964, of magazines from 60 to 52%, and of newspapers from 65 to 48%⁴. Out of a total amount of 125 magazines and newspapers with a printing circulation of 950,000 issues nearly 50%, 575,000 items, were published in

¹ Roman Szporluk, *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR*, Praeger Publisher, New York, 1975, p. 243

² ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe, Dosar 12/1964, Notă informativă în legătură cu cuvântările tovarășilor T. Jivkov și I. Bodiul, rostite la 27 ianuarie 1964 la întâlnirea activului organizației PC Bulgar din Sofia cu delegația CC a PC din Moldova, f. 17

³ Roman Szporluk, op. cit., p. 244

⁴ C. Ciorănescu, *Aspects des relations Russo-Romaines*, Paris, 1967, p. 254

”Moldavian”⁵”, which was clear to highlight the intentions of turning the Romanian population of the Republic into Russians.

The economic and social difficulties faced by the ”Moldavian people under the military occupation of the bourgeois-landlord forces of Romania” was often underlined by the Soviet authorities of the RSS Moldavia. They talked about the outstanding rise of the economic development which followed the ”liberation” of the republic, the industrial production augmenting over 3.3 times. However, the same publication was describing the Soviet Moldavia as ”an agrarian-industrial republic”⁶”.

In an informative material written by the correspondent of ”The Scânteia” (The Spark) in the Soviet Union, it is mentioned an episode during an official visit paid by a delegation of reporters accredited in the USSR to the RSS Moldavia. In answer to the Western German ”Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” newspaper’s correspondent, the Moldavian representative that was accompanying the delegation of reporters replied: “The Moldavian people trace their roots in the principality of Halici which, as everyone knows, was a Slavic principality. The Moldavians went on living in a feudal state ranging from the Carpathians to the Danube, then went under the dominion of the Ottoman Empire.(...). In 1918 the Romanian landlords invaded Moldavia and so for more than 20 years the Moldavians had lived under the yoke of the Romanian nobility. In 1940, as it is well-known, Moldavia was set free and became a Soviet republic. The war that followed is not worth mentioning. To sum up your question, as it is obvious in history, the Moldavians are very close to the Russians and Ukrainians having a Slavic origin”⁷.”

⁵ ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe, Dosar Nr. 4/1964,***, *40 de ani de la formarea RSS Moldovenești și întemeierea PC al Moldovei. Hotărârea CC al PC al Moldovei*, Moldova socialistă, 9 februarie 1964, f. 16

⁶ *ibidem*, f. 15

⁷ *ibidem*, Dosar Nr. 12/1964, Material întocmit de A. Munteanu corespondent permanent al ziarului Scânteia în URSS cu prilejul unei vizite a unei delegații de ziaristi în RSS moldovenească, f. 48

On the background of the discussions the correspondent of The Scânteia eventually had with the Moldavian writer M. Ciubotariu, editor of “The Socialist Moldavia”, he felt very intrigued by the manoeuvres that had been made in the republic to denationalize the people. Recommendations were deliberately being made during the discussions held at the writers’ union in order to replace some archaic terms existent in the spoken language with Russian or Ukrainian words. According to the same writer, the denationalization policy began in the kindergarten, where in exclusively Romanian villages Russian speaking teachers had been employed, the same happening later on in Moldavian teaching language schools where the Russian teachers demanded that only Russian should be spoken including during the breaks. In newly founded factories in the republic Russian speaking workers from all around the Soviet Union were being brought, while the Moldavian youths were being redistributed in the remotest corners of the “Empire”. The process of denationalization continued up to the highest levels in politics where in positions of responsibility mainly people brought from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) were appointed⁸.

It seems that this movement orchestrated by the Soviets was a consequence of the changes operated by Romania in its external affairs beginning with October 1961 when the Romanian Communist Party (R.C.P.) changed its position regarding the leading role of the worldwide socialist movement of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (C.P.S.U.). To this change it was added an assiduous promotion of the national communist doctrine through which it was claimed the right to self-determination of each of the communist parties⁹.

The enterprises of forming a new Soviet nation had been initiated long before the beginning of the Romanian movement of non-alignment and they followed rigorously the “initial recipe” invented by Stalin which meant

⁸ *ibidem*, f. 51-52

⁹ Stephen Fischer-Galați, *The New Romania: From People’s Democracy to Socialist Republic*, Cambridge, 1967, p. 81

to uproot the national communities and to scatter them across the entire Soviet territory. The measures taken by Stalin were brutal and after his death they were disapproved by the new Kremlin leadership. The measures were no longer in line with the image they wished to build, but the final goal stayed the same. In 1955 the official radio in Moscow and the press announced a new plan regarding the relocation of the Moldavian population in the Kazakhstan steppe (a piece of information that appeared in “The Sovietskaia Moldovia” newspaper on March 31, 1955). These official items of news were being restated between 1957 and 1960 and it seems that at the time they might not have been based on a nationalist motivation but a pure economic one. On the background of continuing to industrialize the agriculture, a large amount of the working forces (mainly Romanian) thus set free had to be redirected towards industry, yet not towards that of their own republic but towards the one in Ukraine or Siberia. This transposes into an initiative of “The Moldova Socialistă” newspaper in which a material was published in order to ask the young people and the cosmopolitans of the RSS Moldavia to set off to the plants in the entire USSR: ” The shock working places of Ukraine and Siberia are awaiting for you.” In the same newspaper it was issued that an important number of cosmopolitans had already set off towards these working places and another group was about to leave on December 18, the eager being awaited to enlist¹⁰.

According to the plan elaborated by Khrushchov, the development of the Soviet agriculture was going to show over 42 million hectares of virgin lands¹¹ in the Siberian regions to great advantage (the autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, Eastern Siberia, Western Siberia, the

¹⁰ ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe, Dosar Nr. 12/1964, Câteva problem ridicate în cuvântările deputaților din RSS Moldovenească la Sesiunea a V-a a Sovietului Suprem al URSS (decembrie 1964), f. 74-76

¹¹ Carl Zoerb, *The Virgin Land Territory: Plans Performance, Prospects in Laird Roy*; Edward Crowley (ed.), *Soviet Agriculture: The Permanent Crisis*, Praeger, New York, 1965, p. 29

Volga and the Ural) and the north of the RSS Kazakhstan¹². The yield registered in the years subsequent to this campaign surpassed the expectations of the party organisations, the crops in the USSR rising from 26.9 million tons in 1953 to almost 58.4 million tons in 1958¹³. The action had two distinct phases, one in the period that followed the WWII when an important part of the colonists came from the ethnic groups considered insecure, with the second one taking part in the early '60s. The latter had as priority the activity initiated and coordinated by Kosmosol. Only between 1958 and 1965 did the organisation manage to colonize over a million people¹⁴. The campaign for the mobilizing of the youths was illustrated both in the press and on the radio all around the USSR by launching encouraging appeals together with promises of better lives.

The informative notes written by a part of the Romanian students studying abroad at the time stand proof for these disputes on the Bessarabia Affair. They bring thorough details connected with the classroom activity of the Soviet professors who used to lay the blame on the Romanian state. One of the Romanian students from the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Leningrad said that during the "Language History" classes, the professor pleaded for the Bessarabian matter that had been high on the agenda of the Soviet authorities¹⁵. Another episode with a tinge of nationalism comes up from the Secretarial Office of the metallurgy of the non-ferrous metals of the C.M.E.A. with the headquarters in Budapest. It is disclosed an interesting discussion between one of the Romanian representatives and

¹² Peter Grandstaff, *Interregional Migration in the USSR. Economic Aspects, 1959-1970*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1980, p. 28

¹³ ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe, Dosar Nr. 6/1960, Vol. 2, Repartizarea rațională a suprafețelor arabile ca una din măsurile de sporire a recoltelor globale de culturi agricole, f. 127

¹⁴ Martin McCauley, *Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture. The Virgin Land Programme, 1953-1964*, The Macmillan Press, Ltd., Plymouth, 1976, p. 177-179

¹⁵ ANIC, Fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe, Dosar Nr. 24/1964, Notă cu unele probleme relatate de studenții și aspiranții români care studiau în străinătate, f. 1

his Bulgarian counterpart. The latter seriously charged Romania for their nationalist policy and demanded that the Magyar Autonomous Region should be ceded to Hungary. The Romanian's reply was rather harsh reminding his interlocutor about the fate of the Romanian minority of Bulgaria who are systematically confronted with a huge denationalization process¹⁶.

Due to the information published in the Chinese press that was officially condemning the Soviet Union for the territorial rape against Romania in 1940, Khrushchev had a pitiless reaction and menaced the Romanian state to reopen the Transylvania Affair along with that of Bessarabia¹⁷. The Romanian state was proposed to organise a double round of election regarding the self-determination of the two provinces in case the international polemic continued. The Romanian delegates turned the Soviet proposal down but in public compensation in December of the same year under the auspices of the Romanian Science Academy a book from a Marxist perspective about the double annexation of Bessarabia of 1812 and 1878 was brought out¹⁸. The publishing of the book couldn't escape notice in the western press and literature as it was mentioned as a possible action of rejecting the Moscow authorities¹⁹. After the death of Dej, the Bessarabia Affair came to an end in 1965 when Nicolae Ceausescu reconfirmed the existent borders between the two states: "Both Parts declare for the inviolability of the existent frontiers in Europe"²⁰.

The Soviet Union wishes to consolidate its position in the collective minds of the Bessarabians and with the help of the Prime Secretary Bodiul they will go on publishing materials on the same topic, that of the Moldavian

¹⁶ *ibidem*, f. 17

¹⁷ Martin McCauley, *op. cit.*, p. 99

¹⁸ Karl Marx, *însemnări despre români. Manuscrise inedite*, Editura Academiei Române, București, 1964; vezi C. Ciorănescu, *op. cit.*, p. 220

¹⁹ Hugh Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 104

²⁰ *** , *Comunicat cu privire la vizita în Uniunea Republicilor Sovietice Socialiste a delegației de partid și guvernamentale a Republicii Socialiste România*, Scânteia, 12 Septembrie, 1965, p. 3

nation belonging to Mother Russia. During the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of the RSS Moldavia of March 1966, the Prime Secretary mentioned the fact that the two nations were historically connected thanks to the Cyrillic alphabet they had always used.

According to the older principles describing the economic development of the territories inhabited by the minorities, the Soviets were preparing a new plan of industrialization of the RSS Moldavia which would have made it possible for the Romanian population to be disclosed from the republic and moved first to industrial centres and then to other Soviet republics. The great majority of the Romanian living in Bessarabia were involved in agriculture and this gave an even greater stability in the territory. The Soviet specialists will thoroughly study even the possibility of disclosing and distributing of the inhabitants according to profession, without taking into account their ethnic origins. Luckily enough for us, the Soviets did not derive advantage from the propaganda apparatus of the United States of America that made it possible to form the American nation using almost the same methods also studied by the Soviets concerning the redistribution of the inhabitants across the country irrespective of their ethnic origins.

Politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l'Union Européenne et les défis de la région pontique

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Résumé: L'objectif de l'article est de faire une évaluation quant à la modalité dont l'actuelle Politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l'Union européenne répond aux risques et vulnérabilités extérieures qui proviennent de région élargie de la Mer Noire qui fait partie du voisinage oriental de l'Union.

Les mots-clés: sécurité, stabilité, région de la Mer Noire, Union européenne, voisinage oriental, puissance.

1. Introduction

Depuis la fin des années '80 quand le politologue américain Joseph Nye jr. a lancé le concept de soft power (la puissance douce) et, notamment, d'après la publication en 2004 par le même auteur du volume *Soft power – The means to succes in World Politics*¹, il y a toujours dans la littérature de spécialité dans le domaine de relations internationales et dans les milieux politiques internationales la tentation de donner comme l'exemple de ce concept le projet représenté par l'Union européenne. Dans un livre très connu dans les cercles des spécialistes – *European Dream*² - publié dans la même période avec le livre de Joseph Nye jr., Jeremy Rifkin faisait l'apologie de cette entité politique sur la scène internationale.

Le développement graduel, d'après l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Maastricht, du dimension de sécurité et de défense sous l'égide de la

¹ Josef Nye jr, *Soft power – The means to succes in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York, 2004

² Jeremy Rifkin, *European Dream*,...2005

politique étrangère et de sécurité commune, le deuxième pilier de l'Union, qui venait à compléter le plus grand bloc commercial et économique du monde, a représenté un argument souvent mentionné pour soutenir la compatibilité entre l'Union européenne et le concept proposé par Joseph Nye jr..

Dans ce cadre, parmi les objectifs de l'Union européenne en matière de sécurité, adoptés par la Stratégie européenne de sécurité, document approuvé par le Conseil européen en décembre 2003 et renouvelé en 2008, on trouve l'objectif concernant l'assurance de la stabilité et de la bonne gouvernance dans le voisinage européen³, une vaste région située aux frontières du Sud et de l'Est de l'Union européenne.

De cette perspective, le but de mon article est de rendre une courte investigation sur la modalité dont l'actuelle politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l'Union européenne répond aux risques et aux vulnérabilités extérieures qui proviennent de région élargie de la Mer Noire qui fait partie du voisinage oriental de l'Union. Dans ce sens, dans la première partie de l'article je propose une brève analyse de la dynamique de la politique de sécurité et de défense d'après l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne, notamment des capacités d'action mises à la disposition de l'Union européenne dans ce domaine. Dans la deuxième partie de la recherche je vais examiner les principaux défis en matière de sécurité dans la région pontique. Enfin, dans la dernière partie de l'article je vais proposer une évaluation concise des démarches européennes dans le domaine de la sécurité vis-à-vis des évolutions qui se développent à la frontière orientale de l'Union, notamment dans la zone de la Mer Noire.

³ *Une Europe sur dans un monde meilleur*, Stratégie européenne de sécurité, 2003

2. La dynamique de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l'Union européenne dans le contexte de l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne

A parler dans ces temps troubles, même très troubles, pour la construction européenne sur la puissance douce de l'Union européenne est une démarche risquant, à parler sur la puissance de l'Union est une démarche très risquant et une analyse de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune pourrait sembler pour les observateurs plus sceptiques un exercice de type alexandrin! Autrement dit, il s'agit seulement d'un jeu intellectuel, d'une démarche académique sans beaucoup liaisons avec la pratique politique.

Mais, au-delà du scepticisme constant avec lequel est perçue cette véritable Cendrillon de l'Union européenne, regardée avec la méfiance et la jalousie par certains Etats membres, avec la condescendance par les alliés américains et avec la supériorité arrogante par la Fédération de la Russie, la politique de sécurité et de défense de l'Union européenne a enregistré des progrès en matière d'institutions, de capacités, de concepts et de procédures et, notamment, de compétences de gestion des crises dans les différents théâtres d'opérations extérieures. Ces vrais repères dans la concrétisation de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune pourraient être renforcés par l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne qui d'ailleurs a prévu le changement de la dénomination de cette politique de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense à la politique de sécurité et de défense commune.

Les 29 opérations européennes de gestion des crises militaires, militaires – civiles et civiles⁴ qui se sont déroulées depuis 2003 sur 3 continents, dans les plus brûlantes régions du voisinage européen et au dehors du voisinage, parmi lesquelles les 17 missions sont toujours en pleine action, représentent l'expression d'une vraie capacité de l'Union européenne de développer une

⁴ Voir <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations.aspx?lang=fr>, consulté le 06.06.2013

politique active, intelligente et efficace dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense.

Certainement, il reste à voir et à vérifier dans quelle mesure il s'agit d'une vraie politique commune et qui est-il le plus petit dénominateur commun que les 28 pays membres peuvent le trouver. Et il ne faut pas oublier le fait que les 28 pays membres de l'Union européenne ont toutes ensemble un budget annuel de défense cumulé d'environ 200 milliards d'euro, c'est-à-dire plus que les dépenses de défense cumulés de la Chine, du Japon et de la Fédération de la Russie⁵. Mais si nous ajoutons à ces derniers chiffres, les 90 milliards d'euro qui représentent le chiffre d'affaires de l'industrie de défense de l'Union européenne on peut tirer la conclusion que l'Union pourrait être un acteur stratégique vraiment puissant.

C'est un joueur qui en dépit de sa nature complexe a réussi par ses mécanismes institutionnels et décisionnels à négocier et à mettre en place l'Agence européenne qui est responsable de développement de la coopération en matière de capacités et équipements militaires et certaines capacités civiles de gestion des crises. De plus, l'Union et les Etats membres ont réussi à mettre en oeuvre certaines catégories de forces militaires de réaction rapide, très appropriées à la réponse aux crises qui peuvent surgir dans les régions d'intérêt pour l'Union – il s'agit de Groupements tactiques de lutte ou Battle Groups⁶.

Donc, on peut remarquer que les ressources et les capacités ne manquent pas à l'Union! Ce qui semble qu'il manque c'est l'utilisation sage, efficace, cohérente et commune des toutes ces capacités! Dans cette perspective, il est possible que la dimension commune de la politique de sécurité et de défense de l'Union européenne devienne plus consistante au fur et au mesure que la structure institutionnelle générée par le Traité de Lisbonne

⁵ Chatherine Ashton, Opening address, Symposium Common Security and Defence Policy, Washington DC, 8 may, 2013,

⁶ idem

– Le Service européen d’action extérieure – sera capable à créer le désirable effet de synergie interinstitutionnelle et... intergouvernementale.

Le processus de coopération en matière de capacités de défense au sein de l’Union européenne, développé depuis 2010 sous l’égide de devise «pooling and sharing », pourrait être tant la première phase de cet effet de synergie que le signe de la prise de conscience au niveau des gouvernements des Etats membres du fait que la politique de sécurité et de défense commune doit être prise en considération comme modalité de promouvoir et de sauvegarder les intérêts nationaux et européens. L’étape suivante pourrait être celle qui a été annoncée par l’Haut Représentant pour les affaires étrangères et politique de sécurité et qu’il s’agit de la prise en charge plein par l’Union européenne de la dite l’Approche Globale – Comprehensive Approach⁷ qui prend en consideration le fait que l’Union européenne se trouve dans la situation privilégiée de disposer d’une gamme élargie de moyens et capacités d’action extérieure – militaires, civiles, humanitaires, administratives, économiques – en matière de gestion des crises.

Enfin, une carence qui affecte constamment la politique de sécurité et de défense commune et d’autres politiques européennes est représentée par la nature diffuse de la direction politique de l’Union européenne qui affaiblit la capacité de l’Union de donner les réponses appropriées aux défis qui proviennent de différentes régions, y compris de région pontique. Une possible solution à cette faiblesse structurelle pourrait offrir le Conseil européen de décembre 2013 qui à la proposition de son président, Herman van Rompuy, aura comme le sujet de débat la défense européenne⁸.

3. Les principaux défis de sécurité dans la région de la Mer Noire

Le catalogue des défis classiques ou non classiques en matière de sécurité auxquels sont confrontés la région pontique et les Etats de la région, y

⁷ ibidem

⁸ ibidem

compris les Etats qui sont membres de l'Union européenne, inclue une gamme vaste de défis qui peuvent être regroupées dans six principales catégories.

Tout d'abord, il faut mentionner les défis politiques et stratégiques parmi lesquels le plus visible est le maintien de la tendance de fragmentation de certains pays de la région, y compris par la persistance des conflits gelés dans les différentes entités séparatistes, comme Osetie du Sud, Abhazie, Nagorno-Karabackh, Transnistrie, Tchétchénie etc.

Ensuite, on peut indiquer les défis politiques et institutionnels, notamment le maintien des certains Etats faibles, ayant une capacité de gouvernance et institutionnelle précaire, en dépit de plus de vingt années passées depuis la chute des régimes communistes et la proclamation de leur indépendance. Cette capacité institutionnelle précaire a facilité le développement des réseaux de la crime organisée nationale et transnationale; ces réseaux, notamment ceux qui sont abrités dans les régions grises comme la Transnistrie, sont parfois en mesure d'entrer en compétition avec les systèmes commerciales légales, y compris par le trafic illicite de personnes, d'armements et de drogues.

Puis, il faut mettre en évidence les défis de nature militaire, notamment l'asymétrie claire en matière de capacités de défense entre les deux grands acteurs locaux, c'est-à-dire la Fédération de la Russie et la Turquie, et les autres Etats de la région pontique.

Il ne faut pas omettre certains défis économiques ayant un fort composant stratégique comme la confrontation plus ou moins avouée pour le contrôle des grands couloirs commerciaux, y compris des routes d'acheminement des ressources énergétiques de la région de la Mer Caspienne vers l'Union européenne.

Ensuite, il faut mentionner un défi plus subtil de nature sociétale qui découle de l'hétérogénéité profonde des valeurs civiques, politiques, culturelles et morales des sociétés et des élites des Etats riverains à la Mer Noire, selon l'héritage, les traditions politiques locales et la religion majoritaire.

Enfin, certains défis sociaux et démographiques doivent être mentionnés, notamment la polarisation extrême des sociétés post-communistes et les dynamiques démographiques différentes entre le Sud et l'Est de la région pontique – la Turquie et l'Azerbaïdjan qui enregistrent une augmentation de la population – et le Nord et l'Ouest de la région ayant un recul démographique accentué qui peuvent générer des flux migratoires importantes dans la région et au dehors de la région.

4. Les démarches actuelles et futures de l'Union européenne sous l'égide de sa politique de sécurité et de défense commune

L'Union européenne a essayé développer une approche assez nuancée, peut-être trop, quant à la région pontique et à l'égard des défis de sécurité qui proviennent de cette région.

La politique de voisinage de l'Union européenne et son approche adaptée à l'Europe de l'Est, c'est-à-dire le Partenariat oriental, la Synergie de la Mer Noire, les démarches déroulées par l'Haut Représentant pour les affaires étrangère et la politique de sécurité sous l'égide de la PESC représentent les principaux composants de l'approche européenne dont je disais l'année dernière, pendant la précédente conférence sur la région de la Mer Noire⁹, que celle-la est excessivement sage et trop préoccupée à ménager les susceptibilités des tous partenaires de la région, notamment celles de la Fédération de la Russie.

Les mêmes traces, parfois plus prononcées, on peut retrouver dans les actions de l'Union européenne qui tiennent de la dimension de sécurité et de défense de la PESC. Même au niveau de la communication publique dans cette matière nous pouvons remarquer l'habileté des responsables européens, tout d'abord de l'Haut Représentant pour les affaires étrangère

⁹ Voir Gheorghe Ciascai, „*La stratégie de l'Union européenne pour la région de la Mer Noire entre la synergie programmée et la prudence assumée*”, dans *European Union and Black Sea Regions*, vol. I, Giovanni Mineo Editore, 2012

et la politique de sécurité, d'éviter à mentionner la région pontique comme l'aire prioritaire d'action pour la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune. Les discours publics concernant la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune prononcés par Mme Catherine Ashton dans la première partie de l'année 2013 omettent à mentionner la région pontique, quoique l'Union européenne y déroule deux missions complexes sous l'égide de cette politique: EUMM dans la Georgie (d'après la guerre russo-géorgienne de 2008) et EUBAM dans la Moldavie et l'Ukraine. Si le Caucase de Sud et la Georgie sont parfois mentionnées dans les communications de presse de l'Union européenne à la suite des incidents dans la zone qui sépare l'Osetie de Sud de Georgie, des autres parties de la région pontique sont entrés dans une approche européenne de routine, bien que les événements troublants de mai et de juin 2013 de Turquie relèvent la complexité de l'espace pontique.

Le renoncement au Représentant Spécial de l'Union européenne dans la République Moldavie et l'implication extrêmement prudente de l'Union dans les autres dossiers régionaux mettent en évidence une sorte de ligne rouge tacitement établie entre la Fédération de la Russie et l'Union européenne.

Si nous examinerions avec une attitude plus critique la prudence excessive manifestée par l'Union européenne dans la région pontique en matière de politique de sécurité et de défense commune, nous pourrions poser la question suivante: dans quelle catégorie d'actions européennes doit être introduite la décision du Conseil de maintenir au dehors de l'espace Schengen deux Etats membres de l'Union européenne riveraines à la Mer Noire qui se trouvent sur le couloir d'acheminement des ressources énergétiques vers l'Union européenne et de trafic illicite vers la même Union?

Le SELEC de Bucarest¹⁰, les capacités militaires, les connaissances et les compétences réelles quant au voisinage et à l'espace pontique de la

¹⁰ Southeast European Law Enforcement Center, voir <http://www.secicenter.org/>

Roumanie et de la Bulgarie apportent certainement une réelle valeur ajoutée à la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune de l'Union, y compris à l'égard de défis qui proviennent de région de la Mer Noire.

La preuve que ces deux Etats représentent des atouts réels pour la dimension de sécurité et de défense de l'Union européenne vient de leur capacité de développer des structures de forces de type des Groupements tactiques de l'UE¹¹ qui sont ouverts à la participation des Etats de la région pontique qui ne sont pas membres de l'Union européenne. Ainsi, en 2011 déjà, la Turquie a participé à coté de l'Italie et de la Roumanie dans un Groupement tactique et en 2012 l'Ukraine a été incluse dans un Groupement tactique mis à la disposition de l'UE par les Etats membres de l'Europe de Sud-Est, c'est-à-dire la Grèce, la Bulgarie, la Roumanie et le Chypre.

Cette inclusion des pays pontiques non membres de l'Union européenne dans les capacités militaires développées sous l'égide de la Politique de sécurité et de défense pourrait être une solution plus sage quant aux défis de sécurité de la région en comparaison avec la prudence excessive des hauts responsables de l'Union. Et il ne faut jamais oublier que cette région est essentielle pour assurer la sécurité énergétique et, par conséquence, pour la sécurité économique de l'Union européenne et de ses citoyens.

¹¹ Voir http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/fr/esdp/91846.pdf; consulté le 05.06.2013